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Since 1937, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) 
has marketed hydroelectric power to utility and industrial 
customers in the Pacific Northwest. In 1982, the agency 
found itself in a new role, one which required it to acquire 
whatever power resources were needed to meet the demands of 
the region's utilities. In particular, its Administrator 
had to confront the problem of how to deal with the 
ii 
escalating costs of the troubled Washington Public Power 
Supply System's nuclear plant projects. In response, BPA 
undertook the preparation of its first independent regional 
power forecast. The process by which this forecast was 
produced was intricate and multidimensional, involving a 
variety of parties having stakes in the outcome of the WPPSS 
decision. Application of the Multiple Perspective Concept 
to this process illuminates its technical, organizational, 
and personal dimensions and, in doing so, uncovers both 
strengths and weaknesses in the forecast. 
Examination of the forecast from the technical 
perspective revealed an elaborate set of interlinked models. 
Baseline, high, and low forecasts were developed based upon 
different sets of economic projections and different 
assumptions about conservation and resource acquisition. 
The organizational perspective revealed BPA to be in a 
transitional stage. Its more traditional engineering 
functions waned in relative importance, as new functions 
grounded more heavily in economics (ratemaking, forecasting, 
conservation, resource acquisition, and financial manage-
ment) swelled. Interorganizationally, environmentalists, 
ratepayer groups, and the region's utilities all had strong 
but contrasting interests in the outcome of any decision 
regarding the fate of the WPPSS plants. 
The personal perspective revealed that each of the 
Administrators heading BPA since the early 1970s defined 
iii 
the agency's approach to the resource planning problem 
differently. In the early 1970s , where major regional power 
deficits seemed imminent, Donald Hodel, then Administrator, 
approached this problem as one having an engineering 
solution: build capacity ahead of need. When his successor, 
Sterling Munro, was confronted by slowing load growth and 
increasing regional concern over rate disparities and 
environmental protection, he focused upon a predominantly 
political solution: the passage of Regional Power Act legis-
lation. Finally, Peter Johnson, Administrator at the time 
of the 1982 forecast, facing the economic strains placed 
upon the Northwest by WPPSS, reframed the problem as one 
having a business solution. 
Taken together, the Multiple Perspectives yielded the 
following conclusions about BPAs 1982 forecast. 
BPA's range forecast constituted a major improvement 
over the point forecasts preceeding it. It did, however, 
leave important classes of uncertainty unexplored and the 
region vulnerable to certain events or outcomes. 
BPA's models were better suited to address certain 
issues important at the time of the 1982 forecast than their 
predecessors (e.g. rate provisions of the Regional Power 
Act, conservation potential, etc.). The model of the 
national economy, however, remained a black box, potentially 
significant feedbacks (e.g. electricity prices on economic 
variables) were not represented, and the sheer size and 
iv 
elaborateness of the modeling system placed practical limits 
on its use. 
The technical review process surrounding the forecast 
ultimately resulted in a new consensus within the power 
planning community on load futures (i.e. low growth). This 
review process centered on choices between existing models 
and, to the degree it required a fluency in econometrics and 
engineering concepts, undoubtedly excluded potential 
valuable insights. 
A stronger method of dealing with forecast uncertainty 
is needed, one which utilizes a disaster-avoidance strategy 
and plans for high impact/low probability events (such as 
oil shocks, Depressions, nuclear accidents, etc.). This 
method need not involve the use of large models, but should 
seek to incprorate qualitative insights from persons 
normally outside the technical sphere. 
111 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Guidance and encouragement is essential to a research 
project as ambitious as this dissertation. I would like to 
thank my committee members, Jack Churchill, George Lendaris, 
William Manning, and especially the committee chairman, 
Harold Linstone, for their assistance, cooperation, and 
patience in this effort. 
I would also like to express thanks to the Bonneville 
Power Administration, both for their openness and support in 
this project. Particularly helpful, at various stages of my 
work, were John McConnaughey, Terry Esvelt, Don Hoffard, 
Chuck Schneider, Roger Moore, and members of the Uncertainty 
Work Group. 
Special thanks go to Kimm Olin for producing this 
document under a series of tight deadlines. 
Finally, I thank my mother and my trusty beagle, Casey, 
for moral support throughout the project. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................•............. IiI 
LI ST OF TABLES .............•.......•.........•........ viii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............•.................•........ x 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .•.•........•...•.•.......•...... xiii 
CHAPTER 
I 
II 
INTRODUCTION 1 
Overview: Loads, Forecasts, and Power 
Planning ............................. 1 
Background: The Historical Context for 
Columbia River Resource Planning ••... 6 
The New Deal and Growth of the North-
west 
The Hydrothermal Power Plan, WPPSS 
& the Regional Power Act 
Power Forecasts and Their Role in 
Shaping the Northwest's Future 
The Multiple Perspective Concept: Three 
15 
Views of the Forecast .•......•..•..•• 20 
THE T-PERSPECTlVE •.•.•••.••••....••••••.•... 30 
Forecasts, Decisions, and Plans: 
The Technical Context for Model Usage 30 
An Overview of BPA Forecasting System 38 
Energy Demand and Energy Supply: The 
Models Used in BPA's Forecast 
Economic/Demographic Projections: 
Inputs to Energy Forecasting 
Models 
44 
CHAPTER 
Demand Models: End-Use and Econo-
metric Tools 
The Supply Pricing Model 
Projections of Regional Energy Con-
sumption: Outputs and Adjust-
ments 
The Regional Demand Forecast: Evaluation 
v 
PAGE 
from the T-Perspective .•...........•. 139 
Inputs, Outputs, Data Flows: The 
Forecasting System Revisited 
Forecasts Core Assumptions: White 
and Black Boxes 
Forecast Evaluation: Risk and 
Reliabili ty 
Ends and Means: The Forecast in the 
Context of Planning Objectives 
III THE O-PERSPECTlVE •••.•••.•••..••...•.••••... 177 
Organizations and Their Products: An 
Introduction to the O-Perspective 177 
The Intraorganizational Dynamics of BPA: 
A Look Inward ............. e'. • • • • • • • • • 182 
Overview: The Climate Within the 
Organization 
Power Requirements: Projecting Loads 
and the Regional Economy 
Rates: Lessening Disparities Under 
the Terms of the Regional Act 
Conservation: A New Organizational 
Priority in the 1980s 
Power Resources: New Options for 
Electricity Supply 
Significant "Non-Participants": 
Financial Management and the 
Policy Committee 
The Interorganizational Power Planning 
Arena: A Look Outward .•••••••••••.••• 211 
CHAPTER 
Overview: The Texture of Changing 
Roles and Responsibilities 
The PNUCC: A Waning of Traditional 
Authority in Forecasting 
The Regional Council: A New Look at 
Resource Planning 
ODOE: The Council's Precursor in 
Oregon? 
NRDC: Alternative Futures for Alter-
native Energy 
DSI's: New Contracts, New Conditions 
The Northwest Natural Gas Distribu-
tors: The Other Guys 
The "Expert" Groups: Consultants and 
Research Organizations 
The Media: Selectively Reflecting the 
Issues 
The Energy Forecasting Arena Through the 
O-Perspective: Summary and 
vi 
PAGE 
Conclusions •.•.•.•••.......••....•••• 236 
IV THE P-PERSPECTIVE .•.•.•...•.....•..•......•. 252 
V 
When Individuals Do Make a Difference 
The P-Perspective in Overview .....••• 252 
Managing the Organization: A View From 
the Top .... 0 I I ... CI " • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 256 
Managing the Forecast: A View From the 
Middle .................... It • • • • • • • • • • • 271 
The P-Perspective -- Concluding Remarks .• 291 
CROSS-CUING THE PERSPECTIVES 294 
Introduction: Cross-Cuing - The Decision 
Process in 3-D ••••..•.......••..••••• 294 
Cross Cuing: The "Map" ••••••..••••.•...•• 298 
Dp.scribing the Timelines - T, 0, and 
P in Parallel 
CHAPTER 
Events and Impacts - A DiscusSion of 
the Elements and Cross Cues in 
the Map 
A Digraph Interpretation of the Fore-
vii 
PAGE 
cast Process ...•..................... 403 
VI CONCLUSIONS ................................. 414 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Tying the Threads Together: An Overview 
of the Chapter ...........•.........•. 414 
Conclusions About the Forecast: What 
Multiple Perspectives Says .........•. 415 
Conclusions from the T-Perspective 
Conclusions from the O-Perspective 
Conclusions from the P-Perspective 
Conclusions from T- and O-Perspective 
Cross-Cues 
Conclusions from T- and P-Perspective 
Cross-Cues 
Conclusions from 0- and P-Perspective 
Cross-Cues 
Conclusions From T, 0, and P: The Big 
Picture 
Conclusions about Multiple Perspectives: 
What the BPA Forecast Says ..•........ 488 
Overall Methodological Considerations 
Specific Methodological Conclusions 
Concluding Thoughts •••.•••.•....••....... 506 
Postscript 1987 ..............•..•.••.•... 511 
.......................................... 518 
TABLE 
I 
II 
LIST OF TABLES 
Multiple Perspectives .................... . 
Basic Industry Employment Estimation •••... 
III Key Energy Forecast Assumptions. Explicit 
Modeling Choices by Sector ............ 
IV Summary of Residential Model Inputs ....... 
V Summary of Commercial Model Inputs ........ 
VI Inputs to the NEPP Industrial Model ....... 
VII Inputs to the Supply Pricing Model ........ 
VIII Summary of Forecast Results by Sector 
PAGE 
25 
61 
77 
82 
101 
119 
127 
( 1 0 a 0 MWH) ••.••.••••••..•••••.••.••••. 13 8 
IX Summary of Forecast Core Assumptio~s ..•... 159 
X A Summary of Organizational Actors in the 
Forecasting Process .•.....•............ 237 
XI Administrators' Perspectives on Resource 
Development ............................ 267 
XII A Suwnary of Comments Presented at BPA's 
Technical Workshops ••...•...•.•.......• 352 
XIII Technical Choices Made by BPA For Its 1982 
Forecast 379 
XIV A Summary of Technical Changes Between Draft 
and Final Forecasts •..•..•••••.•....•.• 386 
XV Comments on BPA's Forecast and Responses ..• 397 
ix 
TABLE PAGE 
XVI Selected Core Assumptions Underlying BPA's 
1982 Forecast .......................... 466 
XVII A Summary of Key Conclusions from Multiple 
Perspective ........................... 489 
LIST OF FIGURES 
FIGURE PAGE 
1. Relationship of Rates, Resources, and 
Regional Growth ....................... . 9 
2. The BPA System of Forecasting Models. 
An Overview of Inputs, Models, and 
outputs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 
3. Schematic of Models Used for Economic/ 
Demographic Inputs. A Diagram of 
Data Flows Between Models ..•.•.....••... 47 
4. 
5. 
Dynamics Assumed by Economic Base Model. A 
Digraph of Relationships Between Basic 
and Non-Basic Industries ••..•.•.••.••••. 
The BPA Population Model. A Flowchart of 
52 
calculations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . . . . . .. . . 63 
6. The BPA Housing Model. The Derivation of 
Hou~holds, Average Unit Size and New 
Cons truct i on ............................ . 
7. Flow Chart of Regional Income Model 
8. Schematic: ORNL Residential Energy Use 
67 
70 
Hodel ................................... 79 
9. Calculation of Average Energy Use in the 
ORNL Residential Model .••••...•••..••.•.. 84 
FIGURE 
10. 
11. 
12. 
Calculation of Thermal Integrity in the 
ORNL Residential Model ....•...•........ 
Calculation of Heating Fuel saturations in 
the ORNL Residential Model ..•.......... 
Calculation of Appliance Usage Intensity 
in the ORNL Residential Model ..•....... 
13. Final Energy Use Calculation for the ORNL 
xi 
PAGE 
86 
89 
90 
Residential Model....................... 93 
14. An Overview of the structure of the ORNL 
Model of Commercial Sector Energy Use .... 
15. Calculation of Floorspace Additions in the 
ORNL Commercial Model 
16. Calculation of Energy Use Per Square Foot 
98 
103 
in the ORNL Commercial Model ...••....... 106 
17. Calculation of Floorspace saturations by Fuel 
and End-Use in the ORNL Commercial Model. 110 
18. Calculation of Equipment Utilization in the 
ORNL Commercial Model •.•...••.....••.••• 112 
19. Computation of Final Energy Use In the ORNL 
Commercial Model 114 
20. An Overview of the structure of the NEFF 
Industrial Energy Use Model 120 
xii 
FIGURE PAGE 
21. An Overview of the structure of the BPA 
Supply Pricing Model .•.................. 128 
22. Adjacency Matrix for Models in the Fore-
casting System........................... 142 
23. Reachability Matrix for Models in the Fore-
casting System •.........•......•..•.••.. 144 
24. Input-Output Diagram of BPA Forecasting 
System. A Detailed Representation of Data 
Flows in the Modeling System •........... 147 
25. Organizational Charts of BPA 1971 - 1982 
(selected detail). A Look at the Growth 
of Power Requirements (A), Rates (B), 
Conservation (C), Power Resources (D), 
and Financial Management (E) .•........• 194 
26. Map of Cross Cues Between the Three Perspec-
tives. Critical Events, Decisions, and 
Processes Depicted on Timelines ...•..... 299 
27. A Digraph Representation of Multiple Per-
spectives Surrounding BPA's 1982 Fore-
cast .................................... 406 
AEA 
BPA 
CEC 
CRA 
DOE 
DRI 
DSI 
EVA 
IOU 
LBL 
MSNW -
NEPP -
NERA -
NRDC -
ODOE -
OPEC -
ORNL -
PGE 
PNUCC-
POWER-
PP&L -
PSU 
SCL 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
Applied Economics Associates 
Bonneville Power Administration 
California Energy Commission 
Charles Rivers Associates 
Department of Interior 
Data Resources Incorporated 
Direct Service Industry 
Energy Ventures Analysis 
Investor-Owned Utility 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 
Math Sciences Northwest 
National Energy Policy Project 
National Economics Research Associates 
Natural Resources Defense Council 
Oregon Department of Energy 
organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Portland General Electric 
Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee 
People's Organization for Washington Energy 
Resources 
Pacific Power and Light 
Portland State Univ~rsity 
Seattle City Light 
SOM 
SOU 
WNP 
WPPSS-
WSU 
Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill 
Sum-Of-Utilities-Forecast 
WPPSS Nuclear Plant 
Washington Public Power Supply System 
Washington State University 
xiv 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
OVERVIEW: LOADS, FORECASTS, AND POWER PLANNING 
The passage of the Regional Po\rer Act in 1980 reflected 
a shared recognition of the need for more extensive and 
careful planning of the region's energy resources. Not 
surprisingly, in parallel with this increased concern for 
resource planning there has emerged a concern for the devel-
opment of reliable long-term electricity demand forecasts. 
For most of the Bonneville Power Administration's existence, 
an overabundance of power and the ready availability of new 
hydroelectric sites made demand forecasting relatively sim-
ple: elementary trend extrapolations sufficed. When elec-
tricity is cheap and readily available, the incentives for 
conservation and efficient resource allocation are few. 
Under such conditlons, no major changes in resource mix or 
development strategy are to be expected. When new resources 
are expensive and potentially damaging to the environment, 
forecasting becomes more difficult technically and more sen-
sitive politically because demand projections way be used to 
justify decisions dlfferentially affecting the population. 
In the current situation not only has the complexity 
of demand forecasting grown, but a need to understand the 
practical implications of such forecasts more clearly has 
become paramount. New generations of econometric a~d 
end-use models used for forecasting allow a wider array of 
social, economic, and political factors which influence 
demand to be dealt with. At the same time, however, they 
introduce complexity (and often ambiguity) and sometimes 
conceal judgmental manipulations buried in the elaborate 
structures of the models. Such introduction of judgment, 
along with the inevitable imposition of practical and 
organizational constraints on methodology, render fore-
casting a dynamic activity, and one that cannot be under-
stood or evaluated by technical criteria alone. 
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Under the terms of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power 
Planning and Conservation Act, the primary responsibility 
for long-term regional forecasts and resource acquisition 
plans lies with the Regional Council's staff. SPA, however, 
is required to make resource acquisition and f1nancing 
decisions which depend, at least in part, on a long-term 
projection of electricity demand growth. In the past, BPA 
has been a participant in the Sum-Of-Utilities forecast of 
the Pacific Northwest Utilities Conference Committee 
(PNUCC). In the period immediately preceding the publica-
tion of the Council's official regional forecast and 
regional plan in 1983, SPA's decisions were based entirely 
upon its own first independent long-range demand forecast, 
developed using a methodology and a set of models which 
closely resemble those ultimately adopted by the Council. 
Hore specifically, this independent forecast required the 
development of primary economic and demographic inputs, the 
iterative use of an electricity supply pricing model with 
demand forecasting models (for residential, commercial, and 
industrial sectors), and ongoing public involvement during 
the forecast development period. 
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Given the regional importance of the BPA forecast and 
the complexity of the associated technical and non-technical 
factors, a thorough analysis of the forecasting process as 
well as the methodology is warranted. The aim of this 
dissertation is to perform such an analysis of the BPA 
forecast. The main methodological tool to be employed is 
the Multiple Perspective Concept developed by Linstone et al 
(1981), described in detail below. 
The objectives of the research described in this 
dissertation are threefold. The first 1s to understand more 
clearly and completely how forecasts of energy and, more 
specifically, electricity loads affect regional decision-
making processes in the areas of economic and power 
planning. Within the forecasting and futures research 
communities there is fairly widespread acceptance of the 
idea that the chief task of forecasters is not to predict 
exactly what will occur in the future, but rather to provide 
planners and decision makers with information which will 
help them better anticipate future possibilities (or future 
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consequences of present decisions). In recognition of the 
possible effects of forecasts as self-fulfilling or 
self-denying prophecies, point forecasts specifying a single 
future are increasingly being replaced by range and 
contingency forecasts which explore the consequences of 
different sets of potential events and circumstances. Even 
in such a broadened (and to some extent self-critical) 
forecasting context, however, it is essential to explore 
what Ascher (1978) refers to as "core assumptions", usually 
unstated assumptions about background or context factors 
which influence the behavior of the variables or trends 
under investigation. The first objective, then, is to use 
the Multiple Perspective Concept to gain a better under-
standing of the elements and assumptions which give shape to 
the numerical values embodied in the final forecast. 
The second and complementary objective is to gain a 
better understanding of the process of forecasting. 
Forecasts are used as data upon which decisions are made. 
The information needs of decision makers serve to define 
both the research questions asked and the models selected to 
answer them. Moreover, the varieties of problems which 
forecasts address can be seen to undergo development over 
time as members of the forecasting and decision-making 
"communities" interact. Interactions among the numerous 
elements of the forecasting process are complex and multi-
dimensional. The Multiple Perspective Concept, with its 
explicit recognition of distinct technical, organizational, 
and personal dimensions of problem solving or decision-
making situations provides a useful tool in explicating the 
dynamic, interactive characteristics of demand forecasting. 
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The third and final objective is to develop and demon-
strate further the usefulness and applicability of the 
Multiple Perspective Concept (the MP Concept) as a tool for 
researching complex aspects of decision making. The power 
forecasting context chosen for the research described in 
this dissertation, characterized as it is by the use of new 
models in a politically sensitive situation engendering a 
modicum of organizational restructuring, is ideally suited 
to analysis using the Multiple Perspective methodology. 
Application of this conceptual and methodological framework 
to the forecasting situation descibed should result in the 
fulfillment of the first two objectives. In addition, 
however, a generalization of findings on the use of the MP 
Concept and the interrelation between the perspectives is an 
important additional goal of the research. 
Before beginning an examination and analysis of BPA's 
first independent long-term forecast, however, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at both the context in which 
the forecast was performed and the tool to be used for the 
investigation. The remainder of this chapter thus focuses 
upon the history of power planning in the Pacific Northwest 
and the characteristics of the Multiple Perspective Concept. 
BACKGROUND: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT FOR COLUMBIA 
RIVER RESOURCE PLANNING 
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Current regional power planning efforts, and the 
forecasts used to support them, may be fully understood only 
by placing them in an historical context. The resources of 
the Columbia River, along with its numerous tributaries, 
have been central to the sustained development of the 
Pacific Northwest, and have in many ways formed the core of 
the region's economy. A brief examination of the history of 
the development of the Columbia River system is thus 
necessary to illuminate the numerous issues which surround 
the use of its waters, particularly as they relate to power 
resource use and planning. 
The New Deal and the Growth of the Northwest 
The modern-day development of the Columbia River had 
its roots in the Depression years of the 1930s. Appalled by 
the poverty of the then relatively underdeveloped Northwest, 
President Franklin Roosevelt author!zed the construction of 
the first of a series of dams along the Columbia in March, 
1933. Authorized under the National Industrial Recovery 
Act, the Bonneville and Grand Coulee Dams typified the 
multiple-purpose Public Works Administration projects of the 
era. In addition to creating a wealth of jobs at a time 
they were desperately needed the projects allowed funds from 
the Federal Treasury to be funnelled into undertakings 
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designed to stimulate economic growth; undertakings of a 
scale well above what small governmental bodies or private 
interests could afford to implement. Specifically, 
positioning massive dams at key locations along the Columbia 
served to control floods, enhance navigation (and, hence, 
commercial transport), expand recreational opportunities, 
and promote irrigation through the control of streamflows. 
Perhaps most significantly, the dams permitted the region to 
tap the awesome hydroelectric potential of the Columbia 
River system. With the facilities subsidized by Federal 
funds and constructed by the Army Corps of Engineers, the 
hydropower generated at the damsites promised to be both 
cheap and abundant -- perfectly suited for Roosevelt's 
objective of the rural electrification of the Northwest. On 
August 20, 1937 Roosevelt signed the Bonneville Project Act, 
creating the Bonneville Power Administration within the 
Department of the Interior. This act established BPA as a 
power marketing agency, empowering it to bu1ld and operate 
transmission facilities necessary to encourage the widest 
possible use of electric energy, giving preference and 
priority of its use to public bodies and cooperatives 
(Springer, 1976). 
Over the next thirty years, the addition of twenty more 
Federal dams along the river essentially transformed it from 
a freeflowing stream (w1thin which many varieties anadromous 
fish flourished) into a series of manmade lakes. As long as 
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the Federal government was willing to invest U.S. Treasury 
dollars in these large scale projects (built at relatively 
low cost) electric power was both cheap and abundant. Not 
only was BPA able to market power from the Federal based 
hydrosystem to the public bodies and cooperatives of the 
region which comprised its "preference customers" but it 
also had plenty of power to sell to other groups, most 
notably Investor Owned Utilities (IaUs) and Direct Service 
Industries (DSls). The latter group was composed of large, 
electricity-intensive industries, such as aluminum, which 
settled in the region during World War II. These industries 
remained after the War, signing long-term contracts with BPA 
guaranteeing them a reliable electricity supply. DSls were 
"serviced directly" in that they maintained their own trans-
formers and bought power directly from BPA rather than from 
the public or private utilities within the region. Inexpen-
sive electricity also brought industrial and commercial 
customers to the region who did not buy directly from BPA, 
but benefitted substantially from the Federal hydrosystem. 
Underlying this trend of regional growth was a set of 
dynamic processes which was essentially self-amplifying. 
For a long period of time the network of dams was somewhat 
"overbuilt" -- that is, the system was capable of generating 
more power than was needed. Under conditions of surplus, it 
is to everyone's advantage to seek new customers and raise 
demand levels. This is because when the construction, 
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operating, and maintenance costs associated with the power 
system are spread over a larger base the costs per kilowatt 
are lower. Low rates also promote the use of electricity 
where alternative fuels might be substituted if they were 
price-competitive (e.g. electric resistance space heating in 
homes instead of gas heat). 
--+::::===--tNEW CUSTOMERS 
RATES GENERATING 
CAPACITY 
+ 
Figure 1. Relationship of rates, resources, and regional 
growth 
Figure 1 represents this dynamic in the form of what is 
called a digraph. A '+' above an arrow indicates that the 
element at the head (point) of the arrow is influenced to 
change its size or value in the same direction as that of 
the element at the arrow's tail (i.e. if the tail element 
increases or decreases so also will the head element). 
Conversely, a '-' indicates that the two elements change in 
opposite directions; an increase in the value of the tail 
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element will produce a decrease in the head element while a 
decrease will engender an increase. What the digraph in 
this generalized form omits, however, is the strength of the 
links and the exact sequencing of the reciprocal impacts 
(i.e. the time lags). During the Northwest's growth period 
hydroelectric generating capacity was added in large chunks 
on a regular basis as the Corps of Engineers continued to 
exploit the sites along the Columbia River System promising 
the highest yield. The influx of new customers into the 
region was steady enough that wholesale electricity rates 
were among the lowest in the country and rate increases were 
minor. In the late sixties and early seventies, however, a 
number of developments took place which were destined to 
change this situation. 
The Hydrothermal Power Plan. wpPSS. and the Regional POwer 
The signing of the Columbia River Treaty in 1964 and 
the subsequent construction of the intertie connecting the 
Northwest with the Pacific Southwest in many ways heralded 
the end of an era of the growth of cheap hydropower in the 
region. The treaty allowed the joint U.S.-Canadian con-
struction of a final series of dams near and above the 
canadian border. In the short-term, these projects resulted 
in a sizable power surplus. Canada's share of this surplus 
was especially large in proportion to the population of 
British Columbia. As a consequence, one of the conditions 
of the Treaty specified that the u.s. (i.e. SPA) would 
promise to purchase a share of Canada's surplus. The 
intertie permitted SPA to sell available surplus power to 
Cali fornia. 
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Despite the bountiful supply of hydropower available to 
seemingly any customer desiring it, it became apparent that 
virtually all the potential sites for high-head, Federally--
sponsored hydro projects had been exhausted. Projections of 
continued high demand growth suggested to the power planners 
of this era that alternative sources of generation would be 
needed to prevent anticipated power deficits. SPA's 
response to this perceived need was the development and 
institution of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan in 1968. As a 
power marketing agency, SPA did not possess the authority to 
build any generation. Under the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan, 
however, SPA entered into a "net billing" arrangement 
with its preference customers. Under net billing SPA 
acquires the power generated by thermal plants constructed 
by the public utilities which comprise its preference 
customers and integrates this power into its transmission 
grid. BPA assumes the preference customer's share of the 
costs of the new thermal plants, and averages these costs 
with those of the less expensive hydropower. Regional power 
rates then reflect this melded cost of thermal and hydro-
electric energy. 
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Perhaps the most significant of the thermal resource 
development projects undertaken were the five nuclear plants 
constructed primarily by the Washington Public Power Supply 
System (WPPSS), a consortium of 16 public utility districts, 
with secondary participation by major investor-owned 
utilities in the region. While BPA assumed a role in the 
financing of only the first three of the five plants, all 
were planned and sited in anticipation of the major power 
shortages then predicted to occur in the mid-1980s which 
provided the impetus for the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan. 
Progressively, increasing regional demand for 
electricity and ambitious new thermal plant construction 
altered the dynamic illustrated by Figure 1, modifying 
primarily the strength and timing of the reciprocal impacts 
depicted. New generating capacity was being added in the 
form of coal and nuclear plants sponsored by various public 
and private utilities instead of the usual form of large-
scale, relatively regularly scheduled Federal hydro 
projects. Whereas the Corps of Engineers' expertise was 
largely a known quantity, that of the contractors involved 
In the construction of the various thermal projects was not, 
and, In retrospect, proved highly variable in quality from 
project to project. Cost overruns, sometimes immense (as In 
the case of the WPPSS nucl~ar plants), plagued and delayed 
construction and, to the extent that these costs were 
incorporated into rate structures, caused a series of 
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"jumps" in the price of electricity. Moreover, because a 
surplus of hydropower was no longer available, the regions's 
IOU's could no longer depend upon BPA for their power 
supply. They now were forced to take a back seat to the 
region's preference customers. As a result, private 
utilities had to rely more heavily upon expensive thermal 
power than their public utility counterparts, creating 
significant rate disparities in the region. Along with a 
growing concern for the potentially hazardous enviromental 
impacts of thermal plants (particularly nuclear), these rate 
disparities triggered a number of political responses. A 
variety of groups actively championed conservation as an 
environmentally sound and cost-effective alternative to 
increased thermal generating capacity, some of them 
intervening in facility siting procedures. Additionally, 
several pieces of legislation were prepared, target ted at 
the differential regional electricity rates. DRPA 
(Domestic and Rural Power Authority) would have transformed 
all of the residential and small farm customers in the state 
of Oregon, largely served by rous with noticeably higher 
rates, into a large public utility district, thereby 
entitling them to preference customer status. The Pacific 
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Bill 
(known familiarly as the Regional Bill) was proposed in the 
1970s and finally enacted in 1980. Reflecting the pr1or1-
t1es of an impending energy "crisis" as perceived during the 
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19705, the Act established a Regional Power Planning Council 
comprised of eight members, two persons appointed by each of 
the governors of the four states in the region (Washington, 
Oregon, Idaho, and Western Montana). The Council is respon-
sible for developing a twenty-year demand forecast and 
resource acquisition plan giving conservation and renewable 
resources priority over any new non-renewable energy 
sources. The Act also considerably augmented BPA's respon-
sibilities in the region, requiring it to acquire all the 
resources necessary to supply wholesale power to any 
utilities applying for it. Under the power allocation 
strategy defined by the Act, BPA's existing preference 
customers enjoy electric rates which cannot exceed what they 
would have been without the passage of the Act. Investor 
owned utilities are permitted to "exchange" power for their 
residential and small farm customers, priced at the 
utility's average wholesale cost, for electricity at the 
lower Federal rate, thereby considerably reducing regional 
rate disparities. The DSls, in effect, provide rate relief 
for the IOU's domestic and rural customers through rate 
increases they bear in exchange for long-term firm power 
contracts that would otherwise not be available. Subject to 
these requirements, Bonneville must project demand and 
purchase whatever power is needed to prevent shortages, 
employing the same priority ranking for resource acquisition 
as does the council. 
15 
POWER FORECASTS AND THEIR ROLE IN SHAPING THE NORTHWEST'S 
FUTURE 
It was thus in a set of circumstances very different 
from what had served for over thirty years as the regional 
status guo that BPA assumed its new and augmented roles and 
responsibilities. Severe cost overruns on new thermal 
facilities, increasing rate disparities, and a growing 
advocacy of conservation and environmental protection had 
undermined the dynamiCS of steady regional growth. In the 
wake of the passage of the Regional Act, resource and rate 
planning became matters of increasing concern: BPA could not 
afford to compound the consequences of mistakes and mis-
judgments which it inherited from the 1970s. BPA's first 
independent long-term forecast, prepared in 1982 (a full 
year before that of the Regional Council) was thus destined 
to prove central to a number of financially critical and 
politically sensitive decisions concerning the Power System. 
A major factor compounding the sensitIve nature of 
BPA's forecast was the role earlier forecasts has played in 
shaping some of the region's emerging problems. Beginning 
in 1954, the Pacific Northwest utilities Conference 
Committee (PNUCC), a consortium of all of the region's 
utilities, prepared 11-year (and, after 1968,o20-year) 
forecasts of loads and resource requirements for the west 
Group Area (a geographic domain, largely congruent with the 
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Northwest Region, except for the omissions of portions of 
eastern Oregon and Idaho). PNUCC's forecast for the west 
Group Area, known as the Sum-Of-Utilities (SOU) forecast, 
was produced, as the name suggests, by simply adding 
together the forecasts submitted by the DSIs, IOUs, and 
public utilities in the region. Bonneville was a regular 
participant in the SOU forecast, producing demand pro-
jections for a number of the public utilities that lacked 
their own load forecasting capabilities. The ostensible 
strength of this approach is that it allows each utility to 
take a hard look at its own service territories; territories 
about which it is presumably best informed. In practice, 
however, a wide variation in forecasting expertise and 
sophistication exists among the member utilities of PNUCC, 
and key assumptions about economic and population growth and 
the elasticity of demand with respect to price which each of 
the utilities made in preparing their own forecasts were 
often inconsistent. Between 1968 and 1978 the projected 
twenty-year average annual rates of growth (AARGs) expressed 
in the SOU forecasts were conspicuously high, though falling 
from 5.3\ to 3.8\ very gradually over this period (Marshall, 
1978:23). However they may have differed in their judgment 
of specifics, virtually all of the member utilities assumed 
that the regional economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s would 
continue unabated through the periods described in the 
forecasts and that power would remain sufficiently inex-
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pensive that ~atepayers would maintain existing consumption 
levels, even in the face of inevitable rate increases. In 
addition to the efficacy of these assumptions in inflating 
10ng-te~m fo~ecasts, seve~al othe~ incentives have been 
cited as sources of ove~fo~ecasting du~ing this period 
(Ernst and Ernst, 1976): the legal requirement of utilities 
to supply anyone requesting power, the perceived moral 
obligation to prevent power shortfalls, and (so long as the 
~egulated retu~n on investment exceeds the cost of capital) 
the tendency to add capital equipment in orde~ to inc~ease 
ove~all revenues. Though, in hindsight, the erroneous 
unde~pinnings of these forecasts appear self-evident, at the 
time a 5\ AARG of regional electricity demand was generally 
accepted as realistic, and utility planners championed the 
inc~eased construction of thermal plants in response to 
their belief in the reliability of these estimates. 
Notably, eighty-eight of the region's utilities ~esponded by 
joining the construction consortium for the ill-fated WPPSS 
nuclear projects 4 and 5, endeavoring to avoid a power 
shurtfall anticipated to occur in mid-1983. 
The lower growth power consumption patte~ns of the late 
1970s suggested that the demand projections contained in the 
SOU forecasts might prove unrealistically high. Economic 
recession, slowed regional g~owth, and conce~n about the 
effects of often escalating the~mal plant const~uction 
costs on future rates led to speculation about the 
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consequent impact of these factors on the size of loads. A 
number of alternative regional forecasts were developed in 
response to the perceived severity of this uncertainty. In 
1977, PNUCC began using an econometric model (described in 
more detail in Chapter II) developed by National Economic 
Research Associates (NERA) as a cross-checK for its ~OU 
forecast. This model's demand projections, however, 
basically tracked those of the SOU forecast and, as such, 
did not provide a noticeably different alternative to the 
utility industry's "conventional wisdom" (twenty-year growth 
rates ranging from 4.11 to 5.46 percent, with a mean of 
4.55\ in the first year of the model's use). Substantially 
different growth rates, however, had been produced several 
years earlier by the Washington State University (WSU) 
Environmental Research Center. In 1975, the WSU research 
group prepared a set of three thirty-year (1971-2000) demand 
projections for electricity, natural gas, oil, and coal for 
each of the states in the Pacific Northwest (PNW). The 
end-use model employed by WSU projected demand for four 
consuming sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, and 
extractive) based upon various sets of assumptions regarding 
population and fuel prices. The WSU forecasts were markedly 
lower than either PNUCC's SOU or econometric forecasts, 
displaying 30-year AARGs ranging from 1.43 to 2.38 percent 
(Harshall 1978:31). Early in 1977, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC) in Palo Alto, California prepared an 
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end-use analysis of power demand in the Northwest. Building 
upon other studies (particularly a 1976 report prepared for 
BPA by the consulting firm of Skidmore, Owings, and Herrill) 
rather than employing an econometric or end-use model, 
NRDC's forecast focused upon potential conservation savings 
in the region. Assuming that virtually all of the waste of 
electricity could be eliminated by conservation (without 
zegard to the nature or effectiveness of the incentives 
needed to bring about these demand reductions) and that no 
thermal plants would be built other than those approved or 
under construction in 1977, NRDC projected a modest 2.41 
percent annual growth from 1975 to 1985, followed by a 
slight decline in loads (0.95 percent) between 1985 and 
1995. Lastly, in 1978, the Northwest Energy Policy Project 
(NEPP) released a twelve volume report evaluating regional 
energy issues and policy options. Included in the report 
was a series of forecasts (low, medium, and high) of 
possible energy futures for the Northwest. Prepared using 
an econometric model (to be described in detail in the next 
chapter) the average annual growth rates for electricity 
through the year 2000 were 1.43, 2.93 and 4.38 for the low, 
medium, and high scenarios respectively. 
When, by the early 1980s, loads fell far short of 
almost all predictions, rate hikes became increasingly 
frequent, and skyrocketing construction costs forced WPPSS 
projects 4 and 5 into mothballs, any official forecast which 
20 
would be used to dizect power and conservation resource 
planning decisions tended to be viewed with mistrust, or at 
least great caution, both by the general ratepaying public 
and the numerous special interests in the region. It was in 
this context that BPA produced its first independent long-
term forecast, the subject of this dissertation. 
THE MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVE CONCEPT: THREE VIEWS OF THE 
FORECAST 
Given the recognized impacts of forecasts on past 
resource planning and the significance of the decisions 
facing BPA and the region in the early 1980s, it is not 
surprising that BPA's first independent long-term forecast 
was an object of considerable concern and attention. In 
order for this forecast to be useful as a guide to the power 
planning decisions facing the BPA Administrator and the 
region, it was necessary that the models and methodology 
used in its development display greaten sophistication and 
comprehensiveness in dealing with resource, rate, and 
conservation policy alternatives than their predecessors. 
Moreover, in order for this forecast to be accepted by the 
numerous parties to be affected by consequent power 
planning, it was helpful, if not necessary, to open up the 
processes of input development, model testing, and forecast 
preparation to public involvement. 
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In no sense, then, can the forecast and its development 
be understood simply as a technical exercise uninfluenced by 
historical precedent, institutional priorities, or political 
considerations. The process of its development was multi-
faceted: as such, thorough comprehension of the forecast and 
its ramifications require consideration of a wealth of 
technical and non-technical factors. An investigatory tool 
ideally suited to the tasks of examining and analyzing such 
factors is the Multiple Perspective Concept, a recent 
outgrowth of research in the areas of technology assessment 
and systems analysis. 
The systems approach to research and problem solving 
rests upon the premise that problems are complex and 
interrelated and that their solution is predicated on, in 
some way, comprehending them as a whole rather than as 
isolated, independent fragments. This basic premise, 
however, has undergone fundamental reinterpretation as 
systems research had matured. As Nehnevajsa and Menkes in 
Linstone et al (1981) have noted (in the context of tech-
nology assessment) a number of basic stages of development 
may be identified. stage I extended the basic calculi and 
optimizing techniques of narrowly-defined systems analysis 
(or operations research) to encompass a range of concerns 
other than economic feasibility. "The whole" of most 
problems was acknowledged to be larger than previously 
characterized by cost-benefit evaluation. stage II aimed 
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for "comprehensiveness" in impact identIfIcation and 
evaluation. "Wholeness" was sought in schemes attempting to 
address all of a problem's key quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions. stage III emerged from a recognition of the 
futility involved iil the .werly ambitious goal of comprehen-
siveness. Instead, it identified the generation of an array 
of good-risk contingency plans and policy options as a more 
useful and practical way to address "whole" problems of 
conceT.~ to decision makers. 
The Multiple Perspective Concept rests upon the pre-
mises of the third stage (and shows promise of moving re-
search into stage IV as it transcends some of the limits of 
traditionally-defined "rationality"). It seeks to provide a 
number of useful inSights developed from different perspec-
tives applied to a single decision process or problem area. 
Based upon the insights of political analyst Graham Allison 
(from his 1971 work, Essence of Decision; Explaining the 
Cuban Missile Crisis) and developed by Linstone et al (1981) 
the concept recognizes three distinct, though cOt'l.plementary, 
perspectives for viewing a decision area: a technical 
perspective (T), an organizational perspective (0), and a 
personal perspective (P). 
The T-perspectlve is the one commonly associated with 
research and structured inquiry. For a great many inves-
tigators, it is the ~ strategy of inquiry ever employed 
or considered. The T-perspective is premised on notions of 
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cause-and-effect, objectivity, and prediction by completely 
rational means. Problem solving aims at optimization and 
employs formal analysis, quantification, and modeling 
towards this end. The T-perspective is also frequently 
reductionist in character and biased against the individual 
or unique phenomenon. 
By contrast, the O-perspective typifies in the 
"inquiry" conducted as part of the daily round of organ-
izational life. Managers, bureaucrats, and staff personnel 
in organizations do not deal with the world in the abstract 
or from a detached point of view. Real practical necessi-
ties and organizational needs shape the ways they look at 
things and the ways they go about doing things. The 
O-perspective is both objective and subjective; it "sees" 
the world according to a mix of standard operating 
procedures and uncertainties, aiming at satisfactory rather 
than optimal solutions to problems. Both investigation and 
implementation tend to be incremental and reflect the 
parochial priorities and planning rituals of the 
participants. 
Finally, the P-perspective is the most unique and 
idiosyncratic, reflecting the subjective visions and 
"partial rationalities" of particular individuals. Although 
individuals often view the world in ways which fuse false 
certainty, simplification, and needs for esteem with their 
rationales for action, it is often the unique viewpoint 
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which illuminates or explains otherwise incomprehensible 
events. Perhaps more importantly, individuals act in terms 
of their perceptions and in ways shaped by their personal 
histories. While the individual may indeed disappear into 
the crowd, he or she may also be the prime mover in major 
events, bringing specific abilities to bear upon circum-
stances in ways that engender unique results. 
The goal of the Multiple Perspective Concept is to 
illuminate decision areas through the simultaneous applica-
tion of the three perspectives. As noted above, the 
perspectives are distinct but complementary: they not only 
tend to concentrate attention on different objects but also 
proceed from very different paradigms of thought. They thus 
together form a more complete picture of the world though 
they can not be derived from a more comprehensive framework 
by means of a single logic. Table I (reproduced from 
Linstone et aI, 1981) summarizes and contrasts the salient 
features of each of the three perspectives. 
Some precedent exists for the critical evaluation of 
applications of systems analysis and forecasting which is 
performed using complex models. Both Berlinski (1976) and 
Andersen (1977) have leveled criticisms against the use of 
systems dynamics models (Andersen doing so using a framework 
which is, in many ways, a direct "ancestor" of the Multiple 
Perspective Concept). The specific application of the MP 
Concept to the forecast product (and associated procedures) 
WELT-
ANSCHAUUNG 
CHARACTER-
ISTICS 
PU:PERRED 
INQUIRING 
SYSTEM 
'l'IME 
CONCEP'I' 
TABLE I 
MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 
'l'ECHNICAL ('I', ORGANIZATIONAL (0, PERSONAL (PI 
aclence - technology lIoclal lnfraotructure individuation _ the aelf 
cauae-effect 
objective 
problea .olving 
ab.traction and aodeling 
analy.i. 
prediction 
optiabation 
coaplete rationality 
u.e of average. probabili-
tie. 
trade-off. 
product 
uncertaintie. noted, aany 
caveat. 
Lockean - data 
Leibnixian - aodel 
Kant ian - aulti_odel 
technological ti.e 
.iniaal di.counting 
cau.e-effect and challenge-re.pon.e 
objective and aubjective 
problea avoidance or delegation 
ogenda (·proble. of the _onent·, 
~xperience, credential. 
recognition of partial unpredic-
tability long range planning 
often ritualized 
.ati.ficing (fir.t acceptable, 
rather than be.t. option' 
increaental change. alov adaptation 
parochi.l prioritie. loyalty 
.tandard operating procedure. 
factoring/fractioneting proble •• 
co.proai.e and bargaining 
proce •• 
action or iupleaentation 
avoidance of uncertainty 
Hegelian - dialectic 
"erlea~-Ponty - negotiated reality 
.ocial ti.e 
moderate di.counting 
challenge-re.pon.e 
.ubjective 
leader. and follover. 
ga.e-in-progre •• for ao.t 
need for belief •• certaintie. 
.tatu. i.prove.ent or •• intenance 
focua on .i.pliatic hypotheaeB rather 
than acanning aany 
creatiVity and viaion by few---the yogi-
each con. true. attribute. of otherll 
partial rationality 
inner world 
le •• ing and experience 
cope with rew alternative. or variable. 
filter out 1.agea inconaiatent with 
paat experience 
iapact 
Maalov hierarchy of neede or ••• 
power/influence/do.inance-- tho co~ai •• ar 
rear of change and unknown 
intuition - nou .. na 
individual re.lity 
eclectic i •• - experiential 
per.onarl;l.e 
high diacounting 
N 
(J1 
26 
developed by BPA for their first independent regional load 
forecast forms the basis for this dissertation and proceeds 
in series of steps reflected in the sequence of chapters. 
Chapter II focuses upon the forecast from the dominant 
viewpoint of science and technology, the T-perspective. 
Each of the models used in the regional forecasting effort--
the NEPP and PNUCC econometric models, the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory Residential and Commercial End-Use 
Models, and the BPA electricity supply pricing model are 
discussed and diagrammed, as is the system by which their 
outputs were interlinked. The methods by which primary 
model inputs were developed are discussed. Finally, the 
models and methodology are critically evaluated. This 
entails generic comparisons of the strength and weaknesses 
of econometric and end-use models, an identification of 
limiting core assumptions associated with the modeling 
enterprise, and a discussion of the results (i.e. the 
forecast product) and their reliability. 
In Chapter III, the a-perspective is applied to the 
forecasting process, viewing it as a response of BPA's Power 
Requirements staff to the challenge placed upon it by 
internal organizational needs (e.g. tailoring modeling to 
the variOUS, and sometimes conflicting needs of ratemakers 
and planners elsewhere in the organization) and outside 
agencies (e.g. PNUCC, private utilities, the Regional 
Council). To understand the organizational underpinnings of 
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both challenges and responses affecting the forecasting 
process, it is necessary to describe the principal actors in 
the power planning arena, the standard operating procedures 
by which they operate, and the changes or developments in 
their institutional enviroments. Descriptions of intra-
organizational developments center on an enumeration of 
BPA's new responsibilities under the Regional Act, the 
growth and development of several Divisions du~ing BPA's 
recent internal restructuring, the application of standard 
and ad hoc operating procedures in the forecasting effort, 
and the dynamic, interactive character of organizational 
needs as they constrain or steer the technical process of 
forecasting. Interorganizationally, BPA's changing rela-
tionship with the Council, established regional forecasting 
bodies, and the involved public is documented and analyzed 
to see how its influence is felt on the forecast. The goal 
of this analysis is to see what forces (or actors) in a 
changing organizational situation in the region (and in BPA) 
helped give shape to an important piece of technical output 
(i.e. the BPA forecast) upon which significance decisions 
were at least partially based. 
In Chapter IV, the P-perspective is used to illuminate 
yet another dimension of the forecasting process. Key 
actors and outstanding decisions affecting the course of the 
demand forecasting effort are identified and their signifi-
cance assessed. Included here are both the actions of the 
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staff and "non-technical" decision makers (e.g. the Power 
Administrator) which modified or gave direction to the 
events shaping the forecast product. Analysis is directed 
toward identifying personal and situational characteristics 
which predispose principal actcIs towards their behavior. 
Chapter V cross-cues the insights obtained through the 
application of each of the three perspectives (i.e. displays 
their interdependencies), producing a composite or inte-
grated picture of BPA's forecasting effort. It is in this 
chapter that the "explanatory" powers of the Multiple 
Perspective Concept are demonstrated. Whereas the previous 
three chapters explored the forecasting process through the 
"selective lenses" of each of the perspectives individually 
this chapter builds a composite picture illustrating the 
interpretation of elements identified and isolated in the 
earlier chapters. Included in this chapter is an investi-
gation of the issue of "validation" of the insights gained 
through the use of Multiple Perspectives. Following guide-
lines proposed by Linstone (1984:321-327) a digraph 
representation of the dynamics of interaction between the 
perspectives is presented. Such a representation not only 
displays a picture of overall findings clearly and unambig-
uously, permitting critical evaluation and, potentially, 
reinterpretation, but also yields new insights through 
analysis of cyclical and indirect impacts between the 
perspectIves. 
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Finally, Chapter VI summarizes and concludes the 
research. It focuses both upon conclusions about the BPA 
20-year forecasts derived through the application of the 
Multiple Perspective Concept, and upon general conclusions 
on the use of the MP Concept in research on decision areas. 
This includes a set of propositions about the appropriate 
domains and methods of application of each of the perspec-
tives and general comments on the types of problems a 
researcher may expect to have to deal with using the HP 
Concept in an organizational context. 
CHAPTER II 
THE T-PERSPECTIVE 
FORECASTS, DECISIONS, AND PLANS: THE TECHNICAL CONTEXT FOR 
MODEL USAGE 
Most generally, the intent of forecasts, whatever the 
domain of their application, is to assist decision makers in 
dealing with the uncertainty associated with the future. In 
situations where forecasting is performed, the forecasts 
provide the decision maker with selected "vistas" of the 
future "state of the world", based on various assumptions or 
speculations. Forecasting is thus perhaps best understood 
as fundamentally interlinked with the activities of planning 
and decision making. Planning may be though of as "the 
process of preparing a set of decisions for action in the 
future, directed at achieving goals by optimum means". 
Decision making, in turn, consists of the act of selecting 
one from several courses of action (Martino, 1978:332-337). 
In all but the most trivial situations, the decision maker 
is confronted with some aspect (or aspects) of the 
environment over which he has little or no control but which 
nonetheless critically impacts the mission or task he is 
responsible for carrying out (e.g. consumer demand for 
goods, services, or energy). Informed decision making, 
whether a part of short- or long-range planning, requires 
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an assessment of the likely state of the environment, and it 
is this role which forecasting attempts to fill. 
Forecasts, however, may differ widely in terms of the 
amount of information they yield, the number of issues they 
address, and the variety of questions they are able to 
answer. Forecast sophistication is a function of the 
techniques or models used, the resources available, and, 
perhaps most importantly, the scope of the associated 
planning effort. In situations where the environment is 
relatively unchanging or where key decision makers see the 
future as unfolding in a relatively straightforward fashion, 
forecasts tend to be viewed as reasonably precise statements 
of what is going to happen. By contrast, where the environ-
ment is viewed as complex and turbulent and the future as 
fraught with uncertainty, planning is aimed at devisIng 
reasonable courses of action in the face of a variety of 
contingent events. The forecasts associated with such 
planning tend to be more complex, addressing a wider 
spectrum of environmental variables and providing poten-
tially valuable information about the contingencies 
envisioned. 
Both the overall methodological strategy and the 
specific technique (or techniques) employed in a forecast 
are, in large part, functions of the perceived needs of 
decision makers and the planning philosophy espous~d, though 
quite obviously, decision makers, planners, and forecasting 
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technicians may incorrectly assess the situation and proceed 
in an inappropriate fashion. The simplest, and in many ways 
the most risky, methodological strategy is to produce a 
point forecast, which aims at an accurate description of a 
single "most likely" future state of key elements in the 
environment. Unless the environment is extremely stable 
<and extremely simple in its behavioral characteristics) 
such a forecast is apt to provide a poor base for planning. 
Range forecasts remove some of the risk normally associated 
with point forecasts by defining the upper and lower bounds 
to a region within which the values of outcome of future 
events or trends are thought likely to fill. The conditions 
which define the boundaries of the range usually do not 
differ qualitatively from those of a single point forecast; 
rather it is the magnitude of influence of certain crucial 
variables which is subjected to variation. Planning based 
upon range forecasts is thought less risky because it is 
geared to a accommodate the variety of possible future 
states falling within the posited boundaries. Unfortun-
ately, where the character of the environment is subject to 
more rapid change, range forecasts are insufficient to 
address the full spectrum of qualitatively different futures 
that may be considered reasonably likely. A scenario or, 
more correctly, contingency analysis, seeks to explore the 
significance of different constellations of possible occurr-
ences to planning and decision-making efforts. Such 
analysis is predicated upon a recognized need for highly 
flexible planning options, and, as such, associated 
forecasting techniques and models tend to be more complex, 
since they must address a wider variety of events, trends, 
or policy consequences. 
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The specific forecasting tool (or tools) selected is 
also primarily a function of planning and decision-making 
needs (though, clearly, the sheer availability or work-
ability of a technique or model in a given situation is 
additionally of central importance). Most generally, these 
techniques may be grouped into two major categories: 
exploratory and normative. 
Exploratory forecasting techniques start from the 
present situation and project the future of some variable 
(or variables) or concern by making various assumptions 
about continuation of past or present patterns of growth and 
activity (Martino, 1978:287). Although these techniques may 
vary rather widely in terms of their complexity and sophis-
tication, they all are suited to planning in environments 
where basic relationships among elements do not vary 
appreciably over time (even though the particular values or 
states the elements may assume). Trend extrapolation and 
correlation are perhaps the simplest of exploratory tech-
niques. Both plot the change in a dependent variable 
against a single independent variable whose behavior is 
more stable or at least better known (in the case of trend 
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extrapolation the independent variable is time). Any causal 
mechanisms which might link the variables remain unknown, in 
effect burying possible complex linkages between the vari-
ables considered and othe factors in the "black box" of the 
trend or correlation relationship. Growth curves constitute 
marginally more sophisticated techniques for plotting trends 
against time, requiring prior knowledge of the upper limits 
of the value of the dependent variable -- something which is 
neither always known or even always applicable. Econometric 
models consist of linked, simultaneously-solved regression 
equations (derived from historical relationships between 
each dependent variable and one or more independent vari-
ables) whose terms are based upon economic theory. Such 
models display noteworthy differences in size (ranging from 
several to several thousand equations) and accuracy. 
Generally, econometric models explicitly address a somewhat 
wider range of environmental factors than most exploratory 
techniques and are particularly appropriate where price, 
income, or productivity are significant "drivers" of the 
trends under consideration. Finally, simulation models, 
first developed in an engineering context, may be used to 
illuminate the unfolding of a wider variety of processes 
over time. A simulation attempts to "imitate" the dynamic 
characteristics of the real world system it models by 
performing a series of numerical calculations which follow 
the changes of the states of that system over time (Gordon, 
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1978:9-10). In contrast to other exploratory forecasting 
techniques, simulations are "white boxes" which endeavor to 
explicate the structure of causal connections between system 
elements, though, admittedly, what is embodied in a simula-
tion model's structure is what its developers believe to be 
the structure of the real world (which mayor may not be its 
true structure). The mathematical equations connecting 
variables reflect observed (or adjudged) relationships 
thought to endure ov~r time. As such, they share a weakness 
of other exploratory techniques: they cannot address 
structural changes in real world relationships which might 
occur in the future. The strength of simulation models is 
the "intermediate output" which they produce in arriving at 
their final calculation; namely, the description of inter-
actions between system elements which may be useful for 
decisionmaking. 
Normative forecasting methods seek to identify what 
type of future conditions are most desirable with the 
objective of bringing them about (thus, the name "norm-
ative"). This is accomplished through techniques which 
permit the forecaster to layout the full array of 
alternatives so that critical comparisons can be made. 
Where the system or process being analyzed can be described 
in terms of causation, hierarchy, or levels of complexity 
relevance trees (which permit cost-benefit comparisons 
between different systems required to fulfill a number of 
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missions) may be used. By contrast, where a system may be 
broken down into nonhierarchical elements which can be 
altered independently, morphologies (which enumerate a row 
of different alternatives for each of the problem parameters 
forming the columns of the matrix) are appropriate. Final-
ly, in the cases where all the alternative routes or sequ-
ences by which a task or mission may be accomplished can be 
mapped, mission flow diagrams may be employed (Martino, 
1978:287-317). Normative methods are best used where 
decision makers and planners have a great deal of control 
over the courses of behavior which key elements will follow. 
Where the full spectrum of alternatives cannot be readily 
specified, or where decision-making power is insufficient to 
affect critical environmental parameters, normative methods 
are of limited use. 
While this classificatory distinction between explora-
tory and normative forecasting methods is a useful one, two 
qualifications need to be made. The first is that there are 
commonly used techniques which may fall into either category 
(or both categories) depending upon how they are used. Most 
notable are informed judgment ("genius forecasting") and 
Delphi, an anonymous, iterative technique for evoking and 
structuring expert opinion on various forecasting issues and 
topics. Whether these techniques are to be regarded as 
exploratory or normative is dependent upon whether they are 
used for, respectively, predictive or policymaking purposes. 
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A second. and perhaps more important, qualification is that 
the distinction between exploratory and normative techniques 
is not as sharply drawn as first may appear to be the case. 
Even though decision makers may not be able to control the 
major "environmental" factors which their forecasts address, 
they are quite often able to influence them (albeit indir-
ectly and incompletely) through their decisions, frequently 
without suspecting they are doing so. self-fulfilling 
prophecy refers to a condition where an image of the future 
helps bring about events which might otherwise not have 
occurred. For example, the widespread belief in an imminent 
stock market crash can result in a pattern of reckless 
selling and trading which in fact serves to drive the market 
down. conversely, self-denying prophecy refers to a condi-
tion where a probably correct image of the future (based on 
current trends) results in actions by decision makers which 
bring about a very different set of outcomes. Forecasts of 
severe resource depletion, for example, may bring about in-
creased exploration for and conservation of materials, 
thereby averting a foreseen crisis. Thus, where planning 
and decision making can affect the environment which an 
"exploratory" forecast addresses, that forecast can have 
very real normative, pollcymaking consequences. 
The BPA 20-year regional demand forecast subjected to 
analysis in this dissertation was geared to planning 
resource acquisitions and ratemaking in lieu of the Regional 
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Council's April 1983 forecast and resource plan. The 
forecast used three sets of economic and demographic 
projections and policy assumptions to produce a range of 
demand growth trajectories (baseline, low, and high) within 
which actual electricity consumption is anticipated to fall. 
The method of forecasting was to employ an interacting set 
of demand and electricity pricing models in an exploratory 
mode (though, as will be seen in the Chapter V a number of 
parties in the region questioned its possible "normative" 
consequences). The "system" of interacting models used in 
the BPA forecast is described in the section that follows. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE BPA FORECASTING SYSTEM 
The BPA forecasting effort was carried out over a 
number of months in three stages designed to allow the 
interested public and opportunity to criticize, comment, and 
make suggestions on the execution of the forecast. 
stage One: In December of 1981, a preliminary set of 
regional economic and demographic projections were prepared. 
The public was invited to examine the credibility of the 
projected values of such variables as regional employment, 
population, income, and fuel prices as well as the method of 
their derivation. At roughly the same time, the technical 
merits of four demand models being considered for use in 
BPA's first independent long-range forecast of electricity 
consumption were reviewed by the staff. The Northwest 
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Energy Policy Project (NEPP) All-Sector Model of electricity 
use, the Pacific Northwest utilities Conference Committee 
(PNUCC) Econometric Model, and the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory (ORNL) Energy Use Models for the residential and 
commercial sectors were used to simulate four possible 
energy growth scenarios for the region exemplifying differ-
ent levels of conservation program implementation. The 
results were published and made available to the public. 
Stage Two: In April of 1982, BPA released a draft 
~ 
forecast of electricity consumption in the Pacific Northwest 
along with a revised set of economic/demographic projec-
tions. For the forecast, a somewhat more sophisticated 
approach was taken than was the case for the earlier model 
review. Separate economic and demographic inputs were 
prepared for public and private electric utility service 
districts. The ORNL Residential and Commercial Sector 
Demand Models and the industrial portion of the NEFF Econo-
metric Model were used in tandem with an electricity supply 
pricing model to determine private and public utility loads. 
Stage Three: In July of 1982, the final version of· the 
20-year demand forecast was released. Only slight model 
changes were implemented between draft and final forecasts. 
The sundry changes in model input assumptions prompted by 
public comment and the substitution of the results of the 
Brookhaven Pulp and Paper Process Model for the NEPP model's 
highly counterintuitive results for that industry resulted 
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in a minor decrease in the projected average annual rate of 
growth over the 20-year period from 1.7 to 1.6 percent. 
The major development characterizing stages Two and 
Three of the forecasting process was the development of a 
price-responsive system of interlinked models. Fuel price, 
as the 1970s have effectively taught, is a prime determinant 
of energy consumption. People will not only use larger 
amounts of energy for particular tasks when the source of 
that energy is abundant and cheap but will also employ the 
energy for a larger variety of end-uses. As the price of a 
fuel rises, consumers characteristically curtail their use 
of that fuel or switch to a cheaper competing source of 
energy. Conversely, energy demand is a central factor in 
determining energy price, particularly in the case of 
electricity. As the demand upon established power-genera-
ting resources approaches their capacity, new facilities 
must be built or developed to accommodate anticipated 
increases in consumption. New resources are more costly to 
construct, and the power they generate is, correspondingly, 
sold at a higher price. This higher price for new energy 
will, in turn, tend to dampen demand. 
The system of models developed by BPA designed to deal 
with this interrelationship between electricity supply and 
demand is depicted in simplified form in Figure 2 b~low. 
INPUTS 
! REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC/ 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
~BQ~§£!lQli~ 
(by public & 
private rate 
pools) 
MODELS 
ENERGY DEMAND 
MODELS 
OUTPU'l'S 
ENERGY 
CONSUMPTION 
ESTIMATES 
~. ORNL Residential r---.- (by end-use, 
• ORNL Commercial sector, fuel 
• NEPP Industrial and rate pool) 
(Demand) (Prices) 
ELECTRICITY 
SUPPLY PRICING 
MODEL 
Figure 2. The BPA system of forecasting models. An 
overview of inputs, models and outputs. 
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The first component is the one in which the economic/ 
demographic inputs needed to operate the demand models are 
prepared. While some of the inputs used by the demand 
models are not region-specific (e.g. parameters for 
engineering or econometric relationships used in the model) 
the values for a number of the basic driving variables 
(e.g. non-electric fuel prices, employment, population, 
lncome) are and must be derived in-house by BPA staff. 
Regional inputs (broken down by public and private electric 
utllity service districts) are developed from national 
economic models (i.e. the Data Resources Inc., or DRI, 
model) various industries' own projections of employment and 
, 
productivity, and several BPA in-house models (e.g. 
population). 
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The economic/demographic projections serve as inputs to 
the second system component which is comprised of three 
energy demand models; the ORNL Residential Model, the ORNL 
~ommercial Model, and the industrial and street lighting 
portions of the NEPP model. Both of the ORNL models are 
hybrid economic/engineering models which are particularly 
well suited to policy analysis applications. The NEPP model 
is an all-sectors, all-fuels econometric model, though only 
portions of its total capabilities were used for the BPA 
forecast. 
The third component of the forecasting system is an 
electriCity supply pricing model developed in-house at BPA. 
Orginally known as the Integrated Supply Demand Model, the 
current priCing model substitutes the ORNL and NEPP models 
for its demand module. The pricing model takes as its input 
the sector-specific demands calculated in the second 
component of the forecasting system and develops a set of 
prices based upon the least-cost mix of new resources needed 
to meet the projected loads. The stream of prices so deriv-
ed in turn becomes input for the demand models which are 
rerun to develop a secondary estimation of future consump-
tion. These ca~culated demands are again entered into the 
pricing model, and the iterative process continues until an 
equil1br1um of both price and demand 1s reached. 
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The fourth and final component is where the output of 
the fo~ecasting p~ocess is adjusted and tallied: energy 
consumption estimates broken down by fuel type (though in 
fact the official fo~ecast document focused upon electri-
city), ~ate pool, (i.e. public vs. p~ivate), sector, and end 
use (e.g space heating, lighting, etc.). Seve~al calcula-
tions we~e pe~fo~med exte~nal to the models, and these 
ultimately affected consumption estimated totals. ~rojected 
irrigation loads (developed using a B~A irrigation model) 
were added into the residential load. l~rigation loads were 
calculated only once and did not change from ite~ation to 
iteration with the pricing model. Similarly, loads for 
federal agencies and direct service industries (OSls) we~e 
compiled f~om long-term contract demands (which were not 
subject to price changes during contract lifetimes) and 
added to commercial and industrial loads respectively. ORNL 
Commercial Hodel and NE~~ street lighting submodel loads 
were pooled during the iterative process to approximate 
commercial demand. Finally, for the pulp and paper indus-
try, the output of the Brookhaven Pulp and ~aper ~rocess 
Hodel (run at Brookhaven Laboratory) was substituted for 
that of the NEPP model. 
As noted above, the actual structure of the models 
forming the B~A forecasting system embodies a complexity not 
displayed in this cursory overview. The next sections 
examine the models and procedures in greater detail. 
ENERGY DEMAND AND ENERGY SUPPLY: THE MODELS USED IN BPA'S 
FORECAST 
A problem with the foregoing discussion of major types 
of forecasting is that focusing upon a relatively few 
general features which distinguish a technique obscures 
whatever internal complexity may be present in a given 
application. Though simple in principle, each of the models 
used by BPA employed a significant number of assumptions 
which were represented with varying degrees of explicitness. 
To un4erstand the forecast fully, it is necessary to 
delineate the entire methodology employed in arriving at the 
economic and demographic prOjections used as model inputs 
through the iterative, concatenated use of sector demand and 
electricity pricing models to the final calculation of 
20-year demand growth. 
This major subchapter details both the overall 
methodology and the internal structures of each of the 
models employed in the BPA forecast. First, the basic 
components of the system of models are presented in broad 
stroke in an overview section which focuses upon how the 
system as a whole operates, what role each of the models (or 
components) plays, and how these models are interlinked. 
Next, each indivldual component is examined In detail, its 
internal operating structure (and the concomitant technical 
assumptions) laid bare for examination. Finally, the larger 
forecasting system is reconstructed, but at a higher degree 
45 
of detail and resolution than in the overview section. The 
resulting "master" input-output diagram should allow each 
model calculation to be referenced to each of its antecedent 
calculations, transformations, and assumptions. 
Economic/Demographic Projections; Inputs to Energy Fore-
casting Models 
In order to forecast the energy future of the Pacific 
Northwest it is necessary to develop a set of projections of 
economic/demographic conditions characteristic of the region 
to serve as inputs to the demand models for the various 
sectors. For BPA's 1982 long-term forecast, projections of 
a number of key variables reflecting changing economic and 
demographic conditions were prepared. Three distinct 
streams of values for such factors as employment, popula-
tion, income, housing, and fuel prices were developed to 
represent conditions which would conceivably characterize 
baseline (i.e. "best guess"), high, and low energy consump-
tion (this was done for both public and private utility 
service districts). These projections are developed by the 
Economic Studies Section of Power Requirements using a num-
ber of different models and techniques. 
While the projections of economic or demographic 
variables are done separately, each using a distinct proce-
dure and embodying a unique array of assumptions, the 
derivations are interdependent to the extent that the 
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calculated values of one variable (e.g. employment) are used 
as inputs to the models used to compute the values of other 
variables (e.g. population). This interdependence renders 
the entire set of projections more internally consistent 
than would be the case if each variable were projected in 
isolation from each other but, at the same time, makes the 
consequences of many assumptions "hereditary", or embedded 
in final values other variables assume. Figure 3 provides 
an overview of the relationship of the models employed in 
the development of the set of economic/demographic projec-
tions. 
Outputs of the Data Resources Inc. (DRI) model of the 
national economy are used for a number of purposes: as in-
puts to the models used to project the future values of 
economic and demographic variables, as direct inputs to the 
demand models, and as standards for determining high and low 
ranges. The economic base model refers to a technique (not 
an actual computer model) for deriving non-basic industry 
employment from projectlons of employment in basic (i.e. 
exporting) industries (which are calculated in a variety of 
ways depending upon the particular industry). Employment 
projections are used as inputs to the BPA population model 
(which develops future values for both population and 
households) and the BPA income model, which also uses the 
output of the population model in the calculation of total 
personal and per capita income. The BPA housing model takes 
(1 ) 
DRI MODEL OF 
...---1 NATIONAL 
ECONOr-1Y 
~ (2)~~~:8J~~ _________ ~~ IECONOMIC BASE 
MODEL 
(Employme n t) 
5) 
INCOME NODEL 
(Per Capita 
(3) r---~~----~ & Total Per-
POPULATION ~---'--'~Isonal) 
... __ .... t-tODEL 
(Population 
& Households) 
(4) ~ __ ~ ________ -, 
HOUSING MODEL 
.-__ ~(New & Existing ~ 
Units, Avg. Size) 
~ ________________ -.~.I _ TO 
DE~lAND 
MODELS 
( 6) • 
FUEL PRICE 
CALCULATION 
(Gas, Oil, 
Coal) 
Figure 3. Schematic of Models used for economic/ 
demographic inputs. A diagram of data flows between 
models. 
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the number of households as determined by the population 
model as an input to develop estimates of total housing 
stock, new construction, and average unit size for homes for 
the-forecast period. Finally, fuel price projections for 
energy sources competitive with electricity (i.e. natural 
gas, oil, and coal) are prepared independently of the other 
BPA models, though DRI projections are involved. 
Having taken an overview of the relationships existing 
between the techniques employed to develop individual econo-
mic or demographic projections, it is now appropriate to 
examine each of these techniques separately and in greater 
detail. 
The DRI Model of the National Economy. Data Resources 
Incorporated is one of a number of firms which prepares and 
operates models of the u.s. economy which may be accessed or 
operated by subscribers to their computer service. Three 
distinct prOjections of national economic trends from 1980 
to 2006 were utilized by BPA: TRENDLONG2006B (a baseline 
projection), OPTIMLONG2006B (an optimistic, "high case"), 
and PESSIHLONG2006B (a pessimistic, "low case"). While this 
model is essentially a "black box" to its users, a number of 
basic assumptions may be identified. 
TRENDLONG2006B represents, or embodies, the following 
assumptions. 
no major economic mishaps (such as oil price shock or 
untoward policy shifts) 
average annual rate of population growth .9\ by 1985, 
.8\ by 1990, and .6\ by 2000 
potential output grows by average annual rate or 2.8% 
in 1980 and 2.3\ in 1990 
growth of labor force slows to 1.0\ per year in the 
1980s and .8\ from 1990 to 2000 
labor force participation rate increases to 66.8\ of 
population by 1990 and 67.5\ by 2006 
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employment growth continues at an average annual rate 
of 1.7\ between 1980 and 1990, declining to .9\ between 1990 
and 2006 
annual inflation rate drops from 7.9\ in 1982 to 6.4\ 
in 2006 
both energy prices and energy consumption increase 
slowly (1.9\ per year in 1980s, 1.4\ afterward) 
housing starts recover from current slump and average 
1.87 million units from 1981 to 1990 and 1.69 million from 
1991 to 2000. 
Optimistic and pessimistic trends also assume a rela-
tively smooth path of economic growth without any major 
mishaps. They differ from the mean, or baseline, growth 
trajectory in a manner which is more quantitative then 
qualitative. 
In OPTIMLONG2006B 
average annual rates of growth (AARGs) of potential 
output are 3.5\ for the 1980s and 2.6\ from 1990 on to the 
end of the forecast period 
inflation settles down to 5\ per year in 1986 and 
averages that value until 2006 
employment in 2006 is increased by 4.7\ over the base 
case 
labor force participation increases to 71.4\ in 2006 
For PESSIMLONG2006B 
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The AARG for potential output is 2.3\ through 1990 and 
1.8\ form 1990 to 2006 
the rate of inflation rises to 10\ in 1986 and remains 
at that level through 2006 
ways. 
year 2006 employment is down 4.7\ from TRENDLONG2006B 
labor force participation is limited to 64.4\ in 2006 
Outputs of the DRI model are used in three distinct 
First, some of the outputs of the model are used in the 
sector demand models without any alteration or modification. 
Included here are DRI projections of the AARG of industrial 
productivity, interest rates, gross nation product (GNP), 
consumer price index (CPI), and implicit price deflators 
(based upon GNP and personal comsumption expenditures, or 
PCB) • 
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Second, a number of the ORI national model outputs are 
used as inputs to the other economic/demographic models de-
pIcted in Figure 3. 
Specifically 
The housing model uses state level projections of 
housing starts. 
The model used for projecting employment in the timber 
industry uses the GNP forecast. 
The regional income model uses u.S. contributions per 
employee, U.S. per capita property income, and U.S. per 
capita transfer payments, and 
Fuel price calculations employ ORI estimates of prices 
for crude and retail petroleum, natural gas, and coal. 
Finally, the ranges of the three ORI trend lines were 
used to establish proportional ranges in the high and low 
case values of many of the BPA's regional projections. 
The Economic Base Model. The name given to the overall 
methodology for· projecting regional employment is 'economic 
base model'. 'Kodel' here refers to a way of determining 
employment from non-basic industries from a series of 
calculations which project employment for each of ten basic 
(i.e. exporting) industries individually. The economic 
assumptions behind the economic are represented in the 
digraph in Figure 4. (NOTE: An arrow from one element in 
the digraph to another indicates that the element at the 
arrow's tail influences the element at the arrow's head. If 
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+ 
LEGEND 
® + .. ® 
As A increases increases decreases, B decreases 
® .. ® 
As A increases de!;:reases decreases, B increases 
Figure 4. Dynamics assumed by economic base model. A 
digraph of relationships between basic and non-basic 
industries. (Detail of Figure 3, Box 2) 
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the arrow is 'signed' with a '+' the change in the affected 
element is in the same direction as that of the element 
impacting it; whereas a I_I indicates a change in the op-
posite direction.) 
Basic industries are those which export their output to 
consumers outside of the region. As such, they are essen-
tially "driven" by external demand which spurs increased 
productivity which, in turn, requires increased employment. 
Industries classified as "basic" include agriculture, food 
processing, lumber and wood products, pulp and paper, chem-
icals, primary metals, electronics, transportation equip-
ment, mining, and Federal government. Growth in basic in-
dustry correspondingly stimulates the growth of non-basic 
industry in the region. Demand for the products and ser-
vices of non-basic industries encourages increased produc-
tion and employment. The actual calculation of non-basic 
industry employment 1s cazzled out by applying an employment 
multiplier to total projected basic industry employment. 
The multiplier, consisting of the ratio of total to basic 
industry employment, was derived by calculating this ratio 
for each year from 1950 to 1979, by state, and then extra-
polating to the end of the forecast period. Applying the 
multiplier to projected basic employment yields total 
employment. subtracting basic from total employment pro-
duces the total non-basic industry employment for forecast 
years, which is then disaggregated into distinct sector 
categories based upon historical trends and national 
projections of individual industry growth. 
54 
Thus, the values which the projections of non-basic 
industry employment assume are dependent upon the size of 
basic employment in the region. Figure 4 would seem to in-
dicate that regional employment is completely demand-driven 
and subject to continued growth as long as unfilled demand 
for exports exists. In reality, however, basic industry 
growth is limited by a variety of resource, price, and 
policy constraints which are, to a large degree, industry-
specific. For this reason, employment in each of ten basic 
industries is projected using a distinct methodology, as 
well as its own distinct data sources, which reflect the 
unique circumstances affecting its growth and development. 
Projecting employment in agriculture involves embracing 
somewhat greater uncertainty than is the case with other 
basic industries. A reasonable share of farm employment 1s 
comprised of migrant and part-time family labor, a fact 
which makes precise estimation difficult and virtually re-
quires some use of judgment. BPA estimates were prepared 
from data originating at two sources. One was the reports 
of state level agencies which document historical employment 
(and disaggregate it to county level). The other was Bureau 
of Economic AnalysiS (BEA) projections of state and county 
level employment in agriculture. Essentially, BPA 
judgmentally modified the trend described by BEA so that 
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projections-were more consistent with the historical employ-
ment statistics from the state agency reports. High and low 
ranges were placed around the baseline employment projec-
tions using the ranges, though not the actual values, deve-
loped in a 1979 study by the Northwest Agricultual Develop-
ment Project (NADP). As a check for the credibilty of the 
BPA projections they were cross-compared with those 
developed by the Census of Agriculture and the u.s. Depart-
ment of Agriculture's Crop Reporting Board. 
For the food processing industry, historical employment 
data at the county level obtained from s~ate employment de-
partments were subjected to a trend analysis. Trends were 
modified slightly where information from county level 
sources indicated specific industry expansion plans. High 
and low ranges were developed around the baseline trend for 
food processing employment based upon DRI national 
employment ranges for the industry. 
A computerized model first developed for the u.s. 
Forest Service was used to develop the baseline employment 
figures for the lumber and wood products industry. The 
Timber Assessment Harket Hodel (TAMH) determines levels of 
future prices and production by Simulating interactions in 
the markets for stumpage, lumber, and plywood as constrained 
by the biological growth of the timber resource base. Using 
u.s. Census forecast of national population and DRI middle 
range GNP projections, the model produces a forecast of 
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industry output. These TAHH forecasts are disaggregated to 
the state level and multiplied by a ratio of worker-years 
per unit of industry output, yielding total industry employ-
ment. High and low projections were based upon past rela-
tionships between employment and new housing starts and DRI 
high and low projections of national housing starts. 
Employment in the pulp and pape; industry was fore-
casted in two different ways. For primary product sectors 
(pulp, paper, and paperboard) employment estimates were made 
by analyzing current u.s. Forest Service forecasts of re-
gional pulp production and earlier forecasts of regional 
pulp production levels (both of which suggested virtually 
stable employment levels for the duration of the forecast 
period). In the converted paper product sectors employ-
ment-to-population ratios were calculated and multiplied by 
preliminar¥ population projections. Because growth in the 
pulp and paper industry Is tightly constrained, high and low 
ranges could not deviate greatly from the baseline. They 
were derived by varying the start-up times and production 
levels of new plants. 
The chemicals (and allied products) industry baseline 
employment was also projected to grow at a moderate rate. 
Industries in this category may be subdivided into three 
main groups: chlorine-caustic, agricultural chemicals, and 
nuclear fuels processing and engineering (1.e. Hanford). 
For each group, h1storical data was obtained from state 
agency reports. Projections, however, were developed 
differently for each group. Chlorine-caustic employment 
growth is calculated by correlating it with changes in the 
pulp and paper industry (where such chemical products are 
used routinely). For the agricultural chemical industry, 
employment growth was considered proportional to DRI pro-
jections of national industry employment. Finally, for 
nuclear fuels (a very constrained area of growth) industry 
estimates of potential growth were judgmentally adjusted. 
High and low ranges were developed by applying different 
estimates of the Pacific Northwest's share of national 
employment to DRI national industry employment forecast. 
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For the high case, the historic growth of the region's share 
was extrapolated to the end of the forecast period, and the 
resulting values applied to ORI's optimistic trend. For the 
low case, a constant share equal to the 1980 value was 
applied to the DRI pessimistic economic projection. 
Employment in primary metals was projected in two 
different ways, depending upon the metal under 
consideration. Primary aluminum smelters obtain almost all 
their electricity from BPA. Since sales are not expected to 
increase significantly over the next 20 years, aluminum 
production growth was assumed to occur only because of 
modernization of existing plants and the addition of the 
planned Alumax plant. From reports on plants modernized 
since 1979 and knowledge of planned efficiency improvements 
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in other plants, projections were made of anticipated pri-
mary aluminum output increases and the additional labor 
force required (adjusting for increased productivity). High 
and low ranges were established by varying demand and elec-
tricity prices relative to the base case. The high case 
assumed greater demand and increased production (and employ-
ment) due to further price-induced modernization. By con-
trast, the low case assumed lower demand, less moderniza-
tion, and the termination of plans to construct Alumax. For 
"non-aluminum" primary metals regional growth (based on 
historical values and anticipated developments in specific 
facilities) was indexed to national trends for the industry 
developed by DRI. High and low ranges were likewise indexed 
to DRI optimistic and pessimistic trends. 
Fer the electronics industry in the PNW employment 
projections were based upon both the public statements of 
individual companies and the reports of both state depart-
ments of economic development and local agencies. From 
these projections, each state's share of DRI's national 
employment estimates was determined. For the high case, 
these same shares were applied to the DRI optimistic pro-
jection. For the low case, the states' shares were judg-
mentally reduced (to represent a slowing in the relative 
growth of the regional electronics industry) and applied to 
the DRI pessimistic national industry employment projection. 
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The transportation equipment industry is comprised of 
three main subgroups: aerospace (chiefly Boeing), ship and 
boat building, and miscellaneous other (motor vehicles, 
railroad eqiupment, and travel trailers;. For each of these 
subgroups, specific industry estimates of anticipated em-
ployment were obtained and judgmentally adjusted to be con-
sistent with other forecasted economic trends. High and low 
ranges for transportation equipment were developed by deter-
mining the share of each state (except Washington) of DRI's 
estimates for the base case and applying these shares to the 
appropriate employment estimates in the optimistic and 
pessimistic trends. Because of historically wide swings in 
the industry in the state of Washington, its average abso-
lute change in yearly employment for the last 20 years was 
determined and that amount added to (high case) or sub-
tracted from (low case) baseline values to approximate its 
range. 
The mining industry is extremely resource-dependent and 
its employment only determined by demand to a limited de-
gree. Kine-specific estimates of employment were developed 
from historical values and scaled up or down to reflect 
different levels of production for high and low cases. 
Finally Federal government employment, limited by each 
Administration's hiring ceilings, was obtained from in-house 
estimates, with high and low cases representing, respect-
ively, relaxed and tightened hiring restrictions. 
Table II summarizes the primary industry employment 
derivations. 
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The BPA Population/Household Hodel. The BPA population 
model employs what is known as a cohort-component method for 
projecting population change. Cohorts are persons born 
within a distinct period of time (in the case of the BPA 
model, every five years). The components of population 
change are fertility, mortality, and migration. The model, 
in effect, operates by "aging" the members of each cohort in 
the existing population at five year increments, making ad-
justments for births, deaths, age and sex composition 
changes, varying labor force participation ~ates, and in-
and out-migration. The model produces state level popula-
tion estimates which are split into public and private 
service territories by disaggregating 1980 county level 
census data using percentages of residential customers serv-
ed by public and private utilities. These percentages were 
modified slightly where employment projections indicated a 
change of proportion of total employment in public or pri-
vate service areas. 
A more detailed representation of the operational 
structure of the population model is depicted in Figure 5. 
The model is based in the year 1970 and accordingly begins 
its operation using 1970 population values (although it was 
operated to match the 1980 age composition of each state). 
Age- and sex-specific fertility and suryiyal rates (taken 
TABLE II 
BASIC INDUSTRY EMPLOYMENT ESTIMATION 
Industry 
Agriculture 
Food Processing 
Lumber & Wood 
Products 
pulp and Paper 
Chemicals 
Employment periyation High/Low Adjystment 
- judgmental adjustment of - NADP high/low 
BPA projections based ranges applied to 
on state level agency BPA-calculated 
reports 
- trend analysis of state 
employment departments 
(modified for specific 
industry expansion 
plans) 
- TAMM forecasts of re-
gional production 
disaggregated to state 
level & multiplied by 
employment/output ratio 
- primary product: USFS 
projections & earlier 
BPA forecasts converted 
paper products: em-
ployment/population 
ratios multiplied by 
preliminary population 
projections 
- chlorine-caustic: 
correlated with pulp 
and paper growth 
agricultural: growth 
proportional to 
national DRI baseline 
nuclear fuels: judg-
mental adjustment of 
industry estimates 
baseline 
- state's shares of 
national employ-
ment applied to 
DRt optimistic & 
pessimistic trends 
- DRt projections 
of optimistic and 
pessimistic case 
housing starts 
applied to BPA 
base line 
- star t-up times 
and production 
levels of known 
plants scaled up 
or down 
- each state's share 
of national em-
ployment extra-
pola ted to 2000, 
shares applied to 
ORI's optimistic 
trend for high 
case, constant 
share (1980 level) 
assumed for low 
case derivation 
from DRI pessi-
mistic trend 
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Industry 
Primary Metals 
Electronics 
Transportation 
Equipment 
Mining 
TABLE II (Cont'd) 
Employment Deriyation 
- aluminum: industry 
estimates of produc-
tion (including 
modernization) cor-
related with employ-
ment, Alumax added 
non-aluminum: regional 
historical estimates 
indexed to ORI baseline 
- public statements of 
individual companies' 
expansion plans and 
projections of state 
depts. of economic 
development 
- judgmental adjustment 
of aerospace industry 
estimates of growth 
and expansion~ non-
aerospace shares taken 
from historic data 
and ORI base li ne 
national trend 
- mine-specific employ-
ment estimates 
Federal government in-house estimates 
(given current hiring 
ceilings , existing 
Federal facilities) 
High/Low Adjystment 
- aluminum: high case 
adjusts demand & 
amount of modern-
ization upward, low 
case assumes lower 
demand, less modern-
ization. no Alumax 
non-aluminum: state 
shares of national 
employment applied 
to ORI optimistic 
and pessimistic 
trends 
- state shares applied 
to DRI optimistic 
trend for high case, 
reduced shares 
app lied to DRI 
pessimistic trend 
for low-case 
- states' shares ap-
plied to ORI opti-
mistic -& pessimistic 
trend except for WA 
where avg. absolute 
yearly employment 
change added to or 
subtracted from 
baseline 
- baseline estimates 
scaled up/down to 
reflect different 
levels of mine pro-
duction 
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- in-house estimates 
(relaxed or tightened 
hiring ceilings) 
( START] 
PARTICIPATION 
RATES 
!lENT 
ADJUSTHEIIT 
FACTOR 
POPULATION 
DIFFERENCE 
IN LABOR 
FORCE VALUES 
" NET MI-
GRATION OF 
WORKERS 
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Figure S. The BPA population model. A flowchart of 
calculations. (Detail of Figure 3, Box 3) 
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from state Depts. of Vital Statistics for the historical 
period and from national projections of the U.S. Bureau of 
Census from 1980 to 2000) are then applied to the base year 
values to produce a preliminary 1975 population value. To 
this preliminary value, labor force participation rates 
(also age-and sex-specific) taken from the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics are applied, yielding the portion of the 
1915 labor force filled by "survivors" of the 1970 
population who are of working age. 
This labor force value, however, does not reflect the 
net migration of workers occurring from 1970 to 1975 (just 
as the preliminary 1975 population figures do not reflect 
total net migration). A calculation of the total 1975 ~ 
ployment is developed using the economic base model describ-
ed in the previous section (though, prior to 1980, the em-
ployment values are actuals, not estimates). An unem-
ployment adjustment, accounting for frictional unemployment, 
is then performed to convert total 1975 employment into the 
total 1915 labor force. This "employment-derived" labor 
force value was developed by applying participation rates to 
preliminary 1975 population. The difference between these 
two values constitutes the net migration of workers. Since 
many migrating workers characteristically bring (or take) 
their families with them, the net migration of workers is 
multiplied by an adjustment factor to yield the net migra-
tion of population. This resulting value is then added to 
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(or subtracted from) the preliminary 1975 population value, 
producing a final figure reflecting mortality, fertility, 
and migration. 
From the final 1975 population value, the number of 
households is calculated by applying headship rates (i.e. 
proportion of persons heading a household) to each age-sex 
group and summing the forecasts for each of the groups. 
Headship rates are taken from national projections developed 
by the U.S. Bureau of Census. 
Once the final population and household values are 
calculated for 1975 the population is once again "aged" 5 
years to 1980 and the set of calculations begun again. This 
process is repeated until the forecast horizon (2000) is 
reached. 
The high and low ranges for population were developed 
by varying some of the key model input values, based upon 
changes in fundamental assumptions. For the high case, high 
employment, higher levels of labor force participation, 
lower fertility (since more childbearing-age women shift to 
the work force), and high headship rates were assumed. By 
contrast, the low case assumed lower employment and labor 
force participation, highter fertility, lower headship rates 
and higher unemployment adjustment. 
The Housing Hodel. The housing model used at BPA 
utilizes the output of the population model to project the 
total housing stock, new housing construction, and average 
house size for four housing types: single-family attached, 
single-family detached, multifamily, and mobile home. 
Projections are done on a state level and aggregated to 
regional totals. Since housing projections are driven by 
outputs of the population model, the public-private split 
for housing is simply accomplished by using public and 
private population values. 
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The internal structure of the housing model is depicted 
in Figure 6. A breakdown of households by age class is pro-
duced by multiplying age-specific population estimates by 
headship rates. (These values are taken from the population 
model discussed in previous section). Occupancy rates for 
the four types of housing are determined from three factors. 
The first is a set of base year (1980) occupancy rates, 
developed from residential survey data developed for PNUCC 
and BPA by Elrick and Lavidge. (For 1980, no further 
calculation is perfomed: the values are used as taken from 
the survey data). The second is a penetration rate which 
estimates the preference choices among the housing types for 
new construction. This penetration rate is derived from DR! 
state level projections of housing starts. The third and 
final factor is a distribution rate which allows the addi-
tional construction to be allocated among the various age 
groups in the population. These distribution rates are 
calculated from residential survey data. For each year in 
the forecast period after 1981, the occupancy rate is cal-
Occupied 
Housing 
Units 
Total Now 
Construction 
Reprinted from (B?A, 1982b:43) 
Figure 6. The BPA housing model. The derivation of ho~se­
holds, average unit size and new construction. (:etail of 
Fi9~re 3, Box 4) 
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culated by adjusting the previous year's occupancy rate to 
account for the penetration rates of new construction 
(distributed among the various age groups). 
68 
Multiplying the number of households by occupancy rates 
gives the breakdown of occupied housing units. Total hous-
ing stock is next derived by adjusting occupied housing 
stock for vacancies. This is accomplished by dividing 
occupied housing by one minus the vacancy rate (taken from 
Annual Housing Syryeys). 
Having calculated the total stock for a given year, the 
housing model next determines new construction. This is 
done in several steps. New net construction represents the 
construction of new homes to accommodate the needs of a 
growing population. It is simply the difference between a 
given year's total housing stock of a given type and that of 
the same category for the previous year. Next, replacement 
construction (new homes to replace those which were demo-
lished) is calculated by multiplying the previous year's 
total stock by a replacement rate (assumes an average life 
of 56 years for a conventional home, 24 years for a mobile 
home). Finally, total new construction is derived by summ-
ing net new and replacement construction. 
The final output of the housing model, average unit 
~, is estimated using a simple vintage model which dis-
aggregates the total stock of houses into groups constructed 
in the same year. From the residential survey data are ob-
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tained the average unit size of the existing stock (by vint-
age) constructed prior to the base year, the average unit 
size for new homes (assumed to remain equal to the average 
size of the most recent vintage covered by the survey), and 
the breakdown of the base year housing stock by vintage. 
For each forecast year units which must be replaced are 
removed from the oldest available vintage. After this has 
been done, average unit size is calculated by taking a 
weighted average of all the Vintages. 
High and low ranges for housing were developed simply 
by substituting high and low values for population and 
headship rates for those used in the baseline run. 
The Income Model. An econometric model was recently 
developed by BPA staff to project both personal and per 
capita income by state. The model first projects the 
various components of income and performs successive 
aggregations to arrive at total personal income. As such, 
the intermediate outputs (i.e. the income values of the 
various components) of the model are also of significance 
(some of them are, in fact, used in the demand models). 
Figure 7 provides a detailed representation of the 
internal structure of the income model. USing an econo-
metric equation, the incomes for various sectors of the 
economy are calculated as a function of employment (by 
category) and U.S. average earnings (also by employment 
category). The employment estimates are those developed by 
WAGE. SALARY INCOME 
~RO:TYJ INCOIIE 
-- -~--- ~TRAN;F~~--l PAYIIENTS - -_ .. -
--.-~~~-~ CONTRI-BUTIONS RESIOENCE 
TO SOCIAL ADJUSTIIENT 
INSURANCE 
- .. -- .------
Reprinted from (BPA, 1982b:132) 
Figure 7. Flow chart of regional income model. (Detail of Figure 3, Box 5) 
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BPA, while the average earnings for each category are 
obtained from DRI. The categories thus calculated are 
non-durable and durable manufacturing, mining, construction, 
transportation, wholesale/retail trade, F.I.R.E. (finance, 
insurance and real estate), services, and government. Non-
agricultural proprietors' income, agricultural labor and 
proprietors' income, and other labor income for the region 
are developed as shares of national totals (DRI). Non-
durable and durable manufacturing incomes are summed to 
obtain total manufacturing income. Transportation, whole-
sale and retail trade, F.I.R.E., services and government 
incomes are aggregated to produce commercial income. Next, 
non-agricultural labor and proprietors' income is derived by 
summing incomes from the manufacturing, commercial, mining, 
construction, and non-agricultural proprietors' categories. 
The further addition of agricultural labor and proprietors' 
income and other labor income to this sum yields total labor 
and proprietors' income. 
Total personal income is subsequently obtained from 
this last total by a series of calculations. Property 
income (a function of BPA population estimates and DRI 
values for U.S. per capita income) and transfer payments 
(the product of BPA population estimates and DRI U.S. per 
capita transfer payment projections) are added to total 
labor and proprietors' income. From this figure is subract-
ed contributions to social insurance (the product of BPA 
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employment and DRI estimates of U.S. contributions per 
employee). The resulting value is then given a "residence 
adjustment" measuring the net difference between income in-
flows and outflows which result from such factors as commut-
ing employees or absentee landlords and proprietors. This 
residence adjustment, based upon BPA employment values, com-
pletes the calculation of total personal income. 
Finally, per capita personal income is derived simply 
by dividing total personal income by BPA population esti-
mates. 
High and low range income were developed by substi-
tuting high and low BPA population and employments for base-
line values and optimistic and pessimistic DRI trends for 
its base case TRENDLONG2006B. 
Public/private splits are Similarly determined by the 
values of the BPA-derived inputs to the income model. The 
variables estimated by DRI are all national averages and, as 
such, apply equally to public and private utility service 
districts. 
Fuel Prices. A critical variable driving all of the 
demand models is the price of fuels competitive with elec-
tricity. The prices of oil, natural gas, and coal in the 
region are calculated by BPA, though no computerized model 
1s employed. oil prices are regional, but coal and natural 
gas prices vary somewhat from state to state. No differ-
ences in non-electric fuels are observed to exist between 
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public and private electric utility service areas: hence, no 
public/private split needs be made. 
Petroleum prices are calculated in four basic steps. 
First, the relative shares (or the percentages of the total 
amount supplied to the region) originating at various 
sources are determined. The shares of crude origination 
from Canadian, Alaskan, Domestic, and Imported sources vary 
across the forecast period. The values assigned to the 
shares for these sources are determined for the historical 
period (1978) from u.s DOE's Energy Data Report, and for 
the period from 1979 to 2000 from DRI crude petroleum pro-
jections. Second, the prices for crude originating at each 
source are determined from DOE's Monthly Energy Review 
(1978-1980) and from DRI projections (1981-2000). In the 
third step, the average regional prices of crude oil are 
determined by multiplying each source's shares by its 
particular associated crude price value and summing. 
Finally, the crude prices are adjusted for markups of re-
finers and retailers using price data obtained from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and markup data from DOE. The 
resulting values describe the prices of residential, commer-
cial, and industrial distillate fuels and industrial 
residual oil. 
Natural gas and coal price projections follow the same 
series of steps. For natural gas, the relative shares of 
canadian, Alaskan, and Domestic sources are calculated for 
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the forecast period, pipeline prices are determined from DRI 
projections, an average pipeline price 1s computed, and this 
average price adjusted for markups for interstate trans-
mission pipelines and distributing utilities (based on DOE 
cost and revenue data). Retail prices of residential, 
commercial, and industrial natural gas were determined for 
each state as well as the whole region. For coal, the 
shares (for each state in the PNW) are produced for coal 
sources in Colorado, Wyoming, and Utah and contract prices 
computed using DRI projections. An average contract price 
for each state is calculated and subsequently transformed 
into delivered price (reflecting transportation costs also 
based on DRI projections). Delivered coal prices are 
prepared for both the region and each of the states. 
High and low ranges are the result of substituting 
alternative DRI projections for the baseline trend in the 
calculations described above. No modification of procedures 
1s necessary. 
pemand Models; End-Use and Econometric Tools 
The economic/demographic projections described above 
were used in one or more of the sector-specific demand 
models employed in the BPA forecast. These models were run 
in conjunction with a supply pricing model (described below) 
electricity demand feeding into the pricing model, electri-
city prices input to the demand models, until equilibrium 
(or convergence) was reached. For each iteration, all of 
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the models were run with a separate set of inputs corres-
ponding to the economic and demographic characteristics of 
public and private utility service areas. As noted above, 
the wholesale rates charged to investor-owned utilities 
differ substantially from those of public utilities (the 
Regional Power Bill notwithstanding): thus, two distinct 
demand streams were produced so that the supply pricing 
nlodel could determine the appr opr iate corresponding rates. 
(Note: Irrigation, DSI, and federal agency loads were 
calculated exogenously and not subjected to a public/private 
disaggregation. Their values did not vary from iteration to 
iteration, though they were added to the demand outputs 
before they were entered into the pricing model. As a 
result, they will be discussed below where final consumption 
values are presented). 
In addition to a baseline run (BPA's "best guess" at 
the future of regional electricity demand) high and low 
demand projections were developed (also employing the 
public/private split and iterative operation with the 
pricing model). These alternative growth trajectories 
represent the highest and lowest levels of electricity 
consumption to be expected given the set of economic, 
demographic, and policy constraints assumed to be effective. 
In addition to using high case economic and demographic 
inputs, the high demand trajectory assumed less robust 
regional conservation. Contrariwise, the low case alterna-
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tive embodied low economic and demographic projections and 
assumed slightly greater levels of conservation savings than 
the baseline. Table III provides a fuller enumeration of 
the assumptions embodied in the inputs to the individual 
demand models. How these assumptions affect each of the 
models' operations is described in the detailed discussions 
of the ORNL Residential Model, the ORNL Commercial Model, 
and NEPP Industrial Model presented below. 
The ORNL Residential Model. One of the three principal 
models of energy demand employed by BPA staff in producing 
the 1982 forecast was the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
Model of residential sector energy consumption. The ORNL 
model was one of several developed for the USDOE shortly 
after its formation in 1977. The ORNL Residential Model 
embodies a hybrid structure, which reflects characteristics 
of both engineering and econometric models. The model 
architects, most notably Eric Hirst, designed the basic 
features of the model to address the effects of both the 
relatively continuous demographic and economic trends 
stimulating demand growth and the discontinuous energy 
policy interventions anticipated by the newly elected Carter 
Administration. The basic structure of the model is 
illustrated below in Figure 8. 
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TABLE III 
KEY ENERGY FORECAST ASSUMPTIONS 
EXPLICIT MODELING CHOICES BY SECTOR 
Residential 
Sector 
Economic and 
Demographic 
Projections 
Fuel Prices 
Conservation 
Customer Discount 
Rate 
Appliance 
Lifetimes 
Hous ing Size 
"Other" Elec-
tricity Use 
Commercial Sector 
Economic and 
Demographic 
Projections 
Fuel Prices 
Fuel Choice 
Assumption 
Low Case 
low projections 
low projections 
BPA budgeted 
programs 
base value 
base li fe times 
10% smaller 1990 
15% smaller 2000 
calculated by 
model 
low projections 
low projections 
some oil used by 
2000 
Base Case High Case 
base projections high projec-
tions 
base projections high projec-
tions 
BPA budgeted slower pene-
programs tration of 
BPA bud ge ted 
programs 
base value 
base lifetimes 
constant 
constant 
calculated exter-
nally to increase 
by 10%per house-
hold 
base projections 
base projections 
little oil used 
by 2000 
higher value 
longe r life-
times 
10% higher 1990 
10% higher 2000 
calculated ex-
ternally to 
increase by 
18% per house-
hold 
high projec-
tions 
high projec-
tions 
little oil 
used by 2000 
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TABLE III (Cont'd) 
Low Case Base Case High Case 
Conservation BPA budgeted 
programs 
BPA budge ted 
programs 
slower penetra-
tion of BPA 
budgeted pro-
grams 
Floor Space per 10' lower 
Employee 
Building Owner lower 
Discount Rate 
Equipment Life- base lifetimes 
times 
Industrial Sector 
Economic and 
Demographic 
Projections 
Fuel Prices 
low projections 
low projections 
constant 
base 
base li fe times 
10' higher 
higher 
longer life-
times 
base projections high projec-
ti~ns 
base projections high projec-
tions 
Aluminum Plants Alumax not built1 Alumax built 
20' of existing 
Alumax built 
Labor Product-
ivity 
capacity closed 
lower projection base projection higher pro-
jection 
x 
Intensrtyof 
Apptl3nce 
Use 
Reprinted from BPA, 1982a:68 
ElIlClsncy 
of Homes 
Figure 8. Schematic: ORNL residential energy use model 
The fundamental equation represented in the model 
ENERGY = 
USE 
ENERGY USE/ 
UNIT 
x • OF 
UNITS 
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The basic unit in the case of the residential sector is the 
appliances. The model determines the number of appliances 
of a given type by multiplying the number of occupied house-
holds (calculated using the BPA housing model discussed 
earlier) by the percentage haying appliances (or the satura-
tion rate). The average use per appliance is computed by 
multiplying the estimated appliance efficiency (or average 
use) relatIve to the base year of 1919, times a usage inten-
~ factor describing the level at which an appliance is 
operated. Finally, for the heating and air conditioning end 
uses, a thermal integrity index, describing the shell char-
acteristics of the homes modeled (i.e. how efficiently the 
homes hold heat), also enters into the calculation of aver-
age appliance use. 
The ORNL Residential Hodel is based in 1979, and 
projected changes in such factors as appliances efficiency 
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or saturations are calculated as indices of base year values 
given as inputs. The model distinguishes between new (i.e. 
constructed during the forecast year) and existing (i.e. 
constructed before the forecast year) homes. New equipment 
efficiencies, appliance saturations, usage intensities, and 
thermal integrities are computed for new homes while, for 
existing homes, the values for these variables are weighted 
averages of previous years' values. Conservation policy 
options are tested through the components modeling 
appliance efficiency and thermal integrity by substituting 
exogenously determined index values for those calculated as 
a response to fuel price changes. This capability consti-
tutes one of the two major strengths of the ORNL model rela-
tive to others used to determine residential energy use. 
The other strength of the model is the detailed breakdown of 
its output. The ORNL Residential Model projects energy use 
for each of 72 distinct housing type/appliance/fuel type 
categories over the entire forecast period, recognizing 
three housing types (single-family, multiple-family, and 
mobile home), eight appliances or end-uses (space heating, 
air conditioning, water heating, refrigeration, freezing, 
cooking, lighting, and 'other'), and three fuels (elec-
tricity, natural gas, and oil). Forecast totals are pro-
duced by aggregating across the various energy use cate-
gories. 
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To understand the capabilities and limitations of this 
model fully, it is necessary to look at each of the com-
ponents identified above individually and in greater detail. 
Such an examination follows Table IV below which summarizes 
the variables used as inputs to the model (economic/ 
demographic projections prepared by Economic studies are 
denoted by an asterisk). 
The average use component calculates the efficiency of 
the average appliance servicing the eight end uses recog-
nized by the model for each of the three housing types. 
Figure 9 charts the logic flows of the component's opera-
tion. 
1979 is the base year for all average use calculations. 
The values for this year were developed from the residential 
survey performed by Elrick and Lavidge for BPA and PNUCC and 
are given as inputs. After 1979, the average use values for 
newly constructed homes (i.~. "new' in the forecast year) 
are estimated as a proportion of the 1979 base year value. 
The index values (i.e. the proportion of the base year 
values) for new construction after 1979 are derived using 
efficiency/cost tradeoff curves (also referred to as tech-
nology curves). These curves embody the concept of life-
cycle cost minimization which predicts that homeowners will 
offset the higher operating costs of appliances resulting 
from increased fuel prices by investing more initial capital 
for more efficient equipment. The inputs to these equipment 
TABLE IV 
SUMMARY OF RESIDENTIAL MODEL INPUTS 
VARIABLE UNIT(S) 
Equipment Lifetimes (by end-use) • Years 
1979 Equipment Price • 1975-$ 
(by end-use/fuel type/housing type) 
Long Run Equipment Usage Electricity • Real No. 
Discount Rates for Tradeoffs • Fraction 
Equipment Technology Curve Parameters • Real Nos. 
structure Technology Curve Parameters • Real Nos. 
Interest Rate for Structural Curve • Fraction 
Investment Lifetime for Thermal Integrity. Years 
Load Reduction (air cond/space heat) 
New Homes with Air Conditioning 
(by housing type) 
Market Penetration Rate Adjustment 
Coefficient 
Base and Final Years for Present worth 
Calc. 
1979/1980 Usage Intensity 
Real Interest Rates for Present Worth 
Calc 
Short/Long Run Elasticity 
Implicit Discount Rate 
1979 Base Year Average Energy Use 
(by end-use/fuel type/housing type) 
1179 Saturation Rates 
(by. end-use/fuel type/housing type) 
• Ra tio 
• Fraction 
• Real Nos. 
• Years 
• Ratio 
• Fraction 
• Ratio 
• Fraction 
• Btu/Unit 
• Fraction 
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TABLE IV (Cont'd) 
yARIABLE 
1979 Penetration Rates 
(by end-use/fuel type/housing type) 
*Housing Stocks (1979-2000) 
(housing type) 
*New Construction (1979-2000) 
(by house type) 
*Avg. House Size (1979-2000) 
(by housing type) 
*Indexed Fuel prices (1979-2000) 
(by fuel type) 
*Indexed Per Capita Income (1979-2000) 
Number of Units Retrofit (1979-2000) 
(by housing type) 
Retrofit Thermal Integrity 
Conservation Measures (1979-2000) 
(by housing type) 
- new home construction 
- water heater wraps 
- shower flow restrictors 
- faucet flow restrictors 
- low flow shower heat 
- heat pumps 
Reduction Factors for Measures 
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UNIT(SI 
• Fraction 
• Million Units 
• Million Units 
• Fraction of 1979 
• Fraction of 1979 
• Fraction of 1979 
• Millions of Units 
• Real Nos. 
• No. of Units Affected 
• Fractions 
New 
Input: 
Fuel Prices 
Average 
),-____ +\ Energy Use 
Given as 
Inpu ts 
Avg. Energy 
Use Equals 
Avg. Use For 
Tot~ 1 Stock 
Year T-l 
Base Year 
Calculate Average 
Energy Use Index 
for New Homes 
Using Efficiency/ 
~--~~Cost Tradeoff 
Input: 1919 
Equipment 
Cost 
Curves 
Calculated Values GOing 
to A are used in the 
Determination of Saturations, 
Usage Intensity, and Final 
Energy Use 
Fiaure 9. Calculation of average energy use in the 
ORNL residential model. 
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efficiency/cost tradeoff curves are fuel D~Lces. 1979 equip-
ment costs. a discount rate (representing the homeowners 
perceived payback period for capital investment), and the 
parameters for the curves. The resulting index value is 
multiplied by the 1979 base year value to yield the average 
use for a given type of appliance in a given type of new 
home. 
For existing homes, the average use is assumed to equal 
the average use value calculated for the total stock of 
homes for the year prior to the forecast year (e.g. for 
existing homes in 1987 the average use equals that of the 
total 1986 stock). The derivation of this value is detailed 
below in the section describing the final energy use cal-
culation. 
The thermal integrity component, describing the effi-
ciency with which homes maintain their interior temper-
atures, functions according to a logic virtually identical 
to that of the average use component. This logic is mapped 
in Figure 10. Thermal integrity calculations, as the name 
suggests, apply only to those modeled end-uses specifically 
concerned with regulation the internal temperature of dwell-
ings: hence the calculations are n2t applicable to end-uses 
other than space heating and air conditioning. As is the 
case with all components in the residential model, the 
thermal integrity component is referenced to the base year 
1979. Thermal integrity ~ year values are given as In-
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Figure 10. Calculation of thermal integrity in the 
ORNL residential model. 
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outs to the model and calculated as an index value for new 
homes in subsequent years (i.e. 1979=1.0 for index calcula-
tions). 
For years after 1979 the thermal integrity index for 
new construction is calculated using structural efficiency/ 
cost tradeoff curves, which are conceptually identical to 
the curves used in the average use calculations except that 
they apply to shell characteristics rather than appliance 
efficiency. (For existing construction after 1979 the ~ 
vious year's thermal integrity index for the total stock of 
homes is maintained. Its calculation is described below in 
the section of the final energy use calculation). A 
number of variables enter into the life-cycle cost cal-
culation of thermal integrity: the anticipated investment 
lifetime for the thermal integrity measure, fuel prices, the 
initial capital cost of the measure, discount and interest 
rates, the fraction of new homes with air conditioning, the 
load reduction ratio for homes with air conditioning (i.e. 
air conditioning loads divided by space heating loads), and 
the curve parameters. Thermal integrity is determined, for 
new homes, by multiplying the resulting index by the ~ 
year value. 
The saturation component calculates the proportion of 
homes having a certain type of appliance using a specific 
fuel. This proportion is referred to as a 'saturation' when 
describing the total stock of homes and as a 'penetration' 
when applied to the vintage comprised of new homes. The 
logic of the calculation is represented in Figure 11. 
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In 1979, the base year of the ORNL Residential Model, 
both the saturation for the total stock of homes and the 
penetration of appliances in the 1979 vintage are given as 
inputs. After 1979, saturations and penetrations are cal-
culated by the model. For existing homes, the saturation is 
equal to the saturation for the previous year's total stock 
of homes. For new homes, the fuel and appliance choice is 
calculated using a series of inputs. These specified by the 
user (i.e. in the input deck for the model) include ~ 
prices. per capita income. 1979 equipment prices. discount 
rates for tradeoffs between appliances choices, and a market 
penetration rate coefficient (adjusting the calculation for 
market imperfections). Two other inputs to the calculation 
are produced internally by the model. The first is the ~ 
dex value calculated in the average use component for new 
homes. The second is a similar index calculated by the 
thermal integrity component. The latter is applied only if 
the end-use under consideration is either space heating or 
air conditioning. 
The usage intensity component, depicted in Figure 12, 
models behavioral responses of homeowners in response to 
changing fuel costs. While over the long run, owners re-
spond by replacing old appliances with newer, more energy-
efficient equipment, their short-term response is to curtail 
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Figure 11. Calculation of heating fuel saturations in 
the ORNL residential model. 
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consumption (i.e. reduce the intensity of appliance usage) 
to offset increased energy costs. 
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For newly constructed homes the usage intensity index 
equals 1, denoting that new appliances are receiving full 
expected use. This is not surprising since the average use 
algorithm specifies that new equipment choices reflect and 
optimal life-cycle cost response to fuel prices in the year 
of selection: hence the equipment may be cost-effectively 
operated at expected levels during that year. For existing 
construction, however, full usage intensity is scaled down-
ward (or, potentially, upward, should fuel prices decrease) 
to account for changes in fuel prices taking place between 
the year the appliance was installed and the forecast year. 
The calculation of the usage intensity index 1s based upon 
the elasticity of the homeowner's appliance utilization 
response to changes in fuel prices and income. 
User-specified inputs to this calculation include, in addi-
tion to fuel prices and per capita income, interest rates, a 
long-run usage elasticity, the ratio of short- to long-run 
elasticities, the ratio of 1979 to 1980 usage intensities, 
and the base and final years for the present worth calcula-
i1£a. Additional inputs to the calculation which are devel-
oped within the model, rather than specified by the user are 
the average energy use index for the previous year's total 
stock of homes (by type) from the previous year and, 
Similarly, if the appliance under consideration is used for 
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space heating or air conditioning, the average thermal inte-
grity index for the previous year's total stock (also by 
housing type). The usage intensity index is used to scale 
energy use values in the final energy use calculation. 
The final energy use calculation, represented 
graphically in Figure 13, depicts how the "products" of each 
of the components are combined to produce the final model 
outputs (which are disaggregated by housing type, fuel type, 
and end-use). This calculation (mirroring that of Figure 8 
but with increased detail) is carried out both for newly 
constructed housing units and for the total stock of homes. 
Conservation policy testing is carried out at this point by 
modification of values entering into the calculation. 
For new homes, the calculation of energy use is a 
straightforward multiplication. The number of new homes 
(i.e. new construction) is multiplied by the percentage of 
new homes having appliances (derived in the saturation com-
ponent) yielding the number of appliances in new construc-
~. The average use of appliances in new construction is 
calculated as a product of average use. usage intensity, and 
(if the end-use in question is space heating or air condi-
tioning) thermal integrity. The resulting values for energy 
use per appliance and number of appliances are multiplied 
together to yield energy use fOr new construction in the 
forecast year. 
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Figure 13. Final energy use calculation for the ORNL 
~esidential model. 
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For the total stock of homes, the final energy use 
calculation is somewhat more complicated. Summarily, it 
Involve5 taking a weIghted average of energy U5e in new and 
existing units, adjusting for demolition of older homes and 
replacement of ob501ete appllance5, and applying conserva-
tion measures to existing units. A saturation of the total 
stock of homes is calculated as the weighted average of the 
previous year's appliance saturation for the total stock and 
penetration rates for appliance in new homes (these satura-
tions are weighted by the total housing stock and new con-
struction). Adjustments are made to the weighting of exist-
ing units to account for demolitions of older homes and 
the replacement of portion of older appliance based upon 
user-specified equipment lifetimes. The replacement appli-
ance mix reflects that of new units, rather than the pre-
vious year's total stock. Multiplying the total stock 
saturation by the total housing stock for the forecast year 
yields the total number of appliances in the residential 
stock. The average use of appliances in the total stock of 
homes is calculated as the product of the weighted averages 
of the outputs of usage intensity average use, and (where 
appropriate) thermal integrity components. If BPA conserva-
tion programs are assumed to be in effect adjustments are 
made to thermal integrity (for retrofits) or average use 
values, scaling then down by externally determined reduction 
factors in proportion to the number of units affected. For 
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space heating and air conditioning end-uses the average use 
calculation is further scaled by an index value for the 
average house size for the total stock (relative to the 
average 1979 house). Final energy use for the total stock 
is determined by multiplying number of appliances by energy 
use per appliance. 
The ORNL model produces sector energy consumption 
totals from the "bottom-up" first, projecting demand for 
each of the 96 end-use/fuel type/housing type combinations 
and arriving at final totals by means of aggregation. 
Public and private forecasts are developed simply by running 
the appropriate input sets through the model. Baseline, 
high, and low forecasts are distinguished not only by the 
sets of inputs employed but by differing sets of operating 
assumptions. The size of new homes, treated as constant in 
the base case, is assumed to be, in the low case, 10% 
smaller by 1990 and 15\ smaller by 2000, and, in the high 
case, 10\ higher by 1990. Appliance lifetimes were length-
ened, in comparison to low and base cases, for the high 
case: from 23 to 29 years for space heating, from 13 to 16 
years for air conditioning and water heating, from 19 to 24 
years for refrigeration, from 21 to 26 years for freezing, 
from 18 to 23 years for cooking, and from 10 to 13 years for 
'other' (lighting was assumed to have a 1 year lifetime 
irrespective of which case was under consideration). Be-
cause of the introduction of new appliances such as VCRs and 
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home computers into the residential sector, the 'other' end 
use for electricity was manually adjusted upward by 10% per 
household for the base case and 18% per household for the 
high case (internally calculated values were unmodified for 
the low case). Finally, for the high case the consumer dis-
count rate was raised, relative to low and base cases, and 
BPA budgeted programs were assumed to have a slower 
penetration. 
To illustrate how the ORNL Residential Model operates, 
the following description of its operation in the year 1990 
is provided. 
The average use component determines the efficiency of 
appliances in the newly constructed 1990 vintage of homes in 
response to changes in fuel prices. Existing homes are 
assumed to display the average use value of the total stock 
of homes for 1989. 
Similarly, the thermal integrity component determines 
the structural efficiency of 1990 homes, while applying the 
1989 total stock value to existing homes. Thermal integrity 
calculations are applicable only to two of eight end-uses, 
space heating and air conditioning. 
The saturation component calculates the penetration of 
new appliances for the 1990 vintage of homes. The 1989 
saturation for the total stock of homes is applied to 
existing homes. 
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The usage intensity component derives a "scaling 
factor" for the average use value for existing homes, 
representing the home owner's behavioral response to changes 
in income and fuel prices. For new homes, the "scaling 
factor" is equal to 1.0 (i.e. no behavioral adjustment is 
made). 
Final energy use calculations are made for both new 
homes and the total 1990 stock. New 1990 construction is 
multiplied by the saturation, a average use, usage 
intensity, and, where appropriate, thermal integrity values 
for new homes to yield a energy use value. This is carried 
out for each end-use/fuel type/housing type combination. 
For total 1990 stock, the total number of housing units is 
multiplied by weighted averages of the values of new and 
existing 1990 homes for appliance saturation, average use, 
usage intensity, and, for two end-uses, thermal integrity. 
Adjustments occur to account for houses torn down in 1990, 
appliances replaced (in proportion to their expected life-
times), and projected end-use specific BPA conservation 
programs. These are also projected for each end-use/fuel 
type/housing type combination. Final consumption values for 
each fuel, both for new homes and the total residential 
stock, are determined by aggregating categorical values. 
The ORNt commercial Model. The ORNL Commercial Model 
was developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 1977 for 
the U.S. Department of Energy, principally by Dr. Jerry 
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Jackson. Like the ORNL Residential Model (which! of the 
two, was completed first) the commercial model was designed 
to address a specific variety of policy consideration. Not 
surprisingly, its basic hybrid engineering/econometric 
structure, depicted in Figure 14, closely resembles that of 
the residential model. 
Ener9Y Use 
(by buildin9 
type, fuel, 
and end-use 
Floor.pace 
Served by 
Each Fuel 
Figure 14. An overview of the structure of the ORNL 
model of commercial sector energy use. 
In the commercial sector, this basic unit is a square 
foot of floorspace. The model projects the floorspace for 
ten types of commercial buildings over the forecast period 
(by means of either an econometric or stock-flow approach). 
It then segments or partitions this floorspace by the 
saturations of four basic fuels (i.e. the fraction of 
floorspace served by each fuel). Next it determines the 
basic efficiency of equipment for each of five different 
ena-uses (i.e. 1ts operat1ng energy use per square foot) for 
each new or refitted vintage. Finally, it determines the 
level of utilization of the equipment the short-term, be-
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havioral conservation response to changes in fuel prices. 
Most basically, the commercial model differs from the resi-
dential model in three ways. First, the commercial model is 
based in 1970 rather than 1979. While this sometimes makes 
it more difficult to obtain needed data inputs, it facili-
tates model calibration, since it must "track" ten years of 
history before reaching the forecast period. Second, the 
model recognizes a different array of building, fuel, and 
end-use type. Commercial floorspace is broken down into ten 
building types (retail-wholesale, office, auto repair, 
warehouse, school, health care, public, religious, hotel, 
and miscellaneous), four fuel types (electricity, natural 
gas, oil, and other), and five end-uses (heating, cooling, 
watel: he.3.tlng, lighting, and other). Finally, rather than 
simply distinguishing new from existing buildings, the 
commercial model treats each vintage (i.e. all the floor-
space constructed in a given year) separately. Since the 
first vintage modeled is 1924 construction, by the year 2000 
(the forecast horizon) a total of seventy-seven distinct 
vintages are being dealt with separately. 
The ORNL Commercial Model, like the residential model, 
operates from the bottom up. For each forecast year it 
calculates the energy use for every building type/fuel 
type/end-use combination (a total of 200) for each vintage 
and aggregates these calculations to arrive at a final 
energy use total. 
100 
While the basic model structure, outlined above, is 
relatively simple the actual calculations are somewhat more 
complex. To clarify the commercial model's operation fur-
ther, each component will be described individually in 
greater detail, and a description of the calculations 
carried out for an example forecast year, 1990, provided. A 
summary list of model inputs is presented in Table V (an 
asterisk denotes those inputs developed by the Economic 
Studies section as economic/demographic projections.) 
Although the ORNL Commercial Model is based in 1970, 
the floorspace component begins projection square footage in 
commercial buildings after 1980. This is because, sometime 
after receiving the model from ORNL, BPA was able to obtain 
ten additional years of historic data on regional floor-
space. 
Figure 15 depicts the fashion in which the floorspace 
total for each vintage constructed between 1924 and 2000 are 
calculated. For vintage constructed prior to 1981, the 
"calculation" consists of merely reading the historical 
values for 1924 total standing stock (i.e. all commercial 
construction built up to 1924) and the annual floorspace 
additions from 1925 to 1980 from the input tape. These 
floorspace values were estimated at ORNL based on F.W. Dodge 
construction data. For vintages constructed after 1980, one 
of two floorspace projection submodels may be employed. 
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TABLE V 
SUMMARY OF COMMERCIAL MODEL INPUTS 
VARIABLE 
19Z4 Base Year F100rspace stock 
(by bldg. type) 
1970 Floorspace Fractions Served by 
Fuel Type/End-Use 
Yearly Additions to F1oorspace, 
1925-1980 (by bldg. type) 
1970 Energy Use/Sq. Ft. (by end-use/ 
fuel type/bldg. type) 
*Rea1 Per Capita Disposable Income 
(1971-80, 1985, 1990, 1995, 2000) 
*1970 Fuel Prices (by fuel type) 
*Fue1 Prices (1971-80, 1985, 1990, 
1995, 2000 by fuel type) 
Regression Coefficients for ORNL 
Floorspace Forecasting Eq. (by 
bldg_ type) 
Capital Costs of Heating, Ventilating, 
and Air-Conditioning Equipment (by 
bldg. type) 
Parameters for Efficiency/Cost 
Trade-Off Curve 
Parameters for Discount Rate 
Coefficients of Fuel Share Eq. 
UNIT (S) 
• Millions of Sq. Ft. 
• Percent 
• Millions of Sq. Ft. 
• Thousands Btu Sq. Ft. 
• Thousands of Dollars 
(1975) dollars 
• 1975 Dollars/Btu X 
10E6 
• 1975 Dollars/Btu X 
lOE6 
• Values for Per capita 
Disposable Income, 
Population, and a 
Constant 
• Dollars/Sq. Ft. 
• Curve, Boundaries, 
Years Applicable 
• Rate, Years Applicable 
• Constant 
VARIABLE 
Policy Options 
Building Standards 
Tax Credits 
Grants Program 
(Schools' Hospitals) 
Retrofit Program 
TABLE V (Cont'd) 
UNIT(S! 
• Applicable Years 
• Applicable Years, 
Credit Percentage 
• Applicable Years, 
Expenditure/Sq. Ft. 
Reducing Effective 
Equipment Costs 
• Applicable Years, 
Percent Reduction 
in Energy Use/Sq. Ft • 
••• additional inputs for Battelle Floorspace component ••• 
·Retail-Wholesale Employment 
·Financial, Insurance and Real Estate 
-Government Employment 
-Total Personal Income (PI) 
-Total Labor and Proprietor's Income 
~Total Population 
-Population Less than S 
~Population Less than 18 
-Population Greater than 6S 
-Interest Rates 
-National GNP Deflector 
Costs of Construction 
• No. of Employees 
• No. of Employees 
• No. of Employees 
• Nominal $ 
• Nominal $ 
• No. of Persons 
• No. of Persons 
• No. of Persons 
• No. of Persons 
• Rate 
• Deflator 
• Nominal $ 
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Figure 15. Calculation of floorspace additlons In the 
ORNL commercial model. 
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The original ORNL submodel calculatad floorspace econo-
metrically. The basic regression equation computed the 
total floorspace stock for a given year as a function of 
population and real per capita disposable income. The new 
construction for that year (i.e. the new vintage) was 
derived by taking the difference between the total floor-
space for the year under consideration and the previous 
year's floorspace total. This econometric submodel was used 
for the December 1981 (stage One) technical review of the 
model but not fo~ either the draft or final forecasts. 
For BPA's official forecast, a new floorspace 
projection submodel, developed by Battelle's Pacific 
Northwest Laboratories, was inserted into the ORNL model. 
The Battelle submodel calculates annual additions (not total 
stock) by means of a somewhat more sophisticated stock-flow 
approach. This approach assumes that new construction is a 
function of asset demand, land requirements, and construc-
tion services. The Battelle submodel was assessed to be 
preferable to the ORNL submodel for the final forecast for 
two basic reasons: its theoretical underpinnings were more 
sound from an economic perspective and the distribution of 
floorspace among building categories was intuitively more 
correct (i.e. unlike the ORNL submodel, there was no large, 
unexplained growth of categories such as 'Auto Repair'). 
One further modification of the floorspace calculation 
was performed by BPA staff which did not alter the manner in 
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which floorspace was calculated but did affect the resulting 
values. The data obtained from a survey of non-residential 
buildings carried our for BPA by Westat Inc. confirmed a 
widely held suspicion that the F.W. Dodge data used by both 
ORNL and Battelle in estimating their respective submodels 
systematically undercounted annual additions by about 50 to 
60 percent. 
To remedy this problem an exogenous calculation was 
performed to estimate 1980 and 2000 floorspace. From the 
non-residential building survey a ratio of floorspace per 
employee was developed for 'Trade', 'Service', and 'Office' 
employment categories. Multiplying these ratios by cor-
responding employment estimates for 1980 and 2000 yielded 
target floorspace totals. The computer program for the 
commercial model was then modified to accept a set of 
interactive, user-specified floorspace mutipliers to scale 
the yearly floorspace additions so as to hit target totals. 
Since the F.W. Dodge undercount1ng was assumed systemat1c, 
the same multiplier was applied for all building types. In 
effect, for the final forecast, the quantity of floorspace 
was determined exogenously while the distribution among 
building categories was a product of the historical data and 
the operation of Battelle submodel • 
. The second component of the ORNL model (depicted in 
Figure 16) determines the efficiency of the equipment used 
to service commercial floorspace (i.e. energy use per square 
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Figure 16. Calculation of energy use per square foot 
in the ORNL commercial model. 
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foot). This calculation is performed for each building 
type/fuel type/end-use combination for each vintage (though 
only for the years when that vintage is constructed or re-
fitted with equipment). 
For all vintages constructed prior to 1970, the energy 
use per square foot is set equal to a historical base year 
value representing the average efficiency for the total 
standing stock (i.e. vintages constructed 1924-1970). For 
forecast years 1971 through 2000 the energy use per square 
foot is obtained by multiplying the base year value times an 
energy utilization index (EUI), representing the proportion 
of the base year value used in a given forecast year. 
The EUI is calculated by one of two means depending 
upon the end-use under consideration. For water heating and 
"other" end-uses an efficiency elasticity (developed 
econometrically) is employed which describes changes in 
equipment efficiency resulting from changes in fuel price. 
For heating, cooling and lighting a series of efficiency/-
cost tradeoff cur yes (one for each end-use) developed from 
engineering analysis conducted at ORNL are used. These 
curves, in effect, plot a relationship between the capital 
cost of equipment and its efficiency. The theoretical 
assumption behind the curves is that owners will seek to 
minimize the life-cycle costs associated with the equipment 
fitted to their buildings. In other words, as fuel prices 
increase owners will offset anticipated increases in opera-
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ting costs by purchasing more expensive, but more efficient, 
equipment. In addition to the price of fuel, the owner's 
discount rate for the anticipated payback period for the 
capital investment, tax credits, and subsidies in the form 
of grants for institutional buildings are factors which 
affect a equipment selection. 
It is by means of the equipment efficiency calculation 
that the ORNL model explicitly addresses conservation 
through grants and tax credits (both of which function as 
subsidies which increase the initial capital costs which 
owners are willing to bear), discount rates (a change in 
discount rates can be used to model the alterations in 
perception prompted by such information as audit programs 
would generate), and building standards. The modeling of 
building standards is accomplished by inserting an array of 
EUIs within the computer program which correspond to the 
fraction by which base year energy use per square foot 
values would need to be multiplied to obtain efficiencies 
matching ASHRAE 90-75 building codes. The model calculates 
EUIs based upon the fuel prices given as inputs and compares 
then to the building standard EUIs. If price-induced values 
are low (i.e. efficiency is greater) they are used. If the 
building standards are lower a weighted average of price-
induced and building standard EUls is used, simulating an 
expected incomplete compliance with building codes. 
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The ASHRAE 90-75 codes were effective in 1979 and were 
the only ones modeled for the forecast. A second, more 
stringent set of codes are available to supplant the ones 
already in effect. Similarly, an alternative set of effici-
ency/cost tradeoff curves were available for use which re-
presented the efficiency to be expected from equipment tech-
nology more closely approaching its maxium performance pre-
dicted by engineering analysis. These curves were not used 
because highly counterintuitive results during test runs 
suggested problems in their estimation. 
The floorspace saturation component determines the fuel 
choice for the stock of commercial floorspace. Its opera-
tion is depicted by the flowchart Figure 17. For the entire 
standing stock of buildings constructed between 1924 and 
1970 a single set of saturations or floorspace fractions 
(disaggregated by building type/fuel type/end-use) are used. 
For vintages constructed after 1971, the penetratIon 
of each of the fuels into new vintages is calculated in one 
of two ways. 
For all non-heating end-uses the "calculation" is a 
trivial one. The penetrations are determined judgmentally 
or by means of survey information. One hundred percent of 
each new vintage's floorspace is assumed to be served by 
electricity for lighting and "other" (i.e. electromechanical 
devices) end-uses. In the case of retail/wholesale build-
ings, 100\ of the floorspace is also assumed serviced by 
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Figure 17. calculation of floorspace saturations by 
fuel and end-use in the ORNL commercial model. 
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natural gas (for a very small amount or cooking). Fo! cool-
ing, 50.3\ of new floorspace is fitted with electric equip-
ment; 3.8\ with gas equipment. For water heating, 68\ is 
electric, 27\ is gas, and 5\ is oil. 
For heating, an actual calculation is carried out in 
two steps. First, fuel shares (i.e. the proportion of each 
fuel used in the commercial sector as a whole) are cal-
culated based upon the fuel prices in a given year and 
predetermined price elasticities. In the second step the 
fuel shares are converted into floorspace fractions using 
the energy use per square foot values calculated by the com-
ponent previously described. Ratios are derived for each 
fuel by dividing its fuel share by the energy use per square 
foot for heating using fuel. Each of these ratios is divid-
ed by the sum of the ratios to determine the floorspace 
fractions for each fuel. 
The fourth and final component of the ORNL commercial 
model simulates the behavioral response of building owners 
and occupants to change in fuel prices (and, concomitantly, 
equipment operating costs). Since it is unreasonable to re-
place equipment every time fuel prices increase, most build-
ing occupants respond by decreasing the intensity of its 
use. The equipment utilization component, represented 
graphically in Figure 18, produces what is, in effect, a 
scaling factor applied to the energy use per square foot. 
This value is a proportion of the full utilization assumed 
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Figure 18. Calculation of equipment utilization in the 
ORNL commercial model. 
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for the year equipment is installed (i.e. in the year of its 
installation, the equipment utilization factor is 1.0). 
The calculation of the equipment utilization value for 
a given year from fuel prices and energy use per square foot 
value for that year. From this product is subtracted a 
similar product of the previous year's fuel price and 
equipment efficiency. This resulting term is divided by the 
latter product, yielding a value representing the change in 
price and efficiency relative to the previous year. This 
value is multiplied by a utilization elasticity and the 
resulting quantity subtracted from 1. 
Figure 19 depicts the calculation of final energy use, 
wherein the outputs of the four components described above 
are used to produce a demand total for a given forecast 
year. The multiplication of values here described takes 
place on a vintage by vintage basis for each building 
type/fuel type/end-use combination. The final demand total 
is reached by summing all of the resulting values. 
While this calculation is basically straightforward, a 
few features not previously discussed should be highlighted. 
First, to all vintages (except the one constructed during 
the forecast year) is applied a decay function, simulating 
inevitable demolitions of some of the standing commercial 
floorspace. Second, every 18 years of forecast time, a 
vintage's heating equipment is replaced (i.e. for each 
forecast year, the heating equipment efficiencies for every 
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Reprinted from BPA, 1982c:B77 
Figure 19. Computation of final energy use in the ORNL 
commercial model. 
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18th vintage are recalculated). For non-heating end-uses 
this equipment replacement takes place every 9 years. Fin-
ally, the model simulates retrofits in a fashion virtually 
identical to the use of building standards, except that re-
trofits apply to existing rather than new vintages. An 
array of precalculated retrofit EUIs are stored in the input 
data set. The user specifies the first and last years of 
the retrofit program and the proportion of standing vintages 
to be affected. The program compares the price-determined 
EUIs for the vintages selected with the retrofit EUIs and 
uses the lower of the two values for a revised demand cal-
culation. This feature was added to the model by BPA staff 
but not used for the 1982 forecast. 
The operation of the ORNL model is perhaps best illus-
trated by the use of an example of how it performs in pro-
ducing a set of forecast energy use values for the year 
1990. 
The floorspace component calculates the square footage 
in the new 1990 vintage. Previously computed square footage 
values for 1924-1989 vintages are decayed to account for de-
molitions. Total 1990 standing stock is derived by summing 
the resulting values for 1924-1990 vintages. 
The energy use per square foot component determines 
equipment efficiencies (for all end-uses) for the 1990 
Vintage. The heating efficiencies for 1936, 1954, and 1972 
vintages are recalculated. For non-heating end-uses, 
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efficiencies are recalculated for 1927; 1936, 1945, 1954 , 
1963, 1972, and 1981 vintages (i.e. 9 - rather than 18-year 
equipment replacement assumption). 
Floorspace saturations for all fuel types are cal-
culated for heating for all vintages fitted or refitted with 
equipment. Other vintages retain the heating saturations 
they had prior to 1990. For all other end-uses, "wired in" 
penetrations are applied to fitted or refitted vintages. 
An equipment utilizatiop factor for the year 1990 is 
computed for each vintage still standing. 
Final energy use is calculated by aggregating the 
energy use totals for each of the 200 building type/fuel 
type/end-use combinations for all of the 67 vintages present 
in 1990. 
Baseline, high, and low demand values were produced by 
using corresponding sets of economic/demographic projections 
as inputs. Additionally, minor modifications were made to 
conservation policy assumptions to differentiate the three 
demand trajectories. 
All three cases assumed building standards in effect in 
1979 and grants programs for schools and hospitals from 1978 
to 1987. The building standards were rendered more string-
ent for the low case by modifying the factor used to cal-
culate the weighted average of price and building standard 
EUls so that the standards would have added influence (i.e. 
simulating more complete compliance). 
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The equipment replacement lifetimes for the high case 
were lengthened to 22 years for heating, and 11 years for 
other end-uses. Owners were assumed to maintain equipment 
of lesser efficiency for longer periods of time. 
The discount rate used to approximate the anticipated 
payback period for costs resulting from equipment efficiency 
gains were varied from case to case. In the base case, a 
discount rate of 25\ was reduced to 23\ in 1983 to reflect 
the effects of better information. In the low case, the 
discout rate dropped from 25\ to 20\ after 1980, while in 
the high case it increased from 25\ to 40\ after 1980. 
A number of budgeted BPA conservation programs could 
not be addressed explicitly by the ORNL model (e.g. shower 
flow restrictors, efficient lighting, water heater wraps). 
The demand reductions for these measures were calculated 
externally and the values subtracted from computed demand. 
In the baseline, these savings were judgmentally reduced by 
20\ to account for double counting of savings attributed to 
BPA programs which would have been induced by price. In the 
low case, the same set of savings was reduced by only 10\. 
For the high case, savings were halved and then reduced by 
20\. 
The NEPP Econometric Model. For modeling energy use in 
the industrial sector, a portion of the Northwest Energy 
Policy Project econometric model was used. This model was 
first developed by Math Sciences Northwest (MSNW) in 1977 as 
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part of an energy research project sponsored by the Pacific 
Northwest Regional Commission and has since undergone a 
number of modifications and revisions. Host recently, the 
basic equations of the model were reestimated as part of a 
contract between BPA and Applied Economics Associates (AEA), 
the principals of which had been working at HSNW when the 
model was first created. 
The full NEPP model calculates long-term projections of 
energy demand for four major fuel types (electricity, 
natural gas, oil, and coal) for five comsuming sectors (re-
sidential, commercial, industrial, irrigation, and trans-
portation). This output is provided for the region as a 
whole and each of the four states comprising it. For 
reasons described in the addendum which follows this 
discussion, BPA staff chose to use only the portion of the 
model applying to the industrial sector (and an algorithm 
for calculating street lighting loads described below). 
The industrial model (or, more correctly, submodel) is 
econometric in character and relatively simple in its basic 
structure. In contradistinction to the ORNL models used by 
BPA for forecasting in the residential and commercial sec-
tors, the industrial model produces, for each of 21 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) categories, breakdown of 
consumption by fuel using a top-down approach. Total energy 
use is first calculated for a given SIC, and only second-
arily are the shares of the total energy value allocated to 
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va~ious fuels. No end-use b~eakdown is p~ovided. As an 
econometric model, the NEPP model is not nea~ly as data in-
tensive as the ORNL models, ~equi~ing a ~e1ative1y small 
numbe~ of inputs, though it cannot explicitly add~ess the 
conse~vation policy questions which were, in large part, the 
impetus for the design of the 1atte~ models. Table VI 
enumerates the inputs to the NEPP Industrial Model. Again, 
aste~isks denote inputs obtained from Economic Studies. 
TABLE VI 
INPUTS TO THE NEPP INDUSTRIAL MODEL 
Inputs 
Base Year (1979) Energy 
Consumption (total and by 
fuel type) 
*Emp10yment (by state by SIC) 
*Fue1 Prices (by fuel by state) 
electricity 
gas 
oil 
coal 
* Value Added (by state by SIC) 
Heating Degrees Days (by state) 
G~owth Rate in P~oductivity 
Units 
Btus X 106 
No of persons-base year, 
5 yr AARGs - 1980 thru 
2000 
1979-prices: 5 yr AARGs 
1980 thru 2000 
do11a~s/1000 kwh 
do11ars/1000 cu ft 
million $/1000 barrels 
million $/1000 short tons 
$s-1979; 5-yr AARGs 1980 
2000 
No of days 
~ate (\/yr) 
Figure 20 depicts, in b~oad stroke, the operational 
flow of the NEPP Indust~ial Model. In the July 1982 fore-
cast, this model was employed to p~oject non-OSI industrial 
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Figure 20. An overview of the structure of the NEFF 
industrial energy use model. 
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loads with the exception of the pulp and paper industry 
(which was modeled by Brookhaven National Laboratory, as 
discussed in a later section). 
The internal logic of the model is basically simple, 
utilizing two types of equations: a total energy demand 
equation and a cost share equation to distribute total 
energy among different fuel types. 
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The ayerage prices of each of the fuels modeled (elec-
tricity, gas, oil, and coal) are used to calculate both an 
average price per Btu (weighted by the preyious year's 
consumption by fuel) for all fuels and the cost shares for 
each of the fuel typed (i.e. the proportion of total in-
dustrial demand to be met by each basic fuel). The NEPP 
model uses 1979 as the base year for fuel prices and uses 
five-year growth rates of these prices over the 20-year 
forecast period in its calculations. A lag structure, based 
upon the values of the previous year's consumption of each 
fuel (given as an input in the base year and calculated for 
forecast years) was added to the cost share equation so that 
fuel switching would not be instantaneous as the average 
prices of different fuels altered. 
The average price per Btu is subsequently used in two 
calculations. To derive total energy demand it is used 
along with the number of beating degree days and the volume 
of industrial output. The growth pattern for the last vari-
able Is proxled by the model using the growth of employment 
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or yalge added (depending upon the SIC for which demand is 
being projected) adjusted for changes in productivity. This 
growth pattern is applied to the previous year's demand 
(given as an input in the base year and calculated else-
where), and the resulting series of values used in the 
computation of total demand. In the second calculation, 
price per Btu is multiplied by the value derived for total 
demand, yielding the total expenditure (as a dollar amount) 
on energy for all fuels. 
The resulting amount can then be multiplied by the cost 
shares to derive the expenditures for each fuel type con-
sidered by the model. In turn, these expenditures are 
divided by the average price for the appropriate fuels to 
arrive at the value for consumption of each fuel (lag ad-
justed using previous year's consumption by fuel). 
As with the other sectors, the public/private service 
territory split was based on different sets of input values. 
Baseline, high, and low cases were calculated using differ-
ent sets of economic/demographic projections and by altering 
internal model parameters to enhance the differential 
effects of labor productivity on the high and low cases. 
Addendum; The Roads Not Taken. Earlier it was men-
tioned that the first phase of the BPA forecasting process 
was constituted by a public review of a preliminary set of 
economics/demographic projections and a technical review of 
the models being considered for use. Before going on to the 
123 
ne~t component of the BPA forecasting system, the electri-
city supply pricing model, it is worthwhile to consider 
briefly the models ~ selected for use in the 1982 
forecast. 
The technical review of the models was intended to ac-
quaint the interested public with the tools under con-
sideration for use by BPA, not to produce a forecast. As 
such, the models were not run iteratively with an elec-
tricity supply pricing model, though they were subjected to 
sensitivity testing (of key inputs and parameters) and 
scenario analysis. 
As developed by BPA staff, the scenario analysis con-
sisted of a series of model runs designed to assess how ex-
plicitly the impacts of various types of conservation pro-
grams could be dealt with. The first scenario focused upon 
only price-induced conservation savings. A second scenario 
examined the effects of BPA conservation programs taken to 
the end of their budgeted lifetimes while a third extended 
the savings attributable to these programs through the end 
of the forecast period. Finally a fourth scenario added 
further cost-effective conservation measures (e.g. retro-
fits, building codes, heat pumps) to those of the third 
scenario. 
Of the four models considered, only the ORNL Residen-
tial and Commercial Models could deal with the scenarios 
without requiring excessive external calculation. This 
124 
performance 1s hardly surprising; since the model-building 
efforts at Oak Ridge explicitly aimed at producing computer-
ized tools designed to address such policy considerations. 
The two other models considered could not deal with 
these policy options internally: hence the "four scenarios" 
were identical. One of the models was the NEPP Econometric 
Hodel described above. In addition to the industrial sector 
submodel, ultimately employed in the draft and final 1982 
forecasts, the residential and commercial sector components 
were run. In the residential sector, the NEPP model 
provides a breakdown of energy consumption by three fuels 
(electricity, gas, and heating oil) and six end-use 
categories (space heating, air conditioning, water heating, 
ranges, clothes dryers, and net-use) but does not distin-
guish between housing types, in the commercial sector, the 
NEPP model forecasts total energy demand, distributes it 
among the three fuels, and performs a separate calculation 
for total streetlighting demand. The other model was the 
PNUCC Econometric Hodel, first developed by National 
Research Associates in 1976 to serve as a cross-check for 
the traditional Sum-Of-Utilities (SOU) forecast. Unlike the 
NEPP model, it forecasts only electriCity demand, though it 
does so for all sectors. Like the NEPP model, it produces 
some end-use detail in the residential sector, analyzing 
seven categories (space heating, water heating, ranges, 
clothes dryer, dishwashers, electric cars, and net-use). In 
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the commercial sector, a single econometric equation fore-
casts demand per customer (which is subsequently multiplied 
by the total number of commercial customers). No further 
disaggregation of commercial demand is produced. Finally, 
in the industrial sector a single econometric equations is 
used to calculate electricity demand per unit of value added 
for each of twelve industries (these values are then multi-
plied by the value added for each industry). 
The ORNL models were selected by the staff because of 
their apparent superiority in producing finer degrees of 
disaggregation of output and because of their explicit con-
servation modeling capabilities. The NEPP Industrial Model 
was selected over its PNUCC counterpart for inclusion in the 
BPA system of forecasting models primarily on the basis of 
three technical criteria: it was more recently reestimated 
(by AEA), it provided a more detailed breakdown of indus-
trial demand (i.e. more SIC categories), and it dealt with 
three fuel types rather than only one. 
The supply Pricing Hodel 
Interacting with the demand models descibed in the pre-
vious section was the BPA Supply Pricing Model (SPM). Prior 
to its modification in 1982, to reflect the mandates of the 
Regional Power Planning Act, the model was known as the In-
tegrated Supply Demand Model. First prepared for BPA's 1979 
Rate Environmental Impact statement, the model originally 
contained both supply and demand components (as the name 
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suggests). The operation of the demand component was based 
upon a paper prepared by Kent Anderson of National Economic 
Research Associates for the PNUCC while the supply portion 
was developed internally by BPA staff. The 1982 version of 
the SPM, as noted earler, uses the loads produced by the 
three sector-specific demand models as inputs and produces a 
set of prices by rate pool which are fed back into each of 
the demand models. This process is repeated until equili-
brium, or convergence, is reached. 
In most general terms, the Supply Pricing Model per-
forms two fundamental calculations. First, it determines 
which resources are selected to serve the loads of the 
different rate classes in the region. Second, it develops a 
set of wholesale and retail rates based upon the cost of the 
resources used to meet regional demands. Underlying the 
model's operation are the assumptions that, by 1985, private 
utilities In the region exchange all of their residential 
and small farm loads with BPA in accordance with the terms 
spelled out in the Regional Act (70\ in 1982, with 10\ 
yearly increases thereafter); that all public and private 
utilities sign net requirements agreements with BPA; and 
that BPA acquires power from thermal plants currently under 
construction at the dates they are scheduled to come on-
line. The input variables used by the model in performing 
the abovementioned calculations are summarized in Table VII. 
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As has been the custom in previous sections, the inputs 
provided by Economic Studies are noted by an asterisk. 
TABLE VII 
INPUTS TO THE SUPPLY PRICING HODEL 
Inputs 
Loads (by sector, public/private) 
*Inflation rate 
*Escalation rate 
Interest (by project or plant) 
Amortization (by project or plant) 
Replacement costs (by project or plant) 
Generation costs (by project or plant) 
Construction costs (by project or plant) 
Distribution costs (by sector) 
Secondary Power Harkets 
Units 
Gigawatt hours 
Rate (real no.) 
Rate (real no.) 
Percentage 
Thousands 1980 $ 
Thousands 1980 $ 
Thousands 1980 $ 
Thousands 1980 $ 
Hills/Kwh 
Loads (av HW) 
Most basically, the SPH compares loads for a given year 
with the power supply available and determines the cost of 
whatever resources must be acquired to meet demands. While 
this is quite elementary in principle the accounting 
framework embodied in the model is rather elaborate. Figure 
21 provides a simplified representation of the operating 
logic of the model. 
The SPM taps three resource pools for the power needed 
to meet regional loads: exchange resources (power generated 
by IOUs entering into exchange agreements with BPA), new 
resources, and the Federal Base System (FBS). The histori-
cally low electricity rates in the Pacific Northwest have 
primarily been due to the availability of cheap hydropower, 
and it is the question of the equitable allocation of this 
power that was perhaps the primary impetus of the Regional 
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Figure 21. An overview of the structure of the BPA 
supply pricing model. 
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Act. The FBS is defined to include all Federal hydro 
~esources plus any thermal resources under contract with BPA 
at the date of the enactment of the Regional Power Bill 
(this included Hanford and BPA's shares of Trojan and WNP 1, 
2, and 3). The FBS becomes fixed when the last of the three 
WPPSS nuclear plants comes on-line. Prior to this date, 
however, it is necessary to calculate the size of the FBS 
and determine whether the power supplied by its resources in 
a given year is adequate to meet the demand of the load pool 
comprised for public agency, federal agency, and residential 
and farm exchange customers. If FBS supply exceeds the 
demand of these customers, the remaining FBS power is 
available for meeting the loads of other customer classes. 
On the other hand, if demand exceeds FBS supply, ~ 
resources must be tapped (first exchange, when new re-
sources) to meet the needs of the above described load 
pools. 
The final allocation of resources to rate pools occurs 
after the accounting for FBS generating capacity has been 
completed. Prior to 1985, DSI customers receive first 
access to any remaining FBS power, while after 1985 any re-
maining FBS capacity is pooled with other on-line resources 
and used by both DSI and net requirements IOU customers. 
Should on-line resources not prove sufficient to meet re-
gional loads the model ~ other available resources not 
currently on-line or, after these are exhausted, generic 200 
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megawatt thermal facilities until supply matches de~~nd. 
Resources are acquired so as to conform to the requirements 
of a least-cost mix determined external to the SPM (using a 
linear programming model, not run iteratively with the fore-
casting system, by BPA's Power Resources Division). 
Finally, the model allocates secondary energy available from 
the Federal hydrosystem during seasons where temporary 
surpluses are available. 
After having determined which resources will serve 
which load pools, the SPM calculates both wholesale and re-
tail rates for the various consuming sectors based upon the 
generation, replacement, and new construction costs associa-
ted with hydro projects and thermal planes. (These calcu-
lations take account of inflation and escalation rates, 
interest, and amortization). For any forecast year, FBS 
costs are calculated based upon the operation and main-
tenance costs associated with the working system and addi-
tional costs associated with FBS projects not then on-line. 
For IOYs entering into exchange agreements with BPA, their 
average system costs are determined. For ~ customers, 
rates are determined differently prior to and after 1985 (at 
which time the DSIs, in effect, provide rate relief for 
residential and small farm exchange customers). Before 
1985, DSI rates are based upon exchange and other resource 
costs (including FBS power when available). After 1985, the 
model calculates a public retail industrial rate and sets 
132 
the DS! rate equal to this value. If this value is less 
than the floor rate set for PSIs by provisions of the 
Regional Act (which one would expect to be the case) the 
difference between the two PSI rates is derived. This 
difference is multiplied by the projected PSI loads and the 
,esulting ,eyenues a,e dlst,lbuted to preference and ex-
change customers. Subsequently, a new public utility ,etail 
industrial rate is calculated and the procedure for deter-
mining PSI rates continued iteratively until the difference 
between the PSI rate and the public agency industrial rate 
is less than one mill per kilowatt hour. After this con-
vergence is reached, PSI rates are adjusted by applying a 
reserve credit which reflects the value of interruptible 
load provisions in the PSI contracts (This adjustment is 
also made for pre-1985 PSI loads). Calculated rates for all 
customer classes are then adjusted to account for projected 
secondary sales revenues and dist,ibution costs. Final re-
tail ,ates fo, public utility custome,s are based upon a 
melded cost of FBS and purchase power. For ~ customers, 
residential rates are based upon exchange costs whereas 
industrial and commercial rates are based upon average 
system cost. 
The disaggregation of economic/demographic projections 
and regional loads to correspond to the service territories 
of public and private electric utilities was conducted ex-
plictly for the purpose of iteration with the SPM. The SPM 
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utilized public and private loads (by consuming sector) 
simultaneously in calculating electricity prices, whereas 
the demand models were run twice (for each iteration with 
the pricing model), first using public, then private inputs. 
For the high and low cases, the SPM used the appro-
priate corresponding set of high or low inputs. Addition-
ally, several of the internal operating assumptions of the 
model were modified. In the high case, the secondary power 
rate was double that of the baseline and low case. The low 
case assumed a two year scheduling delay in WNP-3. 
Projections of Regional Energy Consumption; outputs and 
Adjustments 
Having depicted both the derivation of the key inputs 
and the operation of the major models used by BPA in the 
preparation of their first independent long-term demand 
forecast, it is now appropriate to conclude the technical 
description with a discussion of the results. Before doing 
so, however, it is necessary to describe several adjustments 
performed on the outputs of the demand models so that the 
loads of all customer classes were represented in the fore-
cast results. With one exception, these adjustments were 
performed on each iteration of the demand and pricing 
models. 
Adjustments of Regional Loads. The demand models 
descibed above projected the loads for the major consuming 
sectors: the residential, the commercial, and the indus-
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trial. Taken together, however, the outputs of these models 
are still less than the total regional loads: they must be 
adjusted to include streetlighting, irrigation, and contract 
demands. 
Streetlighting loads are calculated using a single 
econometric equation taken from the NEPP all-sectors model. 
Total electricity demand is a function of two independent 
variables: the average price of electricity and population 
(by state). The streetlighting model is run twice per 
iteration, once for public and once for private service 
areas. The resultant loads (produced for the region as a 
whole as well as for the individual states) is added to 
those produced by the ORNL Commercial Hodel before being 
input to the Supply Pricing Hodel. (Any savings attri-
butable to BPA conservation programs are subtracted from the 
econometrically produced demand values). Public/private 
splits, and high, baseline and low outputs are determined 
strictly by the values of the independent variales used as 
inputs and the estimated levels of associated ~onservation 
savings. The streetlighting model performs new calculations 
each iteration. 
Irrigation loads, like streetlighting loads, are added 
to public and private demands for each iteration with the 
pricing model. Unlike streetlighting loads, however, the 
irrigation values are not calculated anew with each itera-
tion. Though values differ for public and private, high, 
135 
low, and basellne, they are determined only once in an 
external calculation: hence the same value for, say, base-
line public irrigation loads is added to the total demand 
each iteration. The irrigation model (like the Economic 
Base Hodel, a series of paper-and paper calculations) pro-
jects irrigation demands, by state, in three steps. First, 
per-acre crop irrigation water requirements are determined 
for different types of crops. Next, the weighted per acre 
farm water deltvery requirement (i.e. crop needs plus 
evaporation and transpiration), the water diversion re-
quirement, and the associated per acre energy requirement 
(i.e. pumping) are computed. Finally, total water and 
energy needs (requirements per acre times acreage) are 
derived. Irrigation loads are added to ORNL Residential 
Hodel output before being entered into the SPH. High case 
projections assume greater irrigated acreage while the low 
case assumed both reduced acreage and increased price-
induced conservation. 
The demands for those customers with whom BPA has con-
tractual obligations were entered into the demand totals 
each iteration. These loads for ~ and Federal agencies 
were estimated outside of the modeling system and simply 
added onto other regional loads before being input to the 
pricing model. Since these customers receive power directly 
from BPA they were classified neither as 'public' nor 
'private'. Demand values remained constant from iteration 
to iteration but did vary between high, baseline, and low 
cases for DSIs. 
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One final adjustment was~carried out on each iteration 
of the pricing demand models. Inspections of the outputs of 
initial runs of the NEPP Industrial Model revealed a 
conspicously low set of demand values for the pulp and paper 
category, not appearing reasonable given industry estimates 
of future growth. As a result, load projections developed 
by Brookhaven National Laboratory for BPA using their 
process model were substituted for the NEPP pulp and paper 
projections. The Brookhaven model is a process optimization 
model which selects the combination of materials and 
processes that minimize the cost of meeting a specified 
level of demand for paper products. Because the Brookhaven 
model could not be iterated with the other models in the BPA 
system, its "optimal" cost-minimizing solution does not 
reflect the electricity prices developed during the final 
iteration of the demand models with SPM (i.e. pulp and paper 
demand remained constant across all iterations). 
Results; Regional Electricity Consumption. After 
iterating the demand and pricing models until convergence 
was reached, the baseline, high, and low forecasts were pro-
duced. Overall, the BPA forecasts were significantly lower 
than others prepared in the region (with the exception of 
the Independent Review of WPPSS 4 and 5 carried out by a 
task force at Washington state University) and posited a 
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near-term power surplus rather than the power deficit 
previously believed to be imminent. The average annual 
rates of growth for baseline, high, and low cases were 1.6, 
2.4, and 0.8 percent respectively. 
Table VIII provides a summary of the results of the 
baseline, high, and low case forecasts produced by BPA in 
its July 1982 forecast. Of the three major sectors, the 
commercial sector displays the greatest AARGs: 2.3\ in the 
baseline, 3.1\ for the high case, and 1.1\ for the low case. 
For each of these cases the commercial growth rates are 
identical for public and private service areas. Industrial 
and residential sectors did not similarly display equal 
growth rates for public and private sectors. In the res-
idential sector, public and private AARGs were, respect-
ively, 1.2\ and 1.6\ for the baseline: 2.2% and 2.6\ for the 
high case: and 0.3\ and 0.9\ for the low case. For the 
industrial sector, public and private loads grew at annual 
rates of 1.4\ and 1.8\ in the baseline, 1.9\ and 2.3\ in the 
high case, and 1.5\ (for both service territories) in the 
low case. Because of the rate equalizing provisions of the 
Regional Act embedded in the SPM, electricity prices grew 
more rapidly for public utility customers between 1980 and 
1990, more strongly curtailing consumption per customer. 
For the contract demand customers, consumption growth 
is severly constrained. For Federal agency customers, the 
growth rate is invariant between cases: 3.9\ per year on the 
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TABLE VIII 
SUMMARY OF FORECAST RESULTS BY SECTOR (1000 MWH) 
20 Year 
BASELINE llM. llll l.llJl. w..5.. UDJl.. lll>BG 
Public Res 22973 24047 27222 25583 29000 1.2 
Irr 3360 3579 3957 4254 4589 1.5 
Corn 8623 9796 10714 11968 13569 2.3 
Stl 406 308 239 253 271 -2.0 
Ind 16263 17227 18008 19278 21418 1.4 
Private Res 27946 30283 33506 36013 38699 1.6 
Irr 3228 3726 3857 4254 4589 1.7 
Com 14146 16197 18087 20032 22360 2.3 
St1 312 215 179 183 179 -2.7 
Ind 15631 16433 18136 19942 22234 1.8 
OSI 21904 22588 26762 27035 27217 1.1 
Fed Agency 710 . 1445 1515 1515 1515 3.9 
Losses 10155 10938 12048 12896 13923 1.6 
Total 145558 158782 172696 184845 199563 1.6 
HIGH CASE 
Public Res 22959 26089 28983 32183 35601 2.2 
Irr 3360 3613 4008 4455 4882 1.9 
Com 8623 10739 12608 14884 17713 3.7 
St1 406 351 291 303 326 -1.1 
Ind 16471 17738 18533 20304 23802 1.9 
Private Res 27930 32852 37700 42052 46964 2.6 
Irr 3228 3761 4008 4455 4882 2.1 
Com 14187 17622 21015 24740 29108 3.7 
Stl 312 259 240 244 245 -1.2 
Ind 15626 17031 18806 20973 24411 2.3 
OSI 21804 22588 27174 27445 27638 1.2 
Fed Agency 710 1445 1515 1515 1515 3.9 
Losses 10171 11557 13116 14516 16281 2.4 
Total 145787 165645 187997 208069 233369 2.4 
20 Year 
LOW CASE 
.!.ll.Q. ..!.ill. ll.2..Q. ill.i. llQ..Q. AARG 
Public Res 22973 23168 23684 24264 24605 0.3 
Irr 3360 3415 3621 3723 3835 0.7 
Com 8582 8909 9107 9692 10606 1.1 
Stl 406 306 238 248 254 -2.4 
Ind 15038 14348 15594 17532 20049 1.5 
Private Res 27946 29119 31024 32262 33385 0.9 
Irr 3228 3555 3621 3723 3835 0.9 
Com 14078 14755 15419 16340 17625 1.1 
Stl 312 213 182 189 191 -2.8 
Ind 15543 15543 17122 18927 20956 1.5 
OSI 21804 21278 20857 21055 21105 -0.2 
Fed Age ncy 710 1445 1515 1515 1515 3.9 
Losses 10049 10204 10649 11210 11946 0.8 
Total 144029 146253 152632 160680 169797 0.8 
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average. For the DSls, baseline and high case growth is 
nearly identical, 1.1 and 1.2\. Most of the growth 1s 
accounted for by the assumed addition of the Alumax plant. 
In the base case DSI customers use 98.9%, rather than the 
high case's 100%, of contracted demand. In the low case, 
where Alumax is not assumed to be built and existing 
aluminum production declines 20%, consumption declines at an 
AARG of -0.2% over the forecast period. 
In all these cases, streetlighting can be seen to dis-
play "negative growth" over the forecast period. Although 
the number of lighted streets and highways grows modestly, 
BPA budgeted conservation programs substantially reduce 
demand by 1990. 
Finally, it should be noted that the regional demand 
totals are adjusted upward to account for inevitable line 
losses, capacity reductions that occur during power trans-
mission through the regional grid. Losses are strictly 
proportional to the total load and, consequently, display 
identical AARGs. 
THE REGIONAL DEMAND FORECAST: EVALUATION FROM THE 
T-PERSPECTlVE 
Now that the BPA modeling system, its components, and 
its output (i.e. the July 1982 forecast) have been de-
scribed, it is possible to perform and evaluation from the 
technical perspective. As the underlying leitmotif of the 
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T-perspective is one of analysis, objectivity, rationality, 
abstraction, and causal influence, so this evaluation of the 
forecast correspondingly focuses upon such characteristics 
as validity, methodological consistency and completeness, 
model performance, and goodness-of-fit between the tech-
niques employed and the objectives addressed. Necessarily, 
such a technical analysis raises a variety of broader issues 
which cannot be understood without further explication of 
related organizational and personal factors. Such issues 
are identified below and will be more fully dealt with in 
the later chapter describing the cross-cuing of perspec-
tives. 
The technical evaluation begins with a reconstruction 
of the BPA forecasting system in its entirety, this time 
examining the relationships and connections between the 
various models (and their operating assumptions) in much 
greater and more revealing detail than was done in the 
introductory overview. This laying out of the full network 
models facilitates the next step of the technical analysis, 
tracing the core assumptions of the forecast back to their 
origins. In turn, the identification of core assumptions 
serves as a point of departure for an assessment of the risk 
and reliability associated with the forecast. The evalua-
tion concludes with a critical look at the goodness-of-fit 
of the forecast methodology with BPA's stated planning ob-
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jectives and poses some larger questions to be answered in 
the final chapters of this dissertation. 
Inputs. Outputs. and Data Flows; The Forecasting System 
Reyisited 
As the above descriptions have revealed, there are a 
large number of interlinked models in the BPA forecasting 
system. The outputs of one model may be the inputs to one 
or more of the other models in the system, and, to the ex-
tent that the latter models are sensitive to those inputs, 
their performance is at least in part determined, or con-
strained, by the performance of the former model. In 
effect, the assumptions made to run any given model are 
"inherited" by any other models they feed with data. The 
significance of such assumptions may range from trivial to 
paramount and their effects may be amplified or dampened as 
they are "transmitted" through the network of models. As a 
first step in the technical evaluation of the forecast it is 
necessary to trace out the data flows between the models and 
establish and "audit trail" which traces assumptions back to 
their sources. 
Two tools useful in this exercise are what are known in 
digraph theory as adjacency and reachability matrices. An 
adjacency matrix provides a graphic summary of the immediate 
impacts of a row variable on a column variable. In Figure 
22 the variables are the models used by BPA staff in pre-
paring the July 1982 forecast. An 'x' in one of the boxes 
Mill'" W U '" UI ::!: C ..:I ::!: 
.,; 0 UI Z to! 0 Z C< Co 
C to! '" :c M to. .,; U .... UI UI 
PRI X X X X X X X X 
~CON BASE X X X X 
IPOPULATION X X X X 
~OUSING X 
NCOME X X 
IFUEL PRICE X X X X 
!RESIDENTIAL X 
"'O~I:1ERCIAL X 
NDUSTRIAL X 
TREETLIGHT X 
P~I X X X X 
Figure 22. Adjacency matrix for models in the 
forecasting system. 
indicates that the outputs of the row model are inputs to 
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the model in the associated column. Thus, an entry in any 
matrix cell indicates that assumptions embedded in the row 
model may affect the operation of the column model and the 
• 
matrix as a whole provides a quick overview of the number of 
connections between a given model and the others in the 
system. (Note that the diagonal of the adjacency matrix is 
blank. While a number of the models make projections using 
outputs for previous years as independent variables in their 
calculations -- e.g. the NEPP model's cost-share equations 
-- none reenter model outputs as inputs). Perhaps the most 
striking insight obtained from inspectIon of the adjacency 
matrix is the criticality of the DRI national economic pro-
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jections as direct inputs to virtually all of the models 
employed (excepting the residential and streetlighting 
models). Despite the fact that regional economic or demo-
graphic projections developed by BPA may differ from DRI's, 
it is the latter firm's characterization of national econo-
mic trends which shape the BPA projections, their ranges, 
and the bounds of "credibility" for their values. Also 
apparent is the centrality of fuel prices (both electric and 
non-electric) as inputs to all of the demand models, whether 
econometric (industrial and streetlighting) or end-use hy-
brids (residential and commercial). 
Perhaps more revealing is the reachability matrix 
(Figure 23) which, in contradistinction to the adjacency 
matrix, provides a summary representation of the ultimate 
impacts of a row variable on a column variable. As with the 
adjacency matrix above, the row and column variables are the 
models used in the BPA forecasting system. An entry in one 
of the cells of the matrix indicates that the output values 
of one model will affect the outputs of another model, 
either directly (if the output of the row model is an input 
to the column model, as in the adjacency matrix) or indir-
ectly (if the output of the row model is an input to one or 
more of a chain of models whose outputs "feed" the column 
model). To the extent that the output of a model may serve 
as inputs to models which in turn produce its inputs, the 
cells in the diagonal of the matrix may be non-empty. 
DRI X X X X X X X X X X 
ECON BASE X X X X X X X X 
POPULATION X X X X X X X 
HOUSING X X X X X 
INCOHE X X X X X 
FUEL PRICE X X X X X 
RESIDENTIAL X X X X X 
COmiERCIAL X X X X X 
INDUSTRIAL X X X X X 
STREETLIGHT X X X X X 
Figure 23. Reachability matrix for models in the 
forecasting system. 
Again, the breadth of effect of the DR! long-term 
projections is apparent this time, because of the 
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iterative cycling of demands and prices, literally all of 
the models felt DRI's influence. Most visually striking is 
the solid rectangle of cell entries extending from the 
residential model column through the Supply Pricing Model 
column. Because of the loop structure of the demand-price 
iterations the outputs of each of the demand models 
ultimately affect the values of all the demand models. By 
extension, the economic and demographic inputs to any of the 
demand models ultimately affect all of them (and the Supply 
Pricing Model as well). Thus, for example, although the 
outputs of the housing model only serve as direct inputs to 
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the residential model, the volume of residential demand 
codetermines (with industrial, commercial, streetlighting, 
and irrigation demands) the amount of resources needed to be 
acquired and the distribution of the associated costs. The 
resulting electricity prices feed back into all of the 
demand models until iterative convergence is reached. 
Also significant is the "triangle" of cells in the 
upper left hand corner, representing the interlinkage of 
models employed in deriving the economic an demographic 
projections. In the first phase of the BPA forecast, during 
the technical review of the demand models proposed for use 
in the 1982 forecast, each model was subjected to a series 
of sensitivity tests. The purpose of these tests was to 
establish the responsiveness of each of the models to 
changes in the values of critical driving variables. The 
sensitivity of each of the models to the particular set of 
economic/demographic inputs serving as its independent vari-
ables was so tested and the results recorded. 
Sensitivity tests, however, are often also accepted as 
a type of risk analysis by potential model users or critics. 
The responsiveness of a particular model to variations in 
the values of a given input is often taken as providing an 
indication of the magnitude of forecast uncertainty result-
ing from errors which might occur in the input. When the 
models for developing inputs are interlinked, however, 
sensitivity testing of individual driving variables is com-
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pletely insufficient for even an informal risk analysis. An 
over- or undercalculation of basic employment would affect 
subsequent calculations of population, housing, and income. 
Each of the demand models uses several of these variables: 
thus, for example, a true assessment of the risk involved in 
the miscalculation of employment on the industrial model 
would have to include a corresponding adjustment of popula-
tion inputs. Overall, this would be a test of what could be 
called, for lack of a better name, the "concatenated sensi-
tivity" of the models in the system. This would involve al-
tering the values of the outputs of the first economic model 
in the chain by a certain amount and monitoring the effects 
at each link in the network through the convergence itera-
tion of the demand and pricing models. 
The intricacy of the connections existing between the 
models in the BPA forecasting system is better captured in 
the detail of Figure 24 which maps the entirety of the data 
flows between models. Included in the diagram are several 
data sources in the audit trail not produced as BPA econo-
mic/demographic projections (residential and non-residential 
surveys and least cost mix of resources). These sources, 
and the diagram as a whole, provide a useful point of de-
parture for analyzing the basic core assumptions lying be-
hind the forecast and the risk and reliability associated 
with it. 
DRI Hodel 
of National 
F.conomy 
Fiqure 24. Input-output dia9ram of HPA forecastin9 system. 
data flows in the modelinq system A detailed representation of 
~ 
~ 
-.J 
Forecasts Core Assumption; White and Black Boxes 
Although accuracy is not the sole criterion by which 
the quality of a forecast may be evaluated it is probably 
the most commonly used standard of judgment. In his 1976 
148 
volume Forecasting; An Appraisal for Policy-Makers and 
Planners, William Ascher concluded that the major deter-
minants of a forecast's accuracy are its core assumptions, 
underlying suppositions representing "the forecaster's basic 
outlook on the context within which the specific forecasts 
trend develops" (p199). Core assumptions may be embedded at 
various depths in a forecast (e.g. methodologies, models, or 
judgments) and may be stated with various degrees of expli-
citness. Ideally the forecaster will render these assump-
tions naked -- laying them out in their fullest detail as 
"white boxes" for inspection and evaluation. Fo! various 
reasons, however, virtually all forecasts embed basic 
assumptions in "black boxes" which register only their 
effects. 
The adjacency and reachability matrices (shown in the 
previous section), along with the system input-output dia-
gram, provide a good layout for identifying points at which 
core assumptions are operating along the data audit trail. 
Necessarily, a critical analysiS of forecast core assump-
tions and their consequences must proceed from a touchpoint 
of theoretical objectivity and purity, even though "real 
world forecasts" are invariably saddled with various practi-
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cal constraints which render them far less than perfect. 
Before scrutinizing the forecast audit, trail, however, four 
caveats are in order. First, most of the criticisms leveled 
at BPA models could also be applied to other demand fore-
casting models used in the region. Despite certain undeni-
able shortcomings, the models used by BPA are state-of-the-
art for the region. Second, although one may identify a 
variety of modeling limitations, inconsistencies or omis-
sions, their overall impacts may not be particularly signi-
ficant. For example, hundreds of thousands of dollars of 
contract money could be spent to correct missing feedbacks 
between models by interlinking their software with this 
effort producing virtually no effect on final forecast out-
comes. Third, the identification of an unspoken core 
assumption should not be considered its refutation. Such 
"limiting" assumptions may indeed be quite correct. They are 
merely unacknowledged or taken for granted by those rnaki nil 
them. They should, however, be made explicit and subjected 
to scrutiny. Finally, it should be acknowledged that the 
BPA system of models is "living" it is continuously being 
revised and improved. 
Returning to an examination of the audit trail it will 
be noted that one of the most striking features of both the 
adjacency matrix and the master input-output diagram pre-
sented above was the criticality of the outputs of the PRI 
model to virtually every model in the BPA system. The DRI 
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model of the national economy is a huge econometric model 
which, for its users, such as SPA staff, is largely a black 
box. For the most part, staff members access its various 
outputs remotely but do not actually run the model. Though 
general characteristics of the model are known, the finer 
details of its operation are not. As a result, SPA staff, 
like virtually all of the subscribers to ORI's service, must 
trust that the national economic model performs its multi-
tude of calculations correctly and that each of its com-
ponents produces credible outputs. 
Despite the opacity of major aspects of the ORI model, 
a number of characteristics of its basic projections 
(TRENOLONG2006, OPTIMLONG2006B, and PESSIMLONG2006B) are 
transparent and, as such, their consequences may be examin-
ed. Most noteworthy is the smoothness of all three trends, 
which differ quantitatively, primarily in the rates of 
growth of key variables or indicators. No major economic 
(and presumably social and political) mishaps are assumed to 
occur over a twenty-five year period. While this is no 
doubt an artifact of the inability of ORI's econometric 
model to forecast unique disruptive or discontinuous events 
(i.e. catastrophes and windfalls), undisturbed economic 
trends are unlikely and certainly contradict the last 25 
years of history. 
Furthermore, ORI's long-term trends and projections 
tend to reflect the same short-term bias that more generally 
151 
colors long-range forecasting: the long-term future con-
spicuously reflects the recent past. For instance, twenty-
five year prOjections of oil prices were quite high when the 
effects of the Arab oil embargo and the Iranian hostage 
crisis were being felt but the entire forecast trajectory 
dropped significantly, as soon as it began to reflect its 
author's perceptions of the recent (and no doubt temporary) 
oil glut. Thus, in many ways, these long-term projections 
fit Ackoff's definition of reference projections: "extra-
polations from the past into the future under an assumption 
we know to be false: that things will continue to be done 
and to happen as they have in the past: that is, without 
significant interventions by decision makers or the 
environment" (1978:60). What is of crucial importance Is 
how conscious users are of this assumption of constancy and 
the uses to which they put the results. These issues will 
be addressed below in the discussion which concludes this 
chapter. 
As noted earlier, the economic base model is, in fact, 
a series of techniques for projecting employment in each of 
a number of basic industries and from the resulting values 
infering the size of the non-basic industry workforce. 
Though employment is a central driver for many of the 
models the procedures for its derivation (by major industry 
category) are perhaps the least well-structured of any 
modeling carried out in the SPA system. Judgmental ad-
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justment of industry trends is necessary because of (not in 
spite of) the sensitivity of tt.e various components of the 
forecasting system to changes in employment: economic act-
ivity in regional basic industry is too intimately linked to 
specific business enterprises and developments to entrust 
its projection to mechanical trending. Unfortunately, how-
ever, such an approach to basic industry employment estima-
tion leaves the forecast vulnerable to (or dependent upon) 
the quality of not one but a number of data sources (e.g. 
industry estimates, state employment records, Census of 
Agriculture, etc.). From the standpoint of "consumers" of 
the BPA forecast, each of these sources constitutes yet 
another black box. 
A fundamental underlying assumption of the economic 
base model is that the mix and primary characteristics (e.g. 
mode of production, resource requirements, labor inten-
siveness, etc.) of basic industries will remain unchanged. 
Allowances were made for such factors as anticipated pro-
ductivity increases, but no explicit consideration was given 
to such possibilities as the wholesale out-migration of key 
industries (e.g. aluminum), the impacts of significant tech-
nological breakthroughs, or the effects of planned, indus-
try-selective regional economic development. Events of this 
sort should they occur could not only push employment levels 
outside the range considered for the forecast by also s1g-
nificantly alter the pattern of growth (or, possible, 
decline). 
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The calculation of future values of non-electric ~ 
prices utilizing DR! projections as inputs, mirrors the 
latter in its assumption of no major economic or political 
upheavals. As such, the impacts of such political economic 
events as further embargoes on imported oil or the collapse 
of OPEC as a cartel (neither an implausible scenarios) are 
not considered explicitly. Moreover, the calculation does 
not take into account the influence of electricity prices on 
those of non-electric fuels (a fact recognized by BPA and to 
be adjusted for in future forecasts). While changes in re-
gional natural gas and oil prices are certainly constrained 
by international and interstate markets, they must remain 
competitive with electricity. For all practical purposes, 
projected non-electric fuel prices were inelastic w1th 
respect to changes in the price of electricity. 
Within the demand models are embedded a number of 
assumptions which, if not rendered explicit, silently in-
fluence predictions of future loads. The NEPP Industrial 
Model is econometric in nature, projecting future demands 
based upon histor1cal relationships between electricity con-
sumption and a set of price and employment related vari-
ables. A basic assumption behind any econometric model is 
that the real world causal relationships reflected by (but 
not necessarily described by) the model's regression equa-
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tions will not differ appreciably in the future from what 
they were in the recent past. At least in the Pacific 
Northwest, real electricity prices were not only low in re-
lation to the rest of the United states but also displayed a 
trend of "negative growth" (i.e. real prices actually fell). 
The rapid increases seen in the prices of electricity and 
other fuels are recent and proceed unevenly, sometimes in 
parallel with one another, at other times not. Though the 
NEPP model was recently reestimated using pooled national 
data to describe general consumer responses to price more 
accurately, the question remains of whether or not a nation-
al data series can adequately map or represent anticipated 
regional "rate shocks" or the economic reaction to a power 
surplus when a deficit was expected and planned for: two 
very likely near-term possibilities for the Pacific North-
west. 
The hybrid econometric/end-use structure of the resi-
dential and commercial models, designed to allow users 
the explicit capability to manipulate key model parameters 
for policy analysiS purposes, makes them somewhat less 
sensitive to the problem of regional economic change than 
the industrial model. Nonetheless, several components 
assume that certain key economic relationships remain 
stable. Most notable are those governing consumer fuel 
switching (choice of fuel used for equipment) and utili-
zation (level/amount of use) behavior. Both of the ORNL 
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models were adapted to the Pacific Northwest. Originally, 
they were national models which predicted nation-wide pat-
terns of energy consumption. Adapting them to the Pacific 
Northwest entailed the introduction of region-specific 
inputs (i.e. the economic/demographic projections) and the 
modification of base year values using information obtained 
from regional surveys (also part of the audit trail not 
often evaluated critically). The regional residential sur-
vey was conducted for BPA and PNUCC by Elrick and Lavidge. 
The commercial survey (of regional building character-
istics), performed by Westat Inc., is not truly regionally 
representative, focusing upon Seattle, Portland, and the 
Tri-cities. An assumption underlying its use by BPA was 
that the floorspace per employee ratios and proportions of 
floorspace serviced by different fuels in these three sites 
adequately reflect regional patterns (despite the fact that 
no rural areas are represented in the sample). Aside from 
these changes, however, the models were left basically 
"national" in their character. In effect, this entails 
assuming that persons accustomed to low electricity prices 
(and, concomitantly, high per capita electricity consump-
tion) will respond to fairly rapid increases in prices in a 
manner consistent with the national "norm". Elasticity of 
response is a function of, among other elements, perceptions 
of cost and price trends and may vary across regions and 
periods of time. 
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Technological innovation is worthy of note as a vari-
able with significant real world consequences which is_rare-
ly dealt with explicitly (or adequately) by energy fore-
casting models. In the case of the industrial model, tech-
nological improvement is embodied nowhere other than in the 
growth rate of productivity which serves as an input vari-
able (i.e. some portion of the productivity increase results 
from new technology). The ORNL models explicitly address 
technological improvement, though not innovation, by use of 
efficiency/cost tradeoff curves. These plot equipment and 
appliance efficiency changes against changes in initial 
capital cost. A life-cycle cost minimization function 
specifies that as fuel prices increase, equipment owners 
will invest in more efficient equipment to offset operating 
costs. In principle, both of the ORNL models can use a 
series of tradeoff curves, each representing a further 
development in cost-effective technological efficiency. In 
practice, however, only one curve was used in each of the 
models. Even were a series of curves available for use, 
there exists no mechanism in the models for predicting what 
sort of innovations would occur (although this is, in many 
ways, a moot point since the model deals with end-uses and 
fuels, not specific equipment configurations), what their 
operating characteristics would be (i.e. on which curve), or 
when they would occur (i.e. which year the model user should 
select to "activate" a particular curve). The assumption 
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underlying the residential and commercial models, as they 
were run in the 1982 forecast, is that the building or home 
owner will select the more efficient among currently avail-
able equipment options but that the basic set of techno-
logical options will not change. 
The adjustments to demand made to account for BPA-
sponsored conservation are predicated upon several assump-
tions. The savings estimates, developed independently by 
BPA's Office of Conservation, were, for purposes of the 1982 
forecast, black box estimates (i.e. their paper-and-pencil 
derivation was not documented). Conservation remains a 
relatively unexplored region, making the estimation of the 
penetrations (i.e. percentages of customers affected) and 
savings associated with a particular measure highly judg-
mental. Implicit in any BPA estimates, however, are the 
assumptions of continued institutional budgeting support for 
the anticipated power surplus. BPA's heavy empasis upon 
conservation in recent years, like its priority treatment in 
the legislation of the Regional Power Act, reflects an 
attitude cultivated in the shadow of an impending deficit 
which very likely will not materialize. This casts some 
doubt upon the region's continued receptiveness to conser-
vation as its chief, near-term energy source. 
The operating structure of the supply pricing model, in 
its algorithm for allocating costs among different rate 
classes, embodies the priorities of the Regional Act. In 
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doing so, it explicates an otherwise unstated, but none-
theless central, assumption of the forecast: the perpetua-
tion of the Regional Act, its mandates, and the authority of 
the agencies or bodies it empowers. The centrality of this 
assumption is not surprising given the legislatively-defined 
obligations of the Bonneville Power Administrator (and the 
agency as a whole) and the lead time required in resource 
acquisition decisions (e.g. WNP 1 and 3). From a broader 
vantage point, however, there is no reason why the Regional 
Power Act might not be amended or even repealed given alter-
ed socioeconomic circumstances. 
The least cost mix of resources, providing the power 
supply for the Pacific Northwest, is determined by a single, 
non-iterated run of a linear programming model developed by 
BPA's Division of Power Resources. This model assumes that 
resources will corne on-line at their scheduled completion 
dates and (to the extent that the least cost mix deter-
mination was not performed iteratively with price-induced 
demand revisions) that the optimal mix is essentially static 
or fixed. The not uncommon slippages of completion dates of 
both thermal plants and non-thermal resources (and assoc-
iated costs) suggest a more flexible (or less determinant) 
scenario. 
Table IX provides an abbreviated summary of the 
forecast core assumptions identifed above. 
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TABLE IX 
SUMMARY OF FORECAST CORE ASSUMPTIONS 
Associated Hodel(s) 
DR! National Economic 
Economic Base 
Fuel Prices 
Demand Models 
(industrial) 
(residentiall 
commercial) 
Conservation 
Supply Pricing Model 
Core Assumption(s) 
• no major economic or political 
mishaps 
• smooth patterns of economic 
growth 
• trends differ quantitatively, not 
qual! tati vely 
• long-term future trends reflect 
those of short-term past 
• mix and primary characteristics 
of basic industries remain 
unchanged 
• no significant supply disruption 
• natural gas prices independent of 
changes in electricity prices 
• static technological capabilities 
(though cost-effectiveness of 
existing equipment may change) 
• elasticity of national price 
response better representative 
of likely PNW future than region-
al pattern of recent past when 
cheap hydroelectric power was 
prevalent 
• future regional fuel choice and 
utilization response reflect 
national patterns of recent past 
• continued institutional budgetary 
support of BPA programs 
• continued consumer receptiveness 
during possible power surplus 
period 
• perpetuation of Regional Power 
Act 
• institutional stability 
• supply availability on schedule 
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Forecast Evaluation; Risk and Reliability 
Having identified a set of basic core assumptions 
shaping, or framing, the forecast is now somewhat easier to 
assess the risk and reliability associated with it from the 
T-perspective. (Other dimensions of risk and uncertainty 
are revealed through the use of 0- and P-perspectives, and 
the significance of these dimensions is discussed in Chapter 
VI). In his article on model evaluation (1982: 159-168), 
Labys distinguishes between two distinct assessment tasks. 
Model verification procedures, or tests, determine whether 
or not a model has been synthesized in a manner faithful to 
its conception. At issue are how a particular model's 
operating structure embodies theoretical principles or 
conceptual elements and whether that model displays internal 
consistency. By contrast, model validation is concerned 
with adequacy of the model in representing the underlying 
real world processes or events being modeled. Put differ-
ently, verification is concerned with relationships, or 
mappings, among internal elements while validation centers 
upon relationships between model elements (most notably its 
outputs) and external events, characteristics, or processes. 
This distinction is useful in evaluating the BFA forecast, 
first examining what validation and verification effort3 
were undertaken and then delineating the areas of uncer-
tainty which then remain. This analysis must be carried out 
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on two distinct modeling levels: the level of the system as 
a whole and that of the individual models. 
Though not all of the individual models depicted in 
Figure 24 are operationally interlinked (in the manner of, 
say, the various portions of a computer program) the larger 
system they comprise does, in the strict theoretical sense, 
constitute a model (in this view, each individual model 
constitutes a component submodel of the system as a whole). 
Given the data interdependencies existing between the com-
ponents of the forecasting system -- models developed in-
dividually and differing both in methodological bases and 
conceptual approaches -- the basic evaluative criterion of 
model verification, internal consistency, is of central 
importance in evaluating the performance of the system as a 
whole. Such consistency is perhaps most conspicuously ab-
sent where internal model assumptions conflict or where 
necessary feedback linkages are missing. 
In the real world, the state of the social economy of 
the Northwest is highly dependent upon the price and avail-
ability of the relatively inexpensive electriCity which has 
been perhaps the primary source of its growth since the late 
1930s. Clearly, cheap hydropower has been instrumental in 
attracting businesses, creating job opportunities, and en-
couraging a continued influx of population. Changes in its 
price or availability could curtail economic growth or cause 
a relocation of key industrial or commercial customers to 
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areas outside the region. In short, the connections between 
basic economic and demographic factors and electricity 
prices are rich and bidirectional. As a model, the BPA 
system, however, is not geared to deal with the bidirec-
tional influences between basic economic and demographic 
drivers, on the one hand, and demand and price variables, on 
the other: a fact which even cursory inspection of the 
reachability matrix depicted above quickly reveals. The 
models used to develop economic and demographic projections 
are insensitive to changes in the price of electricity: any 
internal assumptions which might relate these variables to 
electricity prices are invariant (e.g. assumptions about 
high case electricity prices on employment in the aluminum 
industry) despite the fact that demand and price are dyna-
mic. The risk associated with the overall organization 
system is thus proportional to the strength and significance 
of the feedback linkages ~ modeled (e.g. electric to 
non-electric fuel prices, demands to least cost mix, demands 
to irrigation, etc.). These linkages may, in fact, be of 
slight significance (in which case the existing model struc-
ture satisfices), however, this should be proven rather than 
assumed. A more fully representative modeling system would 
closely resemble a macromodel of the regional economy, 
though empasizing those factors most intimately concerned 
with the market for energy. At the time of this writing, 
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however, no regional modeling system approached this level 
of sophistication any more closely than BFA's. 
The "composite" nature of ~he BFA forecasting system 
renders model validation difficult in anything more than the 
most elementary sense (i.e. checking the accuracy of its 
output values as actual electricity sales data becomes 
available). Statistical evaluation criteria, such as those, 
which can be utilized in association with econometric or 
regression techniques but not with the performance of the 
end-use models. Moreover, without the addition of critical 
feedback loops the system as a whole cannot run to reach a 
complete equilibrium state. Ex post forecasts of historical 
demand are not particularly helpful, even if the necessary 
data should prove available, because of the pivotal role of 
the pricing assumptions of the Regional Act which did not 
operate historically but which constitute the most signif-
icant of foreseeable policy constraints. As a consequence 
of these limitations, the "risk assessment" carried out by 
BFA staff in association with the forecast was confined to a 
judgmental evaluation of the probabilities of actual demands 
falling within the bandwidths defined by baseline, high, and 
low case projections (i.e. 15\ likelihood loads will exceed 
the high case, 35\ between low and baseline, 40\ between 
high and baseline, and 10\ below the low case). Without a 
more precisely defined method of evaluating the validity of 
the system as a whole, however, assessment efforts must 
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direct attention toward the separate components, despite the 
possibility that the system could function suboptimally even 
if all submodels performed as intended. 
Individually, the models incorporated in the BFA 
forecasting system have been evaluated with various degrees 
of explicitness. For many of the models (usually those 
involved in developing economic or demographic projections) 
the principal criterion of evaluation seemed to be the 
general acceptability of the reasonableness of the results 
by the forecasting and user communities. Though the income 
model is econometric in nature, and was subjected to 
statistical analysis at the time of its development, the 
other economic and demographic projections models cannot be 
similarly validated. All can, however, be verified to the 
extent that the mathematical algorithms used in making the 
projections can be identified and assessed. 
The model validation and verification efforts actually 
undertaken during the first phase (i.e. the technical 
review) of the forecast taking place in December of 1981. 
The models finally chosen, one econometric (industrial) and 
two end-use hybrids (residential and commercial) display 
unique (and constrasting) strengths and weaknesses which 
become most readily apparent during model evaluation. 
The NEFF model used for forecasting demand in the 
industrial sector displays three distinct strengths which 
characterize many econometric models: it is basically simple 
165 
in its structure (relative to the models used in the resi-
dential and commercial sectors), it requires relatively 
little data as input, and its performance may be evaluated 
statistically. In the recent past, model verification 
efforts included the reestimation of the model's equations 
(by AEA) and the addition of a lag structure rendering price 
response non-instantaneous, both of which presumably 
rendered the model more faithful to the economic realities 
represented. Model validation of the NEPP model, as with 
all econometric models, consisted of the standard test of 
statistical goodness of fit (of predicted to actuals over 
the historical period) and sensitivity analyses. 
The ORNL models display somewhat different character-
istics. As amalgams of engineering simulation and economic 
(or econometric) models, they embody the potential of 
displaying the strengths of both approaches. As simula-
tion models (with "white box" structures) they are designed 
to calculate a number of useful "intermediate outputs" (e.g. 
average energy use per unit, number of projected units, 
usage intensity levels, fuel choice) in the process of 
deriving their final products (projections of energy use 
levels). The outputs such models produce are thus potent-
ially more varied and useful than those produced by similar 
econometric models. End-use models, however, are extremely 
data-intensive, requiring large numbers of varied inputs in 
order to operate. Though their basic conceptual structures 
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may be reasonably simple, they embody a large number of 
internal equations to arrive at their final results. 
Finally, they contrast with econometric models in that their 
overall operation cannot be evaluated statistically (though 
their econometric components may be). These characteristics 
impose definite limitations (and demands) upon model evalua-
tion efforts. The rather elaborate internal structures of 
the ORNL models render model verification a more complicated 
process. To test for internal model consistency, a large 
number of basic variables must be tested. During the tech-
nical review phase, both ORNL models were subjected to ex-
tensive sensitivity testing of key inputs and fundamental 
model parameters. With the exception of a noticeably weak 
cross-price response (i.e. the effects of a change in price 
of a fuel on the consumption of substitute fuels) the models 
responded appropriately. Model validation is even more 
difficult to perform than model verfication on end use 
hybrids. Without statistical goodness-of-fit procedures, 
validation is limited to ex post forecasts (forecasting for 
historical periods) 'or comparison of forecast values with 
actuals as they become available. At least in this regard, 
the commercial sector model was somewhat better validated 
since, being based in 1970, it could be "fine tuned" to 
"track" ten years of history (i.e. hit 1970 and 1979 energy 
consumption control totals). The residential model was 
based in 1979 and hit the appropriate target total for that 
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year, though it could not be tested against any historical 
period. 
Several areas of risk associated with the demand models 
remain in spite of verification and validation efforts. In 
the case of econometric models, such as the NEPP model, the 
real significance of statistical evaluation criteria can be 
misunderstood. Statistical goodness-of-fit indicators apply 
to the past (i.e. the historical relationship between inde-
pendent and dependent variables) but not necessarily to the 
future. Though the terms (i.e. variables) in the regression 
equations of an econometric model characteristically mirror 
fundamental relationships posited by economic theory, they 
do not imply causal connection. Correlations (or regres-
sions) may reflect a series of diverse, but implicit, causal 
relations within which the independent and dependent vari-
ables are situated. The apparent stability of the rela-
tionship between a given dependent and independent variables 
may thus be predicated upon the constancy of socioeconomic 
"background factors" which, if disturbed, alter the rela-
tionship between the terms embodied in a regression equa-
tion. More simply put, the structure of the portion of the 
real world modeled may be more intricate than that of the 
econometric model and may undergo sufficient change that the 
model equations no longer represent it well. Only under 
stable economic and political conditions will the goodness-
of-fit of historical relationships between variables be 
meaningful in the long-range future. 
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The very detailed structure of end-use models which is 
touted as a major strength is also a source of potential 
weakness. Both of the ORNL models are extremely data-inten-
sive: they each require a large volume of diverse inputs in 
order to function. Generally, as the number of required 
inputs increases so also does the likelihood that needed 
data will not be available. In such instances, key input 
values must be developed by extrapolation, simulation, 
estimation, or, frequently, judgment. Though the use of 
judgment does not necessarily entail decreased accuracy 
(e.g. Ascher, 1978:82), in fact, notes that, in survey of 
econometric models "judgment-free econometric models are 
considerably less reliable than comparable models using some 
judgmental input") it does tend to mask a model's "normal" 
performance and, if its role is not explicitly acknowledged, 
obscure the validity and generalizability of results. 
Though BPA staff members were quite explicit about the 
sources of inputs and parameters, it was not possible to 
assess the ~ implications of judgments (or errors in 
judgment) on the forecast (e.g. a portion of the historic 
floorspace additions data used as input to the commercial 
model was estimated by the model builders at ORNL, though 
the procedure was not explicated in detail). Thus, despite 
credible results from sensitivity tests, a band of uncer-
tainty associated with judgmental adjustment (or develop-
ment) of inputs surrounds the utilization of the end-use 
models. 
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The SPM is a simulation model -- a sort of automated 
accounting structure for spreading anticipated construction, 
generation, and operation costs over a number of rate pools 
and customer classes. Verlflcation of such a model is 
routine and necessary, carried out in the debugging of the 
associated computer code and, subsequently, in test runs. 
Validation, however, is not particularly critical since the 
SPM is not a forecasting model and does not itself predict 
the future (though it is driven by predicted demand). What 
is critical is that the model's embodiment of assumptions 
about ratemaking (as outlined by the Regional Power Act) and 
resources acquisitions are credible and consistent -- some-
thing determined by verification. 
To summarize, as with all forecasts the uncertainty 
associated with the future imposes certain risks (in the 
non-technical sense of the term) and limits the reliability 
of the findings produced by BPA. Forecast reliability is 
determined by an evaluation of the models and methodology 
employed their verification and validation. The models 
employed in BPAs forecasting system were tested and sub-
jected to perhaps greater public scrutiny and comment than 
any previous regional forecast. In many cases, this exam-
ination of the various elements of the forecasting system by 
170 
the forecasting and user communities in the region was a 
primary mode of evaluation (e.g. assessing the credibility 
of assumptions and resulting values associated with key 
economic and demographic projections). Demand forecasting 
models were subjected to a technical review (including 
detailed scenario analyses and sensitivity tests) several 
months prior to the draft and final forecasts. 
Despite relatively extensive evaluation efforts, a 
number of areas of risk remain. (As noted above, some of 
the areas of risk fall in the province of the 0- and 
P-perspectives, and will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter to this dissertation). The forecasting system, 
taken as a whole, lacks certain feedback loops which pre-
sumably are present in the real world. Effects which are in 
reality bidirectional are given unidirectional representa-
tion. A ~ system equilibrium, however, may, in fact, 
differ only marginally from forecast values. In other 
words, this lack of feedback from demands and prices to 
economic/demographic projections (also, it should be noted, 
conspicuously absent from other regional demand forecasting 
systems or models) casts additional doubts on forecast 
reliability, though, it in no sense conclusively constitutes 
a significant flaw. 
The Pacific Northwest has displayed a unique set of 
circumstances surrounding electricity usage: abundant power, 
falling real electricity prices, and mild weather. Econo-
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metric models must be specified using either region-specific 
historical series (which reflect conditions no longer exis-
tent) or more general (pooled or cross sectional) national 
data. The NEPP Industrial Model's equations were estimated 
in the latter fashion. Thus, risk is associated with the 
underlying assumption that industries accustomed to unusual-
ly high levels of electricity consumption will, when faced 
with rather abrupt rate increases, respond with "average" 
consumptive behavior. The operation of data-intensive 
end-use models used for residential and commercial forecasts 
rests upon a larger volume of questionable date (and 
judgmental adjustments) than most econometric models, 
offsetting to some extent the benefits of their detailed, 
well-structured outputs and policy testing capabilities. 
Risk and reliability, however, must be assessed in the 
context of stated forecast objectives, (and ultimately 
evaluated in terms of actual forecast needs). The next 
section, which concludes this chapter on the T-perspective 
focuses upon the fit of the BPA forecasting methodology to 
the planning purposes it was designed to address. In 
Chapter VI, the appropriateness of these planning objectives 
are evaluated from T-, 0-, and P-perspectives, with signifi-
cant additional insight resulting. 
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Ends and Means; The Forecast in the context of PlannIng 
Objectives. 
At the beginning of this chapter it was asserted that 
from the standpoint of the traditional T-perspective 
approaches both the overall methodological strategy and the 
specific techniques associated with a forecast are, or 
should be, determined by the planning objectives to be 
addressed. However much the competent use of models and 
methods may reduce uncertainty, the final product must 
answer the correct questions if it is to be useful. An 
evaluation of a forecast must assess the appropriateness of 
the procedures followed to broader planning objectives. , 
The nominal objective of BPA's first independent 
forecast was to provide the Administrator with information 
necessary for him to make defensible decisions about which 
resources to acquire to meet his obligations to the region 
under the Power Act. Thus, in the parlance of the opening 
section of this chapter, the "set of decisions for action in 
the future" constituting the power plan were specific acqui-
sitions to be needed to maintain a workable load-resource 
balance. The forecast provided information on those 
anticipated loads and the corresponding rates to be charged 
to dIfferent customer classes. On the methodological level, 
a "most likely" (i.e. baseline) forecast was developed along 
with high and low growth scenarios to provide resource 
planners with credible limits on the range of acquisitions 
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to consider in developing an optimal generation mix. On the 
level of models, the demand forecasting capabilities re-
flected a need to address the important effects of conser-
vation while the ratemaking algorithm of the SPM embodied 
the priorities of the Regional Power Act. 
Given that the objective of the BPA forecast was indeed 
to determine what quantities of generation capability (or in 
the case of conservation, generation substitutes) will need 
to be acquired in the near future, a range approach renders 
a measure of the associated uncertainty described above less 
critical. What is crucial, from the standpoint of planning, 
is that a number of "parcels" of new resources can be 
identified which can be acquired as needed to meet future 
load requirements. The flexibility associated with such a 
planning strategy -- mapping out a series of resource alter-
natives to address a range of load growth scenarios provides 
additional latitude for actual demand to differ from that 
predicted by the forecasting system. Under such a planning 
philosophy, actual loads may deviate from the baseline 
trajectory without serious consequence, so long as they do 
not fall outside the "boundaries" formed by the low and high 
cases. In the context of this planning philosophy (and 
stated objectives) the method (i.e. range forecast) and the 
models underlying the BPA forecasting system are appropriate 
choices (though, for the purposes of resource and conserva-
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tion acquisitions, the demand models actually a~e fa~ more 
disaggregated than necessa~y). 
Establishing that a forecast is well-fitted to stated 
objectives and planning priorities begs several larger ques-
tions, ones which cannot be addressed fully (or appropri-
ately) by the T-perspective with its analytical emphasis on 
formal techniques. The fi~st question is whether o~ not the 
nominal objectives which the fo~ecast add~esses define the 
full (or t~ue) set of uses to which it will be put. As a 
general rule, the mo~e plentiful and accessible a given 
resource, the less stringent the planning requirements 
associated with its use. In the case of Columbia River 
hydropower, during the era when the system of dams was 
conspicuously "ove~bui1t", regional powe~ marketing was much 
simpler. In the cur~ent situation, with cost escalations of 
the WPPSS projects and the Regional Act legislation severely 
constraining power ma~keting decisions, ratesetting and 
revenue planning begin to resemble, more closely, regional 
economic planning as the anticipated impacts of electricity 
p~lces on different ~ate classes (and Indust~ies) are given 
explicit conside~ation. Clea~ly, such conside~ations go 
beyond the task of matching ~esou~ces to loads and define 
new, expanded uses fo~ fo~ecast ~esults. This implies a 
second mo~e fundamental question add~essed mo~e fully in 
Chapte~ VI: whethe~ the planning process is app~op~iate 
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given observable social, political, cultural, and economic 
trends in the region. 
Since forecasts are an integral part of the decision-
making process, they help give shape to the future (rather 
than merely attempting to describe inevitable outcomes). 
The forecasts upon which the decision to build the WPPSS 
nuclear plants was based proved, at least in part, self-
denying: the high costs incurred trying to meet anticipated 
high demand raised rates to the point that consumption fell 
below the levels which would otherwise have been attained. 
Detractors of BPA's forecast similarly argue that a low 
forecast could be self-fulfilling in that needed resources 
would not be built based upon forecast conclusions, thereby 
restraining normal growth. Both the decision-influencing 
effects of the forecast and the novel challenges the region 
must face as it experiences a series of "rate shocks" 
suggest that a more ambitious approach to power planning 
and, correspondingly, forecasting may be required. A range 
forecast (driven by smoothed national economic "reference 
projections") may adequately define a "bandwidth" of re-
source needs within which actual loads may fall but it 
cannot address qualitative socioeconomic shifts or serve to 
prepare decision makers for the type of critical situations 
they might have to face. 
The chapters which follow investigate the BPA forecast 
through the lenses of the 0- and P-perspectives, define the 
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broader arena of energy issues related to power planning 
decisions, and suggest where information needs surpass what 
current forecasting techniques are capable of providing. 
Chapter V cross-cues insights from the three perspectives, 
looking at key relationships between them. The concluding 
chapter, taking as its point of departure the insights of 
all three perspectives and the cross-cues, will suggest 
another possible approach to regional energy forecasting: 
one geared to a wider spectrum of issues and considerations. 
CHAPTER III 
THE O-PERSPECTIVE 
ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR PRODUCTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
O-PERSPECTIVE 
While SPA's first independent long-term forecast 
reflected a wide variety of often diverse technical consid-
erations, it was also the product of a large, internally 
differentiated organization. As such, its contents were 
additionally shaped by a number of considerations to which a 
purely technical outlook is blind. To recognize the imprint 
which organizational processes and procedures left upon the 
forecast, it is necessary to employ a paradigm of inquiry 
alternative, but complementary, to that of the technical 
analyst: the organizational or O-perspective. 
The O-perspective examines the manner in which organ-
izations actually operate, viewing their decision-making, 
problem solving, and production processes as the output of 
one or more internal units responding to both the challenges 
and causal factors that comprise its social, economic, 
technological, and physical environments. Characteris-
tically, organizations display internal structural and 
functional differentiation. While the units created by this 
internal division of labor appear at least nominally 
integrated in the overall organizational scheme, they 
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are additionally characterized by parochial priorities 
(which may conflict with those of others) and both formal 
and informal rules for behavior. Operating procedures for 
dealing with ongoing day-to-day activity are generally 
standardized, though organizations may develop ~ ~ 
procedures in response to new challenges or situations. In 
many cases, standard operating procedures (SOPs) evolve from 
the routinization of ~ hQ£ procedures (AHPs). Due to the 
division of labor and responsibility in organizations, 
problems (and their solutions) are characteristically 
fractionated, with portions assigned to the appropriate 
organizational division. Even in cases where basic decision 
making is localized, the information supporting it tends to 
originate from a number of different sources. The habits, 
experiences, and professional credentials which form a large 
part of an organization's history or institutional memory 
predispose it towards incremental change and slow adapta-
tion. In this context, problem solving proceeds not by 
optimizing but by satisficing (i.e. uSing, where necessary, 
satisfactory or workable, but not necessarily the best, 
solutions), observing both objective and subjective cri-
teria. A strategy of satisficing endeavors to avoid 
uncertainty to the greatest extent possible, sometimes to 
the point of ignoring it where it actually exists (Linstone, 
et aI, 1981:57). 
Organizations, then, manifest an array of common 
characteristics and operational dynamics which are both 
mirrored and illuminated by the O-perspective. Organiza-
tions, however~ also vary along a number of significant 
dimensions. These variations are what give particular 
organizations and their products their uniqueness. These 
variations are also the organizational features which are 
identified and explained by the O-perspective. 
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Perhaps the most obvious, though not necessarily the 
most important, dimension that organizations may differ 
along is that of size. BPA, in its entirety, employs over 
3,000 persons while some of the interest groups or con-
sulting firms it deals with are composed of a handful of 
individuals. A more important dimension of consideration, 
in terms of the O-perspective, is the degree of internal 
segmentation or differentiation which an organization 
displays -- a characteristic which is not solely dependent 
upon its size. Organizations may be internally differen-
tiated according to structure (e.g. chain of command) and/or 
function (e.g. task assignments). The degree to which the 
operation of such units or segments is integrated forms yet 
another dimension of variation. Integration is not neces-
sarily stronger in simple organizations. The operations of 
extremely differentiated organizations may fit well together 
while those of internally simple organizations may display 
poor goodness-of-fit and coordination of activity. 
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Clearly, however, the possible problems resulting from 
operational misfits or from organizational divisions working 
at cross-purposes are greater in more complex organizations. 
Organizations also differ as to the number and kind of 
missions they attempt to fulfill. They differ with respect 
to their rates of internal change (expansion, rearrangement, 
or contraction) and the degree to which their operating 
procedures are standardized or fixed. They display a 
variety or spectrum of management and decision-making styles 
(often in different parts of the same organization) which 
range from strict autocracy to consensus. Organizations 
also vary in terms of the degree of congruence between 
structure and function. Informal or functional authority 
may crosscut the legitimate structural hierarchy of control 
or complement it. 
A fundamental dimension across which organizations can 
be seen to vary is that of the environment which they must 
confront. Environments range from highly stable or placid 
to extremely turbulent and risk-filled (Emery and Trist, 
1975). Moreover, a given organization's relevant environ-
ment may change over time: new, or different, elements may 
appear which need to be addressed (e.g. environmental 
protectionists) or older, established elements may change 
their behavior (e.g. fast food restaurant patrons seeking 
salads and a wider dietary fare). Organizations vary 
according to the quantity, quality, and rate of feedback 
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they receive from their environments, making the degree of 
difficulty involved in directing their actions highly 
variable. Organizations also differ in both the degree and 
flexibility of their adaptations to their environments. 
Those that are unable to adapt to the conditions which 
constrain their actions (and provide opportunities) 
eventually fail. Those that adapt strongly to their 
surroundings tend to be successful in fulfilling their 
missions provided the adaptation is not so rigid that it 
prohibits necessary change when key contours of the 
environment undergo significant alterations. 
Finally, organizations (or parts of them) differ in 
terms of both the cohesiveness and type of their "corporate 
cultures" (Deal and Kennedy, 1982). Corporate cultures are 
constituted by the basic concepts, values, beliefs, and 
rituals maintained by an organization. They are personified 
by the "heroes" who serve as exemplars or role models for an 
organization's employees and carried (i.e. transmitted and 
maintained) by formal and informal networks of communica-
tion. strong corporate cultures spell out how people are to 
behave and, by doing so, provide a sense of organizational 
identity which is a key determinant of success. Unique 
cultures may evolve in organizational subunits and may wax 
or wane over time. 
This chapter then looks at BPA and its forecast using 
the paradigm of the O-perspective. It begins by looking 
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in~ard at the intraorganizational dynamics of BPA -- changes 
in its structure, revisions in agency missions, and evolu-
tion of operating procedures. Next, the chapter looks 
outward at the interorganizational environment (or power 
planning arena) within which BPA finds itself. The 
redefinition of BPA's duties under the Regional Act altered 
its relations with a number of parties in the region. As a 
result, these parties offered new challenges to which BPA 
had to respond. The significance and the implication of 
these challenges may be better understood by identifying the 
principals and examining their organizational motives, 
histories, and modes of operation. The chapter concludes by 
describing the BPA forecast as an organizational output, 
drawing upon the findings of the previous sections and 
integrating them into a coherent picture consistent with the 
paradigm of the O-perspective. 
THE INTRAORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS OF BPA: A LOOK INWARD 
Oye;yiew; The Climate Within the Organization 
In the chapter introducing this dissertation, the role 
of BPA in the continuing development of the Pacific North-
west was outlined. As an agency of, first, the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior and later the Department of Energy, BPA 
functioned to market the power generated by Federal hydro-
projects and to maintain the transmission network necessary 
to deliver this power to its customers. For most of its 
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history, engineering and construction functions comprised 
the lion's share of the agency's activities and employed the 
bulk of its staff. As long as the primary form of resources 
developed were high-head dams and the base of residential, 
commercial, and industrial customers grew steadily, BPA's 
duties and responsibilities were unambiguously defined and 
its organizational modus operandi highly routinized. In 
many respects, power planning was itself an engineering 
problem during these early years. The market for power grew 
steadily of its own accord. Bonneville's chief mission was 
to construct and maintain transmission facilities. 
Beginning with the initiation of the Hydro-Thermal 
Power Plan, however, the focus of BPA's regional responsi-
bilities began to shift, subtly at first, later more 
dramatically. The challenges of net billing agreements, 
emerging Southwest power markets, growing sentiments of 
environmental protectionism, excessive cost overruns asso-
ciated with the WPPSS nuclear projects and, ultimately, 
Regional Act legislation provided the impetus for augmented 
marketing, forecasting, and resource and conservation 
planning efforts. During this time period, the organization 
grew in size as its functional emphasis shifted. In 1980, 
immediately preceding the passage of the Regional Act this 
trend of growth was reflected in an agency-wide "nomencla-
ture change" in which all units were upscaled: Divisions 
became Offices, Branches became Divisions, and Sections 
became Branches. Subsequent disproportionate growth of 
particular organizational units (such as Conservation's 
evolution into a Division within Power Management and, 
ultimately, an independent Office) in turn mirrored the 
shifts in functional emphasis. 
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As the agency and the region entered the 1980s, load 
growth futures were shrouded in uncertainty. It had become 
clear in the late 1980s that the high growth scenario 
justifying the construction of five nuclear plants would not 
materialize as expected. Whether the growth would merely 
slow enough to lessen the anticipated deficit or drop off so 
dramatically that the region's resources would provide a 
surplus of power in years to come was a question immediately 
in need of being answered. Under the terms of the Regional 
Act, Bonneville became responsible for obtaining whatever 
resources were needed to meet the requirements of any of the 
region's utilities entering into wholesale power contracts 
with them, giving priority to conservation and renewable 
resources over thermal generation. The Act, however, had 
been first drafted at a time when a seemingly inevitable 
deficit situation would have unquestionably motivated the 
region's utilities to enter into power exchange agreements 
with BPA in order to minimize rate impacts of resource 
expansion on their residential and small farm customers. 
Such power exchanges would provide a mechanism for enforce-
ment of the Council's long-range plan. In a surplus situa-
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tion, however, utilities might not find such power exchanges 
cost-effective and Bonneville could instead find itself in a 
situation where its chief problem would be how to market 
power from overbuilt generating resources rather than how to 
attain the maximum possible savings from conservation. 
In the wake of the passage of the Regional Act, 
Bonneville found itself confronting just these issues. The 
changes in the organization's structure, with the waning of 
the relative importance of its traditional engineering 
functions parallelled by a waxing of that of its planning 
decision support system (e.g. forecasting, financial 
analysis, conservation and resource assessment), reflected a 
recognized need to address these uncertainties as effect-
ively as possible. This section on intraorganizational 
dynamics looks at those units within BPA participating in 
(or affecting) the forecast process, examining their chief 
characteristics and describing their change and development 
over time. 
POwer Requirements; Projecting Loads and the Regional 
Economy 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, organiza-
tional units not only operate using habitual standard 
operating procedures but develop ~ h2£ procedures in 
response to both external and internal challenges during 
periods of change. These AHPs may be transitory, reflecting 
temporary, non-recurring circumstances or may "ossify" into 
SOPs. At the time of the 1982 forecast, the Division of 
Power Requirements (DPR) was in the midst of a period of 
relatively rapid organizational growth and change. The 
nature and significance of this change, as well as its 
influences upon the shaping of the forecast, may be most 
clearly seen using a perspective which contrasts the 
Division's organizational structure and function in 1982 
with that of earlier periods. 
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In the late 1960s, at the time of the conception of the 
Hydro-Thermal Power Plan, forecasting functions were per-
formed by the organizational ancestor of DPR, then called 
the Branch of Power Marketing of the Division of Power 
Management. As discussed earlier, demand growth in the 
region, up to that point in time, had proceeded regularly 
and rapidly -- forecasts were basically extrapolations of 
relatively steady trends and engineering, not resource 
planning, challenges were the ones BPA as an organization 
was compelled to address. As the name Power Marketing 
suggests, the problem which had traditionally been addressed 
by the agency was how to sell the power having its source in 
the network of high-head hydroelectric facilities overlaying 
the Columbia River system. With a heavy influx of both 
population and large electricity-intensive industries in the 
1940s and 1950s, and a corresponding relatively stable 
growth of regional hydroelectric potential, BPA's mission as 
a marketing agency was clearly and simply defined. When 
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trend extrapolations of the early 1970s indicated an 
imminent condition of demand exceeding regional hydro-
electric capabilities, the complexion of the mission began 
to undergo change. 
Power Marketing had in many ways been one of the few 
havens for economists in an organization overwhelmingly 
dominated by engineers and engineering considerations. By 
1971, an increasing attention paid to economic concerns 
within the agency was reflected in the formation of two 
Sections within Power Marketing: Economic Studies, and Load 
Forecasting. Load Forecasting functioned primarily to 
assist the region's small public utilities which lacked 
technical staffs in the preparation of their submittals to 
PNUCC's Sum-Of-Utilities forecasts. Economic Studies 
prepared analyses of regional and subregional economic and 
demographic trends to support the preparation of load 
forecasts. 
In the face of apparent forthcoming power shortages, 
shifting priorities in agency policy were reflected in the 
form assumed by the organization's internal structure. Had 
the high-demand SOU forecasts of the early 1970s proven 
accurate, the combined output of the five scheduled WPPSS 
nuclear plants would have proven insufficient to meet loads 
by the end of the century. Under such circumstances, the 
evident problem would not be to find new markets for surplus 
power but to encourage efficient resource development and 
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prudent use of conservation in the region. When the Branch 
of Power Marketing was renamed 'Power Requirements' (without 
any structural change at the Section level) in the early 
19705, it mirrored a progressive shift in organizational 
priorities. Subsequently, in 1975 Power ReqUirements 
devolved organizationally to become a Section within the 
Branch of Power Resources. The Requirements Section per-
formed the same basic functions as before until 1977 when 
PNUCC purchased an econometric model to be used as a 
cross-check to the SOU forecasts. Because, at this date, 
PNUCC did not have its own independent forecasting support 
staff (relying entirely upon the staffs of the member 
utilities) this model was made resident on BPA's computer 
system and attended to by BPA staff. 
By the late 1970s, however, problems with the region's 
earlier forecasts had begun to become apparent. Growth in 
the region had slowed and showed evidence of slowing fur-
ther. Additionally, legislation being prepared would place 
the region's electric power planning under the authority of 
a council composed of representatives of each of the four 
states. Given the failure of past planning and the need for 
more varied and flexible forecasting capabilities, BPA made 
a decision to expand both the role and the scope of its 
forecasting efforts. 
In 1980, Requirements became a Branch of the Division 
of Power Resources, as an agency-wide nomenclature change 
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elevated all organizational units one level in the bureau-
cratic hierarchy. Shortly thereafter, however, in early 
1981, Power Requirements became a Division structurally 
independent of Power Resources. Within this newly-formed 
Division were two Branches: the Branch of Economic and 
utility Studies and the Branch of Energy Modeling and Anal-
ysis. In this reorganization both the Division's responsi-
bilities and staffing levels were increased. utility 
Studies functioned in many ways in the same fashion as the 
Load Forecasting Section of the Power Requirements Branch 
had years earlier: it participated in the SOU forecasts by 
reviewing forecast submittals of small utilities and pre-
paring demand projections for those not having their own 
technical staffs. Economic Studies again prepared regional 
economic and demographic projections as had its earlier 
counterpart. This time, however, the projections were 
tailored to the input data requirements of the new, 
sector-specific demand models to be used in developing BPA's 
first and subsequent independent regional load forecasts. 
The development and maintenance of these models, along with 
specialized data bases used to support their operation, were 
the key responsibilities of the Energy Modeling and the 
Energy Analysis Sections. 
By 1982, Power Requirements was no longer one of the 
few havens for economists in the agency. The principal 
actors in the Division responsible for the preparation of 
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the long-term forecast were, however, all trained as econo-
mists, and the inherent strengths and limitations of their 
disciplinary perspective strongly colored the character of 
the forecast. This organizational precedent of disciplinary 
specialization undeniably exerted a strong influence upon 
both personnel selection and problem-solving approaches. 
The general approach of utilizing economic and demographic 
projections to feed input data into complex end-use fore-
casting models reveals certain assumptions. In brief, the 
approach assumes that projections of key economic and 
demographic drivers are sufficient to acquire a picture of 
the future adequately well drawn for long-term resource 
planning. Contrariwise, it is assumed that social and 
political trends, as well as true innovations in energy 
technology need not be dealt with explicitly -- the range of 
their significant impacts, in other words, is treated as 
entirely embedded within the three economic/demographic 
scenarios incorporated into the forecast. Social, politi-
cal, and technological forecasting were apparently so 
foreign to the forecast principals that they were treated as 
unworkable or unimportant, despite the fact that the struc-
ture of the demand models would have permitted scenario 
analyses along such lines. 
Though SOPs are somewhat helpful in understanding how 
Power Requirements operated during the period coincident 
with the production of its first long term forecast, AHPs 
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developed as the Division grew and internally differentiated 
ltself prove more revealing. SOPs played their strongest 
role in the Branch of Economic and utilities Studies. As 
noted above, the utility Studies Section, reviewing utility 
forecast submittals and providing technical assistance to 
small public utilities in the region, functioned, in large 
measure, as the Load Forecasting Section of Power Marketing 
had nearly a decade earlier. Economic Studies fulfilled the 
same mission as its predecessor of the same name, though its 
roles and responsibilities were augmented considerably as 
BPA prepared to develop an independent forecast. Although 
part of the same Branch as utility Studies, Economic 
Studies was linked by function more strongly to the Energy 
Modeling and Analysis Branch. The specific economic and 
demographic projections prepared by Economic Studies served 
as inputs to the demand models maintained by Energy Modeling 
and Analysis. Though "tried and true" extrapolation tech-
niques were used to prepare some of the projections (e.g. 
industry-specific employment) new, more elaborate computer-
ized models were developed (e.g. population) or accessed 
(e.g. DRI model of the national economy) to develop the 
majority of the Section's products. 
For all practical purposes, Energy Modeling and 
Analysis was something new organizationally. Prior to 1982, 
BPA had not prepared an independent long-term forecast. 
Prior to 1980, the models ultimately used to develop the 
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demand projections were not even resident on the BPA 
computer system. Energy Modeling and Analysis was the 
product of organizational expansion. Though the models used 
to prepare the forecast were well-structured with regard to 
their data and operating requirements, there existed no 
SOPs governing their use. The new Branch, in addition to 
producing load forecasts, expended a large measure of its 
energies acquiring, developing, and analyzing data about the 
sectors modeled. The Energy Modeling and Energy Analysis 
Sections were distinguished not so much by function but by 
focus -- the Energy Analysis Section concerned itself with 
residential and commercial sectors while the Energy Modeling 
Section handled the industrial sector as well as peak, 
hourly, and short-term forecasting. 
The evolution of AHPs proceeded somewhat by trial-and-
error as Power Requirements responded to four basic chal-
lenges in the period preceding and coinciding with forecast 
production. First the end-use models developed at Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory had to be adapted to the Pacific 
Northwest as the territory was defined by the Regional Power 
Act. This entailed the acquisition of data through surveys, 
the reestimation of certain key model parameters, and 
extensive model testing and sensitivity analysis. Second, 
anticipated savings attributable to BPA-sponsored programs 
had to be incorporated into the forecast. Next, the demand 
models needed to be linked to the Supply Pricing Model so 
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that an equilibrium state of prices and loads could be 
determined. Finally, specifics of the forecasting process 
had to be subjected to public review and in some cases 
modified. The results of these four tasks inevitably bore 
the stamp of the emerging Branch's style and, in many 
respects, the manner in which they were arrived at generated 
many of the assumptions at the core of the forecast. 
Figure 25 graphically depicts the changes in BPA's 
organizational structure over time. Section level detail is 
provided only for those parts of the organization which in 
1982, were involved in the production of the long-term 
forecast. 
Rates: Lessening Disparities Under the Terms of the 
Regional Act 
During the 1982 long-term forecast it was the output of 
the Supply Pricing Model (SPM) maintained and operated by 
BPA's Division of Rates that was the element of the 1982 
forecast most critically scrutinized by both special inter-
ests and the general public. It is through wholesale rates 
charged by BPA to both public and investor-owned utilities 
that the forecasting and planning process has its most 
direct, and most clearly understood, impact upon the 
region's residential, commercial, and industrial consumers. 
Moreover, the resource scheduling and electricity pricing 
assumptions reflected in the operation of the SPM were more 
controversial than those constraining the results of the 
DIVISION OF 
ENGINEERING AND 
CONSTRUCTION 
DIVISION OF 
OPERATION AND 
MAINTENANCE 
Figure 25. Organizational charts of BPA 1971 
look at the growth of power requirements (A), 
power resources (D), and financial management 
DIVISION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT 
1982 (selected detail) 
rates (B), conservation 
(E) 
A 
(C) , 
~ 
IJ) 
.,. 
DIVISION OF 
ENGINEERING 
AND CONSTRUC-
TION 
Figure 25 (Cont'd) 
DIVISION OF 
OPERATION 
AND MAIN-
TENANCE 
(B) .. , ____ --, 
..... 
U) 
V1 
OPPICE OP 
ENGINEERING 
AND CONSTRDC-
TION 
Figure 25 (Cont'd) 
OFPICE OF 
OPBRATION AND 
MAINTENANCE 
1980 (poet no.enclature change) 
POWER i ENERGY i POWER IN-
CAPABILI CONSERVA VESTIGA-
TIES TION TIONS 
BRANCH BRANCH BRANCH 
I (E) 
i DIVISION OF i 
FINANCIAL 
MANAGEMENT 
.... 
ID 
CTt 
OFFICE OF 
ENGINEERING " 
CONSTRUCTION 
Figure 25 (Cent'd) 
1981 
~ 
..0 
-.l 
" 
<=u-' ____ ,Cr., 
CHrllC;Y .WDtLINC 
, AMAL1'SIS 
alaMCH 
III' 
Figure 25 (Cont'd) 
~ 
U) 
CD 
199 
demand models. As noted in the previous chapter, electri-
city demand and price are linked; higher prices lower demand 
which either delays or eliminates the need for certain key 
~esources within the forecast period. While increased 
electricity rates seemed a foregone conclusion for the 
~egion, the magnitude of the increases as well as their 
differential effects on various rate pools were unresolved 
issues. Thus, the assumptions built into the SPM strongly 
influenced who would bear the brunt of rate increases and 
which utilities would be able to retrieve some of their sunk 
resources. (Costs of construction of generation projects 
may be included in a utility's rate base only when the 
resource is generating power. utillties which had invested 
in the WPPSS plants thus had a vested interest as to which 
plants came on line in what year.) 
Like the other units within BPA involved in the long-
range planning p~ocess, Rates found its role expanding and 
becoming more complicated during the late 1970s. The 
Bonneville Project Act which created the agency identified 
its preference customers and established guidelines for 
distinguishing between rate pools. As long as the only 
~esource was a steadily growing network of hydroelectric 
facilites, wholesale ratemaking was a straight-forward 
process. The introduction of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan, 
the Canadian Treaty, the Intertle sales to California, and 
the passage of the Regional Power Act all added new wrinkles 
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to the ratemaking picture and though only a very small 
number of the Division's staff directly participated in the 
production of the forecast, virtually all were affected by 
the outcome of the forecasting process. 
Up until the early 1970s, ratemaking was one of a 
number of functions carried out by the customer Services 
Branch of the Division of Power Management. The subdivision 
of this Branch into Service Programming, Contracts, and 
Rates and Statistics Sections, with their corresponding 
specializations, mirrored the increase in attention which 
changing regional circumstances required of the agency. By 
the time of the 1980 agency nomenclature change alluded to 
earlier, Rates had become a Division with two Branches: 
Wholesale Rates and Transmission and Retail Rates. The 
former Branch was the one actually participating in the 1982 
forecast since the SPM was operated under its "sponsorship" 
by staff in its Economic Analysis Section. The entire 
Division, however, was affected by the rate design chal-
lenges offered by the Regional Power Act, a projected energy 
surplus, and the troubled WPPSS construction projects. 
Rates, like Requirements, has traditionally been a 
haven for economists in an organization which had been 
heavily devoted to engineering concerns. In recent years, 
however, further specialization has accompanied a numerical 
growth in staff. These specializations are reflected in the 
names of the Sections comprising the Division. In addition 
to the Economic Analyses Section, Rate uesign and Rate 
Evaluation Sections made up the Wholesale Rates Branch. 
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Cost and Transmission Rates Branch, by contrast, was divided 
into Transmission Rates, Cost Analyses, and Revenue Forecast 
Sections. The organization of the entire Division centered 
upon dealing with alternatives, contingencies, and uncer-
tainties where, before a certain stability could be assumed 
to characterize the ratemaking environment. Thus, forecasts 
and new planning strategies figured prominently in the 
Division's evolving operations. Individual staff members 
were required to be innovative while, in many respects 
narrowing their focus of concern. While the ratemaking 
provisions of the Regional Power Act, the troubled WPPSS 
financial situation, and the determinant structures of 
computerized modeling tools defined very specific problems 
to be solved, the procedures to be used to deal with these 
rate and revenue problems had to be developed ad hoc. Thus, 
economists with specialized training in ratemaking, model-
ing, and forecasting found their way into the center of the 
Division's new mission. 
Conservation; A New Organizational Priority in the 1980s 
Of all the organizational units within BPA taking part 
in the production of the long-term forecast, by far the 
fastest growing was the Office of Conservation. The offic-
ial BPA forecast, as noted in the previous chapter, reflec-
ted conservation savings attributable to BPA-sponsored 
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programs. This explicit introduction of savings estimates 
into the BPA forecasting and planning process signalled an 
increasing significance of the new Office to the agency. 
In the early and mid-1970s, when an apparent power 
deficit loomed over the region, conservation first entered 
into the long-range power planning process, though admitted-
ly overshadowed by the planning of large thermal generation 
projects. Within the legislative arena the seeds of the 
Regional Power Bill were being sown and within the utility 
industry the need for considering conservation as an inte-
gral part of resource planning was slowly, and somewhat 
grudgingly, being recognized. In the late 1970s, an Energy 
Conservation Section (soon to become a Branch with the 1980 
nomenclature change) appeared within the Power Resources 
Branch of Power Management, side-by-side with Power Capa-
bilites, Power Investigations, Requirements, and Thermal 
Power Sections. At its incipience, Conservation's chief 
concern was the development of energy savings programs aimed 
at lessening the likelihood of a severe deficit. 
In early 1981, shortly after the nomenclature change, 
the newly-formed Diyision of Conservation split off from 
Power Resources (at the same time that Power Requirements 
underwent a similar organizational expansion). This 
fledgling Division was further subdivided into a Program 
Branch and an Evaluation and Assistance Branch. The former 
group had the responsibility for designing and implementing 
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SPAs various con5ervation programs while the latter unit 
began the task of determining the regional markets for 
conservation and assessing the effectiveness of conservation 
programs already in place. The growth of Conservation as an 
organizational unit, spurred both by technical necessities 
and the same political forces giving impetus to the Regional 
Act, continued to proceed at a conspicuously rapid pace. 
By early 1982 the Division had become the Office of Conser-
vation with its two Branches each becoming a Division 
(joined by a third, the Division of Technical Assistance). 
Rapid expansion, such as that experienced by Conserva-
tion in its growth from a Section to an Office in less than 
three years time, provides numerous problems along with the 
resulting opportunities. First and foremost, there is a 
great deal of personnel turnover. Not only are large 
numbers of new, relatively inexperienced (at least at their 
duties at BPA) employees added to the staff but more 
experienced persons are applying for newly-opened higher-
graded positions, leaving berths behind them which must in 
turn be filled. secondly, the mix of educational back-
ground, tends to change, sometimes drastically. In its 
earliest days, Conservation was staffed primarily by 
engineers (having experience with the technology behind the 
conservation measures constituting the core of BPA's 
programs) and "advocates" (i.e. champions of conservation or 
renewable resources) with diverse academic backgrounds often 
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only tangentially related to their duties and respons!b!l-
ities (e.g. sociology, history, mathematics, political 
science). Given the relative youthfulness of conservation 
research and development this was not surprising -- most 
schools don't offer a 'conservation' major so most exper-
ience was obtained through special programs or other jobs. 
By the time it had become an Office, however, Conservation 
had begun to specialize internally. As such, more staff 
members joined the units with more quantitative technical 
backgrounds (e.g. economics, statistics, planning) needed 
for revaluating regional savings potential. 
A third and final problem area resulting from rapid 
organizational expansion is that of functional integration, 
both among the units within Conservation and between 
Conservation and other Offices. As Power Requirements 
expanded, the well-structured character of its demand models 
and their input requirements made functional integration 
straightforward, if not simple. Economic Studies provided 
inputs needed to operate the models maintained by the other 
Branch. How Conservation's numerous organizational 
functions would be coordinated was not nearly so obvious. 
In broad concept it was recognized that the Planning and 
Evaluation Assistance Division would assess both the 
effectiveness of conservation programs and the potential 
savings yet attainable, while Programs would develop and 
implement specific strategies to obtain energy savings. No 
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clear-cut methods, let alone deterministic computer models, 
presented themselves, however, making the internal coordi-
nation of activities problematic and necessitating more 
"trial-and-error" with technical approaches. 
Conservation's integration with BPA's planning, fore-
casting, and resource development also begs some questions 
as to its continuing role in the organization. Most 
fundamentally, Conservation's mission is to obtain the 
maximum possible cost-effective power savings. Its contri-
bution to the forecasting process is the determination of 
future savings attributable to its own programs. Yet what 
appears cost-effective during a projected deficit may not 
prove so during a surplus (insofar as resources already 
under construction may be adequate for many years to come). 
Both the initiation of Regional Bill legislation and the 
emergence of a conservation unit within BPA were predicated 
upon a feared power deficit in the 19805 and 19905. Ironi-
cally, with a projected surplus the need for conservation 
within the region becomes called into question. Thus, at the 
time of the first forecast, the role of Conservation within 
the organization paradoxically was growing while its neces-
sity given new regional conditions was becoming suspect. 
Power Resources; New Options for Electricity supply 
The opposite side of the planning equation from demand 
is supply. The Columbia River system, as noted in the 
introductory chapter, is overlaid by a network of high-head 
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dams and transmission lines. This network; one of the 
la~gest of its kind in the world, has supplied the Northwest 
with most of its power since the 1930s when the Bonneville 
and Grand Coulee Dams were first completed. The construc-
tion of these dams using funds from the U.S. Treasury 
yielded the abundant, low-cost electricity which was for 
some time enjoyed by all but more recently ~eserved for 
BPA's preference customers. First with the Hydro-Thermal 
Power Plan, and finally with the Regional Act, the task of 
finding resources adequate to meet the demands of Bonne-
ville's customers has become progressively more complex. 
The Division of Power Resources within Bonneville's Office 
of Power Management is the group tasked with preparing a 
load-resource balance in conjunction with the long-term 
forecast. 
The role of Power Resources, and the relative impor-
tance of certain of its functions, have changed considerably 
since the early 19705. At the beginning of that decade, 
Power Resources was a Branch within the Division of Power 
Management. Its three Sections were Power Capabilities, 
Power Investigations, and Hydrology -- Sections which 
reflected a primary emphasis upon the use of hydropower. 
These functions remained the central concern of the Branch 
through the period when resource planning was based upon the 
assumption of imminent power shortages. Though BPA 
championed the construction of the WPPSS plants to meet the 
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loads of its public utility customers, the Regional Act was 
still being conceived and the agency was not yet obligated 
to acquire resources needed to provide power to any and all 
utilities requesting it. By 1980, however, a change in the 
Division's (this followed the nomenclature change) internal 
structure foreshadowed the role to be played under the terms 
of the Act, reflective of the same issues and considera-
tions. Two of the three former sections had become Branches 
(Hydrology was absorbed into other units), but these tra-
ditional functions were joined by three others also reflec-
ted in the Branch names: Requirements, Energy Conservation, 
and Thermal Power. As noted earlier, within a year of this 
time, the rapidly-growing Requirements and Conservation 
became separate Divisions, leaving Power Capabilities, Power 
Investigations and Thermal Power Branches as principal 
subdivisions. By the time of the 1982 forecast reorgani-
zation was more thorough, embodying concerns of the Regional 
Act. The Power Capabilities Branch was joined by Generation 
Planning and Assessment and Evaluation. 
Power Resources participated in the 1982 forecast 
through the use of two models maintained and operated by the 
Assessment and Evaluation Branch. One model was a linear 
programming model called the Least Cost Mix Model (LCMM), 
the other a Systems Analysis Model (SAM). The LCMM solved a 
complex objective function which determined what mix of 
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potentially available resources should be obtained by 
certain years to meet anticipated loads at a minimum cost. 
The SAM simulated the operation of the entire gridwork of 
resources, evaluating its peaks and patterns of usage. The 
results of these models determined the cost and scheduling 
of the resources selected by the Supply Pricing Model to 
meet forecasted loads. Thus the supply side of the resource 
balance equation incorporated into the forecast. 
Significant "Non-participants": Financial Management and 
the Policy Committee 
Two of the more significant organizational role players 
within BPA were, in the strict sense of the word, nonpar-
ticipants in the forecast: the Division of Financial 
Management within the Office of Management Services and the 
agency's Policy Committee. Unlike the other organizational 
actors within BPA described above, these two "non-partici-
pants" did not play any part in developing either the fore-
cast projections or the inputs used to produce them. Both 
were, however, central partiCipants in the particular (and 
particularly important) decision making process which the 
forecast was supporting. Their specific informational 
needs, however, did help shape the forecast in a number of 
ways by requiring the forecasting staff to ask very well-
defined questions, often in a rather narrowly circumscribed 
fashion. 
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The Division of Financial Management grew out of the 
(pre-nomenclature change) Branch of Finance and Accounts and 
the Budgeting and Planning offices of the Management Ser-
vices Division in 1980. Its expansion within the agency was 
roughly coincident with that of Power Requirements and 
Conservation, all reflecting the changing priorities of the 
power planning environment of the late 1970s. The slowing 
of load growth in the region along with the costly delays 
associated with the five WPPSS construction projects placed 
BPA in an unprecedentedly awkward financial situation. At 
the same time that successful completion of the WPPSS 
nuclear plants required a continued high rating for ad-
ditional bonds, BPA was, for the first time in its history, 
falling behind in its repayment of the U.S. Treasury for the 
financing of the network of hydroelectric projects along the 
Columbia. Analysis of the bond market and the feasibility 
of issuing further WPPSS bonds was a separate, but parallel 
input to the load projections to be used by the Administra-
tor in arriving at a scheduling decision for the completion 
of WNP 1, 2, and 3. 
The other "non-participant", BPA's Policy Committee, is 
a group comprised of the Administrator, his Deputy and 
Assistants, the heads of each of the Offices at BPA, and (at 
least on some occasions) assorted higher staff personnel. 
The members of the Policy Committee are the principal 
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decision makers of the agency. It is their decision-making 
needs that ultimately determine the research, analysis, and 
modeling efforts, albeit indirectly, in several ways. 
First, the types of issues they must address influence the 
selection and use of modeling tools and techniques. The 
selection of detailed forecasting models for sector fore-
casting was, in part, the result of their ability to deal 
straightforwardly with various types of conservation pro-
grams which the agency needed to consider as many options in 
making resource decisions. Second, the scheduling of major 
policy decisions (often dictated by Congress) sets firm time 
limits within which forecasts must be prepared. These time 
limits may, under some circumstances, force the pace of 
forecast development, limiting the exploration of alterna-
tives and thus the reduction of forecast uncertainty. 
Third, members of the Policy Committee make internal budget-
ing decisions on major allocations of agency funds. Thus, 
major data or model development presupposes upper management 
agreement with the broader goals and objectives of the 
technical staff in the various Divisions. Finally, it is 
the members of the Policy Committee who most directly deal 
with the crises and opportunities affecting the agency as a 
whole. Since such matters are often unpredictable so are 
the additional demands for analysiS which they, often quite 
abruptly, place upon the forecasting staff. All these in-
fluences, however indirect, ultimately have a substantial 
effect upon the forecast and its outcome. 
THE 'INTERORGANIZATIONAL POWER PLANNING ARENA: A LOOK 
OUTWARD 
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Overview; The Textyre of Changing Roles and ResponsibIlIties 
As a marketer of wholesale power, BPA has always been 
firmly established in an arena of actors having interests in 
the way the region's power was used and how its development 
was planned for. The hydroelectric output of the Columbia 
River system for many years provided the bulk of the power 
distributed by~he region's utilities, whether publicly-
operated or investor-owned, or used by Direct Service 
Industries. Difficulties concerning the allocation of power 
from BPA's transmission system or the resource mix used to 
meet demand were minimal -- engineering, rather than polit-
ical or economic, problems. With the advent of the Hydro-
Thermal Power Plan matters grew more complex. Investor-
owned utilities found themselves more reliant upon their 
own, somewhat more costly, sources of electricity while 
public utilities were being encouraged to "swap" the more 
expensive outputs of thermal generation for less costly 
hydropower. 
As the decade of the 1970s progressed, the power 
planning arena grew progressively more political and more 
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varied in texture. Increasing rate disparities between 
public and private utilities resulted in movements to turn 
Oregon's residential and small farm customers into a gigan-
tic People's utility District which would become entitled to 
a S~lare of the low-cost power which BPA would be obligated 
to provide. Long-term contracts drafted by BPA guaranteeing 
non-interruptable power to the region's Direct Service 
Industries were looked upon with increasing disfavor by 
preference customers forced to develop thermal plants to 
meet their own needs. Strong environmentalist opposition 
sprang up in response to the introduction of coal and 
nuclear-fired generation facilities in the region, while 
advocates of renewable resource and conservation chided 
planners for all but ignoring "soft energy alternatives". 
One of the significant outcomes of the turbulence 
generated by these conflicting interests was the formulation 
and ultimate enactment of the Regional Power Bill. Even 
after this legislation had been ratified by Congress, how-
ever, organizational interaction within the arena was heated 
and representative of many different groups. 
The impacts of the decisions based upon BPA's 1982 
forecast were obviously going to be significant and widely 
felt. As a result, many organizational actors participated 
directly or indirectly in the process initiated to dissemi-
nate information and solicit critical comment. This process 
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involved public meetings for a technical review of the de-
mand models and a presentation of the draft forecast, each 
followed by a comment period. 
The sections which follow identify the principal actors 
in the interorganizational power planning arena, their 
history of involvement with regional forecasting or plan-
ning, and their special set of inter~ts, circumstances, and 
organizationally-based biases. 
The PNUCCj A waning of Traditional Authority in Forecasting 
During most of the Pacific Northwest's growth as a 
region, the PNUCC (Pacific Northwest utilities Conference 
Committee) has been a central actor in the electric power 
planning and resource development arenas. A consortium of 
the region's utilities, PNUCC has, since its formation in 
1946, largely acted in partnership with BPA in the produc-
tion and distribution of power. While BPA was responsible 
for marketing the power generated from the Federally-owned 
h'jdroelectric facilities along the Columbia River system and 
maintaining the network of transmission lines connecting 
them, it was the member utilities of PNUCC that "wheeled" 
the power purchased from BPA, while investor-owned utilities 
met significant portions of their demand with Federally-
supplied electricity. As noted in the introductory chapter, 
beginning in 1954, PNUCC's load forecasting committee pre-
pared the Sum-Of-Utilities forecast for long-range power 
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planning. The region's utilities thus have been instrumen-
tal in the planning of both large and small scale generating 
resources and have entered into a number of joint capacity 
expansion projects over the last several decades. Most of 
these projects have involved BPA directly or indirectly, the 
most obvious and significant examples being the Hydro-
Thermal Power Plan, wherein BPA "swapped" low-cost hydro-
power for more expensive thermal generation, and the 
construction (or attempted construction) of the five WPPSS 
nuclear plants, the construction costs of which were under-
written by BPA. 
The Sum-Of-Utilities forecast was, until the early-to-
mid 1970s, the only document used in regional power plan-
ning. Naively extrapolating the region's earlier growth in 
electricity consumption (essentially ignoring the factors or 
dynamics underlying the growth), the SOU forecast tended to 
underpredict loads during the 1950s and 19605. In the 
1970s, however, a watershed decade for the region, the 
dynamics underlying regional growth altered suffiCiently 
that the consequences of the naive approach at the method-
ological foundation of the SOU began to be seen. Growth 
slowed to the point that the forecasts made in the early 
1970s appeared at first to be somewhat optimistic, then 
later to be seriously overpredicting increases in regional 
loads. This led, first, to the development of a regional 
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econometric model in 1977 by National Economic Research 
Associates to cross-check the SOU findings. This model was 
resident on BPA's computer system and operated by BPA staff 
in accordance with the directions provided by PNUCC's Load 
Forecasting Committee, comprised of members of the forecast-
ing staffs of the region's utilities. Later, in 1980, PNUCC 
established a permanent staff of its own for dealing with 
forecasting and technical issues. 
Politically and economically, the 1970s provided a 
climate of change, and sometimes turmoil, for many of the 
region's utilities. For a long period, virtually the entire 
region's utilities and industries were preference customers, 
in that they were served by then-abundant hydropower 
(whether they were, in fact, public utilities or not). In 
the late 19605 and the early 19705, however, concern over 
the differential access to inexpensive power grew. Pri-
vately-owned utilities relied increasingly upon their own 
more costly resources to meet their customers' demand. 
Public utilities, the true preference customers in the eyes 
of the law, found themselves in the unaccustomed role of 
building their own generating resources to meet the portions 
of their loads not covered by available hydropower. At the 
same time, the wisdom of guaranteeing Federal hydropower to 
the region's Direct Service Industries under long-term 
contracts (drafted when plentiful inexpensive electricity 
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appeared available for many years to come) was more and more 
being questioned. 
The Regional Act, as noted in the introduction to this 
dissertation, was an attempt to resolve these issues through 
legislation. In the power planning arena, however, growing 
rate disparities signalled new and somewhat divergent inter-
ests within PNUCC. 
The ill-fated WPPSS nuclear plants, constructed as a 
result of high (and, in retrospect, quite naive) demand 
forecasts of the 1970s became something of a bone of con-
tention among PNUCC's member utilities. Though nominally 
the property of public utilities in Washington, several of 
the plants had been heavily invested in by other utilities. 
In particular the region's investor-owned utilities had 
sizeable shares of WPPSS nuclear plant (WNP) number three. 
BPA, which championed the development of these plants during 
the Hodel and Munro Administrations, underwrote the public 
utilities' investments in the plan. 
BPA's 1982 forecast, to be used as a critical input in 
timing the construction of WNP 1, 2, and 3 was inevitably 
looked upon with concern, and to some degree suspicion, by 
many of PNUCC's member utilities. Severely slowing rates of 
regional demand growth not only forced WNP 4 and 5 to be 
mothballed but raised new questions about the reliability 
and accuracy of any forecast used in the resource planning 
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process. A law known as Construction Works in Progress 
(CWIP) prevents utilities from incorporating resource 
construction costs into their rate bases until the projects 
are actually completed and producing electricity. Up to 
that time, funds used for construction are a sunk cost. 
While the mothballing of plants 4 and 5 was a foregone con-
clusion, the fate of WNP I, 2, and 3, and the funds sunk 
into their partial construction, had yet to be decided. 
BPA's problem was to determine which timing scenario 
for the completion of WNP I, 2, and 3 would allow the agency 
to get the necessary bonding on Wall street while still 
meeting regional power needs. This would be determined, in 
part, through the 1982 forecast. Given the inherent uncer-
tainty surrounding the future of load growth in the region, 
however, a relatively slight difference in projected growth 
rates could determine when (and if) particular PNUCC member 
utilities could recover their construction costs. Thus, 
both PNUCC's resident staff and its load forecasting 
committee, comprised of representatives from the region's 
utilities had strong interest in BPA's forecast, its 
details, and its implications. 
The Regional Council; A New Look at Resource Planning 
In early 1981, a new, but significant, organizational 
actor made its entrance into the power planning arena 
the Northwest Power Planning Council (or Regional Council). 
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As noted in the introductory chapter, the Council was the 
creation of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning 
and Conservation Act, passed by Congress in late 1980. 
Drafted during a period of concern over growing regional 
rate disparities and the implications of a changing resource 
base, the Act not only augmented BPA's regional responsi-
bilities and powers but also established a new political 
body, the Regional Council, to oversee the development of a 
long-term forecast and power plan for the Pacific Northwest. 
The Regional Council was developed as a regional, not a 
Federal, body, comprised of two appointments by each of the 
governors of the four states in the region, Washington, 
Oregon, Idaho, and Montana. Chaired by Dan Evans from 
Washington, the Council included Chuck Collins, also from 
Washington, Roy Hemmingway and Alfred Hampson, from Oregon, 
Larry Mills and Robert Saxvik, from Idaho, and Keith Colbo 
and Gerald Mueller from Montana. Under the terms of the 
Act, the Council was required to produce its first Plan in 
the spring of 1983, so during the first six months of its 
existence, the Council recruited the core of its technical 
staff and initiated contract work for the development of 
forecasting models and planning tools. 
In the year and a half between its formation and the 
July 1982 publication of BPA's first independent forecast 
the Council began an ongoIng process of defining itself and 
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its relation to both BPA and PNUCC. Though the terms of the 
Act clearly empowered the Council to produce the definitive 
resource development plan for the region, they did not 
detail how much latitude or flexibility the established 
power planning bodies, BPA and PNUCC, had in implementing 
the Plan. The council members' rendering of the terms of 
the Act saw BPA following the Council's 20-year Plan to the 
letter. From their perspective, BPA's independent long-term 
forecast was at worst an unnecessary duplication of effort, 
at best an interim planning tool to be superceded by the 
Council's 1983 effort. BPA, by contrast, argued that their 
in-house forecasting capability was needed for several 
reasons. Host immediately, a decision on the fate of WNP 1, 
2, and 3 had to be made in mid-1982, not 1983, and the 
policy analysis supporting the decision required a more 
sophisticated forecasting system than any that had been 
previously available in the region. In the longer run, BPA 
argued that their responsibility for implementing the Plan 
required dealing with many details not explicitly identified 
by the Council (i.e. the Plan would not be specific enough 
to anticipate the problems BPA would face and consequently 
could not be treated as an action plan delineating a precise 
series of tasks to be followed without interpretation). 
Successful implementation of the Plan would, according to 
this line of argument, require BPA to test the feasibility 
of a wide array of specific rate design and resource de-
velopment alternatives -- a requirement necessitating an 
in-house demand modeling capability. 
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The Regional Act, in many ways, curtailed PNUCC's 
influence as a forecasting and planning body. Though its 
member utilities all maintained the option not to enter into 
exchange agreements with BPA and rely upon their own re-
sources to meet demand, many had invested heavily in the 
WPPSS plants and had definite interest in their completion. 
Assuming that the utilities would enter into power exchange 
agreements with BPA and that rates would be set based upon 
forecasted loads and revenues, they would also have a strong 
interest in long-term resource planning. Their own fore-
cast, following the establishment of the Regional Council, 
would no longer carry the weight it formerly had, taking a 
back seat to the Council's with regard to major resource 
acquisitions by BPA. 
The potential for adversarial relationships between the 
Regional Council and BPA (and, to a lesser degree, PNUCC) 
was great during the initial stages of the development of a 
long-range Power Plan. Any major differences between the 
Council's official forecast and any of those used by BPA in 
rate design could be assumed to engender major conflicts and 
administrative difficulties. For the most part, the rela-
tionship which evolved between the Council and BPA up to the 
time of BPA's 1982 forecast, though characterized by a 
number of disagreements on specific issues, could not be 
termed truly adversarial. 
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A great deal of potential friction between BPA and the 
Council was dampened by virtue of the newness of the long-
range forecasting and planning task confronting each group. 
Neither group had rigidly defined SOPs to deal with these 
common problem areas and, as such, both groups could still 
be somewhat flexible in the manner in which they addressed 
them. Moreover, the technical staffs of each organization 
were quite similar, both in terms of their backgrounds and 
their general approach to the problem at hand. Though much 
smaller in size, the Council's technical staff displayed 
backgrounds similar to those involved in the production of 
BPA's forecast -- primarily economists and engineers with 
strong skills in computer modeling. The Council's fore-
casting system, being developed under contract at the time 
of BPA's first forecast, bore very strong similarity to 
BPA's, containing sector-specific demand models run itera-
tively with an electricity supply pricing model. The 
residential and commercial models were simply evolutions of 
the econometric/end-use demand models used by BPA. As such, 
they addressed the same basic policy issues and used the 
same basic input variables (the values for which were 
developed by a Council staff member formerly employed by 
BPA's Division of Power Requirements}. These strong 
similarities of modus operandi considerably lessened the 
likelihood of conflict between the two groups. 
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Thus, at the time of BPA's first forecast the Council 
was at odds neither with BPA, which was required to imple-
ment the Plan, nor with PNUCC, the member utilities of which 
could be affected favorably or unfavorably by its conse-
quences. Significant questions of how BPA might implement a 
poorly conceived resource strategy, how the Council would 
deal with noncompliance or reinterpretation of the Plan on 
BPA's part, or how the actions of the region's utilities and 
Direct Service Industries could influence the Plan's success 
would have to remain unanswered until the Council actually 
released its own product in 1983. 
eoOE; The Council's Precursor in Oregon? 
The Oregon Department of Energy (ODOE) represents one 
of the more unique organizational actors in the arena of 
energy politics surrounding BPA's first forecast. Created 
by the Oregon State Legislature in 1975, in the wake of the 
OPEC oil embargo and a severe Northwest drought, ODOE might 
be thought of as a precursor to the Council. Though opera-
ting on different geographical political levels, the two 
organizations were developed largely for the same reasons 
and to perform similar functions. 
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An examination of the major policy issues identified by 
DODE (and described in the 1979 edition of their annual 
energy report, Oregon's Energy Future) reveals a close 
correspondence to those enumerated in the Regional Power 
Act: the timing and mix of generation plants, appropriate 
energy rates, coordination of the operation of the state's 
electric utility systems with those of the region, acqui-
sition of cost-effective conservation, and the development 
of renewable resources. The legislation which created OOOE 
did not specify its tasks and responsibilities with the same 
detail as that embodied in the Regional Act, though it did 
prescribe forecasting and planning (though for all fuels, 
not only electricity). 
In a number of respects, DODE's technical approaches 
foreshadowed those later employed by BPA in its 1982 
forecast. OOOE used several sector-specific energy demand 
models to produce its forecast. Residential sales for the 
state were projected using an end-use model explicitly 
considering three housing types, four age groupings, five 
energy types, and twelve end-uses. An econometric model was 
used to forecast energy use of commercial, industrial, tran-
sportation, and agricultural sectors. All of DODE's models 
were "all fuels" models (since the Oepartment is concerned 
with energy, not electricity, futures) and the forecasts 
they produced had the added distinction of being the first 
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to diverge from the more traditional high growth patterns 
characterizing 1970s forecasts in favor of lower demand 
projections consistent with energy use in the early 1980s. 
Of the actors in the regional power planning arena OOOE 
was thus unique in its prior experience with many of the is-
sues and technical tools central to BPA's 1982 effort. 
Moreover, unlike the Council, the member utilities of PNUCC, 
or any of the special interest groups concerned with the 
outcome of BPA's forecast, ODOE had little vested interest 
in a particular set of findings. It was in no sense in 
competition with BPA, with its decision-making powers at an 
entirely different level of governmental influence: it did 
not serve utilities investing in thermal resources with 
schedules of completion which were in jeopardy; and, while 
no organization can be completely value-neuter or bias-free 
in its research, ODOE has characteristically approached fuel 
and resource mix planning as a problem-solver, not as an ad-
vocate of particular technologies or developmental 
strategies. 
NROC: Alternatiye Futures for Alternatiye Energy 
The Natural Resources Defense Council is a San Fran-
cisco-based organization concerned with, as the name sug-
gests, the protection of the environment. Different mixes 
of power-generating resources will result in widely diver-
gent impacts upon the natural environment. Forecasts, as 
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noted at various points above, provide the basis (or at 
least one of the bases) for generation planning. As such, 
BPA's first independent forecast, influencing decisions 
affecting a large (and as yet relatively undeveloped) 
geographical area, was of particular concern to NRDC. 
In many respects, NRDC's view of BPA's forecast 
differed diametrically from that of most of the organi-
zational actors in the power planning arena. During the 
late 1970s when the high growth scenarios of the Sum-Of-
utilities forecasts were first being challenged, NRDC 
prepared a report funded by the Energy Research and 
Development Administration (now part of USDOE) suggesting 
that the region would need only a fraction of the capacity 
in 1995 that PNUCC was then predicting. NRDC has consis-
tently acted as a watchdog on larger power planning organ-
izations, challenging both the technological and behavioral 
assumptions underlying their forecasts and energy analyses 
and offering alternative scenarios emphasizing conservation 
and renewable resources. 
Being a small public interest organization, NRDC has 
been compelled to make extensive use of somewhat limited 
resources. Its staff has been composed of persons with a 
variety of professional backgrounds (e.g. physics, engineer-
ing, and law), all sharing a common philosophy regarding the 
use of energy and the treatment of the natural environment. 
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Lacking the large mainframe computers and complex models 
used by utilities and energy commissions in power planning, 
NRDC has nonetheless been very effective in using profes-
sional and public involvement channels to obtain the means 
for conducting its analyses. Where possible, NRDC may get 
direct access to computer facilities or have special alter-
native model runs performed by the organizations preparing 
the forecasts, analyses, or plans under scrutiny. A common 
approach used by NRDC is to perform an ex post analysis of 
forecasts, identifying areas where particular judgments or 
assumptions were applied, substituting alternative assump-
tions (and corresponding numerical values) and recalculating 
the results after the changes. (As an example, NRDC might 
look at the market penetrations for home weatherization used 
in a forecast, substitute more optimistic values, and assess 
the impacts). These calculations are often made with "pen-
cil and paper" rather than computers but serve to highlight 
critical areas of uncertainty and force viable, but often 
ignored, alternatives into consideration as power planning 
decisions are made. 
At the time of BPA's 1982 forecast, the region was 
looking upon high growth forecasts with more than a modicum 
of suspicion. Though it seemed clear that revised forecasts 
would be considerably lower than those of the mid-1970s, and 
while many utilities and rate payers had definite interest 
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in seeing WNP 1, 2, and 3 all completed on schedule, many 
also feared that even the lowered forecasts would be overly 
optimistic. The pattern of decelerating growth of the late 
1970s and early 1980s had resulted in regional loads at 
levels nearer to those predicted by NRDC (in its above-
mentioned 1977 report) than by the SOU forecasts. Given 
this background, NRDC entered the 1982 forecasting and 
planning arena as a credible champion of conservation and 
alternative resource planning. 
DSI's; New Contracts. New Conditions 
The region's Direct Service Industries (DSIs) have 
played a significant role as consumers of Federal hydro-
power. The DSls are comprised of a small number of large 
industries (chiefly aluminum, primary metals, and chemicals) 
which receive power directly from BPA rather than from one 
or more of the region's utilities. The first of the DSIs 
arrived in the region during World War II, its output deemed 
essential to the U.S. war effort but requiring the abundant, 
readily-available electricity which the Pacific Northwest 
was able to provide. After the War, the DSls situated in 
the region remained to be joined by others in need of cheap 
power. The DSls are extremely electricity-intensive; a 
large aluminum plant consuming roughtly the same amount of 
power as a medium-sized city. Since the region's hydro-
system was constantly growing (and always somewhat over-
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-built) the OSIs were able to sign long-term contracts with 
BPA guaranteeing them low-cost power over periods up to 20 
years. The OSIs maintained and used their own transformers 
which allowed them direct access to BPA's transmission 
network. 
While power was plentiful, the existence of the OSIs in 
the Northwest was largely without controversy. When it 
became obvious, however, that BPA's designated preference 
customers, the public utilities of the region, would have to 
begin construction of thermal resources for their own power 
while the OSIs still received the hydropower guaranteed by 
their contracts, public opinion began to shift. When the 
impacts of the WPPSS plants on rates was clearly recognized, 
negative sentiments became stronger and many consumer groups 
argued that the OSI's would be "disconnected" from BPA's 
transmission system. 
In the interim, the OSIs were lobbying for the passage 
of the Regional Act. Although the legislation would in-
crease their rates substantially (since they would, under 
its terms, be providing rate relief for IOU residential and 
small farm customers) the rates would, at least on the sur-
face, be less than in other locations and firm power would 
be guaranteed. 
The low power costs in the region have more than offset 
the increased transportation costs, both for the import of 
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raw materials and export of industrial output, which the 
DSIs had to bear by virtue of locating in the northwestern 
corner of the U.S. Though the DSIs calculated that the 
expected rate increases would not be so severe as to render 
maintaining their locations no longer cost-effective, many 
in the region had serious doubts about both the future of 
rate increase and the market value of the DSIs products. 
Were the DSIs to close all, or even some, of their plants, 
the region's ratepayers would be forced to bear the costs of 
both the unpaid portions of the hydrosystem and any thermal 
plants on-line at the time of the DSIs departure. While 
this was not a major concern of the DSIs at the time of the 
1982 forecast, many of the other actors in the power plan-
ning arena justifiably viewed their behavior as a major 
uncertainty. 
The Northwest Natural Gas Distributors; The Other Guys 
Given the abundance of hydropower which has been 
routinely available in the Pacific Northwest, it becomes 
easy to overlook the fact that regional energy futures 
encompass more than just electricity. Although BPA's models 
project usage of "all fuels", the forecasts they produced 
were never intended to be anything other than electricity 
forecasts. The consequences of decisions based on antici-
pated load growth, however, impact not only consumers of 
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electricity but, less directly, consumers of natural gas (as 
well as other fossil fuels). 
The formation of the Northwest Power Planning Council 
in 1980 signalled an imminent increase in the degree to 
which energy policy in the region would be subject to 
deliberate direction. One option available to consumers of 
electricity confronted with price increases is to select 
natural gas (or oil) as a substitute fuel for space heating, 
water heating, and boiler operations. 
As noted in the previous chapter, in any areas of en-
deavor where the shape of the future is determined, or at 
least influenced, by the outcome of the present deciSions, 
forecasts (and plans) may serve as self-fulfilling prophe-
cies. In large part because of the low cost of electricity 
in the region, natural gas has never played the role in the 
Pacific Northwest that it has in other parts of the country 
(though its role has hardly been insignificant). In the 
late 1970s, natural gas prices began to follow the increases 
of its sister fuel, petroleum, and concern about the wisdom 
of becoming overly dependent upon fossil fuels grew. In the 
early 1980s, however, the economics of energy in the region 
began to show signs of change, as the nation regained its 
balance after the second major oil shock concurrent with the 
first series of rate increases resulting from the higher 
costs associated with new thermal generation projects. 
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Potential existed for new regional markets for natural gas, 
but this potential could be affected by electricity resource 
and conservation planning decisions. For example, if, in an 
attempt to prevent anticipated power deficits, the region's 
electric utilities offered residential customers significant 
rebates or subsidies for adopting conservation measures in 
all-electric homes, this could serve as a major disincentive 
for home owners (or builders) to install natural gas heat-
ing. Given the added political authority of the newly-
formed Regional Council to enforce its regional power plans, 
the gas companies were not unreasonably concerned about how 
their industry would be affected. 
Because BPA would, under the terms of the Regional Act, 
be the key force in implementing regional power plans, and 
because BPA's first forecast would precede the Council's by 
a year, the natural gas distributors in the Northwest con-
sidered it to be a document meriting critical attention. 
Most important to the gas companies was that non-electric 
fuel price projections be reasonable (by their reckoning) 
and that the demand models capture fuel choice and fuel 
switching over the forecast period. High natural gas prices 
(relative to electricity) and poor representation of fuel 
switching would tend to elevate load projections, resulting 
in further acquisition of resources and conservation by BPA. 
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This, as noted above, could potentially affect the natural 
gas industry's regional market. 
The "Expert" Groups; Consultants and Research Qrganizations 
Yet another set of participants in the power planning 
arena are what might generally be termed expert groups, 
consulting firms and research organizations (often 
university-based) with expertise in model development and 
evaluation or familiarity with specific issues underlying or 
related to the forecasting and planning process. These 
groups have, at a bare minimum, a professional interest in 
participating and, in the case of consulting firms, poten-
tially a financial interest as well, since the research 
contracts could result from issues raised. These expert 
groups are spokespersons for various types of modeling, 
analysis, or policy considerations and, if they display 
organizational biases, these are the result of past exper-
ience or research specialization rather than financial 
interests in resource decision outcomes. 
Qf the ~ expert groups addressing varous aspects of 
research crucial to power planning only a few had direct 
influence upon the forecast, usually through the public 
involvement process but sometimes by virtue of independent 
investigations in the same research areas conducted in 
parallel with BPA. These groups are identified below. 
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Charles Rivers Associates (CRA) is a Boston-based 
consulting firm with considerable experience with energy 
forecasting models. In 1981 and early 1982 CRA developed a 
series of regional forecasts with the same research group at 
Washington state University that spearheaded the NEPP 
project. These forecasts were developed using modified 
versions of the end-use models employed by BPA in their 
forecast. One of the members of the WSU research team had 
earlier been a member of BPA's Power Requirements staff. 
Two consulting firms performed independent evaluations 
of BPA's forecast. One was National Economic Research 
Associates, the developers of the PNUCC econometric model. 
The other was Energy ventures Analysis, a New York-based 
firm with experience analyzing energy trends in various 
parts of the country. 
Three other research organizations contributed to the 
forecasting process through public involvement channels. 
The Survival Center located at the University of Oregon, is 
a group chiefly concerned with environmental protection and 
energy alternatives. POWER (People's Organization for 
Washington Energy Resources) is a ratepayer's protection 
group concerned largely with the impacts of potential 
resource decisions upon the electricity consumer. Finally, 
the Futures Research Institute, located at Portland State 
University, is concerned with all forms of forecasting and 
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prediction, with special emphasis upon issues of technolog-
ical change and its impacts upon society. 
The Media; Selectively Reflecting the Issues 
One last organizational "actor" must be mentioned 
the mass media covering both BPA's forecasting effort and 
other significant energy issues in the region. The role of 
the mass media is complex; both direct and subtle in its 
operation. Investigative reporters, editorial columnists, 
or television personalities may confront participants in the 
energy arena directly concerning critical issues. More often 
the media work indirectly, as their name suggests, occupy-
ing a position between the actors and between their arena 
and the public at large that comprises the news audience. 
Objectivity in reporting the news is an ideal which is 
in some sense approachable but in no way attainable. Few 
major newspapers or electronic media with a general audience 
deliberately falsify or color their reporting. News, how-
ever, may never be sterile data but must be presented in a 
fashion such that it will relate to the lives and interests 
of those receiving it. News reporting, therefore, invari-
ably presents its subject matter in a particular context. 
It serves to reflect the world, but in a selective manner, 
attaching importance to the portion of events and issues 
which it presents to its audience while relegating other 
portions into an oblivion of non-acknowledgement. This 
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selective attention reflects what is of interest to those in 
a reporter's particular audience (e.g. the impact of nuclear 
plant construction delays on employment in the Tri-Cities 
area) often reinforcing or strengthening existing percep-
tions or opinions. The media also may serve as opinion 
leaders (rather than merely as indices of opinion), actively 
drawing attention to events, issues, or interests which may 
have been otherwise overlooked or ignored by most of the 
audience. Thus, in organizational arenas, such as that 
characterizing regional power planning, the media serve to 
bring the general public into the decision-making process, 
albeit indirectly, and may, in some instances, be used by 
key actors to exert influence upon their co-participants. 
The specific influences of the region's media repre-
sentatives upon the forecasting process will be detailed in 
the chapter on cross-cuing. A general observation can, 
however, be made that, in light of the above discussion, 
media in areas potentially more seriously affected by 
decisions resulting from the forecast (e.g. the Tri-Clties) 
would be expected to view BPA and its actions in a much more 
critical light than other parts of the region. 
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THE ENERGY FORECASTING ARENA THROUGH THE O-PERSPECTIVE: 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The above sections have described the participants in 
the production of BPA's first independent forecast. Some 
had major roles, others participated as minor organizational 
players, often affecting the final forecast product in-
directly. This chapter has, consistent with the O-perspec-
tive, focused upon the forecast as an organizational output 
(or more precisely as a multiorganizational output), identi-
fying the constellation of actors both internal and external 
to BPA, and, to the extent possible, enumerating their 
organizational habits, operating procedures, work priori-
ties, and channels of influence. In Chapter V, which traces 
the cross-cues between the T-, 0-, and P-perspectives, the 
players' moves and their subsequent impacts on both forecast 
process and product are addressed specifically and in de-
tail. In most cases, the challenges to which BPA was asked 
to respond were made through the public involvement process 
as in the form of comments on specific technical choices 
made by BPA in model, input, and forecast development. 
Table X below summarizes the findings of this chapter, 
listing each of the organizational actors involved and 
identifying corresponding chief characteristics, operating 
procedures, interests, biases (vis-a-vis the BPA forecast), 
and channels of influence used in affecting the forecast 
TABLE X 
A SUMMARY OF OHGANI~ATIONAL ACTORS IN THE FOR~CAf,TING PROCFSS 
Actor Background/Characteristics Operating Procedures 
I. Intraorganizational 
}>ower 
Hequlruents 
Conservation 
Rxpamed frOID }>ower Resources Because mos t of the 
to become a separate Division Division's functions 
tasked with producing an were new the first 
independent forecastl had forecast was guided by 
previously helped produce a few SOBs--these related 
portion of the SOU forecast. to the development of 
and worked with PNUCC to some of the economic 
run econo.etric .odel projections used in the 
demand modelsi pro-
cedures for energy 
forecast development 
were evolved largely 
froa 1) lIodel input 
requireaents and 
Grew extremely rapidly in 
late 19705, t'1rst in 
response to antiCipated 
deficit then to BPA's 
increased responsibil-
ities under the teras 
of the Regional Act 
2) agency policy 
support needs 
Few SOPs at time of 
f1rst forecast, method 
for determining esti-
ma tes of future savings 
from BPA programs 
(subtracted from fore-
cast) newly developed 
(and in process of 
revision) 
Interests/Biase~ 
Channels of Influence" 
Hew Divis10n wanted to 
es tabllsh itself and 1 ts 
professional status, both 
within BPA and in the 
region at largel wanted 
aore reliable forecast 
than earlier ones used 
to plan WPPSS plants 
Preponderence of Division 
deCision makers held degrees 
in economics and tended to 
see forecast.ing as economiet 
chore, invariably sought 
econometric solutions to 
modeling problems 
Channels I Direct- staff 
produced deaand forecast 
and aos t of the inputs 
Wanted to establish itself 
as regional leader in area 
of conservation and give 
BPA good reputat10n 
Ambit10us and soaetiaes 
optimistic view of needed 
or attainable regional 
conservation I faVOred. 
forecasts which would show 
N 
W 
-a 
Actor 
Rates 
Resources 
TABLE X (Cont'd) 
Background/Characteristics 
Ongoing role in establishing 
rates for BPA's wholesale 
customer.s expanied ani com-
plicated by passage of 
Regional Act. 1nd recent 
addition of thermal resource 
costs into rate base 
Role and duties changed 
after HydroThermal Power 
Plan and. later. passage of 
Regional Act; home for both 
Power Requirements ani 
Conservation before their 
growth ani separation 
Operating Procedures Interests/Blases 
Channels of Influence 
at mos t a saal1 and 
short-lived surplus 
Channels I Direct- savings 
estimates used in forecast 
iniirect- feedback tilrough 
upper mgmt. via policy 
committee representation 
Established. ratemaking Wanted to provide 
procedures amenied to credible and riliable 
c"nform to terms of'Ac t information for Adllinis-
New responsibilities trator's decisions ani 
include operation of minimize conflict between 
Supply Pricing Model in BPA ani wholesale custoaera 
forecast ani conducting over rates 
analyses of alternative Channe1s1 Direct- produced 
rate schemes electricity price forecast 
Trad,i tional calcula-
tions of hydrosystell 
output and reliability 
supplemented to account 
for new types of re-
source acquisitions. 
LP model developed to 
determine least cost 
mix of resources 
in conjunction with demani 
forecast, iniirect--
through frequent feedback 
to Power Hgr. and Adminis-
trator 
Desired to provide 
credible resource decision 
support information 
Direct- as partiCipant in 
forecast and resulting 
load/resource balanc~ 
indirect- .tilrough Power 
Mgr. 
N 
W 
00 
Actor 
Financial 
Management 
Policy 
COllJllittee 
TABLE X (Cont'd) 
Background/Characteristics 
New and conspicuously 
important organizational 
function in wake of 
WPPSS difficulties 
Committee comprised of 
top BPA decision makers 
Operating Procedures 
Few SOPS because of 
newness of unit, 
analysis of resource 
cost 1JIlpacts on bond 
lIarket akin to tech--
niques commonly used 
in private sector 
Mixture of old & new. 
Existing comaittments 
to unierwr1 ting W PPSS 
constrains actions. 
New respons1bilities 
under Regional Act 
ani unresolved WPPSS 
problems necessitated 
new solutions of which 
forecast and financial 
decision support are 
an integral part 
'Interes ts/B1ases 
Channels of Influence 
Wanted to establish 
reputa tion for providing 
sound financial advice 
in particular regarding 
WNP 1.2. ani J 
Channels I Ini1rect-
Results of financial 
analysiS suggests 
addi tional questions to 
be answered in fore-
casting process 
Needed to eMure that BPA 
-fulf1ll obligations 
unier Act 
-stabilize rates as 
much as possible 
-continue orderly' 
repayment of U.S. 
Treasu:r:y for hydro-
project loans 
-resolve WPPSS dllellllla 
as painlessly as 
possible 
Expected lower forecast 
ani viewed delsy of WNP 
as viable resource 
alternative 
Channels I Chain of COlI.IIani tv 
W 
\D 
TABLE X (Cont'd) 
Actor ~ackground/Characteristics 
II. Interorganizational 
P!fUCC 
Regional 
Council 
Consortium of Northwest 
utilities, prepared SOU 
forecast since 1950s (BPA 
partiCipated in behalf of 
small public utilities 
lacking forecas Ung s tarfs ) , 
SOU underforecasted through 
1960s but seriously over-
forecasted in mid-1970s 
resul ting in WPPSS plants, 
many member utilities had 
invested in WNP 1-5 
(WPPSS utilities are also 
PNUCC lIIembers) 
Newly established body 
under Regional Act legis-
lation: elllpowered to 
produce long-range regional 
resource and conservation 
acquisition plan in spring 
of 198) 
Operating Proced.ures Interests/Biases 
Channels of Influence 
Sua-Df-utllities Desired. to 
prepared by aggregating -reestabllsh forecasting 
individual utility credibility in region 
forecast :submittals, -ensure fair inter-
econollletric lIIodel used. pretation and iaple-
as cross-:heck 1977- lIIenta tion of Regional 
1981, small in-house Act 
staff began routine -ainim1ze WPPSS-related 
analysis of regional financial difficulties 
forecasts in early of lIIember utilities 
1980s, load forecast Wanted BPA forecast to 
commi t.tee (comprised be reasonably low but 
of staff from lIIember high enough to allow 
utilitles) provide WNP completion 
critical comments on Channels I Dlrect- load 
forecast under forecasting comaittee 
eValuation cOllllllents through public 
involvelllent, indirect--
PNUCC upper IIIg111t to 
BPA upper mgmt. 
Nothing starrlardized, 
though Act provided 
broad guidelines for 
activities, forecasting 
systelll similar to BPA's 
under development in 
1982 
Wanted to 
-establlsh reputation 
-establish and exercise 
authority in region 
Heavy emphasis upon 
identifying and realizing 
attainable conservation tv ~ 
o 
Actor 
ODOE 
"RDC 
TABLE X (Cont'd) 
Background/Characteristics 
state agency established 
in mid-1970s-empowered to 
prepare energy (all fuels) 
projections and plans for 
state of Oregon 
Organization dedicated to 
environmental protection and 
the development of conser-
vation as a major energy 
resource I provided critical 
comment on high Northwest 
estimates of load growth 
in late 1970s 1n report 
sponsored by FRDA 
Operating Procedures 
Prepares annual report 
containing sector 
(some models h1ghly 
sim1lar to BPA's). 
established ODOE 
planning function 
similar on state level 
to that of Council on 
Regional level 
Interes ts /Biases 
Channels of Influence 
Channels, Direct- through 
public involve.ent 
indirect- Council aaabera 
with BPA upper .gat. or 
through lIedia 
Wanted to maintain 
leadership role in 
forecasting and planning 
Channels, Direct-
through public involve.ant 
FXtensive critical Desired ambitious 
evaluation of forecast, conservatim program 
planning, or analysis implementation in 
results am assUJlptionslNorthwestl LON forecast 
freqUently generate preferred to minimize 
alternative scenarios liklihood of additional 
by changing specific thermal plant construction. 
key assumptions ani Channels, Direct- through 
observing impacts public involvement, 
iniirect- through legal 
processes ongoing with 
BPA 
tV 
~ 
~ 
• 
·ctor 
DSIs 
Natural Gas 
Distributors 
Experts 
-CRA, NERA, 
EVA 
TABLE X (Cont'd) 
Background/Characteristics 
Large users of power buying 
electricity directly from 
BPAI first located 1n reg10n 
dur1ng WW II and signed long-
term contracts w1 th; pushed 
for passage of Regional Act 
when antiCipated defic1ts 
see.ed to jeopardize future 
firm power contrac ts 
Operated under circumstances 
strongly influenced by 
world petroleum market 
(characterized by rising 
prices and uncertainty 
during 19705); tmminent 
1ncreases in formerly cheap 
electricity prices opened 
possibilities for new 
regional markets 
Operating Procedures 
Anticipated demands 
established as terms 
of power contracts 
Newly developed, at 
least regarding issues 
emerg1ng from BPA fore-
cast--gas price pro-
jections am respons-
1veness of BPAs models 
to fuel awi tching 
foci of critique 
Consulting firms with energy Work by contracts to 
related experience; CRA explore energy use, 
worked on Wash. State U. develop data, and/or 
Interests/Biases 
Channels of Influence 
Wanted to maintain acCess 
to guaranteed fira power 
at low rates 
Channels I Indirect--
with BPA mgmt. in 
contract negotiations, 
through med1a 
Desired to prevent power 
planning or resource ac-
quisition strategies which 
strategies which would 
deter switching into natural 
gas(lower"forecasts with 
low fossil fuel prices 
preferred so electric-only 
conservation policies 
would be minimized) 
Channels I Direct-through 
public involvement (gas 
distributors represented 
by law firm) 
Desired to maintain or 
enhance professional 
reputations (and earning 
IV 
~ 
IV 
Actor 
-roWER Ie 
Survival 
Center 
-Futures 
Research 
Institute 
TABLE X (Cont'd) 
Background/Characteristics Opera ting Procedures 
project to develop regional build models 
forecas t s 1Jailar to BPA' s in 
19811 NERA built PNUCC 
model aid, along with EVA, 
provided ildepeldent evalua-
tion of BPA forecas t 
Croups concerned. with 
protecting consUlllers aid 
natural environment 
University-based research 
organization focusing upon 
forecasting, planning, aid 
other forms of futures 
research 
Both groups act as 
wa tchdogs on energy-
related. JaB.ttersl POWER 
concerned. more with 
rate ilBpacts aid 
resources (particularly 
WHP decisions) 
In forecasting 
context provides 
critical comment ard 
evaluation 
In.teres ts/Biases 
Channels of Influence 
potentials) 1 HERA biased 
somewhat upward in eval-
ua tion (in line with 
their model's predictions) 
EVA biased downward by 
forecas t by analogy with 
TV A service terri tory 
Channels I Direct- HERA 
aid EVA reports cOllllis-
sioned. by BPA 1 Indirect-
CRA results used. as 
evidence of BPA forecaat 
credibility 
Wanted to minimize adverse 
effects of energy develop-
ment 
Channels I Direct- through 
public involve.ent 
Wanted to ensure that 
issues of technology ard 
lIul tiple factors affecting 
futures dealt within non-
siaplistic fashion 
Channels I Direct- public 
involvement 
to.) 
.,. 
w 
4ctor 
Media 
TABLE X (Cont'd) 
Background/Characteristics 
Disseainate information on 
energy issues and events in 
a manner which selectively 
acquaints previously un-
informed populace with issues 
and/or reflects concerns and 
sentiments of significant 
port1ons of reader- or 
v1ewership. act as catalyst 
and reactant 
Opera Ung Procedures 
Turn events and. in-
formation into "news" 
by selective exposure 
to pu~~ici influence 
audience through edit-
orial policies. often 
develop detailed and 
coherent pictures of 
energy arena through 
investigative re-
porting 
Interesta/B1a.ses 
Channels of Influence 
Want to 
-sell product to 
public by asking 
events interesting 
-look out for 
cODlJlunity interests 
-pollee lnstltutions 
1n energy arena 
Slant towards forecast 
variable dependlng upon 
area served and how 
affected 
Channels I Indirect-
through influence 
upon population at 
large and key decision 
malting figures 
IV 
~ 
~ 
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outcome. Though the actors (and organizational interests or 
positions) are diverse a number of generalizations can be 
made about the organizational dynamics underlying the 
forecast. 
First, the numerous issues and concerns addressed by 
the forecasting process configurate around a central focus: 
the decision concerning the fates of WNP 1, 2, and 3 and its 
myriad consequences. Though the 1982 forecast was far 
richer than its predecessors in terms of the number and 
variety of policy considerations (or core assumptions) which 
it explicitly recognized and addressed, its breadth was 
nonetheless limited or constrained by its preoccupation with 
these resources. Internal to BPA, scheduling the completion 
of these two plants (and obtaining the highest possible 
rating for additional bonds) was perhaps the first major 
task of the new Administrator. Much of the post-1980 
reorganization, which elevated the organizational importance 
of Power Requirements, Rates, and Financial Management could 
be described as the development and mobilization of an 
internal apparatus tailored to support this and similar 
decisions. External to BPA, virtually every partiCipant had 
some strong interest in the outcome of the decision and its 
implications. A large portion of the member utilities of 
PNUCC had financial interest in one or more of the "endan-
gered" plants. Though conceding the potential problems of a 
246 
surplus of electricity, most wanted to be able to recover 
some of their costs by including them in their rate bases 
something attainable only after the plants were on-line and 
generating electricity. Environmentalists and strong advo-
cates of conservation, such as NRDC, were concerned that the 
plants be brought on-line if and only if absolutely neces-
sary, that no further overbuilding of thermal resources be 
undertaken, and that conservation be pursued ambitiously as 
a viable resource alternative. Finally, ratepayers associa-
tions, confronting unprecedented rate increases, were con-
cerned with the impact of the new large plants upon their 
pocketbooks. Bringing new plants on-line prematurely (i.e. 
before there is adequate load in the region to balance the 
resource output) would cause more dramatic increases in cost 
per unit of electricity, something ratepayers never want to 
see. 
A second important generalization following an 
O-perspective review of the forecasting process is that, for 
many of the key actors, standard operating procedures serve 
as a very poor explanatory tool for predicting (or account-
ing for) organizational behavior. In many respects, the 
characteristics of the power planning arena of the 19805 
(including the passage of the Regional Power .Act) are the 
direct result of the failure of standard operating proce-
dures of an earlier era. For much of the region's recent 
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history, steady robust load growth met by Federally-
subsidized hydroelectric facilities was a reliable pattern 
which could be confidently extrapolated into the future by 
means of the Sum-O£-Utilities forecast. Slowly growing (and 
for some periods declining) power costs attracted enough new 
industry and people that overbuilding resources was a 
reasonable strategy -- resources did not remain overbuilt 
for any length of time. By the mid 1970s, however, the 
factors underlying the regional growth dynamic had changed, 
though the region's naive methods of forecasting and 
resource planning had not. It took several years of obvious 
overforecasting before standardized procedures were first 
amended then abandoned for more sophisticated alternatives. 
Examination of the principal actors in the forecast 
development process reveals a preponderance of young organ-
izations with few established procedural habits. Though BPA 
was hardly a new participant in the power planning arena, 
the Regional Act had augmented its responsibilities and the 
organizational precedents for producing the SOU forecast 
were of little use in the development of the first indepen-
dent regional forecast with its array of new priorities and 
models. Likewise post-Act ratemaking and financial 
management were virtually new organizational functions as 
was the assessment of regional conservation potential. 
Formal alterations in BPA's internal organizational struc-
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ture reflect the explicitly recognized importance of the new 
challenges facing Bonneville but they provide, at best, a 
partial description of the changes taking place during this 
transitional period. Perhaps most significant of the emer-
ging organizational characteristics was the interdepartmen-
tal basis of the forecasting process. Lines of influence 
(and control) over forecast development crosscut formal 
chains of command as often as they followed them. Within 
those portions of the organization most heavily involved in 
the preparation of the tools and models used in the fore-
casts, at least, management styles bore less resemblance to 
traditional bureaucracy than to the corporate cultures of 
innovative research and development organizations with 
little standardization or routinization of activity, a 
premium on innovative problem solving, and open, "lateraliz-
ed" communicative relationships among participants (irre-
spective of their relative organizational rank or status). 
Outside of Bonneville, operating procedures were 
similarly tentative or transitional. At the time of the 
1982 forecast, the Regional Council had just filled its key 
staff positions and was setting up the apparatus needed to 
produce its own 1983 forecast and resource plan. PNUCC had 
abandoned the use of its econometric model and recognized 
the need for a thorough revision of the Sum-Of-Utilities 
forecast, though a number of utility representatives were 
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reluctant to revise their judgments of future load growth 
downward to the unprecedently low levels that seemed to 
characterize the future. Almost ironically, the two par-
ticipants which seemed to operate most frequently from 
standard procedures were NRDC, which had critiqued a number 
of earlier forecasts both inside and outside the region, and 
ODOE, which had a "head start" working with end-use models 
and dealing with the implications of lower anticipated load 
growth. 
A third important generalization which can be made 
about the organizational dynamics of the forecasting process 
concerns the channels of influence. A number 'of established 
channels for communication with BFA which had been used for 
other types of decisions still remained functional when BFA 
produced its first independent forecast (e.g. FNUCC commit-
tee meetings, hearings, public dealings with BFA executives, 
etc.) but the mechanism used most frequently and by the 
largest number of organizational actors was the public 
involvement process. While public involvement ~ ~ was 
not new to BFA, the type of interaction of outside parties 
with the decision support process encompassed by forecasting 
~ unprecedented. Though not a legal requirement, public 
involvement was virtually a necessity given the expected 
variance of the BFA forecast results from those earlier used 
to guide regional planning efforts and the gravity of the 
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decisions to be based upon them. All comments and criti-
cisms were addressed by BPA staff though not all resulted in 
substantive changes in forecast methodology or findings. 
Fourth, though one can speak somewhat of the interests 
and biases of the various groups regarding forecast out-
comes, it is clear that virtually all groups would be hurt, 
one way or the other, by a grossly inaccurate forecast. 
Upward and downward biases are really a matter of degree. 
An unrealistically low forecast would indicate a need to 
delay the WPPSS plants and largely abandon any vigorous 
efforts to obtain conservation, but would result in power 
shortages and lost opportunities. Unrealistically high 
forecasts would burden the region with excess (and probably 
unsalable) power, high rates, and a large volume of conser-
vation which, given hindsight, would probably not prove 
cost-effective. The questions in effect addressed by the 
groups affecting (and affected by) the forecast were "How 
wide a band of realistic uncertainty surrounds the North-
west's load future?" and "Within this band, what forecast 
would minimize our problems or maximize our opportunities to 
achieve our goals?". 
Finally, a look beneath the changing or newly forming 
operating procedures characterizing most of the organization 
reveals a sense of an emerging new stability of perception 
in the power planning arena, though one that may take 
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several more years to materialize fully. The 1982 forecast 
marked a critical watershed. It was the first major 
decision-supporting process to reflect the change in roles 
and responsibilities wrought by the Regional Act. The 
regional power planning community was in the midst of a 
transitional period of organizational change, but organiza-
tions are notorious for being resistant both to initiating 
such change or living with it for any length of time. (In 
fact, the Regional Act would have been more effective had it 
been passed five or six years earlier, when organizational 
realignment might have delayed or avoided altogether the 
plans for the 5 WPPSS plants). One thus can see, the core 
of new SOPs crystalizing as the power planning organizations 
stake out their new territories and define new tasks. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE P-PERSPECTIVE 
WHEN INDIVIDUALS DO MAKE A DIFFERENCE: THE P-PERSPECTIVE 
IN OVERVIEW 
Coordination and organization of the numerous actlvi-
ties comprising a project the size and complexity of the BPA 
forecast required both formal and informal structuring of 
procedures by those groups responsible for their successful 
completion. In some instances, the actions of key individ-
) 
uals are fully~determined by operating constraints of the 
positions or offices which they occupy within their organ-
izations. Such actions are appropriately handled using the 
O-perspective. They are as habitual, routinized, and re-
flexive as the SOPs governing group and intergroup behavior. 
Other actions of individuals are not the result of the 
prescriptions of office and their ultimate effects may range 
from almost imperceptibly subtle to highly directive and 
dramatic. To comprehend how and why such actions or 
decisions are undertaken, a different perspective is needed 
than either the highly rational one used to expose the logic 
of technical choices or the process-delineating one used to 
understand the dynamics of organizational behavior. The 
perspective which tightens its focus upon unique character-
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istics of an individual's training, attitudes, personality, 
and style is the personal or P-perspective. 
Individuals are unique, and it is the task of the 
investigator utilizing the P-perspective to probe this 
uniqueness to understand which of a person's idiosyncracies 
are able to explain how and why an individual behaves, 
responds, or thinks in a certain way. This emphasis upon 
specifics and particulars, however, should not be construed 
to mean that the P-perspective is devoid of general defining 
characteristics or foci of consideration. The personal 
perspective can be seen to contrast both technical and 
organizational perspectives along a number of critical 
dimensions. 
The P-perspective is, above all else, subjective rather 
than objective in its orientation towards the world, re-
flecting the individuality of actors in a planning, fore-
casting, or decision-making process. Individuals are 
responsive -- they meet the challenge of the world in the 
present in a manner consonant with their unique past 
learning and experience and with their own set of priorities 
and goals for the future. Behavior which often seems 
somewhat irrational to the outside observer may appear 
perfectly rational from the viewpoint of the individual 
under consideration, given his or her limited information 
and understanding. This "partial" rationality is most often 
grounded in an individual belief system which reflects a 
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deeply rooted need for certainty, stability, and control. 
Images, data, or interpretations of events which are incon-
sistent (or cognitively dissonant) with past experience are 
censored, blocked, or filtered out and there is an equally 
strong tendency to simplify the complexities of the world 
into frameworks or variables which can be more easily dealt 
with. 
Individual views of the world are also strongly colored 
by both underlying personality characteristics and immediate 
circumstances which are highly variable from person to 
person and situation to situation. As such, they must be 
examined closely in the context of their occurrence. To 
varying degrees, all persons seek security, and much be-
havior is predicated upon doing what will maintain one's 
livelihood and preserve one's status. Those who might be 
characterized as "followers" within their organizations (and 
within the world) tend to follow such a risk-adverse 
strategy most of the time. By contrast, others' motives are 
strongly characterized by the need to influence, dominate, 
or otherwise wield power. status improvement, more often 
than status preservation, constitutes an underlying object-
ive for such individuals who, depending upon their degree of 
competence, function as leaders or troublemakers. Finally, 
for many individuals, a drive towards self-fulfillment 
constitutes a key determinant of their actions. This drive 
may express itself as a need for meaningful challenges, for 
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creative opportunities i or for public recognition~ but in 
all cases its expression becomes a key to understanding why 
certain individuals view the world and behave as they do. 
In addition to these motivational factors, which often 
are the prime movers for individual action, the P-perspec-
tive is, last of all, characterized by conspicuously short 
decision-making time horizons and a high discounting of the 
consequences of current activities. Individuals normally 
expect (and plan for) rather quick return on investments of 
their money, time, skill, and loyalty and often lose sight 
of or abandon priorities or projects which do not corne 
quickly to fruition. 
In analyzing complex decision-making areas, and their 
consequences, one must understand how particular individuals 
look at the world and the ways in which their viewpoints 
either influence an outcome or provide insight into possibly 
unanticipated consequences or impacts of proposed courses of 
action. In prospective studies, such as technology assess-
ments, where the objective 1s to discover how society will 
be affected by the introduction of a new development, anal-
ysts should target on both the perspectives of the princi-
pals promoting the new idea, procedure, or product, as well 
as those of the numerous parties to be affected. In retro-
spective studies, where the intent is to account, as fully 
as possible, for something which has already been done, the 
focus is somewhat tighter, since one does not have to guess 
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who possibly might be a significant participant in the 
process studies but may concentrate upon persons of known 
involvement. This dissertation, dealing, as it does, with a 
1982 forecasting, planning, and decision-making process 
which has already been completed, falls into the latter 
category. To complement the insights of the two previous 
chapters, the "prime movers" of the forecasting process will 
be identified. Their particular decisions or choices which 
affected the process will then be described and, to the 
extent possible, be discussed in terms of past training, 
experience, or decision-making style. 
MANAGING THE ORGANIZATION: A VIEW FROM THE TOP 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, BPA's 1982 
forecast was the product of a large number of persons both 
within and outside the organization. But whereas the 
O-perspective examines the operating procedures and habitual 
responses of formal and informal groups to the challenges 
the organization faces, it is the task of the P-perspective 
analysis to zoom in on the unique capabilities and directive 
influences of the individuals involved in these same pro-
cesses. 
At BPA, the Administrator through his or her direction 
(or lack of it) exerts a strong influence upon both general 
organizational policy and, in certain instances, specific 
projects. As with many high-ranking office holders, though 
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the position dictates certain actions, the Administrator has 
relatively great latitude in expressing a personal manage-
ment style and orientation towards facing and dealing with 
the agency's problems. Peter Johnson, the BPA Administrator 
since 1981, brought a unique combination of skills and 
experience into the decision-making situation of which the 
1982 forecast was an integral part. Before focusing upon 
the current Administrator, it is instructive to examine the 
contrasting situations which his two predecessors faced 
along with their notably different ways of dealing with 
them. 
The decision-making environment of the 1982 forecast, 
as illustrated in earlier chapters, was shaped by a number 
of forces over the last several decades. One could, in 
principle, trace its roots back to any number of specific 
points in the region's recent history, but, for explanatory 
purposes, perhaps the best place to begin is the onset of 
Donald Hodel's five year appointment as the Bonneville Power 
Administrator in 1972. 
Donald P. Hodel was appointed to the position of 
Administrator in December of 1972, shortly following Nixon's 
reelection and preceding the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973. The 
calm preceding the storm proved short, however. While the 
oil embargo was redefining energy politics, a low water year 
was straining the hydrosystem regionally. Under Hodel, a 
graduate of Harvard and the University of Oregon School of 
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Law, an energy conservation program was quickly organized in 
response. Its success resulted in the new Administrator 
receiving the Department of the Interior's outstanding 
Service Award for the effort. This confrontation with a 
short-lived, but rather ominous, energy crisis served to 
underscore one implication of the high-growth Sum-Of-
utilities forecasts: the era of cheap, abundant power was 
ending and new resources would have to be tapped if the 
region's energy needs were to be met. This conclusion, 
first voiced in Hodel's 1973 annual report and amplified in 
subsequent pronouncements ultimately resulted in the 
issuance of a notice of insufficiency to BPA's preference 
customers on June 24, 1976. This notice stated that "after 
June 30, 1983, BPA would not be able to serve new load 
growth of its preference customers" (Norwood, 1980:262). 
This perception of the possibility of imminent deficit led 
to the establishment of a conservation group within Power 
Resources (as described in the previous chapter) and, more 
importantly, a push for nuclear generation capability in the 
region. Three of the WPPSS plants had been scheduled and 
construction begun early in Hodel's administration. The 
planning of two more plants soon followed, though Phase II 
of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan became held up by legal 
challenges in 1975 pending the completion of a comprehensive 
environmental impact statement. 
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Hodel operated under an acute perception of impending 
power shortfalls (or at least their possibility) and, though 
the policies underlying the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan were 
not long established at the time he took office, power 
planning was still something which he could treat funda-
mentally as an engineering problem. Generation capacity had 
to be added to meet anticipated demand. Private contractors 
replaced the Corps of Engineers in the construction of the 
facilties and Bonneville dealt with the projects indirectly 
by underwriting the investments of the specific public 
utilities but otherwise continued to fulfill its traditional 
functions. 
In January of 1978, Sterling Munro succeeded Hodel as 
Bonneville Power Administrator. Munro had received a 
bachelor'S degree in political science and journalism from 
George Washington University and, like Hodel, had studied 
law. Significantly, he had been a member of Sen. Henry 
Jackson's staff from 1953 to 1975, making him a prime 
candidate for an appointment to the Administrator's position 
under the Carter Presidency. BPA had, the year prior, 
become part of the newly-formed Department of Energy, though 
maintaining the same responsibilities it had as part of the 
Department of the Interior. Though some members of the 
region's forecasting community were beginning to look upon 
their high load growth projections with suspicion, at the 
time Munro took office, decision makers were still readying 
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for an anticipated deficit. Munro's style was decidedly 
political: he immediately concentrated "on BPA's external 
relationships, and proceeded to contact the four Pacific 
Northwest Governors and other leaders and groups throughout 
the region, focusing " ..• on the region's faltering power 
program for inclusion in a new legislative proposal for 
consideration by Congress" (Norwood, 1980:262). Munro's 
former mentor, Henry Jackson, took charge of this bill, 
which was ultimately passed in late 1980 as the Regional 
Act. 
Munro's Administration witnessed growing regional 
concern over rate disparities, environmental impacts, and 
resource development. The WPPSS plants were very obviously 
in difficulty even as Munro took office, due to escalating 
cost overruns and repeated construction delays. But while 
the Administrator ordered an investigation by outside con-
sultants and repeated warnings of impending power shortages, 
he treated the problems of the Supply System as more local 
than regional, requiring little or no intervention or direc-
tion by Bonneville. In 1979, the cost escalations resulted 
in a rate increase for BPA's customers which was totally 
unprecedented. Munro left office in 1981 with the WPPSS 
problem intensifying and new, more significant rate 
increases foreshadowed for later that year. 
Peter Johnson toqk office in May of 1981, roughly a 
half year following the enactment of the Regional Power Bill 
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and just prior to the second majo~ "rate shock" for SPA's 
preference customers alluded to above. The problems with 
WPPSS were corning to a head, and it was obvious to all 
within the power planning community that the first priority 
of the new Administrator would be timely resolution of these 
difficulties. Though the region's forecasting authorities 
were becoming increasingly aware of a slowdown in load 
growth, no consensus about a new pattern had been reached 
and many still feared an impending deficit. Within 
Bonneville (as noted in the previous chapter) in-house 
forecasting and conservation capabilities continued to 
expand. Specifically how their expanded functions would 
dovetail with BPA's revised mission under the Regional Act, 
however, was not something which had been completely re-
solved during Munro's final months as Administrator. 
Johnson's background differed noticeably from that of 
his two immediate predecessors in the Administrator's 
office. Though experienced with the operations of the 
public sector (he served on Idaho Governor John Evans' 
Management Task Force) Johnson's strengths were within the 
sphere of business. At Dartmouth he earned both bachelor's 
and master's degrees in business administration, later 
applying those skills at McGregor Triangle, a Boise, Idaho 
heavy construction company, and Trus Joist, a manufacturer 
of wood products used in home construction. Under the 
budget- and cost-conscious eyes of the first Reagan Admin-
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istration, these skills were viewed as essential to the 
resolution of the Supply System's problems, leading to 
Johnson's 1981 appointment to the Administrator's position. 
Consonant with his background and experience, Johnson 
viewed WPPSS as a business, rather than an engineering or 
political, problem. Under his leadership, Bonneville would 
not deal with the construction problems and their myriad 
regional consequences indirectly but instead confront them 
head-on. A preoccupation with generating capacity, reser-
voir water levels, and transmission lines was eclipsed by 
stronger concerns with "the fiscal integrity of Bonneville", 
"the best interests of present and future ratepayers", and 
'Iprofessional excellence", expressions which not only 
appeared as new guiding principles in BPA's mission state-
ment but which also thoroughly infused the language of 
Johnson's public statements and internal memoranda (e.g. 
Johnson's May 17, 1982 guest editorial in Portland's daily 
newspaper ~ Oregonian). In particular, Johnson's exper-
ience as chief executive officer of Trus Joist provided a 
unique precedent for his approach to the disposition of the 
WPPSS plants. 
When Johnson assumed leadership at Trus Joist in 1974, 
the company, like others in the wood-products industry, was 
facing a changing environment, one increasingly stirred to 
tubulence by the numerous repercussions of the then-recently 
transformed world petroleum market on both national and 
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regional economies. Under the new CEO's direction: Trus 
Joist's planning strategies were modified to reflect the 
financial realities of the new economic climate. Financial 
analysis of Trus Joist's uncertain future during a period of 
projected inflationary increases led Johnson to close four 
of the company's twelve manufacturing plants while weather-
ing the storms of the late 1970s. While most of its 
competitors found themselves seriously over-extended, Trus 
Joist prospered, eventually reopening two of its closed 
plants. By the time of Johnson's departure after six years 
as corporate head, Trus Joist's annual sales mushroomed from 
6 to 76 million dollars. Though other factors were 
undoubtedly involved, it was Johnson's careful planning (as 
Paul Richert-Boe notes in his profile of Johnson in the July 
13-19, 1982 issue of Portland's Willamette Week) that 
constituted the key determinant of the company's success. 
The similarities between the situation Johnson con-
fronted at Trus Joist in the 1970s and the one he later 
confronted at BPA in the early 1980s are striking. In both 
cases, the respective organizations found themselves in 
transformed, and transforming, environments where tradition-
al methods of problem solving (or comfortable standard 
operating procedures) were no longer completely appropriate. 
Trus Joist faced the economic uncertainties of the infla-
tionary 1970s, when energy and production costs grew rapid-
ly. BPA faced a situation characterized by construction 
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difficulties, slowing demand growth, and rapidly escalating 
WPPSS resource costs. Trus Joist found itself questioning 
its need for production capacity. BPA, after years of 
anticipated imminent power shortages, found itself question-
ing its need for generation capacity. Within its newly 
transformed environment, Trus Joist experienced a concern 
over protecting its assets. Within its new environment BPA 
was similarly concerned with maintaining a rating for WPPSS 
bonds which would permit additional sales to finance further 
construction and with assuring the greatest possible rate 
and revenue stability. 
The problem-solving approaches (and, ultimately, the 
solutions) implemented by Johnson at both organizations also 
displayed a striking similarity -- so striking that the 
guidance of the same chief executive officer in both in-
stances is obvious. At Trus Joist, a thorough financial 
analysis of the company's assets and capabilities in light 
of predictions of economic behavior provided the information 
for Johnson, the CEO, to make the difficult, but in retro-
spect prudent, decision to close four of the company's manu-
facturing plants. At BPA, newly organized financial manage-
ment and forecasting units provided analysis which similarly 
recommended delaying the completion of WPPSS 1 and 3. The 
analysis produced two important conclusions: first, that 
chances for adequate additional financing were slim if 
immediate completion of more than one plant was attempted, 
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and, second, that delayed completion of WNP projects 1 and 3 
would not result in regional power shortfalls. Armed with 
this information Johnson, the Administrator, virtually 
repeated his precedented successful decision, shutting down 
the ongoing construction of two nuclear plants in order to 
make the successful completion and functioning of a third 
possible. 
While it is arguable that BPA was already turning 
towards a more "businesslike" approach to managing the 
development of the region's generating resources, this is 
true only in the most general sense. Though the necessary 
forecasting approaches (as well a some of the agency's 
financial analysis capabilities) began evolving during 
Munro's term of office, it was Peter Johnson's unique 
experience (and P-perspective) which gave the organization's 
support system its specific character. Whereas another 
Administrator might have sought to make the WPPSS decision 
based upon regional consensus, Johnson brought the responsi-
bility fully upon himself and BPA, making internal fore-
casting and financial analysis groups a necessity. Whereas 
a different CEO might have second guessed the judgments of 
his forecasting and financial management staffs, Johnson 
(along with the rest of BPA's Policy Committee) accepted the 
often sensitive findings of his technical experts (though 
not without careful and critical scrutiny). This gave the 
organizational units involved the opportunity to make many 
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key decisions about their own development while, at the same 
time, establishing the context defining the purpose of their 
intraagency missions. Finally, whereas an Administrator 
lacking a successful precedent such as the Trus Joist out-
come as part of his experience might not have had enough 
confidence to make and stand by a difficult project-delaying 
decision, Johnson opted for the unpopular, but technically 
warranted, choice to delay WNP 1 and 3. This notified the 
region unequivocally that the operations of the forecasting 
and financial management units were to be taken seriously as 
integral parts of BPA's organization. 
The character of the region's resource development 
problems thus changed significantly over a ten year period. 
Equally significant was the change in the manner that the 
Bonneville Power Administrator perceived the problem and the 
method of its solution. Table XI summarizes the different 
regional conditions faced by Hodel, Munro, and Johnson, the 
experience they brought to bear, and the ways in which they 
perceived and framed the problems confronting them. 
To summarize, Hodel entered office in the early 1970s 
at a time just before the Arab Oil Embargo. The region's 
economic growth was as robust as its load growth, and 
forecasts projected these trends out to the end of the 
century. The perceived need for large thermal generation 
projects to avoid power shortages was accentuated by the 
impacts of the drought year which welcomed the new Adminis-
Administrator 
Donald Hodel 
sterling Munro 
TABLE XI 
ADMINISTRATORS' PERSPECTIVES ON RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT 
Regional Conditions 
High levels of regional 
economic and load growth 
continuing from the 1960s 
through most of Adminis-
tration resulting in high 
load growth projections; 
severe drought and 1973 
Arab Oil Embargo served 
to underscore need to 
avert power shortages 
through resource and con-
servation development 
First indications of slow-
ing regional growth, 
though regional forecast 
projections still high: 
growing rate disparities 
between public and private 
utility customers: WPPSS 
construction cost es-
timates escalations be-
coming source of concern 
and controversy: conser-
vation promoted by Carter 
Administration 
Background/Experience 
Degree in law: three 
years as Deputy Admin-
istrator under Henry 
Richmond--in on ground 
floor of Hydro-Thermal 
Power Plan 
Degrees in political 
science and law; 
member of Sen. Henry 
Jackson's staff from 
1953 through 1975 
Development seen as--
ENGINEERING (or 
Administrative) 
problem: new capacity 
deve lopmen twas 
thought to be straight-
forward with BPA 
backing investments 
of public utility 
customers for ther-
mal plant construc-
tion 
POLITICAL problem: 
while WPPSS cost es-
calations were treat-
ed primarily as a 
nlocal" problem of 
the utilities in-
volved, BPA's role 
under Munro aimed 
at the development 
of Regional Act leg-
islation to ease 
growing rate dispar-
ities and in effect 
expand the resource 
development provis-
ions of the Hydro-
Thermal Power Plan 
N 
CTI 
-l 
Administrator 
Peter Johnson 
TABLE XI (Cont'd) 
Regional Conditiqns 
Load growth falling off in 
region; naivete of earlier 
forecasting process recog-
nized and acknowledged, 
though no consensus of 
"new vision" of future; 
WPPSS 4 and 5 mothballed 
and financial fate of 
plants 1, 2, and 3 un-
certain; Regional Act 
legislation in place but 
its implementation still 
problematic 
Background/Experience 
Business degrees from 
Dartmouth; served on 
Idaho Governor's Mgmt. 
Task Force; CEO at 
Trus Joist for six 
years during which 
time annual sales grew 
dramatically, in large 
part due to strategic 
decision to close 4 
of 12 plants during 
inflationary climate 
of late 19708 
Development Seen as--
FINANCIAL/BUSINESS 
problem: future of 
WPPSS plants seen 
as contingent upon 
bond sales; decision 
to delay plants 1 
and 3 followed from 
financial analysis 
(and forecast) 
simi lar to tha t 
supporting Trus 
Joist plant closing 
tv 
a-. 
CD 
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trator into office. The regional resources development 
plan, centering upon the construction of the WPPSS plants, 
was handled primarily as an engineering problem. This is 
not to say that Hodel, trained in the field of law, ap-
proached the problem as an engineer would. Rather, the 
problem was seen as a technical one: to add sufficient 
capacity (and conservation) to accommodate future demand. 
The Administrator, who had earlier served as Deputy to Henry 
Richmond from the onset of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan, 
rather straightforwardly followed the provisions of that 
Plan, letting private contractors construct the plants for 
the region's participating public utilities while BPA 
underwrote the construction costs incurred by the WPPSS 
member utilities. 
By contrast, Sterling Munro treated regional resource 
development as primarily a political problem. By the time 
Munro took office in 1977, the first indications of a slow-
down in regional growth were becoming evident, though fore-
casts did not yet reflect a significant shift in percep-
tions. A key issue was the growing rate disparity between 
public and private utilities. Rather than deal directly 
with WPPSS's emerging problems, Munro focused instead upon 
the promotion of Regional Act legislation developed princi-
pally by Henry Jackson, for whom the Administrator had 
served as an aide between 1953 and 1975. 
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Peter Johnson entered office after acquiring extensive 
experience in construction and wood products industries. By 
1981, WPPSS 4 and 5 were doomed by the combined effects of 
slowing load growth and sky-rocketing construction costs and 
the fate of the three remaining plants was in doubt. 
Johnson framed the situation as a business problem -- one 
Which required BPA to adopt a leading role in its solution. 
Drawing extensively upon his experience with a closely 
similar situation at Trus Joist, Johnson utilized BPA's 
newly developed forecasting and financial analysis capabil-
ities to arrive at a difficult, but in retrospect, seemingly 
prudent, decision to delay the construction of WNP 1 and 3 
in order to render the completion of plant number 2 
possible. 
Thus, an examination of Peter Johnson's personal 
background and perceptive concerning the resource develop-
ment situation confronting the region at the time he assumed 
the office of Bonneville Power Administrator provides vital 
insights into the manner in which the organizational appara-
tus surrounding the production of BPA's 1982 forecast was 
given its shape. FUrther significance of these insights 
will become clearer in the next chapter which cross-cues the 
three perspectives. 
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MANAGING THE FORECAST: A VIEW FROM THE MIDDLE 
As noted in the previous chapter, Bonneville's long-
term forecast was an organizational product of a variety of 
groups within the agency. Using the P-perspective to look 
at the top of the organization -- the Administrator's Office 
provides significant and sometimes penetrating insight 
into unique managerial styles which strongly direct the 
manner in which the organization is structured and the way 
in which it functions. By itself, however, this focus only 
provides a portion (albeit a significant portion) of per-
sonal influences helping to shape the forecast process and 
its ultimate product. A P-perspective examination of 
middle-level management and technical staff operations with-
in the units specifically tasked with producing the forecast 
provides additional insights which are both necessary and 
complementary to those displayed in the previous section. 
In certain ways, each level of an organization displays 
unique characteristics. At the top, the Administrator pre-
sides over the entire line organization and may exert strong 
direction on the course which the agency follows. At the 
middle levels of the organization, such strong unilateral 
influence is lacking for two reasons. First, the span of 
control of middle managers is, by definition, smaller, 
addressing only a segment of interdepartmental projects such 
as the long-term forecast. Second, and of possibly greater 
importance, forecasting is a problem-solving activity which, 
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at best, might be characterized as semi-structured. The 
production of a forecast is a team effort requiring diverse 
expertise. This means that although process and product may 
alike bear the imprint of the authors, no single individual 
directs the forecast as a plant supervisor would manage a 
highly routinized production function. The forecast, in a 
very real sense, evolves from the coordinated interaction of 
a number of contributing individuals. 
As such, a slightly different emphasis guides the 
P-perspective investigation of the forecasting process in 
this section. While individual personalities and back-
grounds remain as important foci of inquiry, greater 
attention is placed upon understanding the unique circum-
stances confronted by the principals in the forecasting 
process and the nature of the interplay between them. As 
with the previous section, though the events most immediate-
ly and directly associated with the i982 forecast will be 
examined in greater detail, a significant amount of back-
ground information is also provided about the forecast's 
antecedents, beginning with the middle years of the Hodel 
Administration. This, more than T- or a-perspective 
analysis, helps illuminate the specific events and issues 
providing motivation for the development of an independent 
forecasting capability at BPA. 
As described in the previous section, Donald 
Hodel's term as Bonneville Power Administrator began at a 
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time when regional drought3 international petroleum price 
escalations, and continuing strong Northwest economic growth 
all contributed to a picture of future power shortages. 
The Sum-Of-Utilities forecasts had proven generally reliable 
as indicators of load growth, and no new role was seen for 
BPA forecasting staff beyond their usual contribution to the 
SOU on behalf of small public utilities in the region. 
Power Requirements (renamed from Power Marketing, a title 
more appropriate to periods of abundant electricity) was 
functionally subordinate to the Power Resources Branch of 
Power Management, its duties clearly, and modestly, defined 
in a seemingly stable load environment. 
While the organizational analysis (presented in the 
previous chapter) of the development of Power Requirements 
into a forecasting body independent of PNUCC revealed a 
sudden growth in staffing and capability in the 1980-81 
period, the seeds of its transformation had actually been 
planted some years earlier. It was during the middle of 
Hodel's term of office, in 1976, that the first traces of 
cognitive dissonance began to cast a shadow on the consensus 
perception of sustained load growth dominating the power 
planning community. Reiterating a point first made in the 
introductory chapter of this dissertation, it was at this 
point that BPA acquired the services of the consulting firm 
of Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill (SaM) to conduct an 
independent evaluation of the need for five WPPSS nuclear 
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plants. The findings! which concluded that incIeased con-
seIvation would significantly Ieduce, if not eliminate, the 
need fOI five plants, set in motion activity within BPA 
which would eventually culminate in the establishment of the 
agency's 1982 fOIecasting capability. 
As a Iesult of the SOM IepoIt, seveIal membeIs of PoweI 
Requirements undeItook a new exercise beyond the group's 
tIaditional missions of contributing to the SOU forecast and 
conducting poweI marketing studies. Along with Terry 
Esvelt, then wOIking for BPA's EnviIonmental Office, Don 
Hoffard and Mark Roberts attempted to develop a fIamewoIk 
which would render the Skidmore, Owings, and MerIill 
findings more useful. SOM had developed their peIcentage 
conseIvation savings estimates laIgely fIom other sources: 
engineeIing simulations of building energy performance, 
documented peIformance of test stIuctures, and miscellaneous 
"expert" studies. Different savings levels were attributed 
to pIoposed education, incentive, and mandatoIY pIograms in 
Iesidential, commercial, and industrial sectors. 
The sources tapped by SOM usually expressed their 
research results in a form such as "A building constructed 
to ASHRAE 90-75 standards results in a savings of 'x' 
percent relative to a typical 1974 structure". To be useful 
fOI utility planning, howeveI, this infoImation needed to be 
translated into a fIamework breaking down savings by end-use 
and consuming sector -- that is how much of the savings 
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could come from: say: heating, cooling, or lighting loads in 
commercial buildings. Hoffard, Esvelt, and Roberts attempt-
ed to derive an end-use decomposition of the SOU forecast 
using a variety of sources for relevant data (perhaps most 
notably the economic statistics and projections prepared by 
Don Morey who had worked in the group's Economic Studies 
Section). The results of the exercise proved enlightening 
to all those involved. Building up load projections from 
sector-specific forecasts of key economic variables (e.g. 
number of houses X percent electric heating X heating use 
per household) resulted in electricity consumption values 
conspicuously below those of the SOU forecast. Only by 
assigning the differences to conspicuously overlarge 'other' 
and 'miscellaneous' use categories could the SOU totals be 
captured by an end-use framework. 
The following year, PNUCC first used the econometric 
model developed under contract by National Economic Research 
Associates to corroborate the results of the SOU forecast. 
For the BFA staff members who had worked on the end-use 
decomposition exercise, this corroboration, suffice to say, 
proved unconvincing. Although their perspective was a 
minority one, both within the BFA and the larger community 
of regional forecasters, and although their efforts resulted 
in no immediate revisions in Power Requirements' mission 
all would carry the insights gained from the exercise with 
them through the years of the Munro Administration when they 
would take leading roles in developing the technical ap-
paratus for BPA's first independent forecast. 
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At about the same time that PNUCC was "crosschecking" 
the SOU forecast with its newly received econometric model, 
an independent effort, the Northwest Energy Policy Project, 
was being conducted at Washington state University. As 
noted in the introductory chapter this project resulted in 
the development of several forecasts somewhat lower than 
those of PNUCC, produced using a differently specified 
econometric model. Significantly, two members of Power 
Requirements staff, Don Hoffard and Bob Lewis, worked on the 
project. Though, at this time, Power Requirements was one 
of the few bastions of economists within an agency dominated 
principally by engineering concerns, few of the staff econo-
mists had strong backgrounds in computer modeling and quan-
titative forecasting methods (in sharp contrast to the 1982 
staff). Hoffard and Lewis were notable exceptions, account-
ing for their participation in the NEPP modeling effort. 
From the standpoint of the eventual development of BPA's 
1982 forecasting system, this participation raised issues 
which further underscored the need for a harder and more 
thorough look at the varied factors underlying regional load 
growth. 
Even after Sterling Munro took office in early 1978, 
however, skepticism concerning continued high growth in 
regional electricity consumption still represented a minor-
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ity viewpoint. Although PNUCC had revised the SOU forecast 
downward for several years 1n response to the first unmis-
takable signs of slowing load growth, these revisions were 
modest rather than a significant departure from precedent. 
For the majority within the power planning community this 
slowdown connoted a temporary aberration in an otherwise 
stable pattern rather than the onset of a new trend. Given 
the characteristically slow and conservative responses of 
both organizations and the individuals populating them to 
changes in their environments, it is not surprising that the 
"conversion" to a new vision of the future proceeded uneven-
ly and was generally met with resistance by those who had 
made heavy personal, professional, or financial investments 
in the "official" future of high growth. In this regard, 
BPA differed little from other organizations within the 
region. Even within Power Requirements, which was specifi-
cally tasked with anticipating Northwest electricity 
futures, the overriding emphasis was upon fulfilling the 
traditional missions of contributing to the SOU forecast and 
conducting marketing studies, rather than exploring alter-
native possibilities. 
At first, any pressure for development of an indepen-
dent forecasting capability at BPA during Munro's term of 
office was slight, originating from (and largely confined 
to) the group within Power Requirements that had taken the 
critical look at the SOU forecast earlier. Two critical 
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characteristics of the load and resource planning environ-
ment during the Munro's years, however, provided the partic-
ular milieu which the "bottom-up" organizational effort to 
build a forecasting capability internal to BPA needed to 
take root and grow. One was simply the general late 1970s 
pattern of load growth, which, though still strong, con-
tinued to fall below the downwardly revised SOU forecast 
predictions. This gave greater respectability to the 
assertion that the Northwest might be viewing the onset of a 
new trend as opposed to a transient aberrational develop-
ment. The other characteristic was the strong push, from 
many parties in the region (including Hunro himself) for the 
development of the Regional Power Act legislation. Within 
Bonneville, it then became more apparent that should BPA 
assume a new role of acquiring resources to meet the loads 
of any of the region's utilities requesting power exchanges, 
it would need to be able to perform a variety of internal 
forecasts and analyses beyond its previous capabilities. 
Moreover, it also became rather obvious that models other 
than those in use in the region at that time would be 
needed. 
As the Regional Act legislation was being debated 
during 1979 and 1980, several efforts were undertaken 
within Power Requirements which would in many respects, form 
the core of the demand component of the BPA forecasting 
system. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, as mentioned 
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earlier, had, under the Carter Administration, developed 
residential and commercial sector energy forecasting models 
for the Department of Energy. These models had become part 
of the public domain, and, after BPA had become part of the 
USDOE it was simple for the members of the Power Require-
ments staff to acquire Federal Region X (Washington, Oregon, 
Idaho and Alaska) versions of the models "off the shelf" 
(i.e. ready-made rather than specially developed for BFA 
under contract). Not surprisingly, their acquisition was 
initiated by Hoffard, Roberts, and Esvelt of Power Require-
ments, both in response to the obvious weaknesses of other 
forecasts in use at that time and in anticipation of new 
demands to be placed upon the organization. Even had the 
Regional Bill not been enacted, BPA was committed to conser-
vation assessments which would require some defensible 
method of projecting both electricity sales and savings. 
The ORNL econometric/end-use hybrids were, very literally, 
tailor-made for the purpose. 
Very shortly after the acquisition of the ORNL models, 
Mark Roberts and Terry Esvelt had a regional survey of 
residential housing and electricity consumption character-
istics conducted, under contract, by the firm of Elrick and 
Lavidge. Within a year a somewhat different, but parallel 
effort was underway in the commercial sector. The Energy 
Information Administration of USDOE was having a survey 
conducted by westat, Inc., to explore the feasibility of 
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using utility billing records as the basis of conducting 
commercial energy surveys. One of the test sites under 
consideration was in the Pacific Northwest. By adding 
funding to the project, BPA arranged to have all three sites 
selected in the Northwest (Portland, Seattle, and the 
Tri-Cities), resulting in a more useful, but not fully 
regionally representative commercial survey. These surveys 
were needed for three purposes, each consonant with the 
directions that the organization was at that time expected 
to go. One purpose was simply to gain detailed empirical 
familiarity with one or more of the major consuming sectors. 
The efforts made several years earlier, to develop end-use 
framework explaining the SOU forecast had raised many 
questions, and identified many data needs, which such a 
survey could resolve. Second, because the ORNL models 
needed to be calibrated to the Pacific Northwest, as opposed 
to Region X, the survey could be used to obtain (or approx-
imate) regionally representative values for key model input 
variables. Finally, survey results could, if and when 
needed, form the basis for further analysis needed to adapt 
or modify the models as required. 
Last of all, a third, somewhat new effort was begun in 
what had been (and soon would again be) the Economic Studies 
group within Power Requirements. Don Morey had, since the 
1960s, conducted various economic analyses as part of the 
marketing studies forming one of the unit's central mis-
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sions. These analyses had both judgemental and quantitative 
underpinnings, but were not performed using complex or 
sophisticated computer models. When the demand models were 
received from Oak Ridge their data requirements were iden-
tified and efforts were made to develop regional values for 
key variables. In addition to survey data on characteris-
tics of the two consuming sectors represented by the models, 
projections of specific economic variables on both national 
and regional levels were needed. This resulted in a new 
agenda for economic analyses -- projections had to be 
tailored to match the form and format of the input variables 
and, in some cases, new models had to be developed expressly 
for this purpose. This last need would ultimately usher in 
a connected series of computerized economic (and demograph-
ic) models. 
While "bottom-up" organizational pressure for an 
in-house forecasting capability originated with key members 
of the technical staff, the proposed change of mission had 
the support of the Chief of Power Requirements (then a 
section within Power Resources), George Gwinnett. Formerly 
one of BPA's Area Economists, Gwinnett headed the Section 
beginning in the mid 1970s and, during the years when the 
Regional Act legislation was being debated, acted as a key 
spokesperson for the group, representing its new interests 
to other portions of the organization. Up until the passage 
of the Regional Act, however, support within the larger 
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organization was less than wholehearted. Though there was 
no significant internal resistance to the idea of an inde-
pendent forecasting capability, neither was a niche being 
readied in the larger functional hierarchy of the organiza-
tion. In 1980, the newly obtained models were employed in 
the preparation of a series of sector-specific conservation 
assessments, but resource planning was still grounded in the 
forecasts produced by PNUCC. 
The enactment of the Regional Bill in late 1980, in 
large measure provided the direct impetus for Power 
Requirements' reorganization and reorientation. Despite the 
fact that one of Ronald Reagan's first actions after 
inauguration was to put a freeze on Federal hiring, BPA 
managed to open a number of new positions made necessary by 
the agency's augmented responsibilities. Though the hiring 
freeze made it temporarily impossible to fill ~ of these 
slots, BPA, and Power Requirements grew in the wake of the 
passage of the Regional Act (and, as noted in the previous 
chapter, Power Requirements grew disproportionately fast 
during this period). with BPA legally responsible to 
acquire the resources needed to meet the loads of whatever 
utilities willing to accept the terms of the Act, an 
improved, and independent, forecasting system became a 
necessity. It was in this organizational climate that the 
proposals being advanced by a contingent within Power 
Requirements were given the wholehearted support of BPA's 
upper and middle management. 
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Approximately half a year separated the passage of the 
Regional Act from Peter Johnson's appointment to the 
position of Bonneville Power Administrator in mid-1981. It 
was during this interval that Power Requirements emerged as 
a Division within BPA and staffed itself to levels needed 
for the performance of its newly defined (and organiza-
tionally accepted) mission of producing an independent 
forecast to guide resource acquisitions. As noted earlier 
in this chapter, a precise and specific definition of the 
Division's mission awaited the design and development of a 
decision support system geared to perform the financial 
analysis required by Administrator Johnson for his 1982 
decision on the WPPSS nuclear plants. During the last 
months of Hunro's term of office, however, the Division's 
organizational structure was established. 
The staffing chart for the infant Division straight-
forwardly reflected the key issues raised since the mid-70s 
publication of the SOH report. George Gwinnett, who had 
been Chief of Requirements when it was a Section within 
Power Resources, retained his position of leadership as 
Director of the Division. Don Morey, who had performed most 
of the economic analyses for the unit's marketing studies a 
decade earlier headed the Economic and utility Studies 
Branch which was responsible for preparing economic inputs 
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for the new de~and models as well as fulfilling Require-
ments' traditional mission. The other Branch, Energy 
Modeling and Analysis, concerned itself with development and 
operating of the new long-term forecasting models. The 
three supervisors in this new Branch were the same persons 
who had attempted, four years earlier, to develop an end-use 
framework to explain the SOU forecast. Don Hoffard headed 
the Branch while Mark Roberts and Terry Esvelt respectively 
chiefed the Energy Modeling and Energy Analysis Sections. 
The minority viewpoint which the three had earlier shared 
concerning plausible Northwest energy futures was now the 
predominant one within the Division. 
A slight reshuffling of key personnel took place prior 
to the production of the 1982 forecast. George Gwinnett 
returned to the Lower Columbia Area Office, this time as its 
head, vacating the Power Requirements Division Director's 
slot. This was soon filled by Don Hoffard, whose vacated 
Branch Chief position was subsequently filled by Terry 
Esvelt. John McConnaughey then became Chief of the Energy 
Analysis Section, while in Don Morey's Branch, Geoff Moorman 
and Gerry Lenzen respectively headed Economic Studies and 
Utility Studies Sections (the latter unit reviewed individ-
ual utility forecasts and continued BPA's participation in 
the SOU but did not have a role in producing the new long-
term forecast). Though George Gwinnett continued to act as 
the Division's key spokesperson through the early phases of 
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the 1982 public involvement process, it was this lineup that 
oversaw the development of BPA's first independent forecast. 
From the standpoint of the P-perspective, a central 
investigatory concern is the background or training of key 
participants in a technical or decision process. While the 
past experIences of those Power Requirements figures 
managing the forecast was perhaps not as critical as that of 
the Administrators managing the organization, it is still of 
significance in understanding the factors which, over a 
period of time, shaped the development of the long-term 
forecast. 
As noted in the previous chapter, Power Requirements 
was one of the first groups within the traditionally 
engIneering-based BPA to employ economists. As economic and 
fInancial considerations became more central to BPA during 
the 1970s, training in economics became correspondingly more 
widespread organizationally. Not surprisingly, under these 
conditions, all of the Power Requirements staff supervising 
the 1982 forecast had degrees in economics. 
It must also be noted, however, that during the latter 
half of the 1970s, when the implications of the SOH studies 
were first recognized, most of those involved in producing 
(and endorsing) the SOU forecast were also schooled in 
economics, with its emphasis upon the effects of price upon 
present and future consumption. Obviously, then something 
else characterized those who first recognized the limita-
tions of the traditional SOU outlook and spearheaded the 
development of the forecasting apparatus used in 1982. 
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A closer look at the background of the economists who 
pioneered Power Requirements' development suggests several 
factors which predisposed them to revise the traditional 
outlook for power futures. First, and most immediately 
obvious, was the circumstances they found themselves in. 
BPA's involvement with both PNUCC and the contractors at SOM 
made it imperative that someone be given the task of 
attempting to reconcile the two disparate points of view. 
Thus, it seems likely that whoever received the assignment 
would be compelled to reevaluate, to at least some degree, 
the power planning status quo. Given that the task was an 
unprecedented one, however, it could have been approached in 
any of a number of different ways with varying results. 
That it proceeded as it did was the consequence of a second 
factor, the specific training of the individuals involved. 
Terry Esvelt and Mark Roberts were, at the time of the SOM 
review, both relatively new employees at BPA. As such, they 
had much less investment in the organizational precedents 
which were responsible for the maintenance of the "official" 
interpretation of the future. Esvelt worked for the 
Environmental Office and, in this capacity, brought several 
new emphases to the assignment. Though both Don Hoffard and 
Don Morey had been with Power Requirements since its days as 
Power Marketing, both had special areas of expertise whi~h 
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proved significant to the SOU evaluation project. Hoffard 
was one of the first in Requi~ements to have a st~ong and 
extensive background in computer modeling. Computerized 
models require fo~mal, explicit, and consistent explanatory 
principles, though this is not generally true of economic-
based interpretations of load growth. Morey provided exper-
ience in identifying, monitoring, and projecting economic 
and demographic factors which d~ive changes in levels of 
electricity consumption. The availability of both his 
expertise and his projections of economic activity in the 
region allowed (or possibly predisposed) the team evaluating 
the SOU forecast to build up a forecast from basic trends, 
developing a (noncomputerized) model of sorts. This model, 
in effect, undermined any confidence they might have had in 
the SOU projections. 
Though the 1982 forecast was the p~oduct of many 
pe~sons, and though a large portion of the fo~m which it 
finally assumed was determined by the st~uctu~e of the 
models selected, the imprint of the key figures 1n Power 
Requi~ements' reorientation 1s clea~. Don Mo~ey had 
developed (or supervised the development of) the methods 
used to produce the economic and demographic projections 
used in the demand models, 1n particular, the paper-and-
pencil techniques underlying the Economic Base Model used in 
producing the regional employment projections. In 1981, 
Morey became Branch Chief, handing control of the Economic 
studies Section over the Geoff Moorman. For the first 
forecast, however, the methods in place were Morey's. 
As noted above, Don Hoffard was one of the first 
computer-proficient members of Power Requirements' staff. 
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In the mid-1970s, along with members of NERA (developers of 
the PNUCC Econometric Model), he participated in the 
creation of the Integrated Supply and Demand Model (ISOM). 
The demand component of ISOM was the creation of NERA: the 
supply (or resource costing) component was Hoffard's 
contribution. It was the supply component of 150M which, 
when separated, became the basis for the Supply Pricing 
Hodel which provided electricity prices based upon the costs 
of scheduled resources and the priorities of the Regional 
Act. 
Finally, Terry Esvelt and Mark Roberts were largely 
responsible for designing (or at least supervising the 
design of) the model review and forecasting methodology. 
The test runs performed, the evaluation criteria considered 
in the modeling selection procedure, and the form which the 
modeling system ultimately assumed in many ways reflected 
the issues which they had earlier confronted in dealing with 
PNUCC, SOH, and NROC (Natural Resources Defense Council). 
At the outset of this section, it was asserted that at 
the mid-levels of organizations, where activities such as 
the BPA forecast are managed or directed, there is less 
decision-making freedom (at least over central issues), than 
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near the apex where a key individual's style or operating 
priorities may shape the behavior of an entire bureaucratic 
structure. It was also asserted that at these lower levels 
effective use of the P-perspective requires a close exam-
ination of specific circumstances. The description of the 
gradual shift in the perception of regional power futures 
given above provides an illustration of how the personal and 
circumstantial elements so central to the P-perspective 
interact. The summary comments below, which conclude this 
section, should serve to highlight these important inter-
actions. 
In reviewing the specific personal factors prerequisite 
to the development of the 1982 BPA forecast, three inter-
acting elements stand out as determinants. First, and most 
generally obvious, is the specific backgrounds of those 
leading the movement towards a computerized system of 
models. All of the principals in this movement who were 
employed at BPA at the time of the SOM report were econo-
mists in an organization dominated by engineers. This 
training emphasized a focus upon the effects of price upon 
supply and demand which contrasted with the assumptions 
underlying the naive extrapolation methods employed in the 
SOU forecast. More specifically two of the key actors were 
new to BPA, less bound to "official" images of the future 
and more concerned with newly recognized issues such as 
conservation potential and resource policy implications. 
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The two other key figures! though long-time employees, had 
unique training in computer modeling and regional economics, 
which made them perhaps more attentive to the numerous 
factors underlying load growth. In toto, these background 
profiles provided a predisposition for the group members to 
look at forecasting somewhat differently. 
Second, the specific circumstances these individuals 
found themselves in served as a trigger or catalyst to the 
gradual reformulation of an image of the future. As noted 
above, the attempt to reconcile the SOM report with the SOU 
findings led to the development, on paper, of an end-use 
framework which would not account for large portions of the 
loads anticipated by PNUCC. The resulting cognitive 
dissonance led both to a general mistrust of continued high 
growth rates in regional forecasts and to a perceived need 
for a substantially revised approach to forecasting. 
Finally, the general political environment (as embodied 
in the policies of the reigning Administrator) provided the 
milieu in which rapid expansion of forecasting capability 
either was or was not possible. Initial investigations into 
conservation assessment began during Hodel's Administration, 
where the problem was perceived to be avoiding severe 
forthcoming deficits. With Munro taking office, and 
regional power legislation a front-running issue, the 
organization became more receptive to developing an in-house 
forecasting and resource planning apparatus, though tradi-
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tional views still predominated. Full support for the 
expansion plans of Power Requirements was forthcoming soon 
after the passage of the Regional Act, and in 1982, Peter 
Johnson's need for WPPSS financial analysis merged with the 
efforts to develop sector-specific forecasts to produce 
BPA's decision support system. 
THE P-PERSPECTIVE -- CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Examining a decision process from the vantage point of 
the P-perspective, then, entails a focus upon the unique 
attributes of the individuals involved. The next chapter, 
which cross-cues the inSights derived from the three per-
spectlves, should provlde a fuller and richer understanding 
of the significance of the P-perspective. Before moving on, 
however, it is worthwhile reiterating (and to some extent 
expanding upon) several key points regarding the character 
of the P-pexspective. 
First and foremost, investigation from the standpoint 
of the P-perspective, to repeat a point made above, centers 
upon what is unique to individuals involved in decision 
processes. All actions are ultimately carried out by 
individuals, but it is only where choices or alternative 
courses of action are available that the P-perspective is 
the appropriate tool of investigation. If an individual 
reflexively follows "cookbook" technical procedures or 
straightforward1y carries the actions prescribed for an 
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office holder in a particular situation, these behaviors are 
the objects of, respectively, the T- and O-perspectives, 
regardless of how large the impacts are which can be traced 
back to the particular individual undertaking the action. 
By contrast, if an individual had the latitude to select one 
technical procedure over another or one course of action 
over another, P-perspective research would be appropriate to 
explore elements of the individual's background, training, 
character, motivation, or style which could explain the 
choice. 
A second point worth emphasizing before undertaking the 
cross-cuing exercise is that the individual factors affect-
ing complex decision processes should never be dismissed 
merely as distorting biases or as personal agendas under-
taken to the detriment of larger goals or organizational 
activities. While these individual factors (e.g. education, 
problem-solving style, experience) clearly may have signif-
icant impact upon decision processes, they are by no means 
typical, or characteristic, of the focus of P-perspective 
investigation. In fact, unique individual views or 
operating styles may, in certain situations, be unique 
strengths (as Johnson's business orientation to management 
was in the context of the WPPSS decision) and individual 
interests may complement rather than conflict with organi-
zational or public priorities. 
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Finally, it should be noted that though many indi-
viduals with their own idiosyncratic views of the world 
incrementally affect decision processes only a few truly 
exert shaping influences. These individuals are always the 
prime foci of the P-perspective research and their 
identification is the investigator's foremost problem. 
The next chapter, focusing upon the cross-cuing of the 
three perspectives, will better illustrate where and how 
individuals made a difference. 
CHAPTER V 
CROSS-CUING THE PERSPECTIVES 
INTRODUCTION: CROSS-CUING - THE DECISION PROCESS IN 3-D 
Having looked at the decision process surrounding the 
development of the 1982 BPA forecast from each of the three 
perspectives in isolation, it is now time to explore the 
larger theoretical and methodological potential of the 
Multiple Perspe~tive Concept by cross-cuing the perspectives 
~ 
and the insights derived from their use. More traditional 
analyses of complex decision processes usually contain some 
implicit cross-cues, in that researchers will veer briefly 
from a dominant perspective to explain a particular outcome 
(e.g. a predominantly organizational analysis may note how a 
specific technical factor, such as software limitations, 
predisposed a decision). In such instances, however, there 
is rarely an explicit recognition by the analyst that 
alternative paradigms of inquiry are being used and, in 
consequence, no attempts are made to explore the alternative 
perspectives with any thoroughness. 
In this dissertation, an attempt was made to make the 
T-, 0-, and P-perspective investigations as independent of 
one another as possible. The idea behind this strict sepa-
ration of the three paradigms of exploration was, first, to 
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characterize each of the perspectives and their use as 
clearly as possible and, second, to encourage an inves-
tigative thoroughness within each of the individual domains 
of inquiry. Additionally, this segregation of findings 
allows a similar clear illustration of the nature and syn-
thetic capabilities of the subsequent cross-cuing procedure. 
Cross-cuing represents the integration of the three 
distinct perspectives, each with its own unique focus of 
interest and mode of inquiry. This integration, however, is 
not simply a synthesis of findings into a single unified 
picture nor a reduction of the varied insights of the T-, 
0-, and P-perspectives to a common denominator. The 
strength of the Multiple Perspective Concept lies in the 
entirely different approaches each of the perspectives takes 
in viewing a single decision process. Any attempt at syn-
thesis or reduction would simply strip away the very ele-
ments which make Multiple Perspectives useful. Rather, the 
process of cross-cuing illuminates how the perspectives both 
harmonize and conflict along a number of dimensions, convey-
ing a deeper understanding without any necessary resolution 
of disparate insights. As Linstone (1984) has described: 
"The process of integration is not merely one of 
assembling a composite picture from jigsaw puzzle 
pieces, nor ironing out contradictions by some rules 
of thumb, nor arranging the information hierarchic-
ally. Integration resembles the task of conceptual-
izing a three-dimensional object from one-dimensional 
descriptions and two-dimensional drawings (p. 82)11. 
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In many respects, cross-cuing is the "meat" of a 
Multiple Perspective investigation. It is here, where the 
insights of the dlfferent perspectives interweave, that the 
"reasons" behind a decision become apparent, or the possi-
bilities arising from a new technology begin to become evi-
dent in their fullness. In the case of BPA's flrst indepen-
dent forecast, it is in the cross-cuing of the perspectives 
that the interacting forces which shaped the final product 
may be identified and their relative influence assessed. 
Procedurally, the cross-cuing of the different insights 
into the 1982 forecast is developed below in several steps. 
First of all, T-, 0-, and P-events, projects, or decisions 
are laid out on three parallel timelines, each representing 
the domain of one of the perspectives used in the investiga-
tion. Because the focus of this dissertation is on the 
development of the 1982 forecast, heaviest emphasis is given 
to the year immediately preceding the release of the 
official forecast document, since this is when both the 
largest volume of relevant technical work was carried out 
and the most vigorous interchanges took place among actors 
in the power planning community. To the extent that they 
provide a necessary explanatory context, however, events 
from earlier years (such as decisions made during Hodel's 
term of office) are included in the timelines. Although 
such a tripartite chronological ordering, in and of itself, 
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hardly provides a final explanation to a decision process as 
complex as the one forming the subject of this investiga-
tion, this picture ~ provide insight through its compre-
hensiveness. 
The second step is to determine where and how the 
perspectives cross-cue one another. Several distinct 
investigatory activities are encompassed by this step. The 
organizational challenges, both originating from inside and 
outside BPA during the forecast period are examined and the 
extent to which they influenced the core assumptions under-
lying technical choices is assessed. In similar fashion, 
the personal influences of policy makers, planners, and 
project managers are identified and the effects on the 
substantive output of the forecast process are evaluated. 
The extent of the actual impacts of technical findings on 
organizational decisions and actions is evaluated. Finally, 
these cross impacts are mapped conceptually between the 
timelines to provide a representation of how the perspec-
tives interact. 
To deepen the insights conveyed by this tWo-dimensional 
map, digraph analyses of relationships between elements 
uncovered by each of the three paradigms of inquiry are 
developed in the third and final step of the cross-cuing 
process. Returning to the analogy of cross-cuing as a means 
of conceptualizing a three-dimensional object from a series 
of partial descriptions, the digraphs provide cross-
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sectional representations of the "depth" of the decision 
process and some of the dynamics operating along this 
dimension. Often the unique "rationale" underlying a 
decision process has its locus in these dynamic intercon-
nections between T-, 0-, and P-perspectives, and can be most 
clearly understood by tracing the sequence of impacts meth-
odically from one node of a digraph to the next. 
Following the completion of this digraph exercise is 
the final chapter of this dissertation which presents con-
clusions on what the Multiple Perspective Concept reveals 
about the process by which BPA prepared its 1982 forecast 
and on what the case study of the 1982 forecast reveals 
about the uses of Multiple Perspectives. 
CROSS CUING: THE "MAP" 
pesc;ibing the Timelines - T. O. and P in Pa;allel 
The first step in identifying, enumerating, and analy-
zing the cross-cuing relationships between the T-, 0-, and 
P-perspective descriptions of the BPA forecast, as noted in 
the introduction above, consists of laying significant 
events side by side on distinct timelines in order to make 
comparisons and posit linkages. Figure 26 provides the 
graphic representation of these comparisons (The linkages 
indicated between the perspectives will be discussed in the 
section that follows. In the text, a cross cue from, say, T 
onto O-perspective will be denoted 'T-O'). 
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To reiterate yet another point made above, because this 
research focuses upon the development of the 1982 forecast, 
heaviest emphasis is placed upon its immediate determinants. 
Hence, the map is "most dense", as would be expected, in the 
1981-1982 period where the lion's share of the technical 
work and interaction between parties interested in the 
implications of the forecast took place. Descriptions of 
these events, or map elements, are correspondingly detailed 
and at the same time, go beyond what each of the perspec-
tives reveal in exclusion of the others. Particular 
attention is given to the specifics of the public involve-
ment process surrounding the 1982 forecast, for it is 
through this process that technical, organizational, and 
personal factors most intricately (and most significantly) 
intertwine as the region's varied interests attempt to 
influence resource decisions. Events which can be seen 
ultimately to have a significant effect upon the forecast 
process (e.g. the institutionalization of the SOU forecast, 
the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan, the 1973 011 embargo, etc.) 
are also listed and discussed briefly, since they form the 
frames (or contexts) within which decisions of the region's 
power planning community take place. Although the conse-
quences of all such events will be discussed in very general 
terms, their effects are long-lasting and often continuous, 
shaping organizational decisions and technical choices for 
prolonged periods of time. 
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Eyents and Impacts - A Discussion of the Elements and cross 
Cues in the Map 
The earliest event (1) in the map occurs in 1954 and is 
significant as a frame for any discussion of Northwest power 
planning. At this time, PNUCC members first produced the 
SOU forecast by simple aggregation of individual utility 
forecasts. As noted in the introductory remarks above, 
historical events forming the background for the 1982 
forecast are to be sketched in less detail than those within 
the 1981-82 production cycle. Although the SOU forecast is 
listed under the T-perspective for simplicity sake, it also 
was the product of organizational and personal elements 
which, if traced out, would greatly expand the size of the 
map. Rather than do this, key 0- and P- features of the 
forecast will merely be noted (as will be the case for other 
pre-1982 forecasts included on the diagram). The organiza-
tional perspectives at the time of these early forecast were 
firmly rooted in a faith in growth which, in retrospect, can 
be seen to be naive. The utlilty representatives of the 
time were far less versed in mathematical economics and 
modeling than their heirs would be, and the techniques they 
applied reflected their orientation towards the future. 
Many consequences followed from this initial enterprise: a 
long lasting precedent was set for simple trend forecasts as 
an input to the region's power planning decisions. Until 
the early 1970's, stable (and robust) regional growth (erec-
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ted, in many ways, upon the infrastructure of Federally-
based hydropower) posed little challenge to this, in 
retrospect, simplistic forecasting methodology. These early 
forecasts, with their 11-year time horizons were later 
supplemented by 20 year versions (element number 3 on map) 
in 1968. 
The signing of the Canadian Treaty (O-perspective) in 
1964 (event number 2) simultaneously set new policy and 
foreshadowed the end of business-as-usual for BPA. This 
treaty, negotiated by u.s. and Canadian governments (and 
involving the Army Corps of Engineers, the Department of the 
Interior, and BPA) established the sites for the final set 
of high-head dams along the Columbia River system, conclud-
ing an era where additional cheap hydroelectric power could 
be treated as a given. At the same time the immediate power 
surplus resulting from the newly acquired generation in turn 
resulted in the establishment of the California Intertie so 
BPA could market the power it was required by Treaty to 
purchase from Canada, but which was not yet needed in the 
Region. From this point on, Intertie sales became a 
critical part of BPA marketing strategies. 
Element 3 on the map, the expansion of the sou forecast 
to 20 years, was influenced by both the previously mentioned 
events (T-T, O-T). The connection with the first element is 
both direct and obvious -- the methodological precedent 
established in 1954 was carried over. The forecast remained 
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a simple sum of utility-specific trend e~trapolations (wlth 
BPA preparing forecasts for small public utllities) -- the 
extrapolations simply went further into the future. In-
directly, the signing of the treaty provided something of an 
impetus for longer forecast horizons in that the O-per-
spective considerations underlying the formulation of the 
terms of the Treaty (e.g. contlnued Federal participation in 
generating resource development, future regional marketing 
challenges for BPA, etc.) raised questions about the longer 
term future which an extended forecast would help to answer. 
These concerns, however, did not extend to challenging the 
assumptions underlying the SOU or to exploring qualitatively 
different futures. 
A number of factors influenced the formulation and 
implementation of the Hydro-Thermal Power plan in 1968 
(element 4, listed in the '0' column). The T-perspective 
findings of the SOU forecasts (both 11-, and 20-year) pre-
pared in that (and preceeding) years indicated a continually 
growing need for power (T-O). This methodologically-
grounded perception posed an organizational challenge for 
BPA to provide continued high levels of service to its 
customers, particularly its preference customers. Also 
supporting the plausibility of these challenges were the 
aforementioned realizations stemming from'the signing of the 
Canadian treaty (0-0). Decision makers and functionaries 
alike had just taken a hard look at the anticipated 
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limitations of the regional power supply system (even with 
its newly proposed additions) and were just beginning to 
assess the possible consequences of tapping different 
%esou%ces for generation. 
Undoubtedly, the most significant of the decisions made 
in response to the passage of the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan 
(0-0) was that of WPPSS to begin construction of a series of 
nuclear plants (o-perspective: element 5). The Power Plan, 
with its provisions for net billing arrangements with the 
region's public utilities, provided an umbrella for the 
financing of such construction projects. The SOU forecasts, 
at that time the sole picture of Northwest power futures, 
indicated an imminent need for generation beyond the 
capacity of the Columbia River hydrosystem. It was these 
load projections which further reinforced the deeply in-
grained perception in the power planning community of 
continued high growth, and which reaffirmed the traditional 
strategy of building in advance of need (T-O). This initial 
decision, later augmented to include additional nuclear 
facilities, was clearly destined to provide the all too 
fixed context for power planning in the 1980s. 
Within BPA, the perception of anticipated power 
shortages in the not too distant future resulted in some 
organizational changes (T-O). Though functionally the unit 
charged with participating in the SOU forecasts remained 
essentially the same, a 1972 change of name reflected a 
309 
somewhat altered perception of its mission within the 
organization. Power Marketing became Power Reguirements 
(a-perspective: element 6), the name change was indicative 
of the attitude that the unit would no longer be seeking 
markets for abundant surplus power but rather searching for 
ways in which to meet its customers' essential needs, or 
requirements. Though they were perceived or framed somewhat 
differently, the unit's missions, contributing to the sou 
forecast and producing marketing studies, did not, in fact, 
change substantially at this time. 
It was in late 1972 that Donald Hodel became Bonneville 
Power Administrator, bringing his own particular managerial 
style and personal expertise (P-perspective: element 7) to 
the Office. As noted in the previous chapter, Hodel was 
immediately confronted by a low water year, t~xing the 
generation capabilities of the hydrosystem, and, not long 
after, in 1973, the repercussions of perhaps the singlemost 
significant event in recent energy policy making history: 
the Arab Oil Embargo (element 8: a-perspective). America, 
and the world at large, suddenly became acutely aware of 
their heavy dependence upon oil (particularly oil from 
foreign sources) and of the sensitivity of their economies 
to political events half a world away. These conditions 
created a sense of an "energy crisis" requiring strong and 
perhaps drastic remedial responses by government and 
industry (O-P). In the wake of such developments, and in 
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the face of high SOU growth projections (T-P); it is hardly 
surprising that the touchstones of Hodel's Administration 
were the timely and efficient development of thermal 
resources (under the Hydro-Thermal Power Plan) and, to a 
lesser degree, the exploration of possibilities for pro-
moting regional conservation. 
By the midpoint of Hodel's term of office, 1975, the 
new energy-consciousness in the region (mirroring that of 
the nation) had produced a certain polarization of atti-
tudes. BPA and PNUCC were more committed than ever to a 
policy of supporting and promoting the growth in power 
consumption expected to continue throughout the reminder of 
the century. Within BPA (P-O), Power Requirements was 
organizationally subordinated to Power Resources (element 9: 
O-perspective), in a limited sense, foreshadowing the more 
pronounced support role for resource decisions the unit 
would have later under Peter Johnson. 
On the other hand, the "energy crisis" left increasing 
doubt and discomfort about the shape of the future in its 
wake. In 1975, this uncertainty about energy futures led to 
both technical (O-T) and institutional developments (0-0). 
In the former area, the research group at Washington state 
University's Environmental Research Center prepared thirty-
year projections of energy futures using end-use models 
(T-perspective: element 10), and several sets of assumptions 
regarding population and fuel process. They arrived at a 
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very different perception of the future than PHUCC, one 
characterized by much lower rates of load growth. Unlike 
PNUCC, the organizational agenda of the WSU group centered 
on the effects of various economic and demographic factors 
on energy consumption behavior and conservation. Their 
methods originated in engineering and economics and in some 
ways prefigured the orientations of future forecasting 
groups. In the latter area, the state of Oregon responded 
organizationally to the challenge of the energy crisis by 
forming ODOE, the Oregon Department of Energy (O-perspec-
tive: element 11). This group focused an unprecedented set 
of resources to the tasks of forecasting, planning, and 
siting energy facilities for the State of Oregon. 
This growing dispute over energy futures significantly 
provided the impetus (O-T, T-T) for the publication of the 
Skidmore, Owings, and Merrill report under contract to SPA 
(element 12: T-perspective). SPA's issuance of a notice of 
impending insufficiency (element 13: O-perspective) took 
place at roughly the same time, reflecting the firmness of 
the consensus view of impending shortages. There was, 
however, sufficient legitimate disagreement over the 
differences betwen WSU and SOU forecasts and concern about 
the severity of impacts of more limited energy resources to 
mandate a study of regional conservation potential. The 
results of this study, which seriously questioned the need 
for several of the WPPSS plants before the end of the 
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century, raised in turn, further doubts about the picture of 
the world governing energy development in the Northwest. 
Within BPA, the most direct and immediate consequence 
(T-T) of the SOM findings was a Power Requirements' staff 
effort to develop a framework by which the SOU forecast 
could be decomposed into a sector and end-use breakdown 
(element 14: T-perspective). With such a breakdown, the 
plausibility of the conservation savings estimates of the 
SOU report could be assessed. Working from available 
economic and demographic statistics and progressions, 
however, the group was unable to develop a framework which 
would account for the forecasted sales of the SOU without 
massive 'other' and 'miscellaneous' categories for residual 
loads. 
The most significant consequence (T-P) of this failed 
resolution of SOU and SOM reports was the enduring change of 
perspective it engendered in the key participants: Don 
Hoffard, Terry Esvelt, Mark Roberts, and Don Morey (element 
15: P-perspective). In 1977, when PNUCC obtained its econ-
ometric model from National Economic Research Associates to 
cross-check the SOU (element 16: T-perspective), the BPA 
staff members could only be skeptical of its corroboration 
of the SOU, given their experience of the previous year. 
(PNUCC's choice of econometrics reflected the rise of 
quantitatively trained technicians in their ranks. Complex 
models were becoming accepted as desirable if not neces-
sary.) This skepticism regarding forecasts of continued 
high load growth would remain with each of the members of 
this group and eventually supplant the "official" view of 
the late 1970s in Power Requirements. 
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At about the same time that PNUCC was acquiring its 
econometric model, to some extent a response to a growing 
regional debate over desirable energy futures, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council was releasing a forecast of its 
own (element 17: T-perspective). NRDC developed this 
forecast, based upon the earlier SOH report (T-T), in a 
fashion similar to that attempted earlier by BPA. Not 
surprisingly given NRDC's stated goals of protecting the 
environment and promoting conservation as an alternative to 
thermal generation, their forecast for the Northwest was 
characterized by much lower rates of load growth, and much 
heavier institutional development of conservation than 
Northwest planners had envisioned. 
At roughly the same time, new President-elect Jimmy 
Carter brought an overwhelming concern for the development 
of a national energy policy to the Office with him (element 
18: P-perspective). Heavily influenced by the then wide-
spread perception of a world energy crisis (O-T), which had 
been swelling since the time of the Arab Oil Embargo, 
carter, a former nuclear engineer, set in motion the estab-
lishment of a Department of Energy (element 19: O-perspec-
tive) tasked with planning and managing the nation's energy 
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resources. Under the departmental reorganization (P-O), BPA 
ceased being part of the Department of the Interior and 
became subordinate to DOE. 
One of the key organizational divisions of the fledling 
agency was the EIA: the Energy Information Administration. 
Functionally, this unit was tasked with collecting data, 
developing models, and preparing forecast of energy. Sig-
nificant among its early efforts was its contract with Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory to construct energy forecasting 
models for the commercial, residential, and industrial 
sectors (O-T). The structure of the completed models 
reflected the desires of the Carter Administration, tailored 
to test various energy policies and conservation strategies, 
displaying the results in an end-use categorization of great 
detail (T-perspectlve: element 20). 
Also not surprising was the appearance of a Conserva-
tion Section with BPA's Power Resources at about the same 
time (O-perspective: element 21). Though conservation had 
been among the priorities of the Hodel Administration since 
the first suggestions of impending power shortages, it was 
in the climate of late 1970s organizational politics that 
the function obtained its own reorganized niche at BPA. 
On January 1, 1978, Sterling Hunro replaced Donald 
Hodel as the Bonneville Power Administrator (element 22: 
P-perspective), a political appointment perhaps reflecting 
changed priorities of the carter Administration (P-P). 
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Munro, significantly, had earlier worked as a staff member 
for Senator Henry Jackson. His approach to administration 
(as noted in the previous chapter) was a decidedly political 
response to increasing interest, and controversy, about the 
regional management of energy resources. This centered, 
chiefly, on participation in the development of the Regional 
Act legislation designed to promote conservation and orderly 
resource expansion while minimizing disparities between rate 
pools. 
A technical project completed during this time period 
was the Northwest Energy Policy Project forecasts of region-
al energy growth (element 23: T-perspective). The NEPP 
research team was comprised of representatives of academia 
and the utility industry with extensive quantitative back-
grounds, most fundamentally in the area of econometrics. As 
a result of the issues raised by the energy crisis and the 
increasing diversity of views of desirable (or predictable) 
energy futures, NEPP independently prepared a twelve-volume 
report (O-T). This report, evaluating regional energy 
issues and policy options in some detail, included three 
forecast scenarios of possible load growth. Significantly, 
though not nearly as low as BPA's first independent fore-
casts of four years later, the NEPP econometrically-derived 
forecasts were considerably lower than the official planning 
forecasts produced by PNUCC, the medium case displaying an 
average annual rate of growth until 2000 of 2.93 percent as 
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compared to the nearly 5 percent AARG of the SOU and the 
PNUCC econometric forecasts. Though the NEPP forecasts did 
not supplant the SOU, they offered a credible alternatIve 
projection and served to illustrate better the sensitivity 
of images of the future to the particular set of models and 
modeling assumptions employed in their derivation. 
By early 1979, problems associated with the management 
of the region's power supply had become acute, and diverse 
interest groups and organizations became both more vocal and 
more forceful. For purposes of discussion, these organi-
zational responses may be treated as a cluster (element 24: 
O-perspectIve), since the power planning community was 
challenged to respond to virtually all of the concerns 
expressed. Ratepayer groups, increasingly incensed by the 
disparities between rates charged to IOU and ~ublic utility 
residential customers, pressed for rate reform with the 
State of Oregon attempting to turn its entire population 
into one large public utility district through the proposed 
Domestic and Rural Power Authority. Both ratepayer groups, 
and organizations promoting conservation and natural re-
sources, questioned the legitimacy of the DSI's claim to 
hydropower while the region's designated preference cus-
tomers were compelled to participate in the finanCing and 
construction of thermal resources. The DSI's, by contrast, 
feared that their power contracts, soon due to expire, would 
not be renewed and sought the promise of a guaranteed long-
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term power supply. Finally, and most significantly; the key 
players at WPPSS were suffering one construction cost over-
run after another and were hard pressed to maintain their 
planned construction without assistance. 
This turmoil spurred on the development of Regional 
Power Act legislation (O-P), with Senator Henry Jackson 
spearheading the effort in Congress (element 25: P-perspec-
tive). Jackson and Munro were old friends from the days 
when the BPA Administrator had served on his staff, and 
shared both perspectives and goals regarding the proposed 
legislation. Munro worked hard within BPA to satisfy the 
varied interests, and the equally varied problems, of the 
region through the legislative vehicle, while leaving the 
growing WPPSS problem relatively untouched. Though BPA 
offered some assistance with the financing and construction 
problems, responsibility for resolving the difficulties was 
left with the Supply System. 
Beginning in 1979, a number of technical projects were 
undertaken within Power Requirements which would ultimately 
have great bearing upon the 1982 forecast. Though staffing 
levels had not increased appreciably, the tone set within 
the larger organization by Munro, and the anticipation of 
BPA's augmented responsibilities under the proposed Power 
Act, suggested the need for an independent forecasting capa-
bility within BPA. Terry Esvelt, Hark Roberts, and Don 
Hoffard, remembering the lessons of their 1976 exerCise, 
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recognized the need for a new approach to forecasting which 
was capable of addressing the plethora of newly raised 
issues (P-T). As a part of DOE, it was easy for BPA to 
obtain the ORNL residential and commercial end-use models 
for Region 10 "off-the-shelf" -- (i.e. in finished form 
without additional contract work) (element 26: T-perspec-
tive). Region 10 excluded Montana and included Alaska. 
Much of the data in the model input sets had been imputed or 
calculated by the developers, so a need for better input 
data triggered two survey efforts (T-T). The first was a 
regional residential survey conducted under the contract for 
BPA by Elrick and Lavidge. This survey was delivered in 
1979 with analysis of the residential sector almost 
immediately following (element 27: P-perspective). The 
following year, 1980, BPA "bought into" a commercial survey 
already underway for DOE, adding funds to ensure that the 
experimental data collection sites were all in the Northwest 
(element 28: T-perspective). Both of the new models were 
used in 1980 to prepare a conservatlon assessment (T-T) for 
BPA service territories (element 29: T-perspectlve), though 
neither model had, at the time, been fully "loaded" with new 
regional data. 
Organizationally, 1980 was the "calm before the storm". 
PNUCC acquired its own in-house technical staff, instead of 
relying entirely upon utility representatives (element 30: 
O-perspective). Within BPA, an agency-wide "nomenclature 
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change" (element 31: O-perspective) upgraded each of the 
organizational units (Sections to Branches, Branches to 
Divisions, etc.) because of the smallness of DOE relative to 
001, but compared to what was soon forthcoming these changes 
were minor. As 1980 drew to a close, the Regional Power 
Bill was enacted in Congres~ (O-perspective: element 32), 
establishing a new and substantially revised set of 
groundrules for the power planning arena. The Act, to 
reiterate, established the Regional Council, comprised of 
two representatives from each of the four states, empowered 
to develop a long-term resource development plan for the 
region. It established provisions by which the DSI's would 
provide rate relief for residential and small farm customers 
of the IOUs, in exchange for guaranteed long-term power 
contracts. It established priorities for resource acquisi-
tion, giving conservation and renewable resources preference 
over conventional thermal resources. Finally, it added 
resource acquisition to BPA's traditional power marketing 
duties, making the agency responsible to the needs of not 
only its public utility preference customers but to any 
utility desiring to enter into residential exchange con-
tracts. In a very real sense, the passage of the Regional 
Act ushered in the beginning of the process which culminated 
in the release of BPA's 1982 forecast, for it was the added 
responsibilities assumed by BPA which transformed a sector-
specific, regional forecast from a luxury to a necessity. 
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By early 1981; the o~ganizational st~ucture of BPA 
displayed several alte~ations reflecting its new prio~ities 
(O-pe~spective: element 33). Both Power Requirements and 
Conservation unde~went a so~t of organizational fission, 
separating from Powe~ Resources and becoming independent 
Divisions. At the same time, the Division of Rates 
reorganized to modify their wholesale and ~etail ratemaking 
p~ocedu~es in accordance with the provisions of Regional Act 
(0-0). These changes signalled the genesis of the decision 
support apparatus which would underlie later decisions 
concerning the fate of the WPPSS plants. 
In direct and almost immediate response to the passage 
of the Act (O-T), Power Requirements began adapting the 
models resident on BPA's computer system (ORNL, PNUCC, and 
NEPP) to the Pacific Northwest, defined as Washington, 
Oregon, Idaho, and Montana west of the Continental Divide 
(element 34: T-perspective). This involved obtaining, or 
calculating, such key input values as commercial electric 
space heating shares or number of multifamily dwellings 
using data from the Elrick and Lavidge and Westat surveys 
(T-T) as well as reestimating key model parameters and 
coefficients (as AEA did for the NEPP model). 
In January of 1981, Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as 
President of the United states (element 35: P-perspective). 
In contrast to his predecessor, Reagan favored private 
sector development and management of energy resources to the 
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largest degree possible. He also sought to reduce the size 
of government wherever possible. One of his first actions 
after inauguration was to place a freeze on additional 
Federal hiring pending an assessment of the staffing levels 
thought to be needed by various agencies. Though affected 
by the freeze, BPA was able to grow slightly at a time when 
most of the Federal bureaucracy was beset with cutbacks 
because of the additional responsibilities it was assigned 
under the Act. In an even more dramatic move, Reagan 
sought, though ultimately unsuccessfully, to abolish DOE 
an action which presumably would have returned BPA to the 
Department of the Interior. This move was foiled by a 
combination of Congressional resistance and bureaucratic 
inertia. 
A new Republican in the White House, however, had 
numerous less direct repercussions. One which would prove 
extremely significant was the appointment of a seasoned 
businessman to the position of Bonneville Power Administra-
tor lP-P). In May, 1981, Peter Johnson took Office, bring-
ing his business and financial management skills, 50 
consonant with the philosophy of the Reagan Administration, 
to bear upon the WPPSS problem (element 36: p-perspective). 
Because Johnson's background proved to have a great 
influence upon the shape the BPA decision structure would 
assume, it deserves a summary recounting. Johnson earlier 
headed Trus Joist, a lumber and wood products company which, 
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during the 1970s, suffered the fortunes of a slowing maIket 
along with the Iest of the industIY. AfteI evaluating 
pIoduction and operation costs in light of sales projec-
tions, Johnson made a difficult decision and closed several 
of the company's plants so that the remainder might prosper. 
While otheI companies floundeIed, Trus Joist flourished and 
eventually reopened several of the closed facilities when 
profits were once again on the increase. The situation 
Johnson encountered at BPA with the WPPSS plants displayed 
many of the same elements -- escalating costs, a question-
able demand for the product, and over extended financial 
commitments -- and, not surprisingly, his approach to the 
problem reflected what had proven successful in the past. 
Johnson soon discovered that BPA lacked the apparatus 
needed to answer many of the financial questions whIch 
required resolution if decisions were to be made on the five 
WPPSS plants. In response to this need (P-O), Financial 
Management, prior to Johnson's arrival a small niche in the 
large organization, followed the direction which had re-
cently been taken by the Power Requirements and Conservation 
Divisions, and began a perIod of rapid growth (element 37: 
O-perspective). This growth was reflected both in numbers 
(staffing levels) and organizational importance (involvement 
in key organizational decisions). 
At roughly the same time, Conservation entered a final 
cycle of growth, detaching itself completely from Power 
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Management and becoming an independent office (element 38: 
O-perspective). Given the high priority given to the de-
velopment of regional conservation potential in the Act 
(0-0), the number of the tasks assigned to the group grew 
substantially and its change of status reflected the recog-
nition of this change in priorities by BPA upper management. 
Wholehearted organizational support for BPA's fore-
casting effort came with the enactment of the Regional Power 
Bill, since it was then obvious that BPA would need to 
perform certain types of analyses to support resource 
acquisition decisions. After the abovementioned models had 
been successfully adapted to the Pacific Northwest region 
they were subjected to a series of tests within BPA to 
determine their potential usefulness as policy planning and 
decision support tools (element 39: T-perspective). Four 
scenarios were constructed to see how well the models under 
consideration -- the PNUCC and NEPP all-sector models, the 
ORNL Residential Kodel, and the ORNL Commercial Kodel --
could deal with various conservation savings -- no special 
implementation mechanisms or programs were assumed to be in 
place. The resulting values produced by the straightforward 
(i.e. trend- or data-driven) operation of the demand models 
served as a reference against which to assess the user-
determined (i.e. program-driven) alternative. The second 
scenario examined the impacts of BPA-sponsored conservation 
programs taken to their full budgeted lifetimes. A third 
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scenario extended these savings through the end of the 
forecast period (2000), describing a situation where the 
programs would h~ve their funding maintained or renewed. A 
fourth and final scenario added further cost-effective 
measures (e.g. retrofits, building standards, etc.) to those 
considered in the third scenario. Only the two ORNL models, 
designed specifically to answer energy policy making and 
planning questions were able to distinguish between the 
scenarios -- for the NEPP and PNUCC models, all four 
scenarios were identical. This difference would later 
prove to be a significant one. 
In late 1981, prior to "going public" with its tech-
nical reviews and economic projections (T-O), Power Re-
quirements provided a detailed briefing to members of BPA's 
Po licy Committee (element 41: O-perspect i ve) .. Though the 
preliminary projections were noticeably lower than previous 
regional power planning forecasts, they were received with-
out pressure for revision. Some minor industry-specific 
economic forecasts were, however, modified based upon infor-
mation provided by members of the Policy Committee. In 
part, this "hands off" approach to the staff's forecasts may 
be attributed to Johnson's modus operandi of using "hard" 
analysis for decision support a strategy which had proved 
successful for him earlier at Trus Joist. In general, 
however, the Policy Committee knew that the changes seen in 
patterns of regional electricity use were not anomalies but 
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forces that needed to be dealt with. At a strategic plan-
ning retreat held at McCall, Idaho in the autumn of 1981 
(element 40: O-perspective), a number of Policy Committee 
conclusions supported the revised perception. It was 
expected that "regional load will increase at the rate of 2 
to 2 1/2 percent per year in the next two years .•. but that 
the rate of growth will slack off to 1 1/2 percent later", 
so generally lower forecasts were not expected. Moreover, 
it was anticipated that "the region's reaction to our first 
official and ensuing load forecasts will be a little better 
than heretofore, and that many will credit its competence, 
but that there is the potential for conflict with many 
sectors of the public" -- a clear, but not particularly 
novel insight given the late 1970s political climate. Added 
to this insight, however, was the comment "We would like to 
be known as the premier regional entity demonstrating this 
expertise" -- a sentiment recognizing the need to develop, 
and trust the judgments of, a qualified technical staff. 
Finally, the members of the retreat expected that "the 
region might believe that we are not doing enough to achieve 
conservation" (McLennan, 1981:1-2). Given this "mind-set" 
the Policy Committee gave Power Requirements the go-ahead to 
release the controversial findings of its model review, 
complete with its low growth rates and ambitious modeling of 
conservation. 
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Following approval by the Policy Committee, Power 
Requirements began a public involvement process which would 
span nearly six months. While public involvement is a 
cornmon practice for Federal agencies, it was particularly 
important that BPA's first independent forecast be fully 
exposed to the public. Though the Regional Act had passed, 
much of the controversy which prompted its formulation 
lingered in the region. Moreover, how the Power Act would 
be implemented was of special concern to many of the 
interested parties in the power planning arena, with the 
impending WPPSS decision weighing most heavily in the minds 
of the actors. Rates, financing decisions, and environ-
mental impacts would all follow as consequences of the 
forecast. 
In addition to imparting information to those to be 
affected by BPA's decision, public involvement also served 
to provide useful feedback to Power Requirements' technical 
staff. Though their tools and techniques were "state-of-
the-art" for energy modeling, data which the staff used for 
forecasting had limitations, as did the models themselves. 
The public involvement process allowed BPA to tap the fore-
casting expertise in the region. This could result in 
anything from a greatly strengthened product on one extreme 
to its general discrediting on the other end of the 
spectrum. 
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The forecasting process went through three stages 
technical review, draft-forecast, and final forecast -- with 
public comments received in the interim periods. This sort 
of interaction is of critical importance to understanding 
the development of a forecast using Multiple Perspectives, 
for the comments constitute interorganizational challenges 
which BPA had to respond to using patently technical means. 
This six- to seven-month period was when the largest variety 
of forces were shaping the forecast; thus the detail of 
description which follows is greater than for any other 
period illustrated in the cross-cuing map. 
Some qualifications need to be stated about what BPA's 
public involvement was and what it was not. The public in-
volvement process was never intended to be a means of using 
consensus or consultation in structuring the overall tech-
nical decision process, and was not presented as such. BPA 
staff was tasked with developing an independent forecasting 
system in a rather short period of time, given the urgency 
of the WPPSS decision. The resulting in-house capability 
was intended to enable the staff to ask rate and resource 
questions over and above what could be expected from the 
Regional Council once its planning apparatus. Basic re-
search has been prohibited at BPA. As such, models or 
techniques must be developed under contract or obtained 
"ready-made". The models selected, prior to public involve-
ment, were of the species with which the utility industry is 
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most familiar, econometric and end-use models. Lack of 
familiarity with other approaches (or of how to implement 
them or adapt them to the region's perceived power planning 
needs) limited the potential selection. Since public 
involvement began after this selection had taken place, its 
agenda was constrained or focused upon selection between 
alternatives and modeling improvements which could be made 
within the rather narrow band of time available. 
This public involvement agenda had two effects of 
significance. First it precluded, or at least minimized, 
the number of first-order methodological considerations 
which could be meaningfully raised or addressed. Attention 
to model detail tended to eclipse more basic questions of 
the risk and uncertainty and core assumptions associated 
with the overall planning and forecasting process. Second, 
the focus tended to limit the membership of the involved 
public. All persons desiring to make verbal or written 
comments were free to do so. Given the highly technical 
nature of the procedures and modeling tools under consider-
ation, fluency in the language of trends, econometrics, or 
complex models was virtually a prerequisite to participa-
tion. This largely limited the views expressed to those of 
the utility community and conservation groups with extensive 
training in analytical fields such as mathematics, econ-
omics, and engineering. 
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As 1981 drew to a close, BPA conducted a series of 
public involvement workshops designed, as noted above, to 
familiarize the public with the methodology and models which 
would be used to develop its first independent forecast and 
to solicit technical feedback in the form of critical com-
ments. Though depicted as a single cell or block in the 
cross-cuing map, (element 41: a-perspective), the technical 
workshops in fact spanned a period of over a month. The 
cell is depicted as falling within the a-perspective because 
the workshop session provided an arena for organizations to 
represent themselves and their concerns. (Backgrounds of 
the individual representatives, in principle P-perspectives, 
are, however, discussed where relevant.) On December 9, 
1981 a first workshop was given, focusing exclusively upon 
the economic and demographic projections used to dr1ve the 
demand forecasting models. The models in turn, were re-
viewed approximately one month later in a second, two day 
long workshop on January 11-12, 1982. The rationale behind 
the month lag was that should critical flaws be discovered 
in the economic and demographic projections they could be 
corrected over the 30 day period. Otherwise, the subsequent 
demand projections would be founded upon flawed inputs. 
Practically speaking, even when forecasting models appear to 
be behaving reasonably well, a few surprises generally 
emerge when new inputs are entered which require reca1ibra-
tion or perhaps even correction. Thus, from the Power 
Requirements staff's point of view, the delay between 
meetings was a desirable one. 
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All the meetings were set up with essentially the same 
format. BPA staff members made formal presentations on 
materials which had been made available in printed form. 
Next, "expert" panels presented prepared comments on the 
models, methods, or results under consideration. Finally, 
audience members were provided the opportunity to ask 
questions or make comments (verbal or written). All of 
these pieces of the process were transcribed by a court 
reporter and made available for subsequent review. 
The first workshop sessions, focusing upon economic and 
demographic projections, comprised two separate presenta-
tions, each followed by a discussion by four expert panel-
ists and by five statements also prepared by experts in the 
field. The morning presentations dealt exclusively with the 
projection of employment, population, and households. By 
contrast, the afternoon presentations centered upon fore-
casts of fuel price, interest and inflation rates, and 
miscellaneous economic variables used by the various demand 
forecasting models. Panelists were selected both based upon 
their familiarity with the region's economic conditions and 
with the methods used by BPA staff to arrive at their 
projections. 
The morning presentation by BPA staff explained the 
methodology by which employment, population, and housing 
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projections were derived (see Chapter II) and highlighted 
important trends. Employment in lumber and wood products, 
was expected first to recover from the early 80s recession 
but trend steadily downward through 2000. Pulp and paper 
employment was expected to remain relatively steady across 
the forecast period, transportation employment was expected 
to increase slightly, while agricultural employment was 
expected to decline. Robust growth, however, was foreseen 
in the electronics industry, where year 2000 employment 
arrived at a value double that of 1980. Population was 
likewise expected to grow, but less rapidly than the labor 
force. Much of the increase was attributed to migration and 
with heavier female participation in the labor force the 
size of some of the young cohorts were predicted to shrink. 
As a result of these population trends, the number of house-
holds was foreseen to increase, though the percentage of 
single family detached homes was anticipated to decrease 
(i.e. more heads of households but smaller families). 
The morning's panelists included figures from both 
business and government. Richard slaughter, a former 
Professor of Political Science, was, at the time of the 
sessions, Chief Economist with the State of Idaho's Division 
of Financial Management. His responsibilities with that 
agency included publishing the state's economic forecast. 
His comments focused upon BPA's electronics industry fore-
cast, which he thought was overly optimistic. 
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Richard Conway, the second panelist: also had earlier 
roots 1n academia, having been a Research Associate in 
University of Washington's business school. With degrees in 
both engineering and regional sciences his work had included 
the preparation of economic inputs on WNP 4 and 5 for the 
Washington state Legislature and the development of both 
input-output and econometric models for the Hawaiian 
Department of Planning and Economic Development. His 
then-current vocation was economic consulting. Conway's 
remarks stressed the need to reexamine the relationship 
between population and employment, and the importance of 
quantifying forecast uncertainty. 
William Jeske, the third panelist, had received his 
academic training in both mathematics and economics. Corning 
to the session as Special Projects Manager for the Economic 
Development Council of Puget Sound, he had also previously 
served with both Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company 
and Seattle Trust and Savings Bank. Jeske generally liked 
BPA's approach to developing economic and demographic varia-
bles, but asserted the need for industry-specific employment 
multipliers and questioned the assumptions of the housing 
model, noting that it seemingly ignored the effects of 
disposable income. 
The fourth and final panelist for the morning's 
discussion was Phillip Brooks, Senior Economist for the 
Research and Information Systems Division of the Montana 
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Department of Administr~tion. With both business and 
economics degrees he had previously taught economics and 
statistics at universities in both Kentucky and Nevada. In 
his position with the state of Montana, he was responsible 
for their state population projections. Brooks gave a 
limited endorsement to BPA's population projection method-
ology but felt that the factors underlying migration were 
not well understood. He also believed BPA's economic base 
model was better suited to smaller geographic areas than the 
region as a whole. 
A number of attendees responded to the panel with 
comments. steve McLaughlin of Battelle Human Affairs Re-
search Centers felt that BPA should break out its projection 
of households by persons per household. Brian Wall of the 
u.s. Forest Service noted that projections of wood products 
employment should show feedbacks from housing projections. 
Wes Engstrom of Boeing commented that BPA's forecast re-
flected transient problems in his company's past, and that 
apparent productivity increases at Boeing were the result of 
more preliminary work done outside the region. Cleveland 
Anschell of Rainier Bank pointed out that the savings and 
loan industry would no longer, in effect, subsidize the 
housing and timber industries. Finally, John Savage of 
Oregon Department of Energy, suggest~d that BPA dovetail 
near-term and long-term forecasts of economic activity. 
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The afternoon presentations focused upon another set of 
critical projections developed by BPA staff, per capita 
income, interest and inflation rates, and non-electric fuel 
prices. Per capita income projections were developed by a 
non-econometric modeling approach driven by population and 
employment. The regional trends represented modifications 
of DRI projections, and, as in the historic period, were 
forecasted to grow slightly faster than the national average 
(20-year AARG 1.95 percent vs 1.8 percent). 
Interest rates for the region were projected to be 
essentially the same as for the nation as a whole, with 
residential mortgage rates projected to fall from 12 3/4 to 
10 percent by 2000. Commercial and industrial rates were 
seen to fall from 11 3/4 to 8 percent over the same period. 
Inflation rates, then at about 11 percent were calculated to 
fall to a low of 6.3 percent by the end of the forecast 
period. 
Fossil fuels estimates included 20-year projections for 
petroleum, natural gas, and industrial coal. Oil prices for 
the region were, on average, envisioned to grow at 3 percent 
per year to the forecast horizon. Natural gas prices were 
broken out by sector, growing at AARG's of 4 percent for the 
residential sector, 4.3 percent for the commercial sector, 
and 4.8 percent for the industrial sector. Lastly, coal 
prices were seen to grow at a rate of 4.4 percent per year. 
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Once again, four expert panelists were on hand to 
evaluate and comment on BPA's economic and demographic 
projections. The first panelist Don Reading was Director of 
Policy and Administration at the Idaho Public utilities 
Commission. His training was in the field of economics, 
which he had taught prior to obtaining his position with the 
state of Idaho. His remarks advocated the use of inter-
active modeling to supplant trending approaches and criti-
cized an underlying assumption of BPA's forecast, namely 
that regional wage rates would move towards national 
averages over the forecast period. 
Sam van Vactor, a Professor at Portland state Univer-
sity, was concurrently working as a consultant with the 
Northwest Energy Policy Workshop. Bringing expertise on the 
fossil fuel market to his position on the panel, van Vactor 
had previously served with the International Energy Agency 
in Paris, France and had been the Director of Planning at 
the Oregon Department of Energy. van Vactor, focusing on 
fossil fuel prices, believed that the DRI base case upon 
which BPA's fuel price forecast was based was more of a high 
case, and should be lowered accordingly. 
The third panelist, James Scherzinger, received 
academic training in both mathematics and economics. At the 
time of the BPA workshop, he worked as an economist in the 
Oregon state Legislative Revenue Office where his responsi-
bilities included oversight of the state economic and 
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revenue model. His opinion, like Reading's, was that an 
interactive model should be used for developing economic 
projections (rather than the sequential approach used by 
BPA). He also believed per capita income and employment to 
be too high (at least for Oregon). 
The final panelist was Scott Hannigan, an economist who 
was manager of Pacific Power and Light's Load Forecasting 
and Analysis Department. Hannigan had earlier worked for 
the Oregon Department of Economic Development and was a 
member of PNUCC's Load Forecasting Committee. Hannigan 
thought BPA's results reasonable but felt the projections 
were too aggregated for many of the planning purposes for 
which they likely would be used. 
As had occurred in the morning, several attendees chose 
to make statements. Milan Brace, representing a PNUCC task 
force set up to evaluate BPAs forecasts, noted that their 
consensus was that the economic and demographic projections 
were reasonable, but felt that a fully developed economic 
activity model should replace judgments in many portions of 
the forecast. Glen Swift, who did not state an organiza-
tional affiliation, questioned whether the assumption that 
the economic downturn of the early 1980s was indeed tempor-
ary. Charlie Allcock of Portland General Electric recom-
mended that BPA hold a workshop where underlying forecast 
assumptions be identified and evaluated. Cleveland Anschell 
noted most risk associated with the economic forecast was 
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downward and suggested BPA evaluate its baseline again. 
Finally, Adele Newton of the League of Women Voters asked 
how disagreements with the Council's upcoming forecast might 
be resolved. 
Slightly over a month later, on January 11th and 12th 
of 1982, the demand models considered for BPA's residential, 
commercial, and industrial sector forecasts were similarly 
subjected to public scrutiny. The entirety of the January 
11th session was devoted to the residential sector, while 
the following day's session was divided evenly between 
commercial and industrial sectors. The additional time and 
attention devoted to residential sector modeling issues was 
the consequence of the fact that better data collection and 
analysis had been carried out in that sector. 
Three residential models were reviewed by BPA staff at 
the January 11th meeting: the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL) Residential Model and the residential components of 
the all-sector NEPP and PNUCC Econometric Models. In 
general, the ORNL results showed noticeably lower rates of 
growth over the forecast period. More importantly, however, 
the ORNL Model produced different results for each of the 
four conservation scenarios, whereas the NEPP and PNUCC 
models did not. 
Four panelists had been invited to make prepared pre-
sentations on the model's methodologies and inputs and to 
model a result and sensitivity analysis following BPA staff 
presentations on the same areas of focus. They were 
selected with the intent of providing a variety of view-
points on the models and issues under consideration. 
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In selecting the panel, BPA obviously attempted to 
bring in qualified and experienced speakers representing 
diverse professions. Academia, the utility industry, state 
government, and environmental protectionists all found a 
voice in the discussion. But despite these apparent dif-
ferences, panelists displayed some important common 
characteristics. All were, of course, well versed in 
modeling and forecasting and had rich backgrounds in their 
fields. But beyond this, all had specifically worked with, 
or developed, end-use models (the ascendant methodological 
form since the early Carter years) and all had been exten-
sively involved with conservation. To the extent that these 
were focal issues at the time of this forecast, these 
emphases could be appropriate. It is worth noting, however, 
that none of the panelists acted as methodological foils to 
the others. No one, for instance; sought to champion 
econometric models as a generally preferred approach to 
forecasting nor did anyone take a "laissez fa ire" approach 
to the development of conservation in the region (i.e. 
eschewing programs altogether). More importantly, none 
attempted to promote a third alternative approach to 
residential forecasting which employed neither econometrics 
nor end-use frameworks. The participants apparently 
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accepted that BPA's model development agenda was fixed, 
thereby limiting available alternatives or were unfamiliar 
with other possibilities. 
John Duffield, an Associate Professor of Economics at 
the University of Montana, "represented" the academic 
community in the panel. After obtaining his Ph.D. from Yale 
in 1974, Duffield had done research in the area of environ-
ment and energy policy: air pollution standards, oil and gas 
leasing, solar energy, and super-insulated buildings. 
Additionally, at the time of the workshop, he was involved 
in the development of a forecasting model for North-
western Great Plains Coal. Duffield gave what might be 
termed a guarded endorsement of the ORNL end-use model for 
the residential sector. He thought it superior to the other 
models considered, but felt that the model's treatment of 
technology too simplistic. 
Pat King, the second member of the panel, was a Senior 
Load Forecasting Analyst for the Pacific Power and Light 
(PP&L) Company, a PNUCC member utility. Also an economist, 
King had been responsible for developing PP&L's first 
residential end-use forecasting model and had been involved 
in evaluating the company's conservation programs. He also 
preferred the ORNL model somewhat because of its specific 
policy testing capabilities. Like Duffield, he thought the 
technology curves underlying the efficiency choice component 
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were weak, particularly where miscellaneous electricity use 
was concerned. 
A staff member of Oregon Department of Energy also 
appeared as a panelist. Tom Wilson, trained in mathematics, 
had extensive modeling experience. He had, at the time of 
the BPA model review, written the code for two end-use 
models, one of which was being used for ODOE's residential 
forecasts. Beyond this, his forecasting expertise extended 
to issues of electricity pricing and solar economics. 
Wilson confined his attention to what he considered to be 
the preferred model for the residential sector, the one 
developed by ORNL. He noted weaknesses in the technology 
curves, questioning the specifics of the efficiency choice 
calculation, and believed that projections of new residen-
tial space heating did not account for increasing use of 
wood stoves. He suggested developing a hybrid model which 
could compensate for some of these weaknesses. 
The final panelist was David Goldstein, a physiCist 
employed by the Natural Resources Defense Council, the group 
which had, following the 1976 publication of the SOM study, 
questioned the need for the WPPSS plants and the seriousness 
with which conservation was considered as a viable alterna-
tive. Goldstein had become intimately familiar with fore-
casting issues through his involvement with the California 
Energy Commission and had performed extensive building 
conservation potential assessment with Lawrence Berkeley 
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Laboratory. Goldstein felt that the ORNL model was clearly 
superior to the alternatives based upon its capabilities for 
dealing with conservation policy analysis. The structure of 
the model, he claimed, led the energy debate in the proper 
direction. Though data-intensive, the model only required 
data needed for other purposes as well, and thus its use, in 
effect, improved knowledge about the residential sector. 
Like the other panelists, he felt the technology curves 
needed reestimation. 
Aside from presentations by BPA and the expert panel-
ists, the public meeting allowed any attendees to make 
comments or raise questions. Milan Brace, a forecaster and 
energy analyst who had read a prepared statement at the 
economics workshop as a representative of the PNUCC 
technical team a month earlier, suggested that BPA find some 
way of adjusting the ORNL model to "track" a path somewhere 
between those of the PNUCC and NEPP models (which he thought 
more statistically valid) and then use it to perform policy 
analysis. 
Sam van Vactor, one of the panelists in the December 
economics workshop, believed a simplified econometric model 
could better handle the effects of conservation programs in 
its coefficients than end-use models, since the latter had 
to deal with each program individually. Mike McHugh of AEA 
suggested that the optimal solution to the modeling problem 
was a "middle of the road" approach which relied on aggre-
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gate data to the fullest extent possible and then used 
policy-oriented components to carry analysis further. 
Lastly, Doug Woodfill of Math Sciences Northwest expressed 
concern that the discount rate used in the ORNL model's fuel 
and equipment choice was too high. 
On the following day, the models under consideration 
for the commercial and industrial portions of BPA's fore-
casts. Each of these sessions were a half day in length. 
There were several reasons that these sectors received less 
attention than the residential sector. 
The commercial sector consumed the smallest portion of 
electric energy of the three being modeled, but was also the 
fastest growing. Perhaps more importantly, it was (and 
remains) the most diverse in terms of building structure 
configurations and consumption patterns. Because of this, 
however, data on the sector was sparse. In consequence, 
modeling efforts in that sector relied more extensively on 
judgment and, correspondingly, it was more difficult for 
audience participants to substantiate any disagreements they 
might have with BPA's modeling methodology or results. The 
industrial sector was better understood. The types of 
productivity improvements and energy saving programs which 
might be implemented were reasonably well known and, from a 
modeling standpoint, the number of decision pOints (e.g. 
factories, plants) were far fewer than in the other two 
sectors. Additionally, the two models being considered by 
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BPA both employed an econometric methodology. Thus, much of 
the methodological controversy surrounding the model choices 
for the other sectors were afforded less time than the 
residential sector in the technical review with little 
experienced paucity of coverage. 
The commercial sector menu of model offerings paral-
leled that of the residential sector. Three models were 
again considered -- the ORNL Commercial Model and commercial 
sector components of the NEPP and PNUCC models -- and again 
only the end-use model could effectively produce distin-
guishable policy scenarios. 
Again, BPA had selected a panel of experts to comment 
on the commercial models, the methodology underlying their 
use, and the findings of the resulting analysis. Most of 
the previous day's participants were once again on hand, so 
the expertise of the residential sector panelists was avail-
able for discussions and, invariably, many of the audience's 
concerns would resurface. Once again the panelists for the 
commercial sector were selected to provide diverse views 
though the spectrum of orientations did not seem as wide as 
that of the previous day's session in part because of the 
more limited information existing about the sector. 
(Interestingly, two of the panelists would soon become part 
of the Regional Council's technical staff.) 
Tom Eckman (one of the two destined to become part of 
the Council's staff) was an Energy Policy Analyst at the 
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consulting firm of Math Sciences Northwest. (Members of 
this firm had been the architects of the original NEPP 
model, though most had moved to AEA, a rival firm). Eckman 
had been extensively involved in regional energy planning, 
both as a member of Seattle City Light's Technical Advisory 
Committee on forecasting and, in his consultant role, as an 
assistant to the newly formed Regional Council on conser-
vation and resource development issues. Eckman noted the 
need for an all-fuels energy forecasting model with a dis-
aggregated structure to perform rate, resource and conser-
vation analysis. At the same time, he noted the problems 
associated with obtaining the vast amount of data needed by 
the ORNL End-Use Model. He concluded his remarks without 
endorsing any of the model choices unilaterally, the ORNL 
model was clearly the best suited to meet his stated model 
selection criteria. 
John Douglas, of the Washington state Energy Office; 
was the second panelist for the commercial session. A 
professional engineer, Douglas had dealt extensively with 
energy issues both in government and the private sector 
(both as a consultant and as a designer of heating, 
ventilating, and air conditioning systems for Boeing). In 
his role as an Energy Policy Specialist, for the state of 
Washington, Douglas' work focused upon facility siting and 
technical assistance to Washington's two representatives on 
the Regional Council. Like Eckman, Douglas recognized both 
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the necessity of including a conservation assessment com-
ponent and the problems associated with end-use model data-
intensiveness. He also identified the need for assigning 
probabilities to any forecast scenarios produced. 
Laurel Andrews, the third panelist, worked as an 
economist with the forecasting group at Seattle City Light 
(SCL). Prior to her employment at SCL, she had served as a 
private consultant for that utility, as well as Puget Sound 
Power and Light, u.S. Department of Energy, and the Electric 
Power Research Institute. Her credentials also included a 
tour of duty as an Energy Policy Analyst for the City of 
Seattle's Office of Policy and Evaluation. Her comments 
which centered upon a critique of the different models' 
actual performance, led her to conclude that the ORNL model 
was the preferred alternative due to its ability to distin-
guish between different types of commercial customers. She 
also recommended econometric cross-checks on any end-use 
forecast. 
Ken Corum, the fourth and final commercial panelist, 
possessed rather unique insights into the models under 
consideration. At the time of the meeting, Corum was 
departing the staff of PNUCC, where he served as an energy 
demand forecaster, to occupy a similar position with the 
Regional Council. With training in both mathematics and 
economics he had, prior to relocating in the Pacific 
Northwest, worked at ORNL, where he participated extensively 
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in the development of both residential and commercial sector 
models. Corum focused exclusively upon the ORNL model and 
its developmental needs. Observing that the model was first 
specified using national data, several components, especial-
ly the fuel and efficiency choice components, needed addi-
tional work to be adapted to the specific regional condi-
tions of the Pacific Northwest. 
The public comment period surrounding the commercial 
sector presentation was less of a debate on the merits of 
econometric and end-use methodology than the previous days 
session, focusing more strongly on specifics. A noteworthy 
exception was the prepared statement read by Craig Casey, an 
attorney representing six of the natural gas distributing 
companies of the Northwest. It was the conclusion of the 
gas companies that without "finalized" models and modeling 
assumptions that "little of a constructive nature" might be 
accomplished at a public hearing. To be meaningful, the 
hearings would need to present electricity prices (and cost 
assumptions behind them), and provide an opportunity for 
public comment and questions regarding input data before the 
final forecast. 
The concerns of the gas companies were legitimate, 
though the accusations were pretentious. BPA and Regional 
Council had the power to implement conservation programs 
which through subsidies, rebates, or credits, could give 
electricity a price advantage over other fuels. Such 
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programs might under certain circumstances be the result of 
improper representation of comparative fuel prices in models 
(or the models in proper response to them), so, other gas 
companies were correct in noting that a full assessment of 
BPA's models required further information. The full public 
lnvolvement process, however, did provide later opportunity 
for evaluatlng the missing pieces of the forecasting system 
between the draft and final forecasts. Rather strangely, 
however, BPA chose not to reiterate this point in their own 
defense but rather simply let the comment be noted and 
avoided a debate that might have sidetracked the presenta-
tions. 
Mike McHugh, of AEA, noted that he himself had attempt-
ed to build aggregate econometric models of the commercial 
sector with little success, largely due to lack of data 
about the diverse patterns of consumption. Building a 
disaggregate model, he argued, would be even more difficult, 
with large likelihood of serious errors. Given these 
weaknesses, cross-checks for accuracy and plausibility would 
be imperative. Phil Carver of ODOE, after noting his pre-
ference for the ORNL model, criticized the building simula-
tions underlying the technology curves and the model's 
overall price responsiveness. Lastly, Don Dohrmann of ADM 
Associates noted that the floorspace component of the ORNL 
model was isolated from the policy-driven aspects of the 
model. 
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Unlike in the residential sector, no strong voices 
favoring the PNUCC model (or something with a similar 
methodology) were raised. Though weaknesses in the ORNL 
Commercial Model were evident, no alternative approach was 
given serious consideration. 
The concluding session of the public involvement 
workshop focused upon the models proposed for use in the 
industrial sector. This session differed in two important 
ways from its predecessors. First, as alluded to earlier, 
both of the models under consideration were econometric; 
hence, critical comparisons focused upon specific model 
strengths and weaknesses, rather than venturing into 
methodological debates. Second, because it was the final 
session, the associated comment period was the last oppor-
tunity for audience participants to express themselves. As 
a result, the discussion often went beyond industrial sector 
concerns embracing broader, more general, issues relating to 
BPA's upcoming forecasts, its underlying assumptions, and 
its ultimate uses. 
For both models under consideration, only one scenario 
could be considered, due to the inability to handle conser-
vation programs endogenously. The NEPP model produced 
results which displayed an overall average annual rate of 
growth roughly half a percent lower than the PNUCC model. 
In large part, this difference was the result of latter 
models substantially higher predicted growth for lumber, 
paper, chemicals and transportation. 
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The four industrial panelists, suffice to say, all had 
strong backgrounds in econometrics. Frank Taussig, the 
first panelist, was trained as a mathematician and working 
as Senior Economist for the Oregon Public utilities Commis-
sion. Taussig had compiled an impressive background both in 
academia and government, working on short- and long-term 
economic and energy forecasting, analysis of conservation 
and billing credits, and econometric analyses of electricity 
demand. At the time of the workshop, he served on both the 
Regional Council's Advisory Committee as well as PNUCC's 
Load Forecasting Committee. Taussig chose to present 
criteria for good forecast documentation as his contribution 
to the proceedings. Good documentation should contain clear 
statements of objectives, underlying theory, data sources, 
statistical goodness-of-fit measures, the model's perfor-
mance over a historical time period, and relationships to 
other findings. 
The second panelist, Jim Abrahamson, was an economist 
working to produce Pacific Power and Light's system load 
forecast. Like Taussig, he also worked with PNUCC, serving 
on two forecast-related committees; the Model Development 
Subcommittee and the Model Review Subcommittee. As such, 
his familiarity with the PNUCC model and its continued 
development was intimate. Though he found the PNUCC model 
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more transparent and easier to use than the NEPP model, 
Abrahamson found its lag structure weak and it did not 
display fuel substitution effects. The NEPP model produced 
some counterintuitive behavior between industries but, until 
a fresh approach could be developed, Abrahamson felt it was 
the preferred model. 
A representative of one of the region's DSls served as 
the third panelist. Glem Smith, Senior Energy Planning 
Analyst at Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, was at 
the time, involved in forecasting energy prices, business 
planning (related to energy issues), strategic planning, and 
acquisition analyses. His professional experience included 
work as an engineer with both Bechtel Power Corporation and 
Exxon. His academic training embraced both engineering and 
business administration. Smith, like Taussig, did not iden-
tify a preferred model. He did identify several critical 
modeling needs in the sector, including an industry-specific 
forecasting capability and supporting data. 
The final panelist was Ed Whitelaw, a Professor of 
Economics at University of Oregon and President of ECO 
Northwest, a consulting firm. His expertise extended beyond 
academic through involvement with two government agencies. 
He was one of the Oregon Governor's Council's Scientific and 
Statistical Advisory Committee. Whitelaw raised some more 
basic issues about BPA's scenarios which all centered around 
the Regional Act and its consequences. He pointed out the 
need for a revised approach to policy analysis, without 
stating a preference for either the NEPP or PNUCC model. 
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Several audience members followed Whitelaw's concluding 
remarks with comments or concerns of their own. John Savage 
of ODOE suggested that during the near term, when BPA was 
essentially committed to using an econometric approach to 
the industrial sector, some mix between the NEPP and PNUCC 
model be used. Lastly, Bob Keesee, a Senior Government 
Affairs Economist with the Georgia Pacific Corporation and 
Wes Engstrom cautioned against stretching the application of 
existing data bases too far. 
The essential features of the public involvement 
workshop are presented in summary form in Table XII below. 
Though the workshop was an "event" classified as organiza-
tional (O-perspective) it is obvious that personal influ-
ences (P-perspective) impact the process at many points. 
The table thus identifies the participants, their 
organizational affiliation (and, its interest or priorities) 
their background, their critical comments, and the 
anticipated effect implementing their suggestions would have 
on BPA's forecast. 
Before reviewing and analyzing the results it is worth 
making an observation about the use of Multiple Perspectives 
in such contexts. In the quest for explanatory simplicity, 
it 1s all too easy to treat cross-cuing relationships 
reductionistically. Thus, a somewhat cynical characteriza-
PARTICIP"'ITS 
(ORGANIZATION) 
Richard Slaughter 
(State of Idaho 
Div. of Fin. Mg.t) 
Richard Convay 
(Private consul-
tant) 
111 llla. oJeske 
(Econo.ic Develop-
.ent Council of 
PUge t Sound) 
Phillip Brook. 
(Montana Dept. of 
Ada in i s tra t1 on) 
Steve McLaughlin 
(Battelle Human 
Affairs Research 
Centers) 
Brian lIall 
(U.S. Fore.t Service) 
Wesley Eng.troe 
(Boeing Co.p.ny) 
TABLE XII 
A SUMMARY OF COMMENTS PRESENTED AT SPA'S TECHNICAL WORKSHOPS 
ORGANIZATION 
INTEREST 
• Consistency betveen 
BPA and State of 
Idaho economic 
forec •• ts 
• Exp.ndin9 ~phere of 
consultancy in econ-
Ollie areas 
• Healthy Puget Sound 
ar •• econolllY 
• Consistency betveen 
BPA .nd State of 
econoNic projections 
• Contlnuln9 as recog-
nized professional 
technical experts in 
reqion 
• Protection and 
develop.ent of 
timber resources 
• Continued health of 
.nd .ircraft indus-
try in Northwest 
PERS 
BACKGROUND 
Professor of politic.l 
science. econo_let 
Engineering, regional 
Bcience, prep.red 
econo.ic input for 
NNP 4 • 5 
M.th, econo.ic 
Taught econo.ics .nd 
statistica, prepared 
state popul.tion 
projections 
TECHNICAL 
COMMENTS 
Forecast of electronics 
e .. ploy .. ent 
optialstic 
BPA needs to quantify 
forec.st uncertainty, 
relationship of popu-
l.tion to e.ploy.ent 
need. ex.mination 
Multiplier effect varie. 
fro. indu.try to induatry, 
houaing .odel .ssumed 
away economic effecta 
Migration underlying 
population forec.st not 
well understood. economic 
b.se model better .uited 
to .... ller are.s 
Projections of houaeholda 
should be broken out by 
persons per household 
Projection. for tieber 
indu.try .hould reflect 
bidirection.lity of i.-
p.cta (feedbeck of hou.ing 
on eaploy.ent) 
BPA projections of Boeing 
employ~ent .ade fro. 
transient problems in 
recent post, apparent pro-
ductivity increased due 
to changes In -make/buy-
ratios 
SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMENTS 
TO FORECAST 
Would tend to lover econo.ic 
(and load forecas t) lar<;lely 
through .ultiplier effect 
Lover population or higher 
.aploy.ent projections 
Alt.red employ.ent co.position, 
housing forec.st too high for 
housing single f.aily ho~es 
Altered population and housin9 
population forecasts (no indication 
whether raised o~ lowered) 
Revised projectiona of houaeholde, 
likely higher disposable inco~e 
Higher •• ploym.nt (if full potenti.l 
yield accepted a. policy assu~ptionl 
Employment (and load) forec.sts 
lowe red 
w 
VI 
IV 
PARTICIPANTS 
IORCIIINIZIIITION) 
Cleveland Anschell 
IRalnier Bank) 
John Savaqe (OOOE) 
Don Readlnq (Idaho 
Public Utilities 
Co •• isaion) 
Sa. Van V.cto~ 
(PSU, HEPN) 
Jaeea Scheralnqer 
10reqon State Leq-
Islatlve Revenue 
Orflce) 
Scott Nannlqan 
(PP.L, PNUCC) 
Hllan Brace 
IPSPL, PNUCC) 
Glen Swlrt 
ORCIIINIZIIITION 
INTEREST 
• Malntalnlnq or 
atren9thenln9 in-
vra tllRrnta and 
econo .. lc health 
of reqlon 
• Conaistency between 
BPA and OOOE pro-
jections 
• Conalatency between 
BPA and Idaho econ-
oelc prOjections 
• E.pandlnq consul-
tancy, aalntalnlnq 
•• pert at.tus in 
ene.qy aren. 
• Conalatency of BPA 
projectlona with 
.tate rcono.te and 
revenue .odel 
• Conalstency of BPA 
and PP.L projectlona, 
plannln9 which would 
• Ilow pr.L to eake 
.. ood on Invest.enta 
• Reaaonability of fore-
ca~t relattve to 
PNUCC perceptions 
TABLE XII (Cont'd) 
PERS 
BIIICIIGROUNO 
Tau9ht reono.lea 
0lr~cted ODOE'. plan-
n1n9 .ffort •• exten-
alvely re.earched 
world p.troleue 
earket with Inter-
national Enerqy 
Aqency 
Tralnln9 In both econ-
oate. and •• the •• tlc. 
Oreqon Dept. of Econ-
oalc Oevelopeent 
TeCHNICAL 
COHHENTS 
Savlnq. and loan. no lonqer 
to .ubsldlze houalnq and 
t leber Indua try 
Dovet.ll neartera and lonq-
tera econoalc pr01ectlons 
Trendlnq approaches ahould 
be supplanted by Interact Iv. 
Modellnql unreaeonable to 
think re91on.l wage ratea 
would cloae to national 
averaqes 
DRI ba.e ca.e fo •• ll fuel 
for.ca.t too hlqh, .hould 
be low.red 
'rojection. ahould cae. 
froe Interactlv. aodel, per 
capita Inco.e and eaploy-
aent too hl .. h lat least 
for O.eqon) 
Por.ca.t too hlqhly a .. -
qreqated for plannlnq 
purpo.e • 
Interactive aodel .hould be 
constructed to supplant uae 
of judqeent 
Econoalc downtown al .. ht not 
be teaporary, hlqh and lov 
see. arbitrary 
SIGNIFICANce OF COHHENTS 
TO FORECAST 
Decreased houslnq and lueber and 
wood products projections 
Rece.slon would likely producl' lover 
near ter. projection. of econoalc 
activity 
Feedback effect. could alter ceon 
projection. upward/and/or downward 
Load for.ca.t would be lover 
Load for.c •• t would b. lover 
olBaqqr.qatlon could either rolse 
or lover BPA foreeaata 
Forecaat would likely be revised 
if econoa.trte .odel vere used 
Lover foree.ata 
w 
(J1 
W 
PARTICIPANTS 
(ORGANIZATION) 
Charlle Allcock 
(PGE. PNUCC) 
Adele Ne"ton 
(Lea9ue of Woeen 
Voters) 
John Duffield 
(U of Montana) 
Pat ltin9 
(PP.L) 
TOM Wilson 
(000£) 
David Goldstein 
(NRDC) 
Hilan Brace 
(PNUCC) 
San van Vector 
ORGANIZATION 
INTEREST 
• Resource plans and 
rates should not ad-
versely effect PGE's 
customers or share-
~olders 
• 9uaranteein9 voice 
to voters and rate-
payer in plannin9 
d.,cision 
• spearh.,adin9 r.,s.,arch 
into environmental 
and .,ner9Y policy 
• Ensurin9 that for.,cast 
would not adversely 
effect PP'L custo.era 
or shareholders 
• Conalat.,ncy of SPA 
.ethodoloqy and flnd-
inqs with ODO£'. 
forecastin9 experience 
• Protectin9 natural 
resource. and proeot-
In9 conB.,rvation aB 
e resource alterna-
tiv., 
• (aee ilbove) 
• (see abov.,) 
TABLE XII (Cont'd) 
PERS 
BACKGROUND 
TECHNICAL 
COMMENTS 
Assu~ptions behind forecilst 
should be revealed for 
critical examination 
SIGNIFICANCE OF COMHENTS 
TO FORECAST 
For.,cast could be hi9her or lower 
__ SPH asaumptions would be 
revealed 
Public should kno" ho" N/A 
dlsa9reeeents "Ith Council's 
fOr.,caBt to b., handl.,d 
Trained In economical 
performed research in 
ilreas of air pollu-
tion standards and 
solar energy and super 
inaulated bulldin99 
Economlstl had d.,veloped 
PP.L's firat residential 
end UBe forecastln9 
model 
Mathematiclanl built 
and operated ODO£'. 
end-use .odele 
Physicist. had "or ked 
with CEG on forecastin9 
isau"sl had per[orm.,d 
extensive .conservatlon 
assessment at LBL 
Guarded endors.,ment of ORNL 
model b.,cauae of policy 
teating capilbilitiesl "eilk 
representiltlon of new 
t.,chnol09 lea 
Pr.,ferred ORNL aodel struc-
ture, technolo9Y Burv •• 
weak. ·.isc· end-u.e ignored 
video ga.e5. etc. 
Ou.,atlon.,d ORNL aodels tech 
curves and tceat.ent of 
,,00dh.,atin9 SU99PGted devel-
oping ~ hybrid model 
Endorsed ORNL aodell tech-
nol09Y curves outdated 
BPA should calibrate ORNL 
mod.,l to track PNUCC and 
NEPP models 
Sample econoaetric model 
would be preferable 
Lower f')recast 
Lower forecast (though some 
of lowering would be wanted 
by revised misc. category) 
Lower foree.at 
Lower forecast 
H Ighe r [orecas t 
Elth.,r lower lor more likely) 
higher forecasts dependln9 upon model 
W 
11l 
~ 
PARTICIPANTS 
(ORGANIZATION) 
Milte McHugh 
IAEA, 
Doug wood fill 
IMath Scl.nce. NW, 
To. Eck.an 
IM.th Scienc •• NWI 
John Dougl •• 
INa.h St.t. En.r\lY 
Offlc.' 
Laurel Andre •• 
ISCL, 
Iten Coru. 
I~eglonal Council, 
Cr.ig C.s .. y 
INN N.t"G •• Di.t, 
Phil C.rver 
10DOEI 
ORGANIZATION 
INTE~EST 
• Exp.nding .phere of 
consult.ncy , •• in-
t.ining high profea-
.ion.l rep 
• Esp.ndin\l .ph.re of 
consult.ncy •• In-
talnlng per capita 
• Repre.entlng profe.-
slon.l espertl.e of 
con.ulting fir. 
• Con.lat.ncy of BPA 
forec •• t with data 
and r •• earch o( Stat. 
Energy Office 
• Con.l.tency of SPA 
for.c.at with SCL 
reaearch 
• Ensuring BPA forec.st 
~~thodoloqy .nd not 
conflict with Ideas 
or perception of 
Council 
• Protectln9 9 •• CO.-
p.nles froa policies 
which could poten-
tially -.teal- cua-
toa.r. 
• Conalstency of SPA 
a.thodology and 
findings with ODOE'. 
forecasting exper-
ience 
TABLE XII (Cant'd) 
PE~S 
BACKGROUND 
A •• t. to R.\llon.l Coun-
cil on con •• rvation 
and r •• ouree dev.lop-
.ent laaue. 
Enqlneer, extensive work 
in f.cliity altlng, 
con.ult.nt on HVAe d.-
819" for co ••• relal 
building. 
En.rgy policy .n.ly.t 
with govt. aq.ncl.~, 
prlvat. consulting 
In .nerqy field 
TECHNICAL 
COMMENTS 
Middle of the ro.d .odel 
'econoaetric/end-u.e' 
needed 
Di.count r.te u.ed in 
.ppli.nce efficiency cel-
cul.tion too high 
Di •• ggregete, all fuel. 
.od.l needed which could 
perfor. utility-.pacific 
foree •• t. 
Con.ervation policy •••••• -
aent nece ••• ry ele •• nt. 
need for •• thod of .s.ign-
ing probabilitia. 
ORHL aodal prafer.ble due 
to .bllity to recognize 
cuato •• , cl •••• a, econo-
aetric aod.l. should b. 
used a. backup. 
Develop .. r of O~NL aod .. l. ORNL .odel be.t choices, 
(or •• r PNUCC atall technolo9Y curve. need to 
a ... b .. r be .dju.ted to r .. glon 
rorec •• t •• hould .how .11 
•• Bu.ptlon. Iincluding 
elec. price) to .llow 
evalu.tion 
ORNL .odel best of three 
considered, tech. curve. 
and price le.pon.lv~nea. 
(l.w .. d 
SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMENTS 
TO FORECAST 
Hi\lh.r foreca.t 
Higher forec.at 
Higher forec •• t Iglvan ORNL par-
for •• ncea va other .0d~lD on 
·b •• elln~· seen.rio, 
Higher forec.at with end-u .... odel 
(for bs.e 11 na) 
Higher forac •• t 
HIgh .. r (or.c •• t (likely lower.d. 
in turn. by tech curve .djuatftent) 
Hiliher forecast 
w 
U'I 
U'I 
PARTICIPANTS 
10RGANIZATION) 
Don Dohraann 
1110" A •• ociata.) 
Jla Abrahaa.on 
I'P'L, 'NUCC) 
Gl.n Salth 
IKal.~r Alualnua) 
"rank T.u •• lc 
10ugon PUC) 
S., Whlt.le .. 
IU or 0, Sco NW) 
John Savag. 
10DOE) 
ORGANIZATION 
INTEIIEST 
• Eapandlng .ph~ •• of 
consultancy ••• in-
talnlng prof •• aional 
r.putatlon 
• Se. Pat Itlng 
• En.urlng flra power 
contract. vhlch 051. 
caul., liva vlth 
• En.urlng r.asonabll-
lty of r.aulta and 
conalst@ncy with 
0l'e90n PUC Inforaa-
tlnn 
• "aintainlng atrong 
prof ••• lonal repu-
tatlon In foreeaat-
lng ar.a 
• Sa. above 
TABLE XII (Cont'd) 
PEIIS 
BACItGIIOUND 
Econoal.t, a~aber of 
PNUCC a04el develop-
.ent and .odel review 
subeo •• ltt ••• 
Engln •• r •• aperiene." 
ln for.easting an.rgy 
p.le~s. an" .tr.t~gle 
planning 
"ath~aatle. tralnlng, 
work~d In short and 
10n9 tera (orec.otlnq 
and cona.,vatlon .&-
aes.~pnt 
Econo.lat. worked •• 
energy conaultant and 
eeonoale .dvl.or to 
Or .. gon govarnor 
TECHNICAL 
COHHENTS SIGNIFICANCE OF COHHENTS TO FOIIECIIST 
ORNL a04.1 rloorapaca coa- Could ral.a or lo.er foreea.t 
ponent I.olat." froa polley 
Fre.h aodallng approach 
nee"ed for lndustrlal •• c-
tor NEP' .houl., b. use" 
In lntarl. 
Indu.try .p.clfle foreca.t. 
nee"e", no pref.rred ao.,.l 
.el~et." 
No a04.1 •• leete", aanu of 
aode! t •• t. presented for 
BPA .tarr 
8'A ae.narlo. too foeu.a" 
around tera. of Reglonal 
Act, rev I •• ., approach to 
polley ana1y.l. na.d.d 
BPA ahould adopt .Oa. ala 
of 'Nuce an" HEP' a04.l. 
Lower (oreea.t 
w 
U'1 
(T\ 
357 
tion of the public involvement process would view the 
comments of different organizations' representatives as 
self-serving fabrications, designed solely to promote (or 
safeguard) the organization's own limited interests with 
little concern for other parties. While this type of 
behavior is hardly unprecedented in the business world, it 
is not generally representative (and is not apparent in the 
BPA example). The process by which organizational interests 
are represented is much more subtle and not always obvious 
to the parties actually involved. (Likewise, the process by 
which, and the extent t£ which, the agenda of the overall 
public involvement process was constrained also is often not 
obvious, as will be made clear in the next chapter.) The 
Multiple Perspective Concept, within its three distinct 
paradigms of investigation, gains further value as a tool by 
means of its usefulness in elucidating such subtleties. 
Technically speaking, in 1982 there was, as the verbal 
interchanges sketched above indicate, a great deal of uncer-
tainty both about the load futures for the Northwest and the 
ability of the available models to represent them adequate-
ly. Many of the participants in the power planning commun-
ity recognized that the choice of one method (or judgment) 
over another, though perhaps somewhat arbitrary, could have 
decidedly non-arbitrary effects. It was general knowledge 
that the fate of the WPPSS plants would likely be decided by 
the forthcoming forecast, and this decision would affect 
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nearly all the participants through their direct invest-
ments, impacts on the environment, or secondary economic 
consequences. Thus, there were many potential areas for 
debate or contention where interpretations alternative to 
BPA's could legitimately (from a T-perspective standpoint) 
be brought to bear as counterarguments. (As will be seen 
later, this tactic, though not prevalent at the abovede-
scribed model review, was to be a more common one once BPA 
presented an official draft forecast). 
Turning to the results in the Table, several points are 
worth noting. First of all, it can be fairly safely assumed 
that all participants desire to maintain (or cultivate) 
their professional reputations through their actions in such 
meetings. This desire was explicitly listed as an organiza-
tional interest, however, only when this appeared to be the 
overriding interest of the organization, as with conSUltants 
and university scholars who literally earn their living by 
selling their ideas. Secondly, for a number of participants 
(usually those working for local or state agencies and 
making comments on the economic projections) consistency 
with their own work was cited as a key interest. While part 
of the desire for consistency between forecasts can be 
viewed as the result of professional pride of the partici-
pants own work (i.e. they felt their forecasts were 
"right"), on more practical grounds BPA's forecasts and the 
plans it would engender were foreseen as having significant 
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economic repercussions. If the state or local forecasters 
were correct in their anticipations of the future, different 
projections by BPA would, by extension, create flawed plans 
as a likely consequence economic problems for their areas. 
The overlap between P- and O-perspectives can be seen 
in the technical comments made. Inevitably, the technical 
comments reflect the participants past or present efforts. 
Only in some instances do they reflect what the participants 
were then currently working on, as with the representatives 
from the utilities and state agencies. In a small number of 
cases, comments could be seen to be explicitly aimed at 
influencing an outcome in the interest of the participant 
valuing it (e.g. the gas companies formal statement, or 
NRDC's open agenda for promoting conservation as related to 
model selections). But though individual participant's 
comments did not always exert influence on BPA's forecasting 
effort to bring it more in tune with their organizations' 
goals, none of their expert opinions could be seen to work 
against their organizations' own priorities in any way (i.e. 
individual comments were not inconsistent with the organi-
zational interests as described in Chapter III). This pat-
tern will be seen below to hold throughout public involve-
ment. 
In the month that followed the model technical review 
workshop BPA evaluated the verbal (and, where some of the 
participants chose to echo their sentiments along a more 
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formal channel, written comments received and made its model 
selections (element 43: T-perspective). Not surprisingly, 
the choices were, as described in Chapter II, the ORNL 
models for the residential and commercial sectors and the 
NEFF model for the industrial sector. Given the leanings of 
the BPA staff prior to the workshop, these choices were 
comfortable ones. The inadequacy of available econometric 
models had been recognized by the staff who had originally 
acquired the ORNL models as a result of their disenchantment 
with the SOU forecast and its "corroboration" (P - T) and 
the need to account for policy impacts (0 - T) was well 
known. Though some voices were raised against end-use 
models, no good alternative was offered which could be 
implemented within BPA's forecast schedule (e.g. econometric 
or hybrid models). Moreover, most of the panelists had 
given limited endorsement to the approach embodied in the 
ORNL models, so the selection was hardly made in the face of 
resistance. 
In the case of the NEPF Industrial Model, it was chosen 
over the PNUCC model largely because of the fact that the 
former model had been respecified using more recent data. 
Debate over these two models had, at best, been lukewarm so 
the selection was ce~tainly non-controversial. 
A somewhat more significant development occurring at 
the same time was the completion of the Supply Pricing Model 
(described in Chapter II) which determined electricity rates 
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for different groups within the region. Comments at the 
public involvement workshop regarding BPA's "unstated 
forecast assumptions" were primarily aimed at the operation 
of this model, since it was in its structure that BPA's 
interpretation of the Regional Act was embodied (0 - T). 
With its completion, the key missing piece in BPA's modeling 
system was in place, and ready to be used in the draft 
forecast. 
In March of 1982, a preliminary version of the draft 
forecast was completed (T-perspective: element 44), using 
the abovedescribed models and incorporating a number of 
ideas discussed at the January public involvement workshop. 
As with the model review, results were formally presented to 
the Policy Committee for evaluation prior to public release 
(O-perspective: element 45). Minor changes in both economic 
inputs and demand forecasts resulted from this internal 
review. 
The draft forecast was completed in late March (element 
46: T-perspective) incorporating the considerations identi-
fied by the Policy Committee (0 - T), though its public 
release was delayed until April for a number of reasons to 
be discussed below. The draft forecast included a range of 
scenarios (baseline, high, and low) for both economics and 
electricity sales and a set of corresponding probabilities 
of occurrence. The ORNL models were used for residential 
and commercial sectors, while the NEPP model was used for 
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the industrial sector. OS! sales were estimated from 
contract demands, streetlighting sales from another small 
sUbcomponent of the original all-sector NEPP model, and 
irrigations sales were calculated outside the forecasting 
system using paper-and-pencil techniques. The only 
policy-based conservation included in the forecast was that 
expected to be obtained from BPA budgeted programs. The 
demand models were run iteratively with the Supply Pricing 
Model until equilibrium of prices and loads was reached. 
(Because of the small degree of change between draft and 
final forecasts a detailed discussion of specific technical 
choices is deferred until later.) 
Summarizing the draft results briefly, in the base case 
regional economic activity was foreseen to exceed that 
projected by DR! for the nation as a whole. This resulted 
in an average annual rate of growth of 1.7 percent for total 
loads in the region with residential, commercial, and indus-
trial sectors growing at rates of 1.6 percent, 2.2, and 1.6 
percent respectively. These values were unprecedentedly low 
for forecasts to be used in region-wide power planning. 
High and low forecasts likewise were noticeably lower than 
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios previously seen in the 
region. High case loads for the region grew at 2.5 percent 
per year over the forecast period (2.5 percent residential, 
3.4 percent commercial, and 2.1 percent industrial). By 
contrast, regional load growth for the low case was pro-
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jected to proceed at a 0.8 percent AARG. Commercial and 
residential sectors both displayed a 0.9 percent rate of 
growth while the industrial sector grew slightly more slowly 
at a 0.7 percent AARG. 
As the release date for the draft forecast, and the 
anticipated consequent decision regarding the fate of the 
WPPSS plants, drew near, a concern grew over what Bonne-
ville's forecast would mean to the region. stockholders in 
the nuclear plants, drawing inferences from the findings of 
the earlier technical review (and, very likely, from 
"unofficial" sources within the agency), feared that the 20-
year forecast would be so low that work would be stopped on 
one or more of the construction works in progress (element 
47: O-perspective). As noted earlier, until such construc-
tion projects were completed, their costs could not be 
absorbed in the rate bases of participating utilities. The 
outcome of Johnson's forthcoming decision was of obvious 
concern to these actors in the power planning arena. 
This concern was voiced to Senator James McClure (o-P) 
who requested that, prior to its release, BPA's forecast be 
subjected to an independent review and evaluation by a firm 
or organization outside the region (P-perspective: element 
48). In response to this suggestion (P - P), Peter Johnson 
arranged for an independent review of the draft forecast to 
be conducted by National Economic Research Associates, 
(P-perspective: element 49). 
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Dr. Lewis Perl of NERA arrived at BPA roughly one week 
before the forecast was made publicly available and began a 
critique of the BPA forecast (O-perspective: element 50). 
NERA, it should be remembered, had developed the PNUCC 
econometric model not used by BPA which had tended during 
the technical review period to display higher load projec-
tions than the other models considered. As such, it was a 
firm whose credentials would be accepted by the concerned 
parties within PNUCC -- in large measure the reason for 
Johnson's selection (P - 0). By way of technical approach, 
Perl essentially played "devil's advocate", challenging key 
assumptions or methodological choices with plausible alter-
natives, each of which generally would have the effect of 
raising the forecasts BPA had developed. These challenges 
were generally consistent with NERA's econometric research. 
Regarding economic projections, NERA felt that income per 
employee growth was understated but that electricity prices 
might increase faster than anticipated (the latter would 
tend to decrease load growth). Regarding models, NERA 
echoed some sentiments voiced during public involvement, 
noting that the residential and commercial sector model were 
more disaggregate than desirable and endorsing a "multiple 
model" approach to forecasting loads in the various con-
suming sectors. The price and income elasticities in the 
residential model were considered unusually low. Though the 
resulting effects of such elasticities for electric and 
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non-electric fuels would be offsetting, increasing the 
income elasticity to levels thought appropriate by NERA 
would raise the residential forecast. In the commercial 
sector, NERA took exception to BPA's revised method of 
determining floorspace based upon employment rather than 
income, noting that this lowered the forecast. Moreover, 
the naive subtraction of BPA conservation savings from 
commercial sales in effect "double counted" some of the 
savings which were included in the model's response, further 
lowering the forecast. The NEPP Industrial Model was viewed 
as containing several specification errors which overstated 
the speed and extent of price responsiveness, which would 
have made the forecast too low. NERA's overall conclusions, 
released concurrent with BPA's draft forecast, were that the 
growth should range from 0.8 to 3.0 percent instead of 0.8 
to 2.5 percent per year and that the base case (1.7 percent) 
was biased to the low side and would more realistically fall 
in the 2.0 to 2.2 percent neighborhood. 
On April 2, the draft forecast (and the results of the 
NERA study) were made publicly available, in the wake of a 
press release to media throughout the region (O-perspec-
tive: element 51). Three volumes comprised the forecast 
report: a forecast summary, and two technical appendices. 
The latter documents, one focusing upon economiCS, the other 
upon demand models, provided thorough details on the models, 
methods, assumptions, input values, and results embodied in 
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the fo~ecast. With th~ee months sepa~ating publication of 
draft and final forecast, ample oppo~tunity was provided fo~ 
interested o~ganizations and individuals to ~espond with 
critical comments. 
This second phase of public involvement, the ~esponse 
to BPA's forecast (element 52: O-pe~spective), more clearly 
illustrated the dynamic by which o~ganizational interests 
a~e ~ep~esented through "objective" technical comments. 
Unlike at the technical review, BPA was substantially 
committed to a specific set of models and a methodology fo~ 
developing a ~ange of forecasts. The electricity p~icing 
assumptions, as a source of concern to many in the power 
planning community were at last laid out explicitly in the 
fo~ecast documentation and thei~ impacts upon electricity 
sales were evident. Additionally, the simultaneously-
released NERA document p~ovided a ~eady-made set of counte~­
points to which BPA's c~itics could appeal. 
The first ~eactions to BPA's report were, predictably, 
those appea~ing in the region's major newspapers. As noted 
in Chapter III, the media shapes as well as disseminates 
information and attitudes. In order to make "good copy", a 
newspaper article must distill facts of most immediate 
Significance to its readers, sometimes "creating" issues in 
the process. In general, the newspapers throughout the 
region drew out the conclusion that, given the forecast 
results, BPA might delay the completion of one ot more of 
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the three viable WPPSS projects. On April 6, the Portland 
Oregonian highlighted Peter Johnson's comment to a Seattle 
audience that BPA's load forecast might be low. The 
article t~eated the uncertainty surrounding the results 
fairly and the consequent uncertainty about when the three 
plants would come on line. The article's headline "Energy 
Predictions by BPA Said Low" did, however, seem to cast some 
suspicion upon the forecast's credibility. By contrast, in 
the Tri-Cities, where the postponmentof WPPSS plant comple-
tions would have stronger repercussions on those employed in 
their construction, the tone of articles was harsher (and 
somewhat slanted). In an April 7 article entitled "Tri-
Cities Being Killed by BPA Draft Report", Tri-Cities Herald 
reporter Jack Briggs quoted WPPSS risk analyst Jay Maidment 
as calling the report "shoddy statistical work put together 
in a political environment". In the same article he noted 
that NERA's reinterpretation of BPA's range and base case 
would call for continued construction of all three WPPSS 
plants, and quoted WPPSS spokesman Gary Petersen's (false) 
observation that neither WPPSS nor the public had any 
involvement in the forecast's development. 
comments were received formally by BPA over a period 
lasting from April to June. In the early weeks following 
the release of the draft forecast, however, comments were 
sparse due to two reasons. First the technical appendices 
to th~ forecast, which contained detailed descriptions of 
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models, inputs, and outputs were released several weeks 
after the summary document. This meant that a thorough 
evaluation of the forecast had to wait. Second, and of at 
least equal importance, was that the consensus in the region 
was that Johnson was about to finalize his decision on the 
fate of WNP 1, 2, and 3. 
On April 19th, the results of the analysis of regional 
resource alternatives was made public (element 53: 
T-perspective). Based upon the results of the draft 
forecast (T - T) and subsequent financial analysis, the 
report concluded that: 
"Considering the interests of the ratepayers and the region 
as a whole, continuing WNP 12 and 13 on current schedules 
and extending the construction of WNP 11 best preserves and 
protects the economic and financial integrity of BPA and the 
region (BPA, 1982d:2). 
This conclusion was based upon 1) the perceived like-
lihood of a power surplus in the 1980s and 1990s, (power 
forecast), 2) a review of the relative costs of different 
resource options and their impacts on electricity prices in 
the region (rate analysis), and 3) an analysis of the con-
straints on financial markets and credit worthiness of BPA 
under different resource development scenarios (financial 
analysis). The findings of the financial analysis effect-
ively prohibited the completion of all three plants. sales 
of additional bonds would only be underwritten for an amount 
short of what would have been needed to finance the 
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scheduled completion of all three plants on their intended 
schedule. The rate analysis suggested that the delay of 
WNF-1 would result in a somewhat lower rate increase than if 
WNF-3 scheduled completion was extended instead. 
Based upon these findings (T - F), Peter Johnson made 
the decision to delay the scheduled completion of WNF-1 
(element 54: P-perspective). Undoubtedly, however, his 
earlier experience with a similar situation at Trus Joist 
helped provide a certain assurance about the decision that 
might otherwise be missing. At the time of his announcement 
of the decision, Johnson also cited a second independent 
review of BPA's forecast which provided sharp counterpoint 
to NERA's findings. Rather than prepare a point-by-point 
critique of BPA's methodology, as NERA had, Energy ventures 
Analysis Inc. (EVA) an East-coast consulting firm, evaluated 
the BFA forecast by means of an analogy. Comparing BFA and 
the Pacific Northwest with the only similar Federal marketer 
of hydropower, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), EVA 
noted that, when faced with rate escalations comparable to 
those anticipated for the PNW, consumers in the Tennessee 
Valley had curtailed electricity use to the point of 
declining loads. Based upon this, EVA concluded that BPA 
loads would likely be flat through 1985 and not exceed 1.2 
through the early 19905. EVA's "counterpoint" was used to 
illustrate that uncertainties could surround the load 
estimates on both the high and low sides. By offsetting 
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NERA's comments the EVA findings made BPA's baseline and 
fo~ecast ~ange again seem ~easonable. The exe~cise was not 
in any way intended to explo~e the spect~um of unce~tainties 
su~rounding BPA's fo~ecast. 
Though this announcement was not favorably ~eceived by 
all in the ~egion, the WPPSS boa~d of di~ecto~s, influenced 
by Johnson's decision (P - 0) and the analysis unde~lying it 
(T - 0) accepted and adopted Johnson's recommendation on 
Ap~il 29 (element 54: O-pe~spective). Seve~al weeks the~e­
afte~ (May 19, 1982) the Po~tland O~egonian ~an a guest 
edito~ial, penned by Pete~ Johnson (P - 0), explaining the 
findings of BPA's resource assessment (T - 0), and its 
implications to the region (O-perspective: element 56). 
Over the three-month period that BPA staff received 
comments on their draft forecast, the prepared responses. 
Some of these took the form of modifications to draft inputs 
or modeling assumptions. Other responses to challenges 
which the staff dete~mined could not or should not be met 
with methodological changes, were in the form of ~itten 
replies (i.e. counterarguments or explanations of why 
requested changes were not possible.) In late June, a 
revised final forecast was completed (T-perspective: element 
57), in many ways similar to its p~edecessor (T - T) with an 
ove~all AARG of 1.6 percent, but containing revisions 
motivated by public comment (0 - T). On July I, the final 
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forecast was released to the public at large (O-perspective: 
element 58). 
Brief summary descriptions of the forecast results were 
presented in Chapter II. Having described the flow of 
events leading to the forecast's culmination, it is now 
appropriate to detail the numerous specific technical 
choices made, primarily, in response to challenges posed by 
the various parties in BPA's audience. Because the connec-
tions between technical review, draft, and final forecasts 
are better understood by means of direct comparisons, the 
changes between the forecasts are listed together below 
(rather than spread throughout the description of cross-
cuing). First, the influences of the comments summarized in 
Table XII in the draft forecast are enumerated. The subse-
quent revisions between draft and final forecasts are then 
described. Finally, BPA's verbal responses (and rebuttals) 
to technical challenges, as listed in the technical documen-
tation, are discussed. 
In its overall methodological structure, both BPA's 
draft and final forecasts reflected a number of concerns 
voiced by members of its audience. While these comments 
were not always the decisive factor in determining these 
technical choices, they at least contributed to the shaping 
of the final selections, if in some instances only rein-
forCing BPA staff preferences. Following the technical 
model review with its various conservation scenarios, BPA 
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opted to produce baseline, high, and low forecast of elec-
tricity consumption (as well as economics and demographics) 
with distinctions between public and private utility rate 
pools. While this did not result in utility-specific fore-
casts as earlier suggested by Tom Eckman of Math Sciences 
Northwest, it did distinguish between the customer groups 
distinguished by the Regional Power Act. As illustrated in 
Table III, the three forecast scenarios varied not only 
according to levels of economic activity but also numerous 
assumptions on energy use, conservation programs, and WPPSS 
plant financing. These assumptions might be termed overt, 
in that they were consciously made as parametric choices for 
model operation. These overt assumptions were explicitly 
laid out in detail, as requested by representatives of PNUCC 
and Northwest natural gas distributors. As also noted at 
various points in this dissertation numerous covert assump-
tions on such factors as technological innovation, institu-
tional perpetuation, and legislative irrversibility remained 
unexplained in the background, essentially because they were 
"non-issues" in the minds of the BPA modelers and their 
audience, as will be discussed in the concluding chapter of 
this dissertation. Associated with the range of forecasts 
was an assignment of probabilities (which had been suggested 
by John Douglas of the Washington state Energy Office). 
These probabilities were assigned judgmentally following the 
finalization of the forecasts. 
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Model selections for the three major consuming sectors, 
though based upon a set of evaluative criteria, reflected 
the recommendations of panelists and participants at the 
technical workshop. The generally preferred ORNL models 
were selected for residential and commercial forecasting 
while the NEPP Econometric Model was used in the industrial 
sector. Time and resource limitations prevented BPA staff 
from pursuing any major new modeling development such as 
combining the "best" elements of the models as suggested by 
John Savage of ODOE and Mike McHugh of AEA. For similar 
reasons, no back-up models were maintained for an econo-
metric cross check as suggested by representatives of PNUCC 
and SCL. 
Of the possible conservation options discussed at the 
technical review, only one was chosen by BPA to be embodied 
in their draft and final forecasts. The decision was made 
to look only at conservation savings attainable from means 
under Bonneville's direct control. These more "assured" 
savings were those projected to be obtained from BPA 
sponsored programs in existence or budgeted at the time of 
the 1982 forecasts' production. As such, this treatment of 
conservation did not explore what might be obtained from 
individual utility programs on those which the Regional 
Council might promote -- explorations which groups such as 
NRDC would have preferred to see. 
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As noted above, the ORNL Econometric/End-Use Model was 
chosen to prepare the draft and final residential forecasts. 
With the exception of Sam van Vactor of PSU and Mike McHugh 
of AEA who advocated econometric (or hybrid) alternatives, 
all of the participants at the model review workshop had 
given endorsements (though not unqualified) of the ORNL 
model. Some modifications of input variables and key 
parametric values did take place between the technical 
review and the draft forecast. Aside from revised economic 
and demographic projections and electricity prices from the 
newly-completed Supply Pricing Model (which served as inputs 
to all of BPA's demand models) a number of base year values 
were revised to fit the Pacific Northwest Region. The 
residential survey conducted by Elrick and Lavidge was used 
to derive values for base year energy use per appliance, 
energy usage, fuel saturation and penetration rates, and new 
appliance penetration rates. To account for savings due to 
BPA-sponsored conservation programs (including the effects 
of weatherization, shower flow restrictors, water heater 
wraps, faucet flow control devices, and solar or heat pump 
water heater replacement) some adjustments were made to the 
structure of the model to downscale the appropriate final 
end-use electricity sales. These adjustments were based 
upon estimates of saving~ per household and numbers of 
affected households receiv~d from the Office of Conserva-
tion. Choices for behavioral and technological variables, 
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the latter a major source of concern to workshop partici-
pants, reflected data provided to BPA staff by contractors 
continuing development at ORNL, most specifically Eric Hirst 
and Janet Carney. (Additionally, some technology curve 
parameters for retrofit homes were developed by BPA staff 
using National Association of Home Builders Research 
Foundation data). As such the technology curves, though not 
explicitly geared to technological frontiers, were as 
current as ongoing research at the time, and the staff felt 
that as such, they were hardly outdated, as NRDC had earlier 
asserted. Suffice to say, John Duffield's preference, a 
graded series of curves representing progressive techno-
logical developments was beyond the scope of current 
research. 
For the commercial sector, the ORNL model had been 
supported almost universally as the preferred choice at the 
technical workshop, and 1t was the one used for both draft 
and final forecasts. Several features of the model had 
concerned participants and resulted in various staff 
responses. The original econometric approach to projecting 
commercial floorspace centered on a simple regression equa-
tion with population and income as independent variables. 
Though not producing unreasonable responses overall, pre-
dictions for specific building types were often improbable 
(e.g. high auto repair growth). In response, BPA just added 
a new, more sophisticated floorspace submodel which produced 
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credible patterns of floorspace growth. Unfortunately, the 
new submodel systematically under forecasted over the his-
torical period so an exogenous calculation of total 
floorspace was made based upon employment (described in 
more detail in Chapter II), and the predicted, disaggregated 
floorspace values were adjusted upwards correspondingly. 
This gave a more plausible set of floorspace estimates, but 
did not address the issue of the lack of policy feedbacks 
noted by Don Dohrmann of ADM Associates. Such a change, 
though desirable, was not only impractical in terms of 
needed time and effort but also would have been impossible 
to support without significant additional research. The 
technology, or efficiency/cost tradeoff, curves were also a 
major source of concern, but most suggested improvements 
necessitated major research to be first carried out under 
contract (which BPA staff was, in fact, initiating at the 
time). Though BPA staff recognized that regionalized curves 
were needed, as noted by Ken Corum of the Regional Council's 
staff, and that there were indeed some flaws in the curves, 
as pointed out by Phil Carver of ODOE, only minor calibra-
tion adjustments were undertaken. These consisted of minor, 
judgmental alterations of the slope parameter of the curve 
which increase the accuracy of the model's tracking of 
actual consumption from 1970 to 1980. Finally, the model 
was somewhat altered to enhance its conservation policy 
testing capabilities. In its unaltered form, the model's 
structure accommodated the simulation of a 1978 grants 
programs for schools and hospitals and 1979 building 
standards affecting all commercial construction. The 
modification allowed savings from BPA-sponsored programs 
(shower flow restrictions, water heater wraps, energy 
efficient lighting, and financial incentives) to be sub-
tracted from the appropriate end-use after projected con-
sumption was calculated. 
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Participants at the technical workshop appeared to show 
no overwhelming model preference for the industrial sector. 
Jim Abrahamson of PNUCC and PP&L had given a nod to the 
NEPP model as an interim solution to industrial forecasting, 
but little other support was again (at the same time, it 
should be noted, no one championed the PNUCC model). The 
model was chosen by BPA staff primarily because the data 
used by AEA to respecify the model's econometric equations 
~as more current than that used in the PNUCC model. 
Forecast results for separate SICs (Standard Industrial 
Classification) were presented, though separate models were 
not used for different industries (as would be sufficient to 
fully satisfy Glen Smith's desire for industry-specific 
forecasts). 
Irrigation, street lighting, and electricity pricing 
models (described in detail in Chapter II) had not been 
presented to the general public prior to the draft forecast, 
so none of BPA's modeling choices for those models were 
378 
responses to outside "challenges". This did not, however 
hold true for the final forecast (as will be noted below). 
Because economic/demographic projections needed to be ready 
for use roughly a month before forecast deadlines, the high, 
medium, and low projections presented at the December 
workshop were those used in preparing the draft forecast. 
All changes resulting from public comment were incorporated 
into the final forecast, and are discussed below. 
Table XIII summarizes modeling choices made for the 
draft forecast in response to issues or concerns identified 
during the earlier technical review process. 
Though a number of changes took place between draft and 
final versions of the BPA forecast, the overall effect in 
terms of magnitude of change was slight. Base, high, and 
low regional loads respectively dropped by 202, 552, and 851 
average megawatts. A sizeable portion of these admittedly 
modest reductions came in the industrial sector, as the 
result of a modified lag structure in the NEPP Hodel and 
revised assumptions concerning DSI power consumption. 
For the residential sector, six basic changes were made 
which were not the result of new economics or electricity 
prices. Based upon US DOE survey information appliance 
lifetimes were lengthened and equipment purchase prices were 
revised. In response to comments from PNUCC staff following 
the publication of the draft forecast, new thermal integrity 
curve parameters for natural gas and fuel oil heating were 
TABLE XIII 
TECHNICAL CHOICES MADE BY BPA FOR ITS 1982 FORECAST 
Overall forecast 
• High, medium, and low demand scenarios based on both 
different economics and modeling assumptions 
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• Only new conservation modeled was due to BPA-sponsored 
programs 
• Public and private utility rate pools treated 
separately 
• Judgmental probabilities associated with forecast 
distribution 
• No fundamental or structural changes to models reviewed 
in workshop 
Residential sector 
• ORNL model selected 
• Revised base year values for energy use per appliance, 
energy usage, full saturation and penetrations, and new 
appliance penetrations 
• Model structure altered to handle BPA conservation 
savings 
• Behavioral and technological parameters updated where 
possible 
Commercial sector 
• ORNL model selected, new floorspace component added 
• Technology curves underwent minor recalibration 
• Model structure altered to represent BPA conservation 
savings 
Industrial sector 
• NEPP model selected 
• Results presented for separate industrial classifica-
tions 
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used, which were set equal to those of electrically heated 
homes. This change had the effect of making gas and oil 
more competitive as heating fuels in new homes, lowering 
electricity consumption somewhat. Base year space heating 
usage values were altered to reflect "normal" rather than 
1980 weather. Conservation estimates were also revised as a 
result of new estimates prepared by the Office of Conserva-
tion. Finally, an erroneous estimate of single family 
dwellings in private utility service areas was corrected. 
In the commercial sector, modeling changes were equally 
modest. Although the floorspace projection methodology used 
remained unchanged from the draft forecast, revised 
employment values altered the percentage of total regional 
floorspace standing in public and private utility service 
districts at the 1980 and 2000 endpoints for the exogenous 
calculation. Secondly, at the request of PNUCC, base year 
(i.e. 1970) energy use per square for heating was weather 
normalized, so that the model's starting point for energy 
projections was not biased by meteorological conditions 
unique to 1970. Finally, in response to comments contained 
in the NERA review of BPA's forecast, conservation savings 
estimates introduced as model inputs were judgmentally 
reduced by 20\. The reason for this was to compensate for 
double-counting conservation savings. Presumably some of 
the efficiency improvements captured in the efficiency/cost 
tradeoff curves and elasticities derived from historical 
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data were the result of consumers taking the same measures 
in response to price increases as those encompassed by BPA 
programs. The adjustment thus focused on customers who 
would have conserved on their own but used BPA programs as 
the vehicle towards those ends. 
Industrial sector modeling showed more extensive 
changes between draft and final forecasts. In response to 
comments from NERA, Seattle City Light, and PNUCC, Bonne-
ville staff altered the lag structure of the NEPP model, so 
that responses to price changes were gradual rather than 
instantaneous. This both smoothed the pattern of predicted 
growth and lowered the magnitude of loads. Individual 
employment projections were prepared for the chemical 
industry which permitted the NEPP model to distinguish 
electricity sales growth in this industry. Industrial 
conservation estimates received from the Office of Conser-
vation were also revised slightly between draft and final 
forecasts. Because of counterintuitive results for sales to 
the pulp and paper industry, demand projections for that 
industrial classification were performed on the Brookhaven 
Pulp and paper Process Hodel and substituted for those 
derived by the NEPP model. Finally, while contract demands 
were still used to produce the OSI forecast, it was no 
longer assumed that loads would attain and stay at the 100 
percent level, since they had not in the past. Rather, 
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post-1985 DSI loads were, rather conservatively, reduced 1.5 
percent. 
Economic and demographic projections going into the 
final forecast were also revised substantially, though the 
methods of their derivation remain substantially the same. 
Although several participants at the December workshop (i.e. 
Milan Brace, Don Reading and James Scherzinger) had noted 
the desirability of an interactive model, such as under-
taking was practically impossible within the timeline of 
forecast development (though a regional economic model was 
being developed under contract at that time). The major 
changes in the forecast were the result of DRI's periodic 
revision of the national economic projections underlying the 
development of most of the demand model inputs. An addi-
tional general characteristic of the revised economic pro-
jection was a stronger reflection of the downturn character-
izing the economy in 1982. Projections for population, 
income, and housing were lower through 1985, representing 
the effect of a longer recession (and reflecting concerns 
expressed by James Scherzinger, John Savage and Cleveland 
Anschell at the December workshop). This downturn was also 
embodied in lowered base case lumber and wood products 
employment forecasts (in part, a response to Brian Wall's 
comments). High and low case projections were revised 
upward and downward respectively, widening the range of 
future alternatives addressed. As with the range of demand, 
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subjective probabilities were assigned to the economic 
scenarios (echoing Richard conway's sentiments that forecast 
uncertainty should be quantified). staff judgment was that 
there was a 10 percent likelihood that actuals would fall 
below the low, a 35 percent likelihood between low and 
baseline, 40 percent between baseline and high, and 15 
percent above the high. 
A number of more specific changes in the development of 
economic projections were undertaken for the final forecast. 
Fossil fuel price projections were lowered substantially, in 
response to comments made by Sam van Vactor and represen-
tatives of Northwest Natural Gas. At the same time, price 
differences between the consuming sectors were increased. 
On the basis of new Census information, headship rates were 
revised downward and, as a consequence of the new DRI pro-
jections, rates of new housing construction and occupancy 
were revised. Increased replacement rates were the result 
of shorter average dwelling lifetimes. The implicit price 
deflators used to adjust the various projections for 
inflation were also modified slightly in response to the DRI 
national economic forecast update. Finally, several of the 
industry-specific employment estimates were revised, often 
in response to issues raised at the workshop. Transporta-
tion equipment and primary metals employment were downwardly 
adjusted. 
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The response to Richard Slaughter's concerns about the 
employment forecasts for the electronics industry, the 
ranges were broadened to capture possible business cycle 
variation. Last of all, at the suggestion of Wes Engstrom, 
Boeing staff experts were contacted and their advice used in 
the calculation of Boeing employment futures. 
Changes were also made to the remaining component of 
BPA's forecasting system, the electricity supply Pricing 
Model. Revisions chiefly concerned the resources included 
in the model's array of generation choices and cost calcula-
tions. Five coal-fired plants formerly included in the 
resource schedule were removed, since their completion 
seemed dubious. Generic 500 MW plants were substituted if 
additional resources were needed. The list of future 
available hydro resources was expanded based upon estimates 
compiled by PNUCC. The completion of WNP-l was also delayed 
five years based upon the assessment of the need for its 
capacity in the draft forecast. Plant costs were revised 
based upon PNUCC estimates and conservation costs based upon 
new BPA Office of Conservation estimates. On the basis of 
updated information obtained from the Corps of Engineers and 
the Bureau of Reclamation, capital costs for Federal hydro 
projects were recalculated. Also recalculated were the 
effects of curtailment ri~hts on DSI loads. Finally, a new 
component was added to the SPM to account for the effects of 
future income tax liability on system costs. 
Table XIV below summarizes the changes between draft 
and final forecasts. 
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As noted above, BPA's forecast documentation contained 
one other element of significance: wzitten replies to 
issues raised by outside parties. This is explicit 
challenge-response behavior as identified by the O-perspec-
tive. Given the fact that this was BPA's first independent 
forecast, and that major decisions were made based, in part, 
upon its findings, it was critical that underlying technical 
choices be justified to the greatest extent possible. The 
appendices to the forecast documents provided BPA staff with 
the opportunity to respond to their critics and defend (or 
at least explain) their methodological decisions. Described 
below are responses to comments which did not result in any 
of the modeling or methodological changes discussed above. 
These responses are reported as they were prepared by BPA, 
with no evaluat10n of their accuracy or correctness. The 
forecast is evaluated in the final chapter of this disser-
tation. 
Though the end-use models ultimately selected for use 
in residential and commercial sector modeling were most 
heavily endorsed by workshop participants, some parties 
questioned the desirability of such highly disaggregate 
tools. Representatives of PNUCC, Seattle City Light, and 
later NERA all felt econometric models should be used, at 
least at a minimum, as a cross-check. BPA staff reiterated 
TABLE XIV 
A SUMMARY OF TECHNICAL CHANGES BETWEEN DRAFT ANO 
FINAL FORECASTS 
Residential Sector 
• Appliance lifetimes lengthened 
• Equipment purchase prices revised 
• Thermal Integrity curve parameters revised 
• Space heating usage values weather normalized 
• Residential conservation estimates revised 
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• Erroneous value for single family dwellings corrected 
Commercial Sector 
• Floorspace "target" values revised 
• Space heating use/sq. ft. weather normalized 
• Conservation savings adjusted downward to minimize 
"double-count" 
Industrial Sector 
• Lag structure of NEPP model altered 
• Chemical industry projections separated out by NEPP 
model 
• Industrial conservation estimates revised 
• Pulp and paper forecast prepared on Brookhaven model 
• 051 loads assumed 1.S percent below contract demands 
Economic/Demographic Projections 
• ORI national projections revised 
• Lower population, income, and housing projections 
through 1985 
• Lower lumber and wood products employment forecast 
• Range widened, subjective probabilities assigned 
• Fossil fuel price projections lowered 
• Headship rates revised downward 
• Housing construction and occupancy rates revised 
• Implicit price deflators altered 
• Employment projections for transportation equipment, 
primary metals and electronics industries updated 
Electricity Pricing Hodel 
• Five coal-fired plants removed from resource portfoliO 
• List of future hydro resources expanded 
• WNP-l delayed five years 
• Plant and conservation costs revised 
• Curtailment rights on OSI loads recalculated 
• component added to account for future tax liability 
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the need for conservation analyses, consistent with the 
Power Act, which only the end-use models were capable of. 
They also noted the desirability of a cross-check with other 
models but noted the weakness of existing econometric models 
and the impracticability of developing new ones within the 
timeframe of the forecast. 
Several organizations questioned Bonneville's treatment 
of conservation. NRDC criticized BPA for not including any 
treatment of anticipated Regional Council-sponsored pro-
grams. 
BPA responded by noting that this was its intention, 
and that the 1982 forecast was only to serve as a starting 
point for load/resource planning. NERA and PNUCC thought 
programmatic conservation might better be treated as a 
resource than as a component of demands. BPA cited the need 
to have end use sales reflect demand reductions due to 
conservation. 
PNUCC, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the Survival 
Center, and Central Electric Cooperative all questioned the 
probability assessment and the placement of the high and low 
cases. BPA staff reiterated that the probability assign-
ments were purely judgmental in nature nad that the high and 
low cases represented scenarios which were not to be con-
ceived as absolute upper and lower bounds on load futures. 
Though judgmental, the judgments involved were laid out 
explicitly. 
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NERA noted that the BPA forecasting system was so 
complex that knowledge of it tended to be highly segmented 
and dispersed throughout the agency. BPA acknowledged this 
potential problem, noting that supervisory staff had recog-
nized the issue of consistency early and checked it care-
fully. The disaggregated character of the modeling system 
was, however, thought to be both necessary and desirable by 
the staff, given the complexity of issues to be addressed. 
PNUCC observed that BPA's models were not well suited 
to capturing short-term seasonal and business cycle fluctu-
ations which might be of key importance in activities such 
as ratemaking. Bonneville staff responded by noting the 
problem and announcing work-in-progress to develop a con-
sistent short run forecasting model. 
Critics of the ORNL Residential Model focused upon its 
performance in areas of price and income responsiveness. 
Energy ventures Analysis, POWER, Seattle City Light, and 
NRDC all questioned the price responsiveness of the model 
(with EVA and POWER contending the model understated re-
sponse). As a response, BPA staff presented the results of 
sensitivity analyses performed during the testing phase, and 
argued the reasonableness of the results. Seattle City 
Light and NERA both felt income responsiveness was too low. 
Staff noted that only a portion of the model's income elas-
ticity was apparent from findings since some responsiveness 
was "hard-wired" in the model by means of exogenous para-
389 
meters. The overall responsiveness, BPA claimed, was con-
sistent with research findings. 
PNUCC criticized BPA for using different discount rates 
for different appliances in determining residential life 
cycle cost minima. staff replied that literature revealed 
that customers indeed seemed more willing to "gamble" with 
less expensive items, so different rates were appropriate. 
NRDC had argued that there was no evidence to support the 
thesis that residential customers actually made appliance 
selection decisions using life-cycle cost minimization. 
Staff counterargued that the methodology was fully consis-
tent with economic theory and an acceptable predictor of 
aggregate response. 
Members of Seattle City Light staff noted that the 
declining electricity use per square foot values produced by 
the ORNL Commercial Model were inconsistent with the results 
of other econometric models with the region. BPA responded 
that in the end-use models certain factors increased use per 
square foot while others more strongly decreased it. In-
creases in equipment efficiency, which appeared reasonable 
during sensitivity testing, were the chief source of the 
decline in unit electricity usage. Several parties making 
comments questioned the complex price response mechanism of 
the ORNL model. NERA and Seattle City Light both felt that 
the model over-responded to price increases. Energy 
ventures Analysis thought that it might have overestimated 
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the time laq before price-induced conservation takes hold 
and Seattle City Light also believed it underestimated fuel 
switching to electric space heat. In response, BPA staff 
noted that most econometric models used in the region which 
might be used as a basis for comparison were specified over 
data compiled during a period where electricity prices in 
real dollars were falling. This pattern no longer held, 
with prices increasing rapidly, and customer response was 
thought likely to be in the process of changing. Hence, 
accepted notions of appropriate types of levels of response 
might be inaccurate. BPA defended the commercial model's 
performance based upon its calibration to historic fuel 
sales between 1970 and 1980. 
The NEPP model displayed output elasticities less than 
one (i.e. a 10 percent increase in output produced less than 
10 percent increase in electricity consumption) for several 
industries, and both HERA and PNUCC felt this was indicative 
of a specification error. BPA acknowledged a specification 
error, but noted that non-uniform expansion within the 
industries noted could produce such results. PNUCC also 
noted that the model was specified over national energy data 
and, as such, suffered from aggregation and locational 
biases. BPA again acknowledged that this problem merited 
additional research, but defended the specification of the 
model, pointing to the use of pooled time series cross 
sectional data which alleviates the problem of locational 
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bias. EVA and the Survival Center question the inclusion of 
the unbuilt Alurnax Plant among contract demands in the OS! 
forecast. BPA asserted its belief that the recession would 
end world aluminum demand would likely justify the addition-
al smelter. PNUCC criticized the omission of wages from the 
total industrial energy equation. BPA noted that AEA's 
specification allowed wages to be factored out of the demand 
function, but admitted that wages are important and that 
respecification would be considered. Finally, NROC claimed 
that the forecast i~nored industrial cogeneration. Bonne-
ville pointed out that cogeneration was being treated as a 
resource and, as such, was dealt with in a separate resource 
assessment. 
The forecast for the irrigation sector, though not part 
of the January technical review, was the target of several 
critics. PNUCC noted that the model used to develop the 
forecast was conspicuously lacking in explanatory economic 
factors. BPA staff responded that an electricity price 
variable was being added to the model to address such issues 
in future forecasts. NROC voiced several criticisms, 
namely, that the model ignored potential conservation 
inducing alternatives, that BPA should treat irrigated areas 
on the basis of their actual locations, that BPA overesti-
mated the trend toward sprinkler systems from gravity, and 
that the forecast failed to address the effect of irrigation 
on hydro-generation capacity. BPA responded with explana-
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tions, rather than modeling changes to all those comments, 
emphasizing that the model was newly-developed and did not 
contain all the features that might be desired (e.g., price-
induced conservation responsiveness), that irrigated acreas 
were assigned energy and water intensive qualities based 
upon 14 hydrologic subregions, that a study was being 
commissioned to explore the issue of sprinkler and gravity 
lrrigation, and that hydro generation capacity issues would 
be dealt with in a resource assessment. Finally, Joseph 
DeLuca, a private citizen, commented that BPA projected 
irrigation needs were low, based on minimum increases in 
land cultivation curbed by high inflation rates. BPA 
responded that though inflation rates partially accounted 
for the levels of loads, other factors (such as changing 
farm marketing conditions, energy and other costs) were 
largely responsible for the levels of sales. Even if 
inflation rates were lowered, electricity sales would not 
change drastically. 
Methodological considerations underlying the develop-
ment of economic and demographic projections were a key 
focus of numerous comments. The economic base model at the 
center of the projections had been criticized by William 
Jeshe (Economic Development Council of Puget Sound) for not 
having industry-specific employment multipliers and by 
Phillip Brooks (Montana Department of Administration) for 
not distlnguishing migration which is not the result of 
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seeking employment from that which is. BPA responded that, 
in the former case, the derivation of specific multipliers 
was ruled out by time constraints (but would be part of a 
model under construction) and that, in the latter case, the 
economic base model, though not designed to explain reasons 
for migration, did project net migration in a manner con-
sistent with one assumption about the needs and composition 
of the labor force. BPA also noted that its methodology in 
development would allow age distributions for migrants as 
well as disaggregations for income projections. POWER 
suggested that BPA was using obsolete data to arrive at a 75 
percent share for the single family home portion of residen-
tial housing. BPA explained that the 75 percent value was 
not an assumption but a constant consequence of how DRIs 
projections of housing starts reflect age-specific household 
preference rates and the changing age composition of the 
population. The University of Oregon Survival Center 
questioned the validity of the simplifying assumption that 
housing stocks adjust instantaneously to demand. BPA 
defended the simplifying assumption on the grounds that data 
was not readily available to develop such a lag structure 
and that staff did not feel that the absence of such lags 
would strongly affect out year values. Southern california 
Edison questioned why national, rather than regional, vari-
ables were used to project industrial productivity and why 
GNP price deflators were used instead of a Producer Price 
394 
Index in industrial sector inflation assumptions. BPA 
responded that reliable estimates of regional productivity 
were unavailable and that projected inflation was not a 
direct input to the industrial model but only used to ensure 
consistency between income and fuel prices in real terms. 
Hence, the particular inflation index used was unimportant. 
PNGC made several detailed criticisms of BPA methodology. 
First, they challenged BPA's method for developing popula-
tion estimates from the "bottom-up", treating it as a 
function of basic industry employment. This, they claimed 
resulted in forecasted population growing at about half the 
20-year historical rate. BPA countered by noting that, 
regardless of the approach taken to projecting populatIon, 
the two factors decisive in historical Northwest growth, the 
post-war baby boom and accelerated net in-migration, could 
not be seen to contInue growing. Thus, a "top-down" alter-
native would not be likely to yIeld much higher estimates. 
Second, PNGC claimed that BPA's treatment of labor force 
participation was inadequate since they did not appear to 
consider the.market factors affecting It. BPA responded by 
noting that the Bureau of Labor Statistics projections used 
by BPA implicitly embody the market factors of concern. 
Finally, comments from the Futures Research Institute noted 
the primacy of core assumptions in shaping forecast projec-
tions and the likelihood of new basic technological 
Innovations clustering in the near future. BPA responded 
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that assumptions were laid out in as much detail as judged 
to be useful to lay readers and that new technologies and 
industries are somewhat included in projections of employ-
ment in existing industries. (It should be noted that sec-
tions of this dissertation look rather carefully at these 
last areas of the concerns). 
A final category of comments concerned the electricity 
prices developed using the Supply Pricing Model. Once again 
NRDC and PNUCC were the chief sources of critical comments. 
NRDC asserted that BPA's wholesale rate increases for pre-
ference customers (20 percent) were not adequately reflected 
in projected electricity prices, that the costs of the WPPSS 
plants would have stronger rate effects than the price 
forecast indicated, that BPA's 70 percent capacity factor 
for thermal plants was too high, and that interest rates 
seemed inconsistent between thermal resources and conserva-
tion and biased against the latter. BPA responded by noting 
that the wholesale rates for preference customers had not 
been finalized (i.e. 70 percent was at best a tentative 
number), that the WNP costs only triggered significant 
increases in the near term, remaining more constant in the 
long run, that the 70 percent capacity factor, though high, 
used a portion of secondary hydro energy to displace an 
equivalent amount of thermal generating capacity (lowering 
the latter proportionally), and that the borrowing rate used 
1n resources cost calculations was set by Congress and not 
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subject to reinterpretation. PNUCC also questioned the 
accuracy of BPA's calculation hydro capacity, with particu-
lar concern about the estimate of thermal energy reduction. 
They suggested that BPA use an approach in which monthly 
hydro availability would be modeled for each of the 40 
historical water years. BPA responded that they were 
examining such a strategy but were uncertain as to whether 
or not it would yield much additional accuracy. POWER 
believed BPA had underestimated the costs of power from new 
resources. BPA pointed out that final forecast cost 
estimates had changed from the draft and were based on a 
least cost mix resource analysis. The Survival Center also 
noted the problems with resource costing, suggesting that 
BPA first purchase cheaper resources. BPA reiterated its 
methodology on generic resource costing using a least cost 
mix analysis and noted that this analysis was to be expanded 
into the forecasting process to deal with the very issue 
raised by the Survival Center. Finally, Joseph deLuca, a 
private citizen commenting on the forecast, noted the ab-
sence of any mention of hydrogeneration capacity loss due to 
fishing enhancement. BPA acknowledged the omission but 
pointed out that this was a resource analysis, rather than a 
forecasting issue, and that such planning would, in any 
case, be premature before the Regional Council prepared its 
fisheries assessment. 
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Area 
Choice of 
models 
Conservation 
Probability 
assessment 
Forecasting 
system 
Forecast 
horizon 
Residential 
model 
Commercial 
model 
Industrial 
model 
TABLE XII 
COMMENTS ON BPA's FORECAST AND RESPONSES 
Org/Persons 
Commenting 
PNUCC, SCL, 
NERA 
NRDC 
PNUCC, NERA 
PNUCC, BIA 
Survival Center 
Central Elec 
Coop 
NERA 
PNUCC 
EllA, POWER, 
SCl., NRDC 
NRDC 
SCL 
NERA, SCL 
EVA 
PNUCC, NERA 
Summary of 
Remarks 
• Econometric models 
should be used as 
cross-check 
• No treatment of 
Counc il prog ralllS 
• Conservation better 
treated as resource 
• Not clear how BPA 
arrive at probabili-
ties or high-low 
• System so complex 
that knowledge widely 
dispersed throughout 
organization 
• Models not suited to 
short-term fluctua-
tion 
• Price responsiveness 
questionable 
• Different discount 
rates for appliances 
• No empirical evidence 
for life cycle cost' 
minimization 
• Declining use/sq,ft, 
volumes inconsistent 
with other estimates 
• Model's response 
to prise question-
able 
• NEPP model elastici-
ties suggest mis-
specification 
BPA 
Response 
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• Idea sound but 
end-use models 
needed for policy 
ana lys is 
• Omission deliberate 
conservation in 
forecast only 
starting point 
• End use sales must 
reflect savings, 
therefore conser-
va t ion v iewed on 
demand side 
• Probabilities sub-
jective, based on 
staff judgment 
• Disaggregation 
necessary to deal 
with issues: care 
taken to ensure 
consistency 
• Observation correct 
for near term: 
short term models 
under development 
• Sensitivity anal-
ys is sugges ted 
results reasonable 
• Research indicated 
differential wil-
lingness to "gaEble 
on different ap-
pliances 
• Methodology con-
sistent with econ-
omic theory, good 
prediction in 
aggregate 
• Efficiency improve-
ments outweighed 
factors reusing 
use/ft 2 
• Difficult to assess 
responsiveness vis-
a-vis region's 
econometric model: 
consump tion pa t-
terns changing, 
model well calibra-
ted to 1980-90 
• Error lik~ly part 
of problem: non-
uniform ex~ansion 
also possible 
explanatory 
factor 
Irrigation 
model 
Economic/ 
demographics 
projections 
TABLE XV (Cont'd) 
PNUCC 
EVA, Survival 
Center 
PNUCC 
NROC 
PNUCC 
NROC 
Joseph de 
Luca 
Economic 
De ve lopme n t 
Council of 
Puge t Sound 
Montana Dept. 
of Admin. 
POWER 
Survival 
Cen te r 
Southern 
California 
Edison 
• Model specified over 
national data, loca-
tional and aggrega-
tion biasis likely 
• Alumax Shouldn't be 
included in OSI 
forecast 
• Wages should be part 
of NEPP total energy 
equation 
• Industrial cogenera-
tion ignored 
• Model lacked key 
economic explanatory 
factors 
• Model ignored con-
servation 
• Irrigated acres 
should be treated 
according to loca-
tion 
• Trend toward sprink-
lers overestimated 
• Area for additional 
research; pooled 
cross-sectional 
time series data 
best available 
• Projected end of 
recession and in-
creased aluminum 
demand would jus-
tify Alumax 
• Good area for re-
search, specifica-
tion allowed wages 
to be factored out 
• Cogeneration dealt 
with as resource 
• Electricity price 
va r iable to be 
added 
• Model newly de-
veloped, room for 
factor development 
• Irrigated acres 
were treated ac-
cording to loca-
tional sub region 
• Study being con-
ducted 
• No mention of irriga- • Issue would be 
tion on hydro base part of resource 
• Projected irrigation 
needs low based on 
effects of inflation 
• Employment multi-
pliers should be 
industry-specific 
• Irrigation not due 
to need for employ-
men t should be 
separated 
• Single family house 
based on obsolete 
data 
• Housing stocks should 
not respond instan-
taneously to demand 
• Regional variables 
should be used to 
derive productivity 
• Producer Price Index 
should be used for 
inflation in indus-
trial sector 
analysis 
• Forecast load 
levels only partly 
result Qf inflation 
• Scheduled prohib-
ited adding new 
multipliers, new 
model would have 
them 
• Base model doesn't 
separate reasons 
for irr iga tion 
consistent with 
behavior of labor 
force 
• Share for single-
family homes based 
on calculation, 
not assumption 
grounded in old 
data 
• Assumption sim-
plistic but effects 
only significant 
in near term 
• Reliable regional 
estimates of pro-
ductivity unavail-
able 
• Only use of infla-
tion index in 
industrial model 
to ensure consis-
tency 
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Supply 
Pricing 
Model 
TABLE XV (Cont'd) 
PNGC 
Futures 
Research 
Institute 
NRDC 
PNUCC 
POWER 
Survival 
Center 
Joseph de 
Luca 
• Population estimates 
low as a result of 
BPA's approach 
• Labor force partici-
pation rates ignored 
rna r ke t 
• Core assumptions 
shape forecast and 
should be listed 
• Cluster of new inno-
vations likely in 
near future 
• Wholesale rates for 
preference customers 
understated 
• Impact of WPPSS 
costs on rates under-
represented 
• Capacity factor for 
hydro too high 
• Interest rates in-
consistent for 
thermal and conser-
vation 
• Hydro capacity cal-
culations ques-
tionable, should 
model historical 
years 
• Costs of power from 
new resources 
underestimated 
• Cheaper resources 
should be purchased 
first 
• No mention of hydro 
loss due to fishing 
enhancement 
• Major factors In 
historical growth 
no longer opera-
tive, popUlation 
would decrease 
unde r any me tho-
dology 
• Statistics used to 
develop projectionr 
embody market 
effects 
• Assumptions listed 
in detail judge 
adequate for intel-
ligent lay aud-
iences by BPA 
• New technologies 
and industries 
somewhat included 
in employment pro-
jections for new 
indus tr ies 
• Wholesale rates had 
not yet been estab-
lished, forecast 
values reasonable 
• WNP costs result 
in signif icant 
increases only in 
water 
• Capacity factor 
for hydro large 
because of thermal-
displacing secon-
dary generation 
• Borrowing rates 
used were mandated 
by Congress 
• Strategy already 
investigation, but 
additional accuracy 
questionable 
• Costs changed from 
new calculation 
based on least cost 
mix analysis 
• Least cost mix 
analysis to be ex-
tended to future 
choices in forecast 
period 
• Hydro loss study is 
part of resource 
analysis, not 
forecast; such 
an:; l,'::i is 3W~ it:~d 
Council recDmmenda-
tions 
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Table XV below summarizes the technical challenges to 
which BPA provided written (as opposed to modeling) re-
sponses. Identified in the table are the party (or parties) 
making the comments, a short summary of their remarks, and a 
"shorthand" description of BPA's responses. 
In the chapter which follows, the one concluding this 
dissertation, a series of structured comparisons will be 
made between conclusions (or insights) gained from the use 
of Multiple Perspectives in contrast to those gained from 
the individual perspectives in isolation. This demonstra-
tion of the efficacy of Multiple Perspectives involves the 
detailed use of the products of the cross-cuing exercise. 
Rather than duplicate this process, this chapter will simply 
draw out more general conclusions and offer some emergent 
insights into the significance of BPA's forecast development 
to power planning in the region. 
The above cross-cuing process revealed a number of 
significant influences between the three "streams" of 
events. Technical products often serve as precedents for 
establishing (or modifying) organizational missions, for 
basis individual decisions, and for comparing later tech-
nical efforts. Organizational challenges (both intra- and 
interorganizational) often shape the questions which require 
technical response, as well as the methodology by which they 
are answered. Personal influences have effects on various 
levels of organizations, sometimes determining overall 
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pollcy In ways which, in turn, set deflnlte technical dlrec-
tions: at other times providing the seeds for organizational 
reorientation (with its concommltant technical revisions). 
Above all, the cross-cuing exercise illustrated how substan-
tive changes in policy (and decisions) is the outcome of the 
semi-structured interplay of T-, 0-, and P-elements, and 
identified several areas deserving greater attention. 
Ultimately, the impact of the BFA forecast must be 
judged interorganizationally, where it heralded a new 
perception of the future. Undoubtedly, at the time of the 
final forecast's July publication there were many parties 
which did not believe BFA's forecast, did not endorse their 
choice of models or methodology, or did not find that staff 
replies to technical comments convincing. Given the time-
line for the WNF 1 and 3 decision and the development of the 
supporting energy forecasts, BFA could be expected to do no 
more than uncover the technical alternative best suIted to 
the demands placed on them and openly acknowledged this. 
Major model development efforts were precluded durlng the 
six-month public involvement period, and this practical 
constraint was generally recognized by participants. As a 
consequence, major change to load projections could only 
result if a a serious methodological error could be identi-
fied in BFA's operation of its modeling system (Errors that 
might exist in data prepared by other sources such as DRI, 
would likely go undetected by either BFA or members of its 
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regional audience). BPA prepared some sort of "reasonable" 
response to each challenge and, in doing so, defended its 
forecast. The final result was a set of numbers which would 
have to be treated as "official" by anyone entering into 
resource agreements with BPA, even if they felt the forecast 
to be in error. The forecast development process forged a 
new "consensus" which would itself help shape the future of 
the region. 
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A DIGRAPH INTERPRETATION OF THE FORECAST PROCESS 
From the standpoint of systems research, the Multiple 
Perspective Concept allows complex problems to be approached 
not only from different disciplinary points of departure, 
but also from different paradigms of inquiry. Only findings 
~esulting from the T-perspective are capable of being sub-
jected to validation procedures in the strict scientific 
sense of the word. Corporate and judicial decisions cannot 
be subjected to statistical checks of reliability, validity, 
or goodness-of-fit. They can, however, be presented in such 
a fashion that the rationale of investigation as well as the 
evidence or information used may be reconstructed, (though 
not the subjective weighting process used for integrating 
the evidence). This allows potential critics to evaluate 
the object of description and, if desired, construct another 
plausible interpretation, much as two lawyers build their 
contrasting arguments from the same evidence. 
In social sciences dominated by empiricism, such as 
cultural anthropology, field researchers deal with some of 
these issues by, in effect, separating their roles as 
reporters from their roles as interpreters of the findings. 
They strive to keep descriptions as few of interpretation as 
possible, which permits their audience to arrive at dif-
fe~ent conclusions from the same data. In this disserta-
tion, efforts were made to present findings of each perspec-
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tive independently. Internal consistency and, to the e~tent 
possible, comprehensiveness were sought in each case. Simi-
larly, the cross-cuing exercise above was primarily narra-
tive, with most of the major conclusions drawn out in the 
chapter which follows. The detail of description went 
somewhat beyond what was required to reconstruct the 
dissertation's concluding remarks. 
But, the true strength of Multiple Perspectives comes 
from the use of T-, 0-, and P-findings in conjunction with 
one another. This allows the multidimensionality of the 
object of research to be revealed. Because this goes beyond 
simple description, it is essential that the emerging 
multidimensional picture) or its most critical features) be 
presented unambiguously and formally. Digraphs constitute a 
useful and potentially powerful tool targeted. towards this 
end. 
Although the fundamentals of digraph usage were ex-
plained in earlier chapters, further remarks on their appli-
cation to the problem of tying together insights from the 
three perspectives are warranted. Following guidelines 
presented by Linstone (1984:321-327) the nodes or elements 
in digraphs are the perspectives, while the arrows, as 
always, indicate the direction of influence. The signs 
associated with the arrows (appropriate where relations can 
be presented as positive or negative) reflect the direction 
of the influence of one perspective upon another. A plus 
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sign (+) represents "reinforcing the attitude toward, or 
feasibility of, a policy". conversely, a minus sign (-) 
connotes "counteracting the attitude toward, or feasibility 
of, a policy". In the context of the analysis below, 
"policy" will be interpreted broadly enough to include 
selections of technical methodology. 
In addition to creating a picture which lays out the 
relations between the perspectives explicitly, digraphs also 
allow the researcher to uncover the dynamics underlying the 
interactions between them. Signed digraphs accomplish this 
by permitting the interpretation of cycles or feedback loops 
among perspectives. Two basic rules guide this interpreta-
tion. First, a "loop is positive or impact amplifying if it 
has zero or an even number of minus signs negative or impact 
counteracting if it has an odd number of minus signs." 
(Linstone: 1984:323). Second, the total effect of any given 
point on a digraph on any other specific point 1s the sum of 
the effects of all the paths or cycles between the two 
points. (Effects may be direct, or indirectly expressed 
through intermediate points). When all effects are positive 
or all are negative, their sums are, respectively, positive 
and negative. The sum is indeterminate when there are both 
positive and negative effects via different poles. 
Figure 27 below depicts the interactions of perspec-
tives surrounding the development of the 1982 forecasts. 
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Figure 27. A digraph representation of multiple 
perspectives surrounding BPA's 1982 forecast 
406 
407 
The perspectives represented are as follows: 
Tl econometric demand models 
T2 end-use demand models 
T3 other demand modeling techniques 
01 Financial Management 
02 Power Requirements 
03 Conservation 
04 outside participants in BPA public involvement 
P1 Administrator 
P2 Power Requirements' leaders 
Before looking at the flows and cycles embedded within 
the system of relations depicted in the digraph, a few 
linkages should be explained. P2 is split off from 02 to 
distinguish between the effects of individuals' experience 
on model and methodology selection from those resulting from 
newly evolved organizational procedures. A number of 
specific individuals in Power Requirements (those who had 
earlier worked with the SOM report and later emerged in 
leadership positions) had negative experiences with the 
region's existing econometric models (P2Tl negative) and 
more positive (or at least more promising) ones with the 
ORNL end-use models (P2T2 positive). P2 is, in many re-
spects, an antecedent to (or precedent for) 02. 
From the organizational standpoint, 02 is strongly 
constrained by the needs of BPA's Financial Management input 
(i.e. the WPPSS study (01» and proper implementation the 
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terms of the Regional Act by Conservation (03). The former 
needs favor a forecast methodology which provides "a best 
guess" at resource requirements (range). The latter needs 
suggest the desirability of conservation and rate scenario 
capabilities in model selection. Financial analysis needs 
are given the stamp of importance by the management 
priorities of the Administrator (PlOl positive). 
From the standpoint of the forecasting unit (02), both 
Tl and T2 are acceptable alternatives (despite individual 
preferences). Thus, 02T2 and 02Tl are both positive. Both 
Tl and T2 could easily be used in a financial analysis 
context, so TlOl and T20l are both positive. T2, however, 
is ostensibly better suited to conservation policy analysis. 
Hence, though T203 is positive TI03 is negative in sign. 
The training and professional experience of Power Require-
ments staff also left them unfamiliar with other possible 
technical approaches (T3) which could have been used for 
forecasting purposes and might - or might not have been 
accepted by the power planning community. (The significance 
of paths not considered - both models and planning strate-
gies - is discussed at greater length in the next chapter, 
which evaluates what has thus far been described). 
Looking at the cycles involved, both cycles passing 
through T2 (i.e. 02T20302 and 02T20l02) are positive. By 
contrast, only one of the cycles passing through Tl is 
positive (i.e. 02TlOl02 is positive while 02Tl0302 is 
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negative). Thus, when looking at the organizational influ-
ences on technical choices (constrained, it should be noted, 
by the set of choices made available) the reasons for the 
model choices are clear. 
When looking at the sum of effects on T1 and T2 other 
dimensions of the choice of approaches become apparent. 
Influences from P2 and 04 both give extra weight to the 
particular methodology that was developed, though these 
preferences are probably outweighed by the organizational 
consideration described above. 
Several comments need to be made about 04. Because the 
comments received by BPA were varied, there was no univer-
sally preferred set of models or methodology. Preferences 
leaned towards the end-use models, however, so the signs are 
placed on dashed lines to indicate a less than unified 
perception. More important is the reason 04 is linked only 
to T1 and T2. As noted in the remarks introducing the 
description of the technical workshops, the public involve-
ment agenda was contrained to look among preselected models 
for their strengths and weaknesses. Membership in 04 was 
technically open to anyone wishing to participate. Techni-
cians, however, were the primary group 02 contacted through 
mailing lists. Because 02 could not be selective among the 
technicians participating (i.e. could not impose 01 or 03 
concerns on outsiders) 0204 is unsigned and represented by a 
dashed line. Under BPA's timetable, totally different 
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approaches were not deemed readily irnplernentable, thus there 
is no linkage between 04 and T3. Also, although technical 
comments influenced more than simply BPA evaluation of the 
end-use econometric demand models (i.e. numerous input and 
parametric changes resulted from the comments) it was only 
at Tl and T2 that major substantive methodological choices 
could potentially be modified (at least within the time 
frame of the 1981-1982 forecast cycle). 
The perspectives listed outside of the frame labeled 
with names rather than symbols have been added to show 
broader influences which affected model and methodology 
selection in less direct and obvious ways. Economists and 
engineers have, and continue to be the dominant force in the 
utility industry (though there is currently a trend away 
from narrow specialization) and the- influences of these 
disciplines are shown by means of dashed lines. 
Econometrics was used heavily in the models represented 
by Tl and T2. It also was a mainstay of the training of 
members of 02 and most of the members of 04. Conservation 
concerns also figured heavily in the forecast development 
process. 03 was largely made up of conservation specialists 
who, despite somewhat varied academic backgrounds, shared 
common objectives regarding the promotion of efficient 
energy use. In the model development community, conserva-
tion engineers have developed simulation tools for build-
ing design which permit the exploration of the effects of 
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equipment changes on energy consumption. The tools were an 
integral part of the development of T2 but not Tl. General-
ly speaking, then, this illustrates how the tools selected 
for consideration embodied familiar ideas and concepts. 
Also, depicted outside the process are various parties 
whose primarily qualitative insights are potential valuable 
for load forecasting and power resource planning, but who, 
lacking fluency in the lingua franca of modeling, have 
difficulty accessing the review process. Included in this 
category are many business leaders, lawyers, policiticans, 
and government officials. 
Finally, what is missing from this digraph provides 
additional insight into the forecasting process. Conspicu-
ous in its absence is another perspective to support the 
consideration and possible selection of a different modeling 
approach (T3). Both Tl and T2 are supported by "coalitions" 
withln the power planning community. No group can be seen 
to champion any alternative approaches to forecasting and 
modeling, however, and, given the composition of the par-
ticipant groups involved in the forecast development 
process, none is likely to emerge. Thus, the digraph 
suggests the need for a stimulus from outside to prevent 
disciplinary inbreeding and widen the sphere of considera-
tion to include additional technical approaches. Multiple 
Perspectives can be used as a device for obtaining these 
fresh alternative Viewpoints. 
To summarize, the digraph construction exercise 
produced the following conclusions. 
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• T1, the use of pure econometric models, was supported 
directly by 02 directly, Pi and 01 indirectly. It was 
opposed by P2 and 04. One cycle (02T10102) supported T1 
while another cycle (02T10302) opposed it. The model was 
good for financial analysis considerations by weak on 
conservation policy testing. 
• T2, the end-use model approach, was the more strongly 
supported alternative. P2, 02, and 04 directly supported 
its selection. Pi, P2, 01 and 03 indirectly supported its 
selection. Both cycles associated with T2 (i.e. 02T20102 
and 02T203T2) are positive. Thus, the organizational conc-
erns of 03 (conservation assessment) tipped the process 
towards T1. 
• The review process was, as noted earlier, constrained 
to focus upon comparisons between models already available 
for use. As will be described more fully in the next 
chapter, unless some mechanism is used to incorporate the 
insights of non-economists and non-engineers, th1s process 
cannot help but manifest the symptoms of disciplinary 
lnbreeding. 
The potential for development of digraph techniques in 
conjunction with Multiple Perspectives is gre~t and could, 
in and of itself, constltute the topic of a dissertation. 
One obvious area of development, which could provide a 
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bridge between the digraphs and available structural 
modeling techniques, is that of assigning weights to the 
relations. Questions of the strength of influence of the 
Administrator on organizational priorities (and resulting 
procedural choices), for instance, cannot be answered simply 
using signs. 
Obviously this is not a trivial project. It would 
involve ascertaining the strength of perceptions (i.e. how 
firmly certain things are believed to be) as well as the 
organizational responsiveness to d1fferent influence. 
Policy Delphi could provide a starting point for this 
endeavor, though it would have to be carried out virtually 
concurrent with the decision processes under consideration 
to prevent perceptual or attitudinal "revisionism". 
Digraphs thus explicate relationships between perspec-
tives in ways difficult to duplicate by other means. While 
resolving certain issues, however, their use in turn raises 
other. The concluding chapter of this dissertation, in 
evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of BPA's forecast 
methodology, examines important implications of the rela-
tionships embodied in the digraph above (as well as some 
relationships not embodied therein). 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
TYING THE THREADS TOGETHER: AN OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTER 
In the preceeding chapters, BPA's 1982 forecast was 
scrutinized by means of three sets of lenses: The T-, 0-, 
and P-perspectives. To the fullest extent possible, these 
perspectives and the insights which they yielded were kept 
separate and distinct. Only afterwards were the perspec-
tives cross-cued. This strategy was designed to illustrate 
the additional aepth and dimens10n of insight possible to be 
ga1ned from us1ng the multiple perspect1ves together. It is 
through cross-cuing that the full explanatory power of the 
Multiple Perspective concept becomes apparent. It is now 
time to draw out the conclusions wh1ch this exercise 
yielded. 
At the outset of this dissertation, three research 
objectives were defined, all of which w1ll be met in the 
conclusions that follow. The first two concern what the 
methodology of the Multiple Perspective Concept reveals 
about how forecasts influence resource planning and decision 
making and how forecasts are produced through an ongoing, 
essentially interactive process. The section which follows 
lays out the conclus10ns about BPA'S forecast, and the 
process by which it was produced, focusing first upon those 
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conclusions ~esulting f~om the use of each pe~spective by 
ltself and then identifying the additional insights de~ived 
f~om using the pe~spectives in combination. 
The final section explo~es the thi~d and last objec-
tive. It examines what this pa~ticula~ study reveals about 
the Multiple Perspective Concept. He~e a~e listed the 
strengths and weaknesses of the MP Concept experienced in 
this investigation of BPA's fo~ecast, new recommendations 
fo~ its use and application to ~esearch problems, and 
specific areas perceived to be in need of further develop-
ment. 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE FORECAST: WHAT MULTIPLE 
PERSPECTIVES SAYS 
In this section, conclusions about Bonneville's fo~e­
cast de~ived f~om the use of Multiple Pe~spectives a~e 
presented. First, conclusions a~~ived at by means of the 
T-, 0-, and P-pe~spectives used by themselves a~e listed. 
To some extent, these ~eite~ate rema~ks made in othe~ 
chapte~s, but they also often ~eflect pa~aphrasings which 
elabo~ate or emphasize key points which have become clearer 
given the bigger pictu~e produced by this study. Second, 
conclusions ~esulting from c~oss-cuings are described. 
These are listed according to the type of interaction 
between the perspectives (e.g. T on 0, 0 on P, etc.) and, as 
noted above, illustrate the additional values of a multiple 
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perspective approach when contrasted with the conclusions 
obtained from the application of the perspectives in isola-
tion. Finally, the forecasting and planning process is 
evaluated as a whole, based upon the full range of insights 
yielded by this investigation, with heaviest emphasis placed 
upon the area in many ways most central to futures research: 
risk and uncertainty. 
Conclusions from the T-perspectiye 
1. BPA's Modeling System was More complex than (and at 
Least as Sophisticated as) any Previously Used for Regional 
Electricity Forecasting. A point which Bonneville staff 
raised at numerous occasions during technical workshops and 
public involvement was that the models they selected and 
developed were designed to address selected complex issues 
(e.g. conservation policies, electricity pricing). In order 
for these models to satisfy that criterion, they themselves 
embodied a complex structure. 
Two points need to be noted. First, model complexity 
and sophistication, though often g01ng hand in hand, are not 
identical. A model need only have an intricate and detailed 
accounting structure to be complex. The ideas embodied in 
its structure may actually be simple. By contrast, a model 
which is sophisticated embodies elaborate or elegant theory 
in its structure, but that structure need not be compli-
cated. Second, neither complexity nor sophistication in any 
sense endow a model with superiority over alternative ap-
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proaches, nor do they guarantee improved performance. Com-
plex models may simply aggregate or disaggregate simulations 
of real world events without changing the ultimate results. 
Sophisticated models may be difficult to specify or support 
with adequate data. In worst instances, the theory under-
lying their construction, however elegant and cherished by 
model users, may ultimately prove misguided, yielding 
untenable results. 
The disaggregated nature of BPA's overall modeling 
system, and several of the models within that system, 
definitely produced a more complex system than used before, 
as asserted above. This disaggregation, however, is not 
necessarily more sophisticated than some of its predecessors 
(e.g. NEPP, ISOM). The enhanced ability to address specific 
conservation policy issues of concern to BPA which earlier 
econometric models were not capable of addressing at least 
outweighs whatever deficiencies the system might have in 
terms of internal consistency and completeness. It is thus 
best judged at least as sophisticated as its predecessors. 
2. BPA's Selection of Oisaggregate End-Use Models for 
Forecasting Loads was Technically Warranted. It seems 
readily possible to debate the relative merits of end-use 
vs. econometric models ad nauseum. Both approaches may 
display unique strong points; neither necessarily produces 
more accurate results (nor do they necessarily produce 
results meaningful for decisions). While econometric models 
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may be evaluated accord1ng to a number of stat1stical 
goodness-of-f1t measures, the data over wh1ch they are 
specified may be poor or descriptive of a unique set of 
h1stor1cal c1rcumstances. End-use models mix the1r methods, 
and are so data-intensive that judgment must be used very 
freely to fill gaps in inputs. The particular end-use 
models BPA evaluated (and ultimately selected) responded at 
least as reasonably to a battery of diverse tests as their 
econometric alternatives. Their internal structures 
additionally permitted simple and direct policy analysis. 
This latter capability justified the selection of the two 
ORNL models. 
3. The Use of a Range of Forecasts Constituted a pefinite 
Improyement Over Single Trajectory Point Forecasts. As long 
as its methodology is carried out correctly, there 1s in 
principle nothing technically inferior about using a single 
"best guess" for a forecast. Given the changing pattern of 
load growth in the late 1970s and the failure of earlier 
point forecasts to track actual electriCity sales, the 
establishment of baseline, high, and low forecast scenarios 
was a major area of improvement in the BPA forecast. By 
using scenarios rather than statistical "confidence inter-
vals" (not a practical alternative given the disaggregatre 
nature of BPA's forecasting system) BPA made possible more 
thorough evaluation of sources of forecast error. 
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4. Iterating Price and Demand Models Allowed BPA to Couple 
the Best Features of ISDM with its Disaggregated Modeling 
System. Electricity price and demand are intimately linked 
in the real world and it is essential that this linkage be 
represented in any regional power planning forecast. The 
Integrated Supply and Demand Models (ISDM) coupled a 
predecessor of BPA's Supply Pricing Model with an econo-
metric demand component. By developing a pricing model 
embodying the often complicated rate provisions of the 
Regional Power Act, and allowing this to run iteratively 
with its demand models until an equilibrium set of loads and 
prices were reached, BPA enhanced its forecasting capa-
bility. 
5. BPA's Technical Documentation Made the Models Used. 
Their Inputs. Their Results. and the Assumptiqns Behind them 
Explicit to a Degree unprecedented in Regional Demand 
Forecasting. To be evaluated thoroughly, a forecast and its 
assumptions must be laid bare in full detail. BPA's three 
stages of documentation (technical review, draft, and final 
forecast) described in detail all the models under consider-
ation as well as those actually used for the forecast. 
Inputs to models were listed exhaustively and output results 
of both "official" forecasts and major sensitivity tests 
were presented in detail. Of at least equal importance, 
efforts were made to render explicit the assumptions made 
about electricity prices, levels of economic activity, 
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conservation, and resource availability underlying the three 
forecast scenarios. This allowed evaluation of forecast 
error and the identification of possibly overlooked issues 
by BPA's primary technical audience. 
There are, however, basic "core assumptions" implicit 
in such a forecast Which go unacknowledged, not because of 
any attempt to deliberately conceal them, but rather because 
they are taken for granted by the forecast authors. (This 
is usually an artifact of the disciplinary backgrounds and 
methodological leanings of the technical staff.) By way of 
example, the perpetuation of the Regional Act in its 
original form and BPA's roles and responsibilities were 
assumed unchanging. The Direct Service Industries, major 
consumers of electricity energy, were also assumed to be 
content to remain in region as rates rise despite attractive 
opportunities elsewhere. When such assumptions remain tacit 
they limit the number and kinds of technical questions asked 
and, by extension, the alternative courses of action con-
sidered. (The importance of core assumptions will be dis-
cussed at greater length later in this chapter.) 
6. BPA's Treatment of conservation in the FOrecast waS 
Accectable as a Starting Point for Policy Analysis but Only 
as a starting Point. During the technical review of the 
models under consideration for use in its forecast, BPA 
explored a variety of conservation scenarios designed to 
illustrate their capabilities. For the draft and final 
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forecasts, ho~everi conservation was treated in a fashion 
which the staff acknowledged to be only a starting point. 
The demand models were run so as to simulate only those 
programs already in place or those over which BPA had con-
trol. This treatment, though technically acceptable, left 
unexplored not only the amount of savings attainable from 
additional programs (e.g. Regional Council) but also the 
various factors affected by and affecting such programs. 
7. The pRr National Economic Model. Though. in a 
Fundamental Sense. Serving as the Starting Point for the 
Forecast. Remained Largely a Black Box to its Users. DRI 
(along with Chase Econometrics and Wharton) is generally 
accepted as a primary source for projections of national and 
regional economic and demographic behavior. Its national 
economic model is mammoth in both size and complexity. 
Because of this, most subscribers to its services do not 
actually operate the model but use packaged routines to 
access and massage its projections in light of data from 
regional sources, generally based the development of model 
inputs on DRI's numbers. Though the staff understood the 
operation of the national model in general terms, it re-
mained largely a black box both to them and their tech-
nical audience, opaque in terms of both operations and 
assumptions. Though strongly counterintuitive results of 
the national model would undoubtedly be recognized by users, 
other types of miscalculation would not. Forecast inputs 
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would~ in such a case, be vulnerable to any problems inher-
ent in the national model. 
8. Though very Detailed. BPA's Forecasting System Left the 
Effects o£ a Number of Potentially Significant Feedbacks 
Unexplored. While the iterative feedbacks between electri-
city sales and prices constituted one of the basic strengths 
of BPA's forecasting system, its data and information flows 
were more generally unidirectional. Economic and demograph-
ic inputs were derived in a series originating with DRI's 
national projections and inputs to the demand models. 
While, in reality, changing electricity prices may directly 
or indirectly influence employment, migration, and linked 
economic factors, BPA's modeling system did not represent 
such interdependencies. Without additional research, it is 
difficult to assess whether or not these omissions are 
significant (or whether or not they are significant when 
changes in prices exceed critical thresholds). 
9. Though BPA's FOrecast Range waS Deyeloped Using 
Well-Defined and Explicit Methodologies. the Probability 
Assignment Associated with that Range waS not. The 
assignment of probabilities to BPA's range of forecasts was 
performed by Power Requirements staff at the request of 
upper management following their advanced review of the 
draft. While the methodology underlying the development of 
the range had been well thought out, with consideration 
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given to different levels of economic activity, resource 
availability, and conservation, the probability assignments 
were made judgmentally ex post with no explicit methodology. 
In effect, these numbers convey a sort of "gut level" 
reflection of the staff's confidence in their work, not a 
systematic evaluation of the conditions embodied in the 
three scenarios compared to some set of historical be-
haviors. 
Though such "seat of the pants" assessments are not 
technically sophisticated, they are perfectly acceptable 
provided that their authors acknowledge their judgmental 
underpinnings (which BPA did). As a summary reflection of 
forecast confidence, however, they are somewhat inconsistent 
with the high degree of disaggregation in the model1ng 
system. Attempts to improve upon such an approach by adding 
more formal methodological structure generally fall along 
one or more of these lines. First is decomposition -- the 
factors taken (or not taken) into considerat1on are laid out 
explicitly and component probabilities assigned. This 
yields the advantage of allowing users and critics to assess 
staff judgment and substitute their own, if felt necessary. 
The disadvantage is that some method of aggregation must be 
used. This usually leads to a second line of "improvement", 
the development of a statistical method for combining prob-
abilties. Such methods confer the advantage of explicit-
ness, but reflect the infamous computer science acronym GIGO 
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(Garbage In, Garbage out). The ultimate probability assign-
ment, though arrived at through the use of algorithms, 
is only as strong or as weak as the underlying judgments. 
Statistical techniques designed for hard, interval-scale 
data cannot compensate in any way for weaknesses in judgment 
or inaccuracies in perception. The final strategy for 
improvement attempts to develop hard numbers from historical 
data. Such data is frequently unavailable. When it can be 
obtained, the resulting probability distributions mayor may 
not capture all the important outcomes that will be exper-
ienced in the future. If the future differs qualitatively 
from the historical period over which data was collected, 
the resulting distribution will not be applicable. The 
development of any of these alternatives, however, was not 
something that could be carried out in the time BPA had 
available. 
10. pespite the Fact that BPA P;oduced a "state-of-the-Art" 
Forecast. its staff was Fo;ced to Work with (and sometimes 
around) Maio; pata Weaknesses in Some Secto;s. Until the 
mid-1970s, energy forecasting, particularly in the Pacific 
Northwest, was largely non-problematic: both energy availa-
bility and price appeared stable, as did demand growth. 
Because of this, little data about patterns of energy con-
sumption and their relation to building, dwelling, or 
factory production characteristics was collected. This 
situation left forecasters and analysts of the 1980s unable 
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to obtain ~ey pieces of inforro3tion about the foci of their 
concern. 
BPA expended a great deal of resources obtaining the 
best available data, but in some cases what was available 
contained conspicuous weaknesses. Particularly in the 
fast-growing, but internally diverse, commercial sector 
descriptive data was particularly weak. As a result, por-
tions of the forecast were ultimately dependent on data 
developed by simulation or judgment (somewhat negating the 
supposed strengths of the disaggregated end-use models). 
This potentially lessened the reliability of those portions 
while at the same time making them difficult to refute or 
contradict. 
11. BPA's Forecast was Extremely Conservative in its 
Treatment of ~£bnologlcal Change. Relative to earlier 
regional power forecasts, BPA's treated the effects of 
technological change with both greater detail and explicit-
ness. The commercial and residential sector demand models 
developed their projections of energy use by means of 
technology curves measuring efficiency improvements against 
anticipated equipment operating costs. The industrial model 
used productivity as an input, and embedded within the 
values of that input were assumed improvements in tech-
nology. Technological innovations, however, were not 
forecasted either inside or outside the modeling system. 
Technological change, where modeled, was essentially 
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represented as the improvement of existing technologies, 
rather than the development of new ones. consequently, the 
resulting forecast does not allow the evaluation of the full 
range of impacts of energy technology on economics and power 
consumption. 
12. The structure of the Demand Models Somewhat Predisposed 
them Towards Lower Results than their Econometric 
counterparts. Each generation of demand forecasting models 
seems to focus heavily upon the weaknesses of its predeces-
sors. The two ORNL models placed greatest emphasis upon the 
simulation and representation of conservation policy. 
Though the answers the models produced were reasonable, 
their structures encouraged analysis which posed polIcy 
questions specifically about savings (as opposed to market-
ing opportunities, technological innovation effects, etc.). 
As a result, heavier emphasis was placed upon the correct 
representation of demand-reducing conservation programs. 
13. The Final Forecast was Produced with a Number of 
Unresolved Modeling Problems. At best, simulations 
represent reality imperfectly, necessarily omitting details 
or elements which are of potential relevance. At worst, 
they severely distort the reality they strive to represent. 
BPA staff worked with a complex set of models ~hich provided 
a representation of regional economic activity and power 
consumption behavior which was extremely detailed (though 
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such a level of detail is not necessarily the most appro-
priate for decision making). While the overall responsive-
ness of the models tested credibly, a number of problems 
were detected during the public involvement period Which, 
for various reasons, went unresolved (e.g. NEPP elastici-
ties, and lag coefficients, ORNL Commercial Model price 
responsiveness etc.). Under certain, possibly extreme 
conditions, such problems could prove significant. 
14. Though Proceeding from Different Methodological Bases 
and Yielding Contrasting Results. Both Forecasts Were 
Produced Using Legitimate Alternative Approaches. NERA 
chose to critique BPA's forecast point-by-point from the 
perspective of a "devil's adVocate" contending that BPA's 
forecast was too low. Challenging input values and pro-
posing alternative methods for critical calculations, NERA 
In effect produced a higher "forecast-by-adjustment". By 
contrast, EVA, maintained that the Northwest was entering 
new territory where old guideposts would be ineffective. 
Using forecast-by-analogy as a method, EVA projected BPA's 
future based upon the experience of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority. This yielded noticeably lower results (i.e. 
BPA's forecast too high). Both of these studies yielded 
some insights regarding uncertainties of load futures. 
Taken together, however, they only scratch the surface of 
the full spectrum of possibilities which confront the 
Northwest power community. A comprehensive technical review 
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of the BPA forecast would require much more than the produc-
tlon of a pair of counter forecasts (as is discussed later in 
this chapter). 
Conclusions from the O-Perspectiye 
1. Though SOPs are Generally the Proper Starting Point for 
understanding Organizational Behayior. the Actions of BPA's 
Forecasting Group Can Only be Understood by Understanding ad 
hoc Procedures. Standard operating procedures are the 
habitual ways organizations go about doing things and, as 
such, they go a long way towards explaining why a group took 
the action they did. Organizations, however, do change, 
usually slowly, but under some conditions change is, for a 
brief period, rapid. The standard operating procedures for 
preparing forecasts and planning for loads which had been 
used in the 1970s proved inadequate. It was largely in 
response to this failure that the Regional Power Act was 
passed and that BPA expanded its resource and conservation 
planning capabilities. The 1982 forecast was produced by 
newly formed groups in Power Requirements, Rates, and 
Conservation. Because both the organizations and the tasks 
they performed were new, in effect evolving along with the 
forecast process, SOPs were not particularly useful as 
explanatory devices. It was necessary to look more at the 
specifics of the evolving ad hoc procedures which, if 
successful, would become the SOPs of the groups involved. 
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2. At the Time of the 1982 Forecast. a Mixture of 
Corporate Cultures May be Seen Operating Within BPA. Deal 
and Kennedy developed the notion of corporate cultures --
groups of individuals comprising an organization and sharing 
common values and worldviews -- to distinguish successful 
from unsuccessful companies. In large organizations, 
particularly ones undergoing major structural changes lIke 
BPA, it is possible and useful to identify different types 
of corporate cultures at different organizational levels. 
Thus, while the core of BPA could still be best viewed as a 
highly structured bureaucracy confronting slow feedbacks 
about its performance, the newly formed groups within it 
which were charged with developing the forecast functioned 
in many ways more like the cultures of "think tanks". 
Within these groups innovation was high, procedures evolved 
through a lot of trial-and-error, feedback through public 
involvement channels was quick, and within-group communi-
cation was highly lateralized. This concept of multiple 
corporate cultUres heightens understanding of organizational 
drivers as well as misfits. 
3. The ascendancy of Forecasting and Resource Analysis in 
Terms of Relatiye Importance is Reflected in the structural 
Changes Recorded in BPA's Organizational Chart. While it is 
true that important actions do not necessarily follow formal 
lines of organizational influence, major shifts in orien-
tation usually result in structural changes as well. A 
revIew of BPA's organIzatIonal charts IndIcates a late 
1970s-early 1980s shift in emphasis from engineering to 
resource planning and management. 
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4. The Early 1980s Reorganization at BPA can Best be 
viewed as an Organizational Problem-Solving Response to the 
Regional Act and to the Growing wpPSS Problem. As the 1970s 
moved to their conclusion, the problem of financing the 
uncompleted WPPSS nuclear plants became one which BPA 
realized it would have to confront itself. At the same 
time, the outlines of the Regional Power Act, which entailed 
new responsibilities for BPA, was taking shape. The 
reorganization of the Agency with emphaSis on conservation, 
forecasting, ratemaking, resource planning, and financial 
management prepared BPA to meet just those challenges. 
5. Functionally. the Production of BPA's Forecast Crosscut 
Formal Organizational Lines of COmmand. Although the newly 
revamped organizational structure mirrored the revised 
priorities of the agency, responsibility for the production 
of the long-term forecast was distributed over several 
Divisions and even Offices. Understanding how the coordi-
nation of the project took place thus required looking 
beyond, or between, the formal lines of command to the 
subgroups actually tasked with producing the forecast and 
studying their procedures of operation. 
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6. The Public Inyolvement Process waS the one Most Heavily 
Used Channel for Outside Parties to Influence the Forecast. 
Because Bonneville is a Federal agency answerable to the 
public, a number of channels (e.g. hearings, court cases, 
information requests, professional meetings) are available 
to interested parties to obtain information or action. 
Public involvement through meetings and correspondence is a 
common feature of the agency's dealings but rarely is it 
used as extensively as it was during the preparation of the 
1982 forecast, although the agenda behind this process was 
admittedly limited in its scope, (as noted in the previous 
chapter and discussed at greater length below). In large 
measure this was because BPA staff recognized both the 
importance and the sensitive nature of the forecast (and its 
uses) and structured the public involvement process more 
than Is customarily the case. Thus, almost all the "chal-
lenges" which came to BPA did so via this channel. 
7. The Two Primary Groups of stakeholders Participating in 
the Public Inyolyement Process were those with Financial 
Interests in the wpPSS Plants and those Advocating the 
Primacy of Conservation as a Future Resource. During the 
public involvement process, both at the workshops and 
through correspondence, a number of diverse parties revealed 
themselves through their participation. These included 
academics, utility representatives, consultants, ratepayers, 
environmentalists, and public officials. Two groups of 
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stakeholders were represented most heavily in the process. 
First were those PNUCC member utilities with investments in 
the WPPSS plants which would be strongly affected, in terms 
of both finances and their own resource planning by BPA's 
decision to complete, delay, or terminate any of the plants. 
Second were the advocates of conservation and environmental 
protection (NRDC, Survival Center) who wished to ensure that 
BPA took full account of conservation alternatives in their 
forecasts. 
8. Despite pifferent and Even Opposing Interests. 
virtually all Parties COmmenting on BPA's Forecast Would be 
Hurt by the Effects of a Grossly Inaccurate Forecast. A 
constraining factor on comments was the effect which would 
have resulted from BPA taking action on a remark. If BPA 
seriously overbuilt resources in response to comments 
received by, say, shareholders in the WPPSS plants, they, as 
well as BPA, would have to bear the consequences. If the 
need for conservation was overestimated, the region would 
find itself obtaining savings during a surplus period, and 
would likely be reticent to acquire further additional 
conservation even were 1t needed. Thus, subtle pressure 
existed for interest groups to look hard at what they were 
proposing and keep suggestions "reasonable". 
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9. The Process Surrounding the peyelopment of BPA's 1982 
Forecast Signalled an Emerging Realignment in the Regional 
Power Planning Community. The Regional Power Act had 
created new roles for BPA, PNUCC, and the other members of 
the region's power planning community. Though the Regional 
Council was not a major player during public involvement, 
BPA's methods of forecasting and resource planning closely 
resembled those under development for use in the Council's 
Plan. In many ways (e.g. conservation alternatives con-
sidered, resource costing and ratemaking methodologies, load 
ranges) the development of the 1982 forecast foreshadowed 
the role the Council would play in the region while defining 
the "rules of the game" (i.e. acceptable planning ranges) 
for other actors as well. 
Conclusions from the P-Perspectiye 
1. By Establishing overall Agency Policy. Each of the 
Three Recent Bonneville Power Administrators pefined how BPA 
would Perceive and Respond to the Resource Planning 
Situation in the Region. Resource planning first became 
something of a regional problem at the time of the Hydro-
Thermal Power Plan, when it was realized that future loads 
could not be met simply with hydropower. Under Donald 
Hodel, the development of thermal power and, secondarily, 
conservation, were the agency's foremost priorities. Under 
Sterling Hunro, the development of Regional Power Bill 
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legislation was at the forefront. Finally, under Peter 
Johnson, financial planning, chiefly targeted at enabling 
the agency to deal with the WPPSS problem, became a new 
agency touchstone. In each case, the approach and orien-
tation of the Administrator was reflected in both the struc-
tural and characteristics of the organization. 
2. As the P-Perspectiye Would Predict. Each Administra-
tob's View of BPA's Resource Planning Problem was Strongly 
Influenced by his Background. While it 1s clearly the case 
that the complexion of the Northwest's resource planning 
problems, and the region's dominant perception of them, have 
undergone change since the early 1970's, it is also true 
that each of the last three Bonneville Administrators have 
approached the problems faCing them in manners consistent 
with their backgrounds. During Donald Hodel's term of 
office, the region appeared in imminent danger of severe 
power shortfalls. Hodel, whose background entailed a law 
degree as well as an Assistant Administrator's position with 
BPA, adopted an approach very similar to traditional BPA 
operating procedures. He treated resource development as an 
engineering problem (i.e. building sufficient capacity to 
meet anticipated loads) which would be directed according to 
the administrative provisions of the Hydro-Thermal Power 
Plan. When Sterling Munro assumed leadership, he brought 
his political expertise to bear upon increasing regional 
disagreements on rate, resource and environmental issues. 
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The development of Regional Power Act legislation was a key 
means of addressing this issue. Finally, Peter Johnson 
approached the festering WPPSS problem as a business prob-
lem, bringing his extensive experience in the area to bear. 
3. To the Extent that Peter Johnson Defined how BPA's 
Forecasting Apparatus Would be Used in a Financial 
Management Situation. he Helped Giye it Shape. The 
selection,of models and development of needed inputs was 
carried out by BPA staff. A large portion of this work was 
carried out, or at least initiated, during Munro's term of 
office. It was not certain, however, at that time exactly 
how these models would be used. The critical questions 
Peter Johnson asked about the WPPSS situation, and the way 
he asked them, required BPA to perform analyses different 
from what had previously been attempted. This involved the 
development of a financial analysis capability and its sub-
sequent integration with load forecasting results. The 
nature of this integration in turn contributed to the shape 
the load scenarios assumed. It was through this series of 
linkages that Johnson as Administrator could be said to 
shape the development of the forecast. 
4. Johnson's Successful Experience at Trus Joist. which 
Strongly Paralleled the Situation he Confronted with wpPSS. 
Undoubtedly Facilitated his Difficult pecision to pelay WNP 
1 and 3. That the Supply System was beset with severe 
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financial difficulties was a point obvious to all in the 
region at the time Peter Johnson assumed office. For many, 
it seemed equally clear that BPA would be compelled to take 
a more directive role in dealing with the uncompleted 
nuclear plants. The financial and load uncertainties 
surrounding possible resource scheduling decisions were 
great, and hesitancy or "paralysis by analysis". could easily 
have been an outcome. Peter Johnson, however, had faced a 
similar problem earlier in the private sector and his 
company, Trus Joist, had profited handsomely from his diffi-
cult but in retrospect correct, decision to close several of 
the company's plants. This successful experience undoubt-
edly helped give Johnson the confidence to delay WNP 1 and 3 
in the face of sometimes severe criticism. 
5. Key Members of Power Reguirements Staff were Pre-
disposed to Search for new Technical Approaches as a Result 
of the Cognitive pissonance they Experienced Trying to 
Resolye Results of the SOM study with the sou Forecast. The 
perception of imminent power deficits remained dominant in 
the power planning community in general, and BPA in particu-
lar, into the early 1980s. Had there not also been a 
"minority view" present in the late 19705, it is doubtful 
that BPA could have readied itself for its 1982 forecast in 
time. The search for alternative forecasting approaches 
came as the result of a failed attempt by three key Power 
Requirements staff members to reconcile the result of 
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Skidmore, OWings, and Merrill's study of regional conserva-
tion potential with the Sum-Of-Utilities forecast. The 
disaggregated projections which they made of regional power 
consumption fell far below those identified in the SOU 
forecast. This, in turn, led them to distrust the corrob-
orative results of the PNUCC econometric model and prompted 
the search for an alternative modeling methodology. 
6. Personal Background Factors of Key POwer Requirements 
Staff Constituted a Second Element Predisposing Them to Look 
£0; Particular Kinds of New Solutions to Perceived 
FOrecasting Problems. In addition to developing a unique 
insight into problems with then-current forecasting proce-
dures as a result of the SOH study, the members of Power 
Requirements staff who would spearhead the development of 
the system of models used in the 1982 forecast also bore 
some distinguishing characteristics related to their back-
grounds. Those who would ultimately guide the development 
of the 1982 forecast either were then new to the group, and 
not subscribing to the "official" view of the future, 
experienced with the representational issues associated with 
computer models (as distinct from simple extrapolation) or 
both. These factors influenced their search for the tools 
BPA would later use. 
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7. The organizational Climate under the Hunro Administra-
tion Provided the Necessary Context for the Search for New 
Forecasting Tools to Occur. Irrespective of staff percep-
tions or desires, an organization will not allow the expen-
diture of resources on projects which are not viewed as 
important. Under Sterling Munro, BPA was preparing itself 
to address the issues central to the Regional PQwer Bill, 
then being written. It was within this context that the 
need for a greater forecasting capability first gained 
recognition. Without this recognition, Power Requirements 
would not have been able to begin the model and data 
development which they deemed necessary. 
Conclusions from T- and O-Perspectiye Cross-Cues 
Before identifying those conclusions resulting from the 
cross-cuing of two (or more) perspectives, several remarks 
are first in order. A conclusion can be said to result from 
the cross-cuing of perspectives when the use of investiga-
tory criteria from more than one of the approaches or para-
digms are required for it to be inferred. Thus, If one 
observes that a party in public involvement submits tech-
nical comments, this is simply use of the O-perspective. 
The technical comments are an organizational output, likely 
the result of identifiable standard operating procedures. 
By contrast, i£ one were to examine the specific technical 
contents of the comments and indicate how and why the 
particular SOPs of the involved organization shaped the 
comments as they did, then T- and O-pe~spectives vould b~ 
cross-cued. 
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A point made earlier should be here reiterated. It is 
not uncommon for more traditional analyses made predomi-
nantly according to the investigatory paradigm of a single 
perspective to occasionally venture outside that paradigms 
boundaries. AnalysiS of technical material will often 
identify non-technical influences on the product. This 
"cross-cuing", however, is at best informal. Without the 
explicit use of the paradigms encompassed by Multiple 
perspectives, such efforts are neither systematic nor 
thorough. Deeper insights are thus lost. 
The most fruitful area of "paradigmatic interaction" in 
this case study was where the T- and O-perspectives cross-
cued each other, as can be seen from the sheer number of 
conclusions presented below. Where a conclusion derived 
from the use of more than one perspective specifically 
deepens the insights provided by one of the conclusions 
listed above derived using one of the perspectives in 
isolation, this is noted. This more clearly and directly 
shows the strength of using multiple perspectives of 
investigation. 
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1. The Relative predictive Success of the sum-of-ytilities 
Forecast in the 1970's Crvstalized the Perception of High 
Growth Load Futures in the Hinds of Power Planners. 
Conversely. this Widespread Consensus Picture of Load Growth 
and General Faith in the SOU in Turn Discouraged the Search 
for New Forecasting App,oaches with G,eate, Explanatory 
Powe,. For a surprisingly large number of years, the SOU 
forecast provided a reliable guide for planning despite its 
SimplistiC underlying methodology. Given background 
conditions of sustained economic growth and opportunities 
for expansion of the Columbia river hydrosystem, projections 
of future growth based upon historical rates appeared quite 
reasonable. These technical prOjections formed the informa-
tional basis for the establishment of the Hydro-Thermal 
Power Plan and the construction of the WPPSS plants. Once 
the high growth perception was entrenched, an organizational 
apparatus grew up which was geared to resource development 
in a t1me of 1mpending def1c1t. w1th1n such an organ1za-
tion, priority was placed upon tasks other than developing 
new approaches to a forecasting problem believed to be 
already solved. Response to changing regional circum-
stances, as a result, was conspicuously slow. 
2. The A;ab Oil Emba,go of 1973. Pe,haps the Singlemost 
Important Eyent in Recent Ene,gy History. waS the Ultimate 
cause of a NUrobe, of Hodel and Fo,ecast Deyelopment Effo,ts. 
both Nationally and Regionally. While regionally, the 
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stability of the electric power industry had been taken for 
granted prior to the mid-1970s, worldwide the stability of 
the petroleum market similarly seemed a foregone conclusion. 
The sudden and sharp increase in oil and gas prices follow-
ing the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 brought the dependency of 
the American way of life en inexpensive energy sources 
suddenly into the foreground. For the first time since 
perhaps the Second World War, the idea of different energy 
futures, some of which might well entail the curtailment of 
consumption, was taken seriously. Both nationally and 
regionally, new energy policies were debated and, both 
nationally and regionally, new models and methodological 
approaches were sought. The development of end-use models 
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory was part of the Carter 
Administration's reorientation to the changed world energy 
outlook. The NEPP and SOH studies were among early regional 
technical responses. Ultimately, though largely indirectly, 
the Embargo then had an impact on BPA's first independent 
forecast through the models used in its production. 
3. The Need to Legitimize the Findings of its First 
Forecast Prompted BPA to an ynprecedented Leyel o£ Technical 
Response to its Critics. Characteristically, an organiza-
tion's initial efforts at preparing a product are critical. 
Credibility must be established with those affected by the 
organization's efforts. Given the short- and long-range 
impacts of new WPPSS plant scheduling deciSions, it was 
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imperative that Bonneville's forecasts be accepted as a 
guideline for resource planning. As a result, organiza-
tional factors demanded an extremely thorough technical 
review of the forecast. The technical workshops, the 
detailed model and input documentations, and the written 
replies to comments (which served as justification for what 
had and had not been done) all were intended to make BPA's 
subsequent decisions as credible and defensible as possible 
given the methodological framework chosen. Thus, organiza-
tional needs dictated the level of technical expertise 
expended in producing the forecast, while this expertise, in 
turn, strengthened the organization's position on resource 
development. 
4. The Perceived Theoretical Sophistication of BPA's 
Modeling Approach Served to Confer an Air of LegitimaCy to 
the Agency's pecisions (expands on T-perspectiye conclusion 
~ The perceived sophistication of models used to 
produce a forecast has organizational as well as technical 
consequences. Often, the fact that a set of numbers is 
produced by a formidable looking computer model will, in and 
of itself, make a technical product appear of higher quality 
or greater defensibility whether this is truly the case or 
not. Big models are more impressive than small ones, and 
provided that no errors are detected in their operation, 
their outputs inspire greater confidence. Though some 
reservations were expressed about the complexity of BPA's 
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modeling system, the fact that it ~as run ~ithout any 
apparent serious problems likely enhanced the acceptance of 
the forecast. 
5. Ihe Major Modeling Alternatives Available to BPA we;e 
Strongly Constrained by What waS Available "Off-the-Shelf" 
(expands on T-perspective conclusion 12), An organizational 
constraint placed upon BPA as an agency is that it is not 
permitted to do basic research in-house, Though models may 
be respecified, tailored to specific needs, or integrated 
with other tools by staff, basic developmental work is 
prohibited. New models (and new modeling approaches) must 
be developed under contract or obtained "off-the-shelf" 
(I.e. ready-made models are purchased or obtained). Given 
that ~ organizational support for Power Requirements' 
forecasting system development came only after the passage 
of the Regional Act and given the types of models preferred 
by the utility industry, staff was limited to existing 
regional models and the ORNL models. Though the models 
were "state-of-the-art", they were still limited in terms of 
the variety of approaches to forecasting they embodied. 
(The consequences of this conclusion and its immediate 
predecessor are spelled out in the section combining 
insights from all three perspectives.) 
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6. The structure o£ the Forecast Models. to the Extent 
That they Determined the Types of Questions Which Could be 
Asked. Exerted a strong Influence on Forecast outcomes and 
Uses (expands on T-pe;spectiye conclusions 12 and 112). 
All approaches to modeling invariably simplify the reality 
they represent. These simplifications are necessary, but 
tend to follow directions defined by user needs and data 
limitations. Models are geared to ask certain questions, 
but not others. Those chosen by BPA put a premium upon 
looking at conservation policies (or at least those elements 
which could be most directly affected by such policies). 
They did not, and could not, look at other potentially 
significant factors such as marketing opportunities, 
technological innovations, or the effects of cyclical 
business activities. Thus, though the structures of the 
models did not predetermine the results, they limited 
possible outcomes and, in doing so indirectly affected 
organizational decisions. 
7. The peyelopment of a Fo;ecast Using a Range ApprQach 
Set Limits on its O;ganizational Applicability (expands on 
T-pe;spectiye conclusion 13). Just as the selection of 
models sets constraints on a forecast in terms of the type 
of questions which can be asked, the general methodological 
approach underlying a forecast defines how it can be used 
organizationally. The range approach used by BPA repre-
sented an advance over previous approaches which focused 
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upon a single scenario for the future. At the same tlme~ by 
limiting its analyses to three "likely" scenarios of region-
al load futures, BPA limited its organizational preparedness 
to a wide array of possible events which might prove sig-
nificant (more on this issue later). 
8. The Issues Raised as a Result of BPA's Changed Role 
Under the Regional Act Virtually Necessitated Both the 
Acquisition of End-Use Models and the Integration of a Price 
Component into the Forecasting System (expands on 
I-perspective conclusions 12 and 14). The modeling system 
used by BPA for its 1982 forecast was built from the 
bottom-up -- that is, the individual components were first 
developed independent of one another and afterwards integra-
ted. This approach was Virtually mandated by the Regional 
Act with its ratemaking provisions and emphasis on conser-
vation. First emphasis was upon demand models which could 
represent conservation, then upon integrating them with an 
electriCity pricing model. 
9. Most of the Explicitly Stated Assumptions Underlying 
the Forecast Can Be Seen as the Technical Representation of 
Consequences of the Regional Act (expands on T-perspectiye 
conclusion 15). In addition to which models were selected, 
BPA's responsibilities under the Regional Act largely 
determined how the models were ran. Assumptions about 
resource scheduling, rate levels, and conservation programs 
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all reflected BPA's interpretation of their responsibilities 
under the Act. 
10. The Scope of Exploration and Hodel Development at BPA 
was Most Directly Limited by Practical Time and Resource 
Constraints (expands on T-perspective conclusions 11. 18. 
111. and 113), When look ing for the myr iad subtle ways in 
which an organization shapes or constrains its technical 
products, it is easy to overlook perhaps the most obvious. 
Organizations only have a limited amount of resources (time, 
money, and people) which they can expend in dealing with an 
issue or solving a problem. Though Power Requirements and 
other Divisions associated with the forecast's development 
were beneficiaries of a period of growth in the early 1980s, 
their time was fully committed under the preestablished 
forecast schedule. Resource limitations generally deter-
mined the avenues which could ~ be explored (e.g. criti-
cally examining the ORI model operation, testing the 
Significance of missing feedbacks in the modeling system, 
investigating possible technological innovations, correcting 
weaknesses in the ORNL technology curves and the NEPP lag 
structure and, more importantly, opening up first-order 
strategic methodological questions to wider scrutiny). All 
in all, these resource limitations were significant. 
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11. Given BPA's Organizational structure. it is Likely That 
a Number of Different Interpretations were Giyen to the 
Forecast Probability Assignments (expands on T perspective 
conclusion 19). Power Requirements staff added probabili-
ties to their range forecast after its completion, acknow-
ledging the judgmental and subjective nature of the numer-
ical assignments in their documentation. Even under such 
conditions, numbers often confer a false sense of certainty 
to users divorced from the technical process who assume more 
"objective" underpinnings to the probabilities. This 
usually leads them to perform further mathematical analYSis 
(e.g. expected value calculations, averaging, factoring) 
which are unwarranted. Given some of the remarks made 
during public involvement, and some of the uses to which the 
forecast was put, it seems likely that a variety of inter-
pretations were placed upon the highly subjective forecast 
probabilities. 
12. The Preponderant Disciplinary Orientation of Power 
Regui;ements. Rooted Heavily in Economics. Limited its Range 
of Approaches to Issues such as Technological Change 
(expands on T-perspective conclusion Ill). BPA's approach 
to modeling addressed a wide variety of issues and load 
determining factors which had previously been ignored. The 
preponderance of staff members in Power Requirements had 
graduate level degrees in economics and were well schooled 
in the issues that discipline identified and the methods for 
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addressing them. (More generally, in the utility ind~stry 
economists, engineers, and mathematicians dominate technical 
staffs and tend to select modeling approaches with which 
they are most familiar.) At the same time, this training 
generally circumvented (or superficially dealt with) other 
issue areas which, though potentially significant, lay at 
the periphery of the science. As a result, issues such as 
cycles of technological change were not addressed explicit-
ly, the apparent assumption being that whatever impacts were 
not captured in demand elasticities or productivity func-
tions were not capable (or worthy) of being addressed. 
13. The Unresolved Problems at the End of the First 
Forecast Set Directions for Qrganizational as well as 
Technical Development in Power Requirements (expands on 
T-perspectlye conclusion t13). Resource limitations 
prevented Power Requirements staff from making all the 
improvements to their modeling system that were desirable 
within the time horizon of the 1982 forecast. A number of 
data and model development projects were initiated under 
contract during, or soon after, the first forecast produc-
tion cycle. New, more highly regionalized versions of the 
demand models for each of the sectors were developed, the 
modeling system was fully automated, supplementary load 
research was initiated, and plans were made for a short-to-
midterm forecast capable of dealing with cyclical business 
and weather effects. The development of the tools, and 
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their use in resource planning became the overriding organ-
izational missions for the Energy Modeling and Analysis 
Branch of Power Requirements. The formal and informal rules 
for guiding this development and using the tools became the 
Branch's SOPs. 
14. From an organizational Standpoint. the contrast Between 
the Results of the Two Independent Forecast Reviews Helped 
Legitimize BPA's Results (expands on T-perspective con-
clusion 114). Potentially, the type of "counter-forecast" 
developed by both HERA and EVA can hurt an organization like 
Bonneville since they raise important questions about fore-
cast results and the wisdom of using them. HERA's review 
was primarily a challenge to BPA on the behalf of stake-
holders in WPPSS fearing adverse effects if plant completion 
schedules were unnecessarily delayed. In eff~ct it explored 
the impact of possibly conservative growth assumptions, by 
substituting different values for key input variables. This 
called BPA's forecast growth rates into question. The EVA 
review, using an analogy between consumer behavior on BPA 
and TVA service areas, constituted, in effect, a "second 
opinion". Because the two reviews pointed in opposite di-
rections (almost offsetting one another) they actually some-
what strengthened BPA's position, since its forecast fell 
roughly in the center of this bandwidth of uncertainty. In 
terms of addressing the wide spectrum of uncertainty actual-
ly facing BPA, these two "counter-forecasts" barely scratch-
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ed the surface, though using them for such purposes was 
never the intention. As will be noted below, attempting 
such an exploration involves the examination of a large 
variety of qualitatively different environmental and deci-
sion scenarios, and benefits from investigating perspectives 
other than the econometric and trend-based approaches almost 
exclusively used by consulting firms such as NERA and EVA. 
15. The Development of ad hoc Procedures by Power Require-
ments waS Strongly Influenced by the Data Requirements of 
the Forecasting Models and the Data Development Methodology 
(expands on a-perspective conclusion 11). Virtually all 
standard operating procedures evolve by a process involving 
significant experimentation and a substantial amount of 
trial and error. For Power Requirements staff, developing 
an independent forecast was a first-time event. The 
specific ad hoc procedures, many of which would later become 
"institutionalized", developed by the staff were structured 
along the lines of forecast data flows and model development 
priorities. 
16. The Growth of Organizational Complexity Among Units 
Concerned with Resource Analysis Reinforced (and was 
Reinforced by) the Development of More Complex and 
Sophisticated Tools (expands on a-perspective conclusion 
~ Before and during the production of the 1982 forecast, 
a number of organizational units within BPA underwent a 
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rapid and steady expansion. In addition to Power Require-
ments, portions of Rates, Resources, and Conservation 
contributed to the development of the demand forecast. The 
portions of these Divisions involved in the forecast produc-
tions evolved along with their tools in a mutually rein-
forcing pattern. New questions prompted the development of 
new models and the data needed to operate them. As the 
tools were delivered, their complexity necessitated addi-
tional positions designed specifically to manage the use and 
further development of these models. This in turn created 
further new needs, resulting in additional budgets and more 
personnel. This process continued until the major problems 
had been "bounded" by the organizations within BPA respon-
sible for their solution. 
17. The Public Involvement Process was Responsible for a 
Number of Technical Changes. but BPA's Responses to These 
Challenges were Limited by Resource Availability Within th~ 
Organization (expands on a-perspective conclusion 16). BPA 
made a legitimate effort to produce the most technically 
defensible forecast it could within the 1981-1982 production 
schedule. This included explaining, justifying, and 
defending its modeling, choices to critics where technical 
modifications were inappropriate or impractical. (More 
important, from the standpoint of Multiple Perspectives, 
these resource limitations constrained public involvement so 
that potentially useful insights on risk, uncertainty, and 
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the effects of various core assumptions were foregone. Time 
limitations required that BPA staff confine themselves to 
techniques familiar both to themselves and their counter-
parts in the power planning community with the strongest 
voices.) In most cases where a criticism was acknowledged 
but not acted upon, it was the unavailability of resources, 
usually time, which made the necessary change impractical. 
In many of these cases, extensive data collection or new 
basic research would have been required to bring about the 
desired modification. Thus, as with model development, the 
ceiling on model modification efforts were as much a 
function of organizational resources as technical expertise. 
18. In General. the Technical comments of Stakeholders in 
the outcome of those BPA Decisions which were Based upon the 
Forecast Reflected their Interests. Though the strength of 
this Reflection varied (expands on O-perspectiye conclusion 
ill. Parties having stakes in the outcome of the WNP 1 and 
3 decision tended to partiCipate heavily in the public in-
volvement process. Generally they fell into two groups: 
those with financial interests in the nuclear plants, 
wishing to see their completion, and those desiring to 
protect the environment and explore conservation alter-
natives as completely as possible. A review of their 
technical comments shows that their remarks tended to 
reflect their interests, though with varying degrees of 
strength. PNUCC members comments did not always imply 
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technical modifications which would increase the forecast, 
but never suggested changes which were against their 
interests. Environmental protection groups more explicitly 
suggested technical changes which would either lower the 
forecast or encourage more ambitious regional conservation 
programs than BPA's forecast and resource analysis implied. 
Conclusions from T- and P-Perspectiye Cross-Cues 
1. The Fact that End-Use Models were "Intellectually 
Fashionable" at the Time of BPA's First Forecast Hade Their 
Acceptance Easier (expands on T-perspective conclusion 12), 
The ORNL End-Use Demand Hodels ultimately selected for 
commercial and residential forecasting contained a number of 
technical features specifically geared to policy analysis. 
During public involvement, these featUres were generally 
cited as the models' technical points of strength. While 
these capabilities for the basis for their selection, it is 
also true that the models had a reputation for being "state-
of-the-art" in terms of their overall theoretical approach. 
This fact was known by many upon entering public involvement 
and those unfamiliar with the models could perceive their 
"intellectual popularity" in the remarks and behavior of 
panelists at the workshops. Given this, it seems likely 
that at least part of the models acceptability stemmed from 
a wbandwagon effect" rather than detailed technical eval-
uation. 
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2. The cognitive Dissonance springing from the Attempt to 
Reconcile SOM and SOU Reports waS the Consequence Qf the 
Technical Approaches Ayailable at the Time (expands on 
P-perspective conclusion 15). The search for new fore-
casting tools by BPA staff grew out of a failed attempt to 
build up load projections to the levels of the sou forecast 
using a "paper-and-pencil" disaggregated approach. It was 
the limited tools available at the time, however, which 
prompted the ad hoc attempt to build load project10ns up 
from the bottom using available data and forecasts of 
economic activity. Had other modeling tools been available, 
this labor-intensive approach might not have been considered 
and the conclusions drawn radically different. 
3. The More "Politically Open" Climate of the Hunro 
Administration was ConSistent with the Concerns Built into 
the ORNL End-yse Models (expands on P-perspectiye conclusion 
11l. Sterling Hunro assumed the office of Bonneville Power 
Administrator under the Carter Administration when a 
national energy policy was the foremost concern of the 
President. Hunro's background was political, and his 
central focus as Administrator was to reconcile the complex 
problems of regional energy politics, chiefly through the 
mechanism of the Regional Power Act. The ORNL End-Use 
Models, also a product of the Carter Administration, were 
explicitly constructed to address policy issue central to 
the energy politics of the time. Thus, the "political 
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openness" under Munro not only permitted the search for new 
forecasting tools to occur but made the capabilities of the 
ORNL models both acceptable and attractive. 
4. Model structures Helped to Define. More Globally. how 
Individuals View the World. Define Problems. and Search for 
Solutions. A commonly used procedure in creative problem 
solving is to reframe the problem. Viewing old issues or 
concerns with a fresh eye, or from a new vantage point, 
often permits novel solutions. It is when a methodology or 
approach to a problem is automatically adopted that vision 
becomes limited. The models used by BPA were very flexible 
tools, but they set up a way of looking at the world (e.g. 
energy use in the commercial sector as square footage 
serviced by equipment of a particular efficiency using a 
specific fuel at certain level of intensity) which quickly 
became second nature to its users. In the long run, this 
can be seen to limit approaches. The question becomes how 
to use the available models to solve a problem (or a reduced 
definition of the problem) rather than just how to solve a 
problem. 
Conclusion from 0- and P-Perspective Cross-Cues 
1. The Selection of Administrators waS Based upon views of 
the Problems Facing the Region Held by the Federal Ggvern-
ment (expands on P-perspectiye conclusion 12). Each 
Bonneville Power Administrator has assumed office facing a 
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slightly (or greatly) different set of problems and bringing 
a somewhat different set of skills to bear. It is through 
policy setting for the agency that the Administrator exerts 
a unique influence on the management of power-generating 
resources in the region. The choice of Administrator, 
however, is by political appointment, and most frequently 
follows a change of partisanship in the Presidency. What-
ever background skills the new Administrator brings to 
office, then, are deemed appropriate by the party then 
prevailing in national government and are seen as consistent 
with their general (and sometimes specific) policy leanings. 
2. By Crosscutting Lines of Command. the Forecast Produc-
tion Process "Selected For" Different Types of Management 
Skills (excands on O-perspective conclusion 15). One major 
school of organizational theory would insist that a large 
bureaucracy such as BPA must function as a well-structured 
hierarchy, with tasks and responsibilities falling within 
the unique domains of particular organizational subunits and 
authority following formal chains of command. In reality, 
this picture of the organization is rarely fully supported 
by fact, though organizations do vary greatly in terms of 
how closely task performance corresponds to organizational 
structure. BPA was in a transition period during the 1982 
forecast production cycle. During such times, the ability 
to communicate laterally across involved Divisions and to 
develop a "big picture" of the overall technical priorities 
and requirements becomes of paramount importance. These 
circumstances thus "selected for" the skills possessed by 
the chief developers of the forecasting tools, as prime 
qualifying factors for management positions. 
3. As with virtually all Organizations. BPA's Operating 
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Procedures Helped Shape Perceptions of the Staff. Mind sets 
develop not only in response to the characteristics of the 
tools used to carry out a project, but also in response to 
the organizational procedures governing their use. Hence, 
the "approved way of doing things" can easily become the 
only way of doing things considered when confronting a 
problem. In the crystallizing operating procedures develop-
ed for forecast production can be seen emerging perceptual 
frames for seeking problem solutions. 
Conclusions from T. O. and Pi The Big Picture 
The true strength of Multiple Perspectives lies not in 
the useful two-dimensional descriptions which it generates 
when perspectives are paired but in the union of technical, 
organizational, and personal perspectives. The "big 
picture" encompasses the three individual paradigms of 
investigation and its manifold cross-cues. Because of the 
complexity of three-way interactions between perspectives, 
however, it is easier (and clearer) to sketch a coherent 
picture of the BPA forecasting process than to produce a set 
of numbered items, as was done above. While BPA's forecast 
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was state-of-the-art in the utility industry: and while it 
~epresented a major improvement over its predecessors, its 
overall methodology left its users still vulnerable to the 
effects of unforeseen or surprise events (such as WPPSS or 
the oil crisis had surprised planners a decade earlier). 
The big picture allows an insightful evaluation of the BPA 
forecast (through the question of risk and uncertainty), 
identifies several areas needing development, and leads to 
some recommendations on how to evolve a forecasting 
apparatus in an organization environment such as BPA's. 
Forecasts become meaningful as a part of a support 
system for decisions. To function successfully, a forward-
looking decision support system should contain three compon-
ents. The first is a forecasting component, which permits 
decision makers (or their staff) to trace out the conse-
quences of different actions or events. The second com-
ponent is planning, which presents a set (or sets) of 
actions an organization should take to meet its objectives 
given certain anticipated conditions. The third component 
is a monitoring system, providing the feedback necessary 
for an organization to judge the effectiveness of its 
decisions. The integrated use of these three mechanisms 
provides the means by which organizations address the risk 
and uncertainty surrounding decision making. 
Although In common usage the terms "risk" and "uncer-
tainty" are used interchangably an important, and too often 
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overlooked, distinction is made between the terms. In 
the simplest case, which contrasts with both conditions of 
risk and uncertainty, the outcome of a decision or the 
consequence of an event, once it occurs, is both unique and 
inevitable. This is decision making (or planning) under 
certainty, and requires the simplest of guiding strategies. 
Under conditions of ~ the unique outcome of a decision 
or event is not known. The full set of possible outcomes, 
however, are known (or assumed to be known) along with the 
odds or probabilities of their occurrence. Games of chance 
(e.g. dice) exemplify conditions of risk. By contrast, 
under conditions of uncertainty not only is there no single 
unique outcome to be expected, but the odds associated with 
a series of possible outcomes are not known (i.e. multiple 
paths, unknown probabilities). Often under uncertainty an 
additional, and significant, condition also holds: it is not 
even possible to specify the full array of possible outcomes 
(Martino, 1978:340). In such an unenviable environment for 
planning, the spectre of a "surprise" or "shock" future 
always lurks over those assigned to deal with it. 
It is in the addressing of uncertainty that the prImary 
areas of concern illuminated by the three perspectives 
display the largest degree of overlap. From a strictly 
technical point of view, it is recognized that modeling 
techniques and strategies must be rigorously fitted to each 
of the critical dimensions of the situation being modeled. 
Unfortunately. unless strictly technical criteria for 
problem definition are supplemented by broader concerns 
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e.g. those of the 0- and P-perspectives -- many of the key 
dimensions go unrecognized. From an organizational perspec-
tive, principal actors do not want surprises which compli-
cate their jobs, hurt their professional reputations, or 
jeopardize their continued access to people and resources. 
From a personal perspective, key decision makers want to 
avoid the stigma associated with making conspicuously bad 
decisions. Thus, from all three perspectives, the choice of 
a strategy to address uncertainty is an important one. That 
such choices frequently prove inadequate is largely because 
the participants are unable to see the overall problem 
through the lenses of ill of the three perspectives, but, 
rather, focus upon portions or fragments of the overall 
situation. From these more fragmented vantage points, the 
imperative of addressing the full or requisite variety of 
uncertainties seems less critical and a potentially dan-
gerous imbalance of effort results. As such, the imperative 
Is often counterbalanced or offset by other, ultimately less 
significant, considerations (e.g. familiarity with method-
ology, expedience, image, etc.). 
The use of point forecasts, characterized by a single 
trend or trajectory of change, in planning treats the 
environment as though it were characterized by certainty. 
Essentially the strategy Is "one plan for the only possible 
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future". Using such a strategYi decision makIng 1s rendered 
simple (often inappropriately so). Point forecast may be 
used without serious jeopardy when environmental stability 
is guaranteed over the lifetime of the plan, when the fore-
cast and planning horizons are short, and/or when a large 
and significant portion of the determinants are under the 
direct control of planners or decision makers.· 
Correctly used, range forecast are employed in risky 
(but not uncertain) environments. It is thus assumed that 
the set of forecasts either exhaustively addresses each 
possible outcome or future or that the forecast scenarios 
bracket the entire range of these possibilities on the high 
and low ends. Furthermore, it is assumed that the behavior 
of the environment is sufficiently well known that discrete 
probabilities of occurrence can be meaningfully assigned to 
each of the alternatives by means other than subjective 
judgment. Such a strategy Is appropriate when the stoch-
astic behavior of the environment has been thoroughly 
charted and/or when planners can exert influence to con-
strain (though not deterministically control) the full 
spectrum of elements limiting environmental variation. 
Under the conditions of uncertainty, the behavior of 
critical elements in the environment which the planner must 
confront is incompletely or imperfectly known. It is 
impossible for forecasters to assign odds or probabilities 
that reflect anything more than their subjective assessment 
462 
of the degrees of their confidence in their models' per-
formance. When they do, as Ascher and Overholt (1983:267) 
have noted, they tend to overrate confidence levels consis-
tently. Moreover, when the future is truly uncertain, it is 
also impossible to ascertain whether the complete array of 
critical factors potentially affecting the accuracy or use-
fulness of the forecast have been identified and addressed. 
Under these circumstances, however, it is essential that the 
possibility of surprise outcomes (however seemingly remote) 
not be ignored in the planning process, nor should core 
assumptions go unchallenged. Forecasting should, in this 
context, ideally resemble "gaming", where a wide array of 
different scenarios or low probability/high impact events 
and changes in the very assumptions which are too often 
taken for granted are explored with the intent of giving 
planners and decision makers a "feel" for the sensitivity of 
future outcomes both to the assumptions in their models and 
to factors within and outside of their control. This will 
sensitize the users to disaster avoidance planning and to 
effective crisis management. An exploration of key "un-
likely events" or "environmental shocks" should supplement 
any futUres "recommended" as reference cases for planning 
and, correspondingly, should be incorporated into the actual 
planning process. 
The SUm-Of-Utllities forecast worked successfully for 
so long because of the uncommon degree of regional stability 
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during the period of hydrosystem development. Though load 
growth occasionally accelerated or decelerated (resulting in 
correspondingly minor under- or overforecasts), the overall 
trend was sufficiently steady that a forecasting and plan-
ning assumption of (for all practical purposes) a certain 
future proved workable. By the mid-1970s, however, the 
impacts of the real, but previously ignored uncertainties 
surrounding electricity use (e.g. responsiveness to rate 
increases, construction delays and cost overruns, mandatory 
building standards for new commercial construction, etc.) 
began to be felt with severe consequences. PNUCC's 
development (via contract) of an econometric model to 
"cross-check" the SOU findings was a step in the right 
direction, but only one step. The limited range of pos-
sibilities addressed in the assumptions underlying the 
model's operation virtually guaranteed that, within only a 
few years time, actual loads in the region would fall well 
below the predicted lower ninety percent confidence bound. 
The model was allowed to run mechanically, driven by 
economic and demographic variables without any attempts to 
anticipate new policy developments in the region -- the 
future it produced looked no different qualitatively from 
the past. The single scenario developed by PNUCC was 
characterized by optimistically low electricity prices, and 
these prices were in large measure, responsible for the 
continued large increases in levels of regional power 
consumption. 
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The 1982 BPA forecast represented a substantial advance 
over the PNUCC forecasts, both in terms of the analytical 
sophistication (and capabilities) of the specific models 
used and in terms of the wider spectrum of futures con-
sidered. The base, high, and low cases represented distinct 
scenarios predicated upon different sets of economic and 
policy assumptions. As such, they in no sense represented 
statistical confidence intervals (such as those developed by 
the PNUCC Econometric Model) nor did the unfortunately 
misnamed base case represent a midline within the range 
(i.e. given the behavior of the economic drivers producing 
the high and low cases there was no reason that they should 
be evenly dispersed around the base). Probabilityassign-
ments for actuals falling outside the range or between the 
cases were made subjectively, incorporating the multiple but 
not necessarily explicit, considerations encompassed by 
staff judgment. 
To reiterate several important points made in Chapter 
II, core assumptions reflect or embody one's beliefs about 
the "state of the world" and how it changes over time. 
Economic, technological, political, social, and cultural 
factors all may effect future load growth, and how these 
factors are treated has a significant bearing upon the 
outcome of a forecast. Core assumptions may be built into 
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models or govern their use. These assumptions may be 
selected after careful deliberation, but too often modelers 
are unaware of much of what they are assuming or its sig-
nificance. In constructing its 1982 forecast, BPA provided 
detail on the assumptions underlying its forecast range 
which, though uncharacteristically great for regional power 
forecasting, still left many important assumptions unstated 
(or unrecognized) and many dimensions of uncertainty, 
therefore, unexplored. In Chapter II, a number of assump-
tions regarding models and inputs were enumerated. Table 
XVI presents a sampling of core assumptions giving shape to 
BPA's 1982 forecast. 
The environment surrounding energy planning, however, 
particularly over a twenty-year time horizon, is uncertain 
(in the technical sense of the term). Over the past two 
decades possibilities which had seemed too remote to 
acknowledge or too "improbable" to consider became actual-
ities, stunning (and embarassing) the planners who had 
dismissed them. In the international petroleum markets of 
the 1960s, oil shocks resulting from KiddIe Eastern politi-
cal instability were never dedlt with explicitly, much to 
the later chagrin of the Seven Sisters and the American 
populace. Kore recently, within the Northwest power plan-
ning arena of the 19705, construction delays and cost 
overruns were not considered in electricity pricing fore-
casts, since the magnitude and timing of such difficulties 
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TABLE XVI 
SELECTED CORE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING BPA'S 1982 FORECAST 
T-Perspectlve 
generating resources (or conservation) will be acquired 
on schedule and at cost (a particularly heroic assump-
tion given experience with WPPSS!) 
there will be no long-lasting generating resource 
failures (e.g. no Three Mile Islands) 
improvements in efficiency of end-use technologies 
will proceed incrementally (no breakthroughs or inno-
vations) 
a-Perspective 
the world petroleum market will not experience further 
"oil shocks" 
though economic activity may decline in the region (or 
nation) there will be no Depression 
large industries will remain in the region through the 
end of the forecast period (e.g. no wholesale out-
migration of aluminum companies) 
no other wholesale suppliers of electricity (e.g. 
British Columbia Hydro) will compete with BPA for 
Northwest utility customers 
the provisions of the Regional Act will remain in 
effect in their current form through 2000 
P-Perspective 
the 1988, 1992, and 1996 Presidents-elect will not 
fundamentally alter national energy policy 
future BPA Administrators will not alter the basic 
agenda governing resource acquisitions, ratemaklng, 
or utility sales agreements 
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could not be specified, In both cases i the seriousness of 
the oversights were not anticipated but recognized only in 
retrospect. 
Based on these considerations, inherent limitations of 
the basic forecasting methodology currently common through-
out the electric utility industry, and used by both BPA and 
the Regional Council, become evident. From the experience 
of the 1970's, the power planning community has learned that 
the effects of price and policy cannot be ignored and that 
planning for a single, narrow vision of the future is 
inadequate. The models chosen, their core assumptions, and 
the methodology guiding their use reflect a recognition both 
of uncertainty in the values which economic and price varia-
bles may assume and of their ultimate significance. The 
baseline, high, and low scenarios represent only different 
levels on a linear scale of economic activity and different 
levels of conservatlon program effectlveness. The major 
events which affected the energy industry in the 1970s as 
noted above were not smooth, quantitative shifts in levels 
of basic economic variables. They were sudden, unexpected 
developments -- outcomes unanticipated and uncertain in the 
sense defined above -- with strong, abrupt impacts which 
left both power planners and managers in something of a 
state of shock. 
The use of multiple forecasts in planning, as increas-
ingly recognized by BPA and the electric utility industry, 
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is a necessary condition for long-term success. It is not, 
however, in and of itself sufficient. In the long run, the 
only sULprise-free future, to paraphrase the late Herman 
Kahn, would be one with no surprises. The accuracy of a 
forecast tends to be inversely correlated with its time 
horizon (Ascher and Overholt 1983:105). Thus, as the scope 
of planning lengthens, the need to explore and prepare for a 
broader array of distinct environmental and decision scen-
arios expands. Scenarios should embrace trends, events, 
forces, or impacts which would prove significant, whether or 
not they might currently be deemed likely. 
Two basic strategies guide the use of diverse forecast 
scenarios: optimizing (good risk) and disaster-avoiding 
(good hedge). Optimizing approaches are most appropriate 
and most effective in truly risky environments (i.e. those 
where the array of outcomes is known and associated proba-
bilities at least closely estimated, if not known). As 
noted above, range approaches, when properly used, may prove 
sufficient in risky environments. Several specific cri-
teria, however, must be met. First, and most important, the 
environment must be truly risky, not uncertain. Only under 
those conditions are the probability assignments needed to 
arrive at an "optimal" solution meaningful. Second, there 
must exist some evidence that the boundaries of the range do 
indeed encompass all, or most, significant outcomes. This 
can only be established through tests of, rather than as-
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surnptions of, the comprehensiveness of the range. Finally~ 
if the range is characterized by smooth boundaries one of 
two conditions must hold. Either period-to-period trend 
fluctuations must not be of significance (in terms of 
planning responses) or another means must be available to 
deal with these fluctuations. A smooth progressing series 
of events and a wildly oscillating or fluctuating series of 
events may ultimately arrive at the same destination, but 
they require much different responses. If such fluctuations 
are possible, they must not be ignored. 
The range approach to power forecasting, in effect, 
addresses uncertainty as though it were risk. In BPA's 1982 
forecast a much wider bandwidth of economic, demographic, 
and policy considerations was embodied in the three fore-
casts than was the case with their predecessors in the 
region, but none of the scenarios explores the impacts of 
those "extreme" possibilities which produce such serious 
consequences for those ignoring them. The three cases 
filter out disruptive effects of possible political up-
heavals on the energy market (or the world economy as a 
whole); they smooth the peaks and valleys of business cycle 
fluctuation over the long run; they assume timely and 
cost-effective resource completion in the determination of 
electricity prices; they ignore the possibility any techno-
logical improvements beyond efficiency increases in existing 
equipment (i.e. breakthrough technology is dismissed or 
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overlooked); and they do not explore the consequences of 
out-migration of major industries (especially the DSIs). 
Potentially, "surprises" in any of these uncertalnty areas, 
if they occurred, could force actual power sales outside of 
the predicted range, or at least produce conspicuously 
uneven or discontinuous patterns of sales. In BPA's 
forecast, however, the factors deemed relevant' for explicit 
consideration are treated ~ though they described the 
perimeters of a well-defined and well-known distribution of 
future load outcomes (or at least the perimeters of those 
outcomes deemed worth planning for). Probabilityassign-
ments, though explicitly acknowledged to be subjective and 
judgmental, are often treated ~ though they could be 
meaningfully subjected to the same types of statistical 
manipulations or transformations as objective odds (e.g. 
expected value calculations). For all practical purposes, 
then, these forecast-producing strategies redefine the 
problems of uncertainty as problems of risk. 
The disaster-avoiding strategy allows planners to 
"hedge their bets", and is most appropriately used in truly 
uncertain planning environments (either as a sole or supple-
mentary strategy). This strategy centers on enabling 
unexpected events to be managed, rather than anticipated. 
As such, it endeavors to anticipate the effects of high-
impact events, whether they are considered to be likely or 
not, and allow the advance preparation of workable responses 
or preemptive actio~. The scenarios developed must be 
diverse, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
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It is unlikely that, had BPA's current forecasting 
system (and the guiding strategy for its use) been in place 
in the early to mid-1970s, the over-building of the WPPSS 
nuclear plants would have been avoided. Because the new 
demand models are responsive to changes in ele'ctricity 
price, load predictions certainly would have been lower than 
those of the SOU forecasts and, correspondingly, the 
overbuilding of resources (and its impact on rates) would 
have been less severe. Given the economic climate of the 
mid-1970s, however, it is questionable that even ~ case 
inputs developed at that time would have predicted the full 
recesslonary impact of the early 1980s on the Pacific 
Northwest (the input projections used in the PNUCC Econo-
metric Model were such that, as noted above, even the lower 
90 percent confidence bound to forecasted loads exceeded 
early 1980s actuals). Given the general unwillingness of 
forecasters and planners to speculate on the introduction of 
government standards for new construction, the load-dampen-
ing impacts of commercial building programs designed and 
implemented during the carter Administration would not have 
been anticipated. Finally, given the optimistic assumptions 
on resource costs and completion, electricity price projec-
tions would have been unrealistically low. In short, a 
strategy of forecasting for a risky environment would have 
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probably improved the situation in the region somewhat but 
would not have provided adequate insurance against histor-
ical uncertainties and their consequences. 
By contrast, a hedging strategy, if performed correctly 
and if coupled with appropriately flexible planning, could 
have minimized, if not avoided the WPPSS problems. As with 
the Oil Embargo, the precise timing and magnitude of thermal 
plant cost overruns for the WPPSS projects could not be 
predicted, though given the frequency with which large-scale 
projects significantly overrun their estimated costs, the 
latter occurrence should not have been considered a "low 
probability" event (see Peck and Scherer, 1962: 20-23 for a 
discussion of predicted cost errors in military projects). 
Both events would undoubtedly have been perceived as 
possibilities but might not have been included in any "best 
guess" projections. Had disaster avoidance also been part 
of the forecasting and planning agendas at the time, re-
source development strategies could have been developed 
which would accommodate both "surprise" and "business-as-
usual" futures. Dependence upon foreign oil could have been 
lessened by fuller development of domestic resources and by 
expanding reserves. Greater efforts could have been made in 
the Horthwest to wmodularize" generating resources so that 
s.aller "chunks" of load could have been brought on line as 
needed. Some overbuilding would likely have occurred, given 
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dominant perceptions at the time, but the effects could have 
been mitigated more easily. 
Knowing what needs to be done from a technical stand-
point is helpful only when coupled with knowledge of how to 
do it. Multiple Perspectives offers the means to implemen-
tation by illuminating relevant organizational and personal 
elements. Before examining how BPA's current methodology 
might be strengthened however, it is first essential to 
illustrate the factors which have in effect bounded the 
search for effective forecasting strategies. 
For BPA (and the regional power planning community) the 
development of the forecast methodology used in 1982 repre-
sented a step forward in terms of what kinds of uncertain-
ties could be addressed and required a large recruitment of 
organizational resources. Given the elaborateness of the 
models selected for review, the type of public involvement 
solicited and the deadline for the WNP scheduling decision, 
pursuing alternative methodological strategies became 
impractical. Much of this workload, however, was an arti-
fact of the size and elaborateness of the models considered. 
Simpler or smaller models would likely have permitted the 
time to consider and evaluate core assumptions, other 
perspectives, and surprise events and their impacts, all 
essential steps needed to evolve a good disaster-avoidance 
strategy. The factors which are chiefly responsible for the 
selection of the forecast methodology are numerous and 
primarily non-technical. 
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Organizationally, many procedures are set up to use the 
results of optimizing strategies as inputs. When plans or 
decisions are based upon the use of expected values, proba-
bility distributions, or statistical confidence intervals, 
there is pressure (subtle and not-so-subtle) for forecasts 
to be designed accordingly (e.g. range plus probabilities). 
(This was particularly true at BPA under Johnson, given the 
data requirements of the financial analysis process.) 
Interorganizationally, new but familiar strategies are more 
readily accepted than new unfamiliar ones. WPPSS stake-
holders were represented by technical experts who, like most 
of BPA's staff, were most comfortable with econometric or 
engineering approaches to demand modeling, and optimizing 
methodologies. This appears to be generally true of the 
electric utility industry. Disciplinary deoth 1s rarely 
counterbalanced by disciplinary breadth, so commonalities in 
training tend to focus considerations on a limited number of 
approaches considered "legitimate" or "practical", those 
involving complex models. Since BPA was required to obtain 
such models "off-the-shelf" or through development under 
contract, basic model designs were prepackaged. Public 
review, in turn, focused upon a choice among predetermined 
options rather than either a choice of options or a choice 
of strategy for their use. Attention is thus focused almost 
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exclusively upon second-order technical considerations 
(details of models) and away from first-order technical 
considerations (choice of effective strategies for model or 
forecast use). 
Were the utility industry to undertake actions to 
address uncertainty to the fullest extent possible, its 
approach to forecasting would need to embody features of the 
disaster-avoiding strategies described above. Such strat-
egies, in many respects, resemble the war games employed by 
the military to prepare its leaders for the fullest spectrum 
of possible strategic and tactical combat situations. This 
approach must be anchored upon a recognition that the future 
itself is uncertain (i.e. future events are not thoroughly 
determined by current circumstances and, hence, uncertainty 
is real, not merely a measure of imperfections or errors in 
models) and as such not predictable. Rather than only try 
to optimize decisions by guessing which scenarios are most 
likely and then planning just for those futures, this 
approach seeks to explore the widest array of possible 
situations, recognizing fully that none of them may actually 
occur as represented. (This requires a freedom from heavy 
dependence on specific models, since models not only 
determine how the world will be seen, but also limit which 
parts may be seen). In the process of playing the games, 
however, the decision makers develop ways of responding to 
each type of situation or uncertainty identified, increasing 
the likelihood that nothing ~ occur which could catch 
them completely unprepared (Enzer, 1984). 
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For this sort of approach to be successfully imple-
mented, a number of criteria must be met, both general and 
specific in nature. Multiple Perspectives provides crucial 
insights which facilitate the identification and use of 
these criteria. Most generally, the three major components 
of decision support -- forecasting, planning, and monitoring 
must work in coordinated fashion. The forecasting 
component must consider the factors that would have the most 
significant, rather than the most likely, effects upon the 
trend under consideration in order to narrow the organi-
zation's "window of vulnerability" as much as possible. 
Unless the forecasting component explores the consequences 
of a wide spectrum of alternatives, even creative and 
aggressive planning will remain somewhat superficial, blind 
to its sensitivity to critical external factors. The 
planning component must be flexible enough to respond to 
unexpected developments or shifts in trends. These 
responses should be, to the extent possible, incremental and 
reversible and should be appropriately timed (e.g. the 
action plan should not overrespond to brief or transient 
alterations of a long-term pattern). Without flexibility on 
the planning and decision-making end, forecasting an 
uncertain environment does little more than test the "nerve" 
of the decision maker who can see all the possibilities for 
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disaster or success but do nothing other than choose a 
single plan of action and hope that none of the feared 
alternatives occur. Finally, the monitoring (or intelli-
gence gathering> component Is needed to identify which of 
the paths developed in the forecast is closest to the one 
actual events are following and to ascertain whether or not 
a change of path (requiring a change of plan) ,is taking 
place at any moment in the ongoing planning and decision-
making process. If intelligence is not gathered on both the 
factors that affect the trends considered by the forecasts 
and their outcomes, the ongolng process of making decisions 
which implement (or, where appropriate, modify) a plan is 
severely hampered. At worst, planners have no idea what is 
occurring and can only respond reactively when outcomes are 
obvious (such as the members of the Northwest power planning 
community did, only seriously reassessing load growth after 
it slowed dramatically over a four or five year period). At 
best, planners may know what is happening but, without some 
depth in the monitoring effort, will not know how or why. 
With good intelligence, problems of understanding may still 
arise but they are minimized to the extent possible. 
From the T-perspective, the only way to prepare for, 
and hopefully therefore avert disastrous surprises (or 
alternatively, capture golden opportunities) is to examine a 
wider array of alternative scenarios for the future. The 
scenarios, though primarily aimed at disaster avoidance, 
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could be built around a flexible optimizing strategy. In 
other words, though a central or baseline resource develop-
ment strategy, which focused upon a "best guess" of the 
future which will occur, might still be at the core of the 
approach it would be supplemented by contingency plans, or 
preconceived responses to shocks or surprises. The forecast 
scenarios supporting these plans would explore high impact 
effects of different environments, different policies, and 
different decision making styles. The 0-, and P-perspec-
tives, however, reveal a number of currently existing 
obstacles to the implementation of this more ambitious 
technical approach which would need to be overcome. 
Regionally the traditional power planning process, 
involving PNUCC and the SOU forecast, maintained inertia 
through the late 1970s. BPA's system, based on ranges, 
constituted a major development in itself and its archi-
tects, like most power forecasters (and decisionmakers), 
were (and continue to be) unfamiliar with this proposed 
approach to dealing with uncertainty, and underestimate the 
usefulness (and in some cases advantages) of smaller, 
simpler models. The need to make decisions on resources 
such as WNP 1, 2, and 3 in a timely fashion often precludes 
further modification of the forecasting process supporting 
it (a particularly grave problem when large or elaborate 
models are used), while the need for a final resolution of 
the WNP problem, which entails completion of some of the 
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plants; ~ priori limits the flexibility of resource develop-
ment, at least until the plants in question are dlsposed of. 
Furthermore, Bonneville's forecasting system was put into 
place during the early years of the Reagan Administration. 
One of the cornerstones of Reagan's Administration has been 
to fulfill a 1980 campaign promise to "remove the fat from 
the Federal bureaucracy". The ensuing government-wide 
belt-tightening (at least within the civilian portion) has 
virtually precluded the acquisition of funds sufficient to 
scale up the long-term forecasting and planning process to 
include additional scenarios. The perception, however, is 
strongly wedded to the resource requirements of large 
modeling systems. Multiple, simple models may be used for 
scenario development at a much lower cost. Finally, the 
1982 forecast established a new precedent for resource 
planning. Organizationally, BPA underwent a major reorien-
tation (reflected both structurally and functionally) in 
developing the 1982 forecast. Its Administrator also made 
decisions based on a set of numbers and a methdology. Par-
ticularly in its experimental stages, an expanded approach 
to forecasting and planning, even if ultimately more mean-
ingful and beneficial, would likely add confusion to an 
already complicated process of public involvement and could 
possibly call into question decisions to which the region 
has already committed. While this would be appropriate if a 
blatant error in BPA's planning process was uncovered, it 
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would be unnecessarily destructive if the source of disagre-
ement was the result of all-too-common numerical errors 
associated with unfamiliar methods. 
As asserted earlier, the application of Multiple Per-
spectives not only results in a useful multifaceted defini-
tion of the problem but also provides the beginnings of a 
solution. From the T-perspective, the problem is one of the 
consequences of uncertainty: what the organization isn't 
prepared to handle can hurt it, possibly severely. Flexible 
planning must be supported by forecasting which examines 
both most significant and most likely futures. This entails 
exploring the impacts of numerous scenarios, some surprise-
free, others containing surprise events. From the O-per-
spective, it is imperative that organizational resources be 
used efficiently and appropriately and that outside re-
sources be tapped effectively. To the extent possible, 
procedural changes should be kept to a minimum, costs kept 
down, and existing operations kept on schedule. The 
organizational expertise of Requirements, Rates, Resvurces, 
and Conservation groups would be drawn in to address issues 
most closely related to their respective missions. The role 
of the public and signifIcant Interorganlzational actors 
should be considered: public involvement might be full or 
limited. From the P-perspective, it becomes clear that any 
proposals for changing forecasting (or planning) procedures 
must be tailored to the personal styles and priorities of 
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BPA's upper management and the prevailing view of priority 
concerns. While the abovedescribed hedging strategy for 
forec~sting and planning would have provided benefits during 
the terms of office of the last three Administrators, it 
would have to have been "sold" differently. During Hodel's 
Administration the specific models used in 1982 had not been 
developed, but other econometric tools were available which 
could have been used for scenario analysis. Selling the 
methodology would have been most difficult at this time, 
given the apparent stability of load growth. The regional 
drought and impacts of the Oil Embargo, however, could have 
been used as examples of "surprise events" which needed to 
be planned for. Under Munro, BPA's forecasting system began 
its "gestation period". A more rudimentary version of the 
proposed "scenario methodology" might have been promoted 
based upon its abilities to "pre-test" the implications of 
different Regional Bill proposals to BPA and regional 
interest groups. Under Johnson, the importance of fore-
casting was recognized. Because some sort of baseline load 
projections were needed for resource acquisition decisions, 
the additional scenarios would probably best be received as 
supplementary -- extra insurance on the forecast range. 
Following is a description of how this might be carried out. 
The range forecast, as it stands, could remain at the 
center of BPA's planning strategy as three key reference 
projections against which to measure resource requirements. 
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This would allow the agency to expand its treatment of 
long-range load uncertainty without having to "reinvent the 
wheel". Essential to using the range as a point of depar-
ture is the recognition of the limitations of the optimizing 
strategy underlying the overall forecast methodology, the 
models used, and the assignment of subjective probabilities. 
The limitations of an optimizing strategy were discus-
sed at length earlier, and will not be repeated. Suffice to 
say, users as well as producers of forecasts should be aware 
of them. In similar fashion, both staff and management 
should be aware of the weaknesses, as well as the strengths 
of complex models. Though complex models do often provide 
detailed outputs, or perform a large menu of options, their 
mer1ts have been oversold in the ut1l1ty industry. Stud1es 
have shown that methodological sophistication and complexity 
add little to forecast accuracy (Ascher and Overholt, 1983: 
105), while often rendering models (and their products) more 
difficult to use or understand, particularly for executives 
or managers. In particular, the pitfalls of over-dependence 
upon national econometric models should be recognized. Par-
ticularly when the full spectrum of scenarious is confined 
to three or four "best guesses" in an optimizing strategy, 
accuracy becomes important. These scenarios, however, are 
ultimately driven by visions of national economic futures 
which have conspicuously missed significant events, such as 
the onset of the 1981-82 recession (Greenwald, 1984:42-44). 
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This is not to say that complex models should be discarded, 
only that they should be used carefully and that their 
sophistication should not be used as an argument for not 
considering or using other approaches. Finally, any 
assignment of probabilties should be broken down into its 
constituent judgments so that its subjective nature is 
underscored and rendered explicit for all forecast users. 
As noted earlier, such subjective numerical assignments 
represent the modelers' degree of confidence in the perfor-
mance of their models and the assumptions behind their use. 
BPA's assignment of probabilities, however, presents only 
the resultant probability values, leaving opaque what 
constellation of forecast assumptions and model performance 
assessments is embedded therein. Decomposing the value 
would entail listing, in detail, the assumptions defining 
the range and defining the resultant compound probabilities 
(e.g. "it is assumed that even in the low case no economic 
crashes occur, the government does not intervene, plants 
still come in on schedule and at cost, etc."). This 
exercise alone forces the fOlecasting staff into taking a 
deeper look at their modeling procedures, alerts management 
to what the staff has and hasn't considered, and allows 
consumers of the forecast to substitute their own judgments 
for those of the BPA staff and reevaluate the end product 
and the decisions based upon them. Perhaps more important-
ly, however, the exercise defines a prime starting point for 
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exploring potentially disruptive impacts of "unlikely 
occurrences", by substituting the assumptions opposite those 
included in the forecast, one by one, into the models and 
rerunning the forecast (e.g. "what if an economic crash 
occurs, or the government slaps new restrictions on energy 
use, or plant costs rise sharply due to construction delays, 
etc.?") 
The construction of scenarios supplementing the range 
would be targeted at achieving two major purposes. First, 
the scenarios, composed of constellations of plausible real 
world events, would be used to assess the credibility of the 
range boundaries and associated probabilities. If many 
plausible scenarios produced values falling outs1de the high 
or low, the probabilities should be reconsidered. By 
contrast, if most scenarios fell within the range, this 
would constitute a fuller endorsement of its use as a 
planning tool. Second, the scenarios would begin to fill 
out a full fledged disaster-avoidance scenario, exploring 
likely effects of high-impact events (such as oil embargoes, 
resource cost overruns, or technological breakthroughs) on 
loads (or elements of the regional economy). Though it is 
nearly impossible to predict when, and exactly how, such 
events would occur, it is possible to provide decision 
makers with a feel for their consequences and allow them to 
anticipate this response. What is important is that the 
scenarios portray the impacts of real world events or 
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decisions, rather than simply magnitude adjustments of input 
va~iables, on loads 50 that the forecasts are linked to 
things which decision make~s would find conc~ete. Moreover, 
the scenarios should examine numerous technical, organiza-
tional, and personal factors which could have significant 
impacts on electricity futu~es. (One of the pu~poses of 
such an exercise is to dete~mine which factors do or do not 
~esult in significant impacts.) Fo~ example, technical 
factors considered might include uncertainties in assess-
ments of oil reserves, breakthroughs in the development of 
alternative energy sources, or the widespread adoption of 
ultra-efficient energy using equipment. Organizationally, 
scenarios could explore the impacts on loads of a new oil 
crisis through economic boom and bust (i.e. Depression), 
competition from Canadian suppliers of hydroelectricity, 
amendment or repeal of the Regional Power Act, the wholesale 
departure of the aluminum industry from the Northwest, or 
changes in budget for BPA conservation programs. Finally, 
impacts springing from differences in personal management 
styles at both the national and regional levels could be 
explored. This would not necessarily entail guessing who 
might be elected President or appointed Administrator, only 
identifying contrasting approaches to bureaucratic manage-
ment and their consequences. The scenarios could be simu-
lated exclusively on the existing modeling system or could 
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be supplemented with alternative models (used for methodo-
logical comparisons) or "back of the envelope" calculations. 
The process of generating significant alternatlve 
scena~ios yields much fruitful results when a variety of 
diferent 0- and P-perspectives can be tapped. Ascher and 
Overholt (1983) note two research findings that underscore 
the importance of incorporating a broad band of insights 
into forecasting procedures: first, that complex models 
perform better when guided by judgment than when left to 
operate mechanically without intervention (pp. 98-99); and 
second, that forecast accuracy and usefulness is largely 
determined by the validity of core assumptions prior to the 
choice of models or methods (p. 106). The real problem is 
determining what questions should be asked, rather than 
merely focusing upon how answers should be sought for 
questions which have already been posed. Ideally, the 
process of soliciting insights into the core assumptions 
underlying the scenarios-first order methodological consid-
erations -- would extend outside the power plannnlng com-
munity. Business leaders, politicians, lawyers, reporters, 
and "lay persons" in general all possess understandings of 
parts of the world which would benefit the forecast tech-
nician, but these insights are primarily qualitative and not 
well suited to usual technical model reviews. Hence, re-
quests for outside comments should seek open-ended responses 
on the questions of load futures, for not only from expert 
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modelers like HERA or EVA, but also from experts on modeling 
(like Asher and overholt) and non-modelers as well. 'At a 
bare minimum, initial scenario development efforts should 
include non-technical types within the organization. 
This supplemental exercise of examining the sensitivity 
of loads to alternative, and in some cases, radically dif-
ferent assumptions would provide BPA some insUrance against 
such devastating surprises as WPPSS without necessitating 
anything more than a minor procedural reorganization. To 
minimize stress on the organization, the exercise could be 
carried out at times outside the forecast production cycle 
(if necessary), could be performed at varying levels of 
effort depending upon circumstances, and could be designed 
to be cumulative -- that is, rather than repeat the same 
scenarios or assumption sensitivity tests each year new 
contingencies could be investigated so that the body of 
simulations expands in number and scope from year to year. 
What would be critical to this process, irrespective of its 
design, is that decision makers recognize that the range is 
a starting rather than a finishing point, for planning, that 
serious thought be given to contingency plans which would 
modify Bonneville's operations to respond to the require-
ments of the various scenarios, and that an intelligence or 
monitoring system be devised to provide early alert both to 
changes in the planning climate and to outcomes of BPA 
actions. 
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A full implementation plan would; of course; require 
greater detail than the decriptions above, but a more 
intense problem-focused use of Multiple Perspectives could 
be applied to assess the specific organizational resources 
to be tapped and to package communications to appeal to 
individuals in the upper management circle. Such a specific 
application, though following logically from this research, 
could be the basis of a dissertation in itself. 
Table XVII which follows, summarizes the key conclu-
sions produced using Multiple Perspectives, including both 
insights derived from the use of a single perspective in 
isolation and those derived from two or more of the per-
spectives taken together. 
CONCLUSIONS ABOUT MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES: WHAT THE BPA 
FORECAST SAYS 
The Multiple Perspective Concept provided a number of 
insights about SPA'S first independent forecast. The pre-
ceeding section detailed conclusions generated using the 
three perspectives both individually and cross-cued with one 
another. The exercise of applying the MP Concept to the 
rather intricate set of processes which culminated in the 
production of BPA's 1982 forecast not only yielded insights 
about the forecast, but, it also provided a second set of 
insights about Multiple Perspectives, and their application 
to research situations. 
TABLE XVII 
A SUMMARY OF KEY CONCLUSIONS FROM MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 
Technical Perspective 
1. BPA's modeling system was more complex than any pre-
viously used for regional electricity forecasting. 
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2. The use of a range of forecasts constituted a definite 
improvement over single trajectory point forecasts. 
3. The ORI national economic model, in many ways the 
starting point for the forecast, remained largely a 
black box to its users. 
4. Though detailed, BPA's forecasting system left the 
effects of feedbacks between electricity prices and 
other economic variables explored. 
5. Although the forecast range was developed using a 
well-defined methodology, the probability assignments 
associated with that range were not • 
. 
Organizational Pe;sDectiye 
1. The actions of BPA's forecasting group can only be 
understood by observing the development of ad hoc 
procedures. 
2. The ascendancy of forecasting and resource analysis at 
BPA were mirrored in changes in organizational 
structures and staffing levels. 
3. The early 1980s reorganization at BPA can best be 
viewed as an organizational problem-solving response to 
the Regional Act and to the growing WPPSS problem. 
4. The two primary groups of stakeholders participating in 
public involvement were those with financial interests 
in WPPSS and those promoting conservation and 
environmental protection. 
Personal Perspective 
1. Through their policies, each of the three most recent 
BPA Administrators defined how BPA would perceive and 
respond to the resource planning situation. 
2. Administrator Peter Johnson's background in business 
influence both how he would approach the WPPSS 
decision, and how he would employ forecasting toward 
that end. 
3. The leaders of Power Requirements forecasting effort 
originally searched for a new approach as the result of 
an abortive attempt, years earlier, to disaggregate the 
SOU forecast. 
490 
TABLE XVII (Cont'd) 
Combined Perspectives 
1. The organizational needs of Financial Management, Power 
Resources, and Conservation groups strongly influenced 
the selection of models (end-use, with explicit 
conservation policy testing capabilities) and 
methodology (range forecast coupled with optimizing 
strategy). 
2. Public involvement was used extensively during the 
forecast process, but, because it followed the 
selection of modeling alternatives, could, at best, 
address only second-order technical considerations. 
3. A hedging strategy, grounded in a broad variety of load 
scenarios, is needed to avoid disasters such as WPPSS. 
4. Lack of familiarity in the power planning community 
with hedging strategies and planning under uncertainty 
and a perceived environmental stability projected by 
recent forecasts are the strongest obstacles to 
changing the long-term forecasting process. 
5. A good disaster-avoidance strategy can be developed 
without an increase in forecasting staff and budget, 
provided less time is spent on maintaining and 
operating elaborate models, and more spent on 
assumption clarification, consideration of surprises, 
and use of the 0- and P-perspectives. 
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Listed below are conclusions a~=!ved at through the 
process of investigation using Multiple Perspectives. These 
conclusions focus upon specific methodological strengths and 
weaknesses associated with application of the Multiple 
Perspective concept. They additionally present some new 
insights and recommendations on its use which were the 
result of this inquiry. Hopefully, these insights will 
facilitate the continuing development of this potent 
methodological tool. 
Overall Methodological Considerations 
In general, conclusions regarding the use of the 
Multiple Perspective Concept fall into two distinct groups. 
Those lending themselves specifically to the use and appli-
cation of one of the perspectives, and those more appro-
priate to the overall investigative strategy. Since the 
latter, in a certain respect, provide the context for the 
former they are presented first. 
1. Each of the Indiyidual Perspectives Should be Developed 
as Completely as Possible. Though the emphasis of inves-
tigation is upon multiple perspectives, T-, 0-, and P-per-
spectives each by themselves yield much useful information. 
Researchers employing the Multiple Perspective Concept 
should endeavor to develop insights from each of the indi-
vidual perspectives as completely as possible. This not 
only provides more information, it more cleanly separates 
the viewpoints o~ paradigms cha~acte~izing each of the 
pe~spectives and makes the task of c~oss-cuing more 
straightforwa~d, if not simple~. 
2. Researche~s Should Strive for Investigatory Balance 
both Within and Between Perspectives. Even Though Results 
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may Prove Uneven. In this dissertation, an attempt was made 
to devote equal time and effort to exploring each of the 
perspectives. Moreover, within each perspective, an attempt 
was made to give significant areas or objects of exploration 
consistent and comparable treatment (e.g. all the models in 
BPA's forecasting system were diag~ammed and their inputs 
listed, all of the o~ganizations involved in public involve-
ment were examined along certain key attributes such as 
mission, history of interaction with BPA, etc.). This seems 
to warrant general recommendation as a methodology, with 
checklists, tables, and morphologies the principal tools. 
It must be recognized, however, that ~esults will very 
likely tend to be uneven. In this dissertation, the largest 
volume of relevant information came from the T-perspective 
investigation (due to the complexity of the modeling 
system). The o-perspective, by contrast, seemed to yield 
the largest variety of elements (i.e. diverse organizational 
interests) influencing the forecast process. 
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3. Care Should be Taken Not to Overcomcensate for 
Technical Training by Undervaluing T- Relative to 0- and 
P-Perspectives. If it is true that no one protests a 
zeligion moze strongly than one who has recently lost the 
faith, it is also true that few embrace a religion more 
zealously than new converts. For many trained predominantly 
in the investigatory paradigm of the T-perspective, 0 and P 
are an exciting source of enlightenment. It is thus 
tempting to neglect the T-perspective somewhat in favor of 
the challenge (and promise) of the organizational and 
personal perspectives. The T-perspective, however, should 
not be undervalued or otherwise given short shrift. In this 
dissertation, the numerous assumptions about the world built 
into the structures of the complex models used by BPA were 
among the most significant determinants of the forecast 
outcomes and constraints on the forecast process. While it 
is imperative to get beyond the perceptual constraints of 
the technical perspective, it is equally important to re-
spect this perspectives many strengths. 
4. "Audit Trails" and oigraph Representations are 
Important Elements of "validation" for Multiple Perspec-
tives. Multiple Perspectives involves the use of several 
distinct paradigms of inquiry to examine a common process or 
object of study. While statistical validation criteria 
usually associated with the T-perspective are not appro-
priate to 0 and P, it is nonetheless important that 
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explorations proceeding along these other lines of inquiry 
be explicitly documented and reproducible (e.g. corporate 
and judicial decisions are not validated, but the logic by 
which they were arrived at may often by reconstructed). 
Investigative reporters, lawyers, organizational analysts, 
and cultural anthropologists in the field are all required 
to provide evidence for their conclusions. An "audit trail" 
of documentation should accompany the results reported for 
each perspective and description should precede conclusions. 
At present a need exists for the development of validation 
procedures for insights derived from the application of 
multiple as opposed to individual perspectives. The digraph 
presented in the preceeding chapter constitute a useful 
procedure, but one which needs fuller development. 
5. Participant Observation is a Useful Technique in 
Organizational Situations. but to be Applied Fruitfully its 
strengths and Weaknesses must be Recognized. Experimental 
research is useful when looking at a few variables or 
phenomena in a different approach and multiple method-
ologies. To get a true picture, interviews and records 
should be supplemented by direct involvement with (and 
observation of) the processes under consideration. As a BPA 
employee, the author of this dissertation was, de facto, a 
participant observer in the forecast development process. 
The advantages of such an involvement are numerous and 
include more complete and direct access to relevant (an~ in 
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some cases obscure) data, a broader investigatory scope (due 
to a more realistic initial characterization of the research 
problem), and a more economical use of research time (since 
some relevant information will, almost literally, "fall into 
the investigator's lap"). Disadvantages, which must be 
adjusted for, flow from potential conflicts of interests. 
Job pressures may influence reporting, forcing the 
ftofficial" organizatio~al interpretation into research 
findings, or the parochial perceptions of one's organization 
(e.g. defensiveness or hostility to the critics of the 
forecast) and work may further taint what of necessity, is 
already imperfect objectivity. A useful way out of the 
latter dilemma is for the investigator to "role-play" with 
various O-perspectives, seeing his or her own organization 
through othets' eyes and acknowledging the legitimacy of 
these perspectives where appropriate. 
Specific Methodological Conclusions 
Listed below are conclusions derived from this research 
on the application of a single perspective (or ways of 
distinguishing one perspective from another). To the extent 
possible conclusions pertaining to a particular perspective 
have been grouped together. 
1. Wben Attempting to Describe Complex Systems or Models 
from the T-Perspective. it is Useful to Move Back and Forth 
Between a Broad and a Narrow Focus. Hodeling systems such 
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as the one used by BPA are characterized by a great deal of 
internal complexity. To render this complexity under-
standable, it is useful to first assume a broad, comprehen-
sive view of the system as a whole, but with little resolu-
tion or detail, and then "zoom in" on specific attributes of 
the component parts. In Chapter II, this procedure was 
followed and it served as a useful organizing principle for 
research (hopefully rendering the resulting product more 
readable). 
2. The Basic Concept of a System. Defined as a Collection 
of Elements and the Relations Between. Serves as a Guiding 
Erinciple for Completeness of T-Perspective Description. 
While moving from big picture to small picture provides the 
context for T-perspective description (and renders it 
comprehensible), another investigatory principle is needed 
to ensure descriptive completeness. In this study, the 
modeling system was treated as a system in the formal, 
rather than colloquial sense. This meant identifying all of 
the elements in the system (and in the process, establishing 
a boundary which at the same time determined what would be 
considered externalities) and mapping the specific infor-
mation or data flows (relations) between them. This 
required filling in gaps in the official documentation, but 
permitted a thorough input-output analysis Which, In and of 
itself, yielded numerous insights. 
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3. A Number of Technical Tools (such as Reachability 
Matrices. and Flow Diagrams) are Ayailable Which Can be 
Generally Applied to T-Perspective Analysis. While a vast 
number of technical and statistical procedures exist which 
could be applied to technical problems, most are appropriate 
only to specific classes of problems. A few seem both 
generally applicable and generally useful. These tech-
niques, such as the reachability matrix used in Chapter II, 
provide the means toward the end of laying out an explicit 
technical system. Even when routinely or reflexively 
applied, these techniqu~s are revealing (e.g. missing 
feedback loops, concatenated impacts). 
4. An Organization's Own Records are a Useful Starting 
Point for O-Perspective Investigation. As a public agency, 
BPA is required to keep, and make available, organizational 
records. Though many organizations do not face such re-
quirements they generally do maintain a number of records 
which provide a useful starting point (but rarely a 
finishing point) for O-perspective research. Organizational 
charts, staffing records, and "official" histories, by 
themselves, can provide significant insight into key 
organizational events. BPA additIonally keeps transcripts 
of many public hearings which become indespensable documents 
in reconstructing organizational history. 
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5. When Seeking Explanatory Factors for Organizational 
pecision-Making (or Decision-Supporting) Processes, Consider 
Loci of Organizational Char~ Though organizations 
normally change slowly (and often only under duress) change 
usually reflects altered priorities and perceptions. Even 
when these do not directly influence the phenomena or pro-
cesses being studied, they usually say something important 
about the general organizational climate. In this study, 
the relative growth of certain portions of BPA revealed a 
great deal about priorities and interorganizational politics 
(e.g. Conservation's growth from a Section to an Office). 
6. Though an Organization's Operating Procedures in Many 
iaYs Represent the Basic Unit of o-Perspectiye InquirY. it 
is Essential to Remember that these Procedures are Often In 
Flux. An organization's habits are embodied in its standard 
operating procedures. Organizations, however, are usually 
changing, sometimes (though not routinely) quite rapidly. 
Under these conditions, only some SOPs are useful deter-
minants of behavior. One must look at ad hoc procedures 
being developed (somewhat experimentally) and watch their 
crystalization into SOPs. In the case of the 1982 fore-
cast, most procedures were new and only in the infant stages 
of standardization. 
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7. In the Interorganizational Arena. Financial Investments 
are Good Indicators of Interests and Official Positions. 
Not everything an organization does is reducible to profit 
maximization. This is particularly the case among regulated 
industries such as electric utilities. Financial invest-
ments, however, do rank very high among organizations' 
concerns and these investments will be protected as fully as 
possible. As such, they provide a key (though not the only 
key) for understanding the basis of an organization's 
behavior. Investments in the WPPSS plants were among the 
most significant points of contention in BPA forecasting 
process. 
8. A Great Deal Can Be Learned About Organizations by 
Looking Into Mismatches Between Structure and Function. 
Formal organizational charts only reveal the "official" 
structure of that organization the hierarchy of offices 
and authority. This is rarely sufficient to describe organ-
izational behavior or process in any significant detail. 
Many organizational functions crosscut its structural 
divisions, as the production of BPA's forecast did, and are 
the subject of matrix management. These mismatches (not 
necessarily in the pejorative sense) of structure and 
function constitute yet another key to O-perspective 
investigation. 
9. In Examining organizations. Look Not Only to the 
Dominant Corporate Culture but Toward Different Corporate 
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Subcultures. Deal and Kennedy introduced the notion of 
corporate cultures to management literature, and it is 
useful to determine which category of corporate culture an 
organization falls into. Organizations are not homogeneous 
in character particularly during periods of change. Identi-
fying different subcultures allows the investigator a deeper 
look into corporate dynamics, while at the same time high-
lighting areas of contrast in both missions and procedures. 
Thus, though BPA as a whole strongly resembled a tradition-
al, hierarchical government bureaucracy, units such as Power 
Requirements displayed characteristics more like research 
"think tanks" with a premium on creative problem-solving, 
extensive group interaction, and technical general ism (as 
opposed to specialization). 
10. Media Accounts o£ Eyents Can Be Good Points of Depar-
tu,e for 0- and P-Perspective Research. In many cases, 
clear starting points (or "leads") for 0- and P-perspective 
research are difficult to locate. Issues of major signifi-
cance to the public tend to make the attention of the mass 
media, and reviewing library archives of newspapers and 
periodicals can raise issues worth pursuing (in fact, many 
organizations such as BPA make use of clipping services 
which collect and consolidate relevant articles). Newspaper 
columns are revealing both in terms of the "newsworthy" 
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items they identify (their manifest content) and the 
issues or interests they represent (their latent content). 
Such written accounts, however, must be points of departure 
for investigation to be fortified, whenever possible, with 
other research, not prepackaged conclusions. 
11. In Separating 0- and P-Perspectiyes, It is Useful to 
Distinguish Persons from the Roles They Play or the Offices 
They Hold. Because they both consider the actions of 
people, the 0- and P-perspectives are easily blurred 
together. The essential difference is not, however, their 
subject matter but the way they approach it (or their point 
of view). The O-perspective is concerned with the actions 
of groups of individuals or the codifications of those 
actions (i.e. operating procedures). The P-perspective, by 
contrast, focuses upon individual uniqueness or idiosyncracy 
background, style, ~r personal worldview. When looking 
at the actions of an individual, the question then becomes 
one of determining the extent to which those actions were 
the routine response of an office holder or behaviors only 
someone with a particular background could perform. When 
one delves into the explanatory factors accounting for the 
individual's actions, one is in the arena of the P-perspec-
tive. 
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12. The Approach one Adopts to P-Perspectiye Research 
Depends Upon The Purpose of The Multiple Perspective study. 
The Multiple Perspective Concept is a tool which may be 
applied to a variety o£ complex decision areas having very 
different foci o£ interest. Technology assessments are 
prospective, looking towards possible impacts of proposed 
technological developments. By contrast, other studies, 
such as this one, are more retrospective in nature, attempt-
ing to explain (or account for) the chief determinants of 
complex processes or decisions which have already occurred. 
The P-perspective focuses upon unique actions or outlooks 
and depending upon the research application may be employed 
very differently. In retrospective studies, the researcher 
must try to determine which individuals did, in fact, influ-
ence an outcome. and attempt to illustrate how their unique 
outlooks served as determinants. In prospective studies, 
the question is on what sort of impacts might be expected 
from an action or technology, and a broader spectrum of 
viewpoints are sought from the types of individuals that 
might be affected. This more fully taps the explanatory 
power of the P-perspective but makes closure more difficult 
to achieve. 
13. Cross-cuing Should Seek to Map the Paradigmatic 
Elements of One Perspective into Those of Another. Because 
the three perspectives are used in Multiple Perspectives 
studies to look at the same subject matter from different 
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vantage points, it may become difficult to separate 
cross-cues from single perspective views. Earlier in this 
chapter, a basis for distinguishing cross-cues from conclu-
sions flowing from one of the perspectives in isolation was 
described: cross-cues must explicitly show how the concerns, 
or paradigmatic elements, of one perspective influences or 
give shape to the elements of another. Thus, to expand upon 
the example given earlier, if one discusses the technical 
product of a group as an organizational output (i.e. 
describing only the organizational concerns, operating 
procedures, and chain of command underlying its production, 
without a description of its contents) one is working from 
the a-perspective. Conversely, if one focuses upon the 
contents, but not the organizational infrastructure behind 
its development, one is working from the T-perspective. If, 
however, one describes how specific organizational proce-
dures and priorities affect specific technical choices, one 
is cross-cuing. 
14. A Yseful Tool for Organizing and Describing Cross-Cues 
in Retrospective Studies is a Simple Timeline. To be fully 
useful, cross-cuing should proceed by means of some method-
ology. Otherwise it is extremely difficult to even begin to 
feel that one has drawn out the significant conclusions in a 
study. At least for retrospective studies, a simple time-
line (or perhaps three parallel timelines) constitutes a 
useful organizing principle, not unlike a checklist. The 
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investigator may display the most significant elements of 
all three perspectives at once and consider causal or 
interactive relationships between them. This, like the use 
of digraphs, often reveals connections previously unseen or 
not considered. 
15. Cross-Cuing is an Extremely Useful Technique to Get 
Beyond Simplistic one-Dimensional Pictures (or Arguments). 
Each of the three perspectives filters and transforms the 
world through a different set of lenses and interpretive 
structures. Like one dimensional pictures of three-
dimen5ional objects, such interpretive fllters "flatten out" 
certain determinative factors or fill explanatory gaps to 
produce a coherent gestalt of sorts. While the Multiple 
Perspective Concept neither guarantees truth nor produces an 
exhaustive description of reality, it does reveal features 
of the world which would otherwise be obscured. Cross-
cuing can significantly unbias the findings of a single 
perspective. For instance, looking at the BPA forecast 
exclusively from the O-perspective tends to build the 
picture of a "turf battle", with special organizational 
interests being the "true" determinants of forecast out-
comes. When one couples T- and P-research to this tentative 
conclusion one discovers a more complex process of "negotia-
tion through substantive technical products", where the 
validity and substantive quality of forecast methods and 
conclusions exert a determinative (though not fully 
determinative) influence upon decisions and technical 
comments align sometimes weakly or strongly with organ-
izational interests. This depth of insight provides the 
basis for constructive planning where simple adversarial 
confrontation might otherwise prevail. 
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As this study has shown, the use of Multiple Perspec-
tives opens up dimensions of insight into complex decision 
areas which would otherwise remain opaque. In particular, 
the exercise of cross-cuing can significantly deepen the 
volume of useful knowledge about the object of research. 
Like many useful tools, the Multiple Perspective 
Concept will evolve or develop only as it is applied to many 
different situations, where its potentials can be expanded 
and its currently weak or limited aspects limitations 
improved upon. The subject of this dissertation, BPA's 
first independent forecast, provided a case study in which a 
variety of organizations, with almost as varied interests, 
interacted largely through technical products to arrive at a 
significant planning decision. As such, it provided an 
excellent case study for the application of Multiple 
Perspectives. The exercise uncovered a wide array of 
factors influencing the forecast outcome which more 
traditional approaches would have overlooked. Additionally, 
it suggested a methodology or rationale for cross-cuing 
which could be more generally applied to Multiple Perspec-
tive studies. 
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A number of issues surrounding the use of the MP 
Concept still remain to be explored. Host immediately 
recognizable are the need to develop firmer distinctions 
between 0- and P-perspectives in investigative contexts, the 
need to formalize methodologies for exploring the P-perspec-
tive, and the need to realize the promise held by digraphs 
as a technique of validation. These will undoubtedly be 
developed in future studies, strengthening further our 
abilities to bridge analysis and action. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
From the discussion in this chapter, it can be seen 
that Multiple Perspectives provides a useful and potent tool 
for understanding the many facets of complex decision-making 
processes. The usefulness of the HP Concept, however, 
extends beyond the sphere of essentially academic concerns 
and into the realm of the more pragmatic day-to-day 
considerations of organizations. This study provides a 
nua~er of insights about power forecasting which are of 
significance to both Bonneville and the electric utility 
industry in general, and it is appropriate to conclude this 
dissertation by summarily reiterating the findings most 
important to BPA. 
On the most superficial level of its application, 
Hultiple Perspectives serves a descriptive function. By 
defining the fundamental characteristics of the three 
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paradigms of inquiry, the MP Concept directs attention 
to~ard the technical, organizational, and personal dimen-
sions of decision areas in a more thorough and systematic 
fashion. The detailed descriptions of forecasting models 
(and the linkages bet~een them), organizational interests, 
and effects of different Administrators' policies presented 
in Chapters II, III, and IV of this dissertation consolidate 
most of the information about the development of BPA's 1982 
forecast. Having such a centralized source of information, 
in and of itself, is valuable to organizations like BPA in 
that it lessens the likelihood of decisions being made based 
upon fragmented or limited perceptions of ongoing organiza-
tional processes. 
More significantly, Multiple Perspectives can be used 
to provide deeper and more penetrating insights into the 
dynamics underlying decision processes, and, further, 
suggest directions for improving or strengthening these 
processes. The cross-cuing and digraph analysis exercises 
carried out in Chapter V revealed the major forces which 
shaped the forecast and, at the same time, uncovered 
11mi tations or "blind spots" in the process. Like many 
utilities developing long-range plans in the early 1980s, 
BPA sought to avoid the technical mistakes ~hich had led to 
overforecasting in the 1970s. Its forecasting system 
contained detailed end-use models which had been developed 
specifically for conservation policy testing purposes. Its 
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forecasting methodology reflected an increased recognition 
of load uncertainty and substituted a range of forecasts for 
the single point forecasts which had earlier been used for 
regional power planning. Its public involvement process 
allowed a peer review by other members of the utility 
industry and various interest groups. This process helped 
the agency define and better meet its planning objectives, 
and the interactions between key participants in this 
process, and the effects of their interactions, are illu-
minated using a digraph analysis of Multiple Perspectives. 
A~ or.ganization's objectives, however, are not 
necessarily identical to its needs, and it is here that 
Multiple Perspectives provides its most valuable insights. 
The environment which the utility industry finds itself in 
is potentially very volatile. Load growth is ultimately 
sensitive to a number of diverse factors -- political, 
technological, economic, and social -- which power producers 
need to account for in their planning. Range forecasts look 
at a wider spectrum of possibilities than point forecasts, 
but still represent a form of "best guess", ~ne which 
examines quantitatively, but not qualitatively, different 
states of key variables. While ranges may be useful to 
develop a core strategy for resource development, unless 
they are supplemented by a hedging strategy which identifies 
and explores the consequences of high impact/low probability 
events, they leave their users vulnerable to potentially 
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devastating surprises. In an uncertain environment, 
disaster avoidance should take precedence over optimization. 
The findings of this Multiple Perspectives case study 
of BPA's first forecast suggest a number of changes irl the 
forecasting and resource planning strategy commonly used in 
the electric utility industry. 
Given the potential for volatility of the factors 
influencing load growth, resource plans should maximize 
near-term flexibility and responsIveness. This entails 
employing a core strategy which emphasIzes the use of 
modular resources which can be developed (or rescheduled) 
quickly and preparing a supplemental hedging strategy in 
which responses to high impact events (irrespective of their 
assumed likelihood) are considered in advance of their 
occurrence. The objective is to plan for many options, not 
to predict which surprises will occur. 
In order to generate the diverse scenarios needed to 
prepare an adequate hedging strategy, models (or techniques) 
should be used which are simpler, faster, and less data-
intensive than the large end-use tools widely employed in 
the utility industry. These large models should be used 
only when the highly disaggregated products of their opera-
tion are truly needed. 
In scenario development, full use should be made of the 
diverse 0- and P-perspectives which can be tapped, both 
in-house and through a differently structured public in-
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volvement process. Internally, Multiple Perspectives may be 
used to improve the mix and balance of training possessed by 
the staff and to determine what types of skills will be 
needed in the future. In terms of public involvement, the 
MP Concept may be used to encourage a thoughtful exchange of 
diverse ideas and to avoid reducing technical dialog to the 
confrontation of political interests. Lawyers, business 
leaders, politicians, retired military leaders, and 
reporters all have insights into qualitative factors which 
could have sizeable impacts on load growth. These insights 
should be brought to bear at the front end of the forecast 
development process to ensure the exploration of an array of 
core assumptions (e.g. war in the Persian gulf, solar photo-
voltaic breakthroughs, nuclear plant meltdowns, an economic 
Depression, etc.) broad enough for disaster avoidance. 
Lastly, throughout the planning process, there should 
be a continuous movement back and forth between broad and 
narrow considerations to ensure not only that the process is 
providing correct answers but also posing the correct ques-
tions. Once a preliminary research or planning strategy is 
arrived at, it is all too easy to expend more and more 
effort perfecting or elaborating already complicated models 
or procedures instead of determining whether the correct 
issues have been identified and addressed correctly. 
The utility community is now generally unfamiliar with 
the Multiple Perspective Concept (the exception being the 
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Electric Power Research Institute's study prepared by 
Linstone, 1986). Adopting and using it will necessitate a 
change in perceptions and horizons. Though this is not 
always a comfortable process, the rewards it offers in 
dealing with major uncertainties far outweigh the small 
costs. 
POSTSCRIPT 1987 
Nearly five years have passed since BPA completed its 
1982 forecast, and it is instructive to review what has 
happened in the years following that pioneer effort. In 
retrospect, Peter Johnson's decision to delay completion of 
the two of the WPPSS plants appears to have been correct. 
Power sales in the region since 1982 have proven even lower 
than BPA's forecast predicted and had Johnson succumbed to 
pressure to continue construction on WNP 1 and 3, financing 
the projects would have proven untenable (bond ratings for 
the WPPSS plants declined even with full attention focused 
upon a single project). 
Within BPA, ad hoc procedures became routinized as the 
basic protocol for forecast development was repeated on an 
annual basis. As noted in the conclusions of this disser-
tation, the unresolved problems identified during the 
forecast review process effectively defined the research 
agenda for the organizational units involved in forecast 
reduction. By 1983, BPA had developed a midterm forecasting 
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model taIlored to ratemaking and a five-year time horizon. 
The model was simple in structure, developed as a regression 
on employment and temperature variables, and well suited to 
representing the affects of cyclical business activity. By 
1984, the long-term forecast modeling system had been sub-
stantially overnauled, though its basic methodological 
underpinnings remained unchanged. A Regional Economic Hodel 
(REM) was developed for BPA under contract by Wharton 
Associates. The REM displayed two strengths over the 
economic and demographic methods it replaced. First, it 
modeled interactive relationships between various elements 
of the regional economy formerly not considered (though, 
significantly, it still remained unlinked with the price and 
demand components of tho modeling system). Second, because 
the model was housed on BPA's computer system, and its 
computer code rewritten from FORTRAN to SAS by BPA staff, 
the model was much less of a black box than the DR! model 
had been. Though not fully transparent (i.e. it still 
required some national economic projections as inputs), its 
operations could be understood and evaluated. New end-use 
models were also developed under contract for the residen-
tial and commercial sectors. Similar in structure to those 
used in 1982, the new models were developed from regional, 
rather than national, data, provided fuller descriptions of 
energy-using technologies (though still sidestepping 
breakthrough and innovation): and possessed augmented 
conservation policy testing capabilities. 
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At the same time, the uses to which the long-range 
forecasting system was put expanded and diversified. 
Scenarios were run to test the consequences of different 
rate proposals, resource schedules, and OSI relocation 
decisions. The outputs of the sector-specific models were 
used to drive conservation supply curves. These curves, 
like generating resource supply curves, calculate how much 
conservation can be expected to be obtained at different 
levels of program expenditures. 
More recently, however, an awareness of many of the 
limitations of the large models being used for forecasting 
has emerged. Although the disaggregated structure of the 
end-use models is needed for estimating conservation 
programs (e.g. in the internally diverse commercial sector, 
consumption patterns and conservation potential differs 
significantly from one building type to another), it creates 
a number of problems. Specifically, operating the large 
modeling system is expensive, its detail is difficult to 
support by data, and slow turnaround severely limits the 
number of scenarios, or sensitivity runs, which can be 
conducted. In an attempt to remedy this situation, several 
departments within BPA have acquired models or computerized 
procedures which substitute for the large forecasting tools. 
To assess the impacts of proposed programs, the Office of 
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Conservation acquired a systems dynamics model, CPAM 
(Conservation Program Assessment Model), which simulates the 
key feat~Les of the entire modeling system (i.e. demands, 
prices, and resources) more quickly. The Decision Analysis 
Model (DAM) was developed for resource planning. Essential-
ly a Monte Carlo simulator, DAM begins with the growth 
rates of the high, medium, and low forecasts and runs a 
series of "games" in which load growth rates are randomly 
altered on a year-to-year basis. To an extent, this 
procedure addresses the previously unacknowledged problem of 
uneven patterns of change in load growth (i.e. trajectories 
are no longer smooth or linear), though it does not identify 
factors providing the impetus for change, nor have the 
erratic load growth paths it generates been reviewed or 
assessed by decision makers. Finally, a number of PC-based 
spreadsheet programs have been developed to perform specific 
types of sensitivity runs (e.g. effects of building stand-
ards or oil price changes). 
The perception of long-range load futures characterized 
by low rates of growth, though controversial in 1982, has 
become firmly entrenched in the minds of power planners 
(perhaps ~ firmly entrenched). Part of the reason for 
this entrenchment has been the forecasts produced by the 
Regional Council. Using a modeling system only marginally 
different from BPA's, slightly different assumptions, and 
four, rather than three, scenarios, the Council produced a 
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range of forecasted loads ~hich, not surprisingly, closely 
approximated BPA's. This agreement between agencies, at 
best a quality control check on a particular forecasting 
methodology, has been interpreted by many as a convincing 
validation of a particular view of the future, and much 
planning proceeds under this interpretation. 
Thus, while a number of improvements have taken place 
in the state-of-the-art of regional power forecasting since 
1982, some fundamental weaknesses still remain. Though the 
ranges used for resource planning are wide, their plausi-
bility has never been tested using scenarios representing a 
wide array of distinct environmental conditions. Resource 
planning has frequently proceeed using the forecast's 
subjective probabilities to compute expected values or 
measures of distribution suited to "hard" numbers. Efforts 
to improve the process of assigning probabilities have, to 
date focused upon developing quantitative methods for 
aggregating and combining the subjectively derived values 
rather than examining the assumptions underlying them. 
Perhaps most importantly, aside from a conceptual exercise 
performed by an Uncertainty Work Group (of which this author 
was a member), no serious consideration has been given to 
disaster-avoidance planning. Many of the core assumptions 
underlying BPA's annual long-term forecast have evaded 
explicit recognition, as have the consequences of alter-
native assumptions on load projections. still needed are a 
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spectrum of diverse scenarios incorporating qualitative 
insights, while challenging key assumptions, on the fore-
casting side. To date, BPA has done sensitivity analyses on 
select issue areas (e.g. DSI incentive rates, plant delays, 
etc.) but has not made an organized or systematic effort to 
look at high pact events. 
Among planners and decision makers in the power 
planning community, the perception of low demand growth now 
prevails. Decreasing electricity sales in the early 1980s, 
low BPA and Regional Council forecasts, and selected studies 
on the effects of rate hikes and DSI outmigration have been 
perceived as convincing arguments that most risk to be faced 
is downside risk (i.e. loads will, if anything, fall lower 
than forecasted, making it more difficult to sell available 
power and reduce the regional surplus). Risk on the upside 
(higher loads than expected) is generally thought to be 
adequately covered by as-yet-unfinished thermal resources 
(e.g. WNP 1 and 3), planned during a time of apparent 
impending shortages. As a result, BPA, faced with 
difficulties in making its u.s. Treasury repayments, has 
deemphasized further long-range forecasting and resource 
planning efforts. Instead, it has renewed its focus on 
marketing aimed to decrease the current surplus and embraced 
the newer concept of demand side management which seeks to 
reduce future load uncertainties by securing firm power 
contracts with its customers. This reorientation towards 
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near-term considerations is reflected in a reorganization 
which BPA is undertaking at the time of this writing which, 
almost ironically, recombines the forecasting, conservation, 
and resource functions which were separated and expanded 
prior to the 1982 forecast. 
Although this strategy may work for BPA, in the long 
run it contains a weakness which could prove dangerous. 
Like someone who foregoes insurance coverage, BFA could 
either find itself fortunate and operating without mishap or 
suddenly find itself confronting large changes in demand for 
which it is unprepared. When BPA, and the Council, moved 
away from point forecasts and towards range forecasts, they 
took regional power planning a step in the right direction 
and explored areas of uncertainty previously ignored. 
Unless additional steps are taken (perhaps in a slightly 
different direction), however, power planners will miss the 
opportunity to ensure the region's preparedness for 
potentially disastrous occurrences and develop flexible 
responses to the important challenges which likely await the 
utility industry. 
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